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Abstract 
A number of labour and social security reforms adopted by EU countries in the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis have been challenged before national Constitutional Courts, which have sought to resolve the 
conflict between fundamental labour rights and conflicting economic interests, through balancing 
exercises.  
The thesis investigates the legal reasoning developed by the Italian and Spanish Constitutional Courts 
in crucial post-crisis judgments. The study draws on neo-constitutional theories and starts from the 
assumption that fundamental labour rights, understood as rights aimed at protecting workers and their 
dignity either during their working life or after retirement, must be fully enforced, albeit can be subject 
to limitations in order to protect other rights and interests constitutionally guaranteed.  
In order to achieve this objective, the thesis focuses on the jurisprudential theories on balancing 
characteristic of the two judicial constitutional traditions addressed and designs an analytical framework 
that allows a comprehensive assessment of the units of analysis. Overall, the research has shed light 
over a number of issues, which have a general relevance as far as concerns the relationship between 
Constitutional Courts and fundamental labour rights. With regard to the specific cases investigated, the 
study suggests that both Courts tend to supervise the balancing conducted by the legislator, rather than 
to balance actively the conflicting constitutional interests. However, the techniques applied substantially 
diverge. The analysis shows that while the Spanish Judge has failed to both apply the proportionality 
test and guarantee a full enforcement of fundamental labour rights, the unstructured and dialectic 
technique traditionally used by the Italian Court has been – more – functional to this aim. On the other 
hand, in both cases, despite the significant differences, the Courts have uphold the limitations to the 
scope of fundamental labour rights, imposed by post-crisis policies.  
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Introduction: from the EU crisis to constitutional balancing 
 
Balancing between conflicting rights and interests has long been the subject of authoritative 
academic debates, under various perspectives1. For introductory purposes, balancing can be defined as 
a method used by either the legislator or the Courts (both ordinary and constitutional) to regulate or 
decide cases in which the enforcement of one right or interest comes into conflict with another right or 
interest. In what is called the constitutional balancing, the conflicting rights and interests find explicit 
recognition in the Constitution and their scope cannot be compressed to the point of making them void. 
The 2008 crisis2 and the European legislators’ reactions have newly drew attention to the delicate 
equilibrium between conflicting interests and rights in pluralist legal systems. In order to tackle the 
effects of the recent crisis, the EU Institutions have decided to follow the austerity way3. The austerity 
policies adopted by the EU have imposed a number of reforms in certain Member States, inter alia, 
labour and social security reforms, which have put social and labour rights under serious pressure. 
Indeed, even though the flexibilisation of the labour market is not a novelty of our decade, the tendency 
towards increasing deregulation of the labour market was reinforced after 2008, when the bubble burst 
and the financial, sovereign-debt and economic crisis seriously hit a number European countries. The 
way in which EU institutions have reacted to the crisis and attempted to foster a recovery is highly 
controversial. As a general consequence, a number of labour law reforms, adopted by several euro area 
countries with the purported aim of overcoming the Eurozone crisis, have had a negative impact on 
workers and trade unions’ rights4. Indeed, the already unstable labour law has been further impaired. In 
                                                            
1 Among the legal theorists firmly supporting balancing as the most appropriate way to develop constitutional 
judgments, see Alexy 2003. In contrast, authoritative scholars, such as Dworkin and Habermas reject the balancing 
approach, for an introduction cf. Habermas 1996 and Dworkin 1977.  
2 What is generally referred to as “the latest economic crisis” is the result of a bubble burst in United States in 
2007, with the collapse of the subprime loans and the subsequent Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (September 2008). 
These events rapidly hit financial markets worldwide, including EU countries, and, consequently, the real 
economy, too. For a comprehensive review of the 2008 crisis, see Shambaugh 2012. 
3 Chieco, 2015, 360, underlines how this policy option is far from being innovative. The austerity-opponents 
include the noble prize Joseph Stiglitz, who has advocated, several times, against the theory that public financial 
constraints represent a way to foster the economic development, see, amongst others, a 2014 article titled Europe’s 
Austerity Distaster, available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-austerity-disaster. Tridico, 2013, on the 
basis of empirical analysis, argues that countries with a less flexible labour market are those that have performed 
relatively better during the economic crisis. 
4 Clauwaert, Schömann 2012; Bruun et al. 2014; a latest comprehensive review in Vigneau 2018. Overall, it is 
often highlighted that European responses to the Eurozone crisis have threatened fundamental social rights and, 
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short, since 2009, we have witnessed a deepening in the labour law crisis, within, and causally linked 
with, the economic and financial crisis.  
The impact of post-crisis measures on workers’ rights has been widely observed and discussed. It is 
often highlighted that European responses to the Eurozone crisis have threatened fundamental social 
rights as well as institutional balances5, raising also constitutional issues within Member States6. 
Fundamental changes in working time regulation, an increase in atypical employment, consistent 
reforms of rules on redundancy and alteration of the industrial relations structures and processes, which 
have affected social dialogue and collective bargaining, were observed7.  
Baranard describes the EU crisis as divided in “three overlapping phases”. In 2008, mainly because 
of a housing bubble and a credit boom, the financial crisis exploded and it seriously destabilized the 
banking system in EU countries. In 2010, the sovereign-debt crisis followed, because a number of EU 
Member States had to face large deficits, partly due to the necessity to bailing-out banks, as well as 
consistent debts. In order to deal with the most delicate national situations, the EU Institutions 
encouraged the replacement of democratically elected Governments with technical Governments, as it 
was the case in Italy and Greece (2011). Here it comes what the author calls the crisis of democracy8. 
In order to respond to the financial and sovereign debt crises’ effects, the EU has focused on 
improving the economic governance and fostering the adoption of certain shared rules, which mainly 
focus on the containment of public deficit. In 2010, the first move to stabilize the economic situation of 
its area was the establishment of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), by Council 
Regulation 407/2010, on the grounds of the emergency provision under Art. 122.2, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This emergency funding program was administered by the 
                                                            
consequently, institutional balances, raising also constitutional issues within those Member States mostly affected 
by the crisis, like Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain, See Kilpatrick, De Witte 2014; Caruso, Fontana 2015, 
which collects a series of contributions on the relationship between the 2008 crisis and fundamental labour rights. 
5 Sciarra 2014; Giubboni 2016 provides a wide-ranging reflection on the impact of the crisis on the European 
integration process; see also Kilpatrick 2015, where the author investigates on the “interaction of constitutions, 
sovereign debt and social rights in Europe today”. 
6 Tuori, Tuori 2014. Already in 2007, Bin argued that “the decisions that impact on the enforcement of rights are 
taken elsewhere, in cold locations, external to the democratic circle and far from the social conflict”: Bin 2007, 56 
ff. 
7 Clauwaert, Schömann 2012; on Italy, Spain and Portugal, see the concise review by De Stefano 2013 and the 
critical analysis by Giubboni, Orlandini, 2018; Marshall 2014 talks about a proper shifting of responsibility from 
the financial crisis to labour. 
8 Barnard 2012, 127. 
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Council and the Commission, while the European Central Bank (ECB) retained a consulting role. In 
order for the funds to be released, or the loans to be disbursed the State had to comply with certain 
conditions. However, for financial capacity reasons the EFSM has played a minor role. Indeed, still in 
2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was set up. This fund, financed by the Eurozone 
members, was meant to tackle the sovereign debt crisis in a temporary way, while the EU Institution 
were designing and working on a permanent fund. On the grounds of the EFSF, the Commission, 
together with the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (a trio known as Troika), could 
negotiate with the beneficiary States Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), with the aim to release 
financial assistance upon compliance with terms and conditions set out therein. This procedure was 
applied to provide financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece, as well as for the initial 
recapitalisation of Spanish banks in 2012. Finally, the EFSF was replaced by the – permanent – 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which entered into force in September 20129, after Art. 136.3 
TFEU was amended in order to allow the EU Member States to establish a stability mechanism as such 
(however, it is noteworthy that the Treaty amendment entered into force only on 1 May 2013). The main 
objective of the TESM is to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area and the activation of 
financial assistance is connected to strict economic policy conditionality10.  
One of the preconditions for receiving financial support on the grounds of the European Stability 
Mechanism consists in having ratified and implemented Title III of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union, also known as Fiscal Compact (the 
TSCG is an intergovernmental Treaty signed on 2 March 2012). The Fiscal Compact, which 
supplements the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (first introduced in 1997), requires all of EU Member 
States to comply with the debt-level rules, that is with the principle of balanced budget, which entails 
that the general budget deficit cannot exceed 3.0% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Both Spain 
and Italy have decided to constitutionalize the deficit constraints, respectively in September 2011 and 
                                                            
9 On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted the Conclusions on the establishment of the ESM; while, the 
proper ESM Treaty was adopted on 2 March 2012. 
10 See, Tuori, Tuori 2014, 89 ff; Schoemann 2014, 11-24; specifically on the Troika see Fischer-Lescano 2014, 
55-81. 
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January 2012, even though the Treaty did not require the Member States to introduce the principle of 
balanced budget necessarily via Constitutional revision. 
In the meantime, in March 2011, the adoption of the Euro Plus Pact (EPP), from all seventeen euro 
zone members, was reinforcing the economic governance, by deepening fiscal coordination, with a view 
of complementing the Stability and Growth Pact. In particular, it has been concluded having in mind 
four main objectives: promoting competitiveness, which may include reviewing wage setting 
arrangements and fostering the decentralization of collective bargaining; supporting employment, by 
promoting, among others, flexicurity; assuring the sustainability of public finances, also by limiting 
early retirement schemes; reinforcing financial stability. Furthermore, the adoption of the six-pack in 
2011 and two-pack in 2013 has reiterated, within the EU legal framework, what provided for by the 
Fiscal Compact11. 
Already in 2009, both Italy and Spain had been the targets of Council Recommendations exhorting 
national authorities to bring to an end the situation of excessive government deficit12. Subsequently, in 
August 2011, the Italian and Spanish Prime Ministers received a letter from the ECB, where the 
European Bank was inviting the two Governments to proceed with reforms aimed at flexibilising the 
labour market and wage setting procedures, favouring the decentralization of collective bargaining, as 
well as cutting social expenditure and public-sector wages13. 
Overall, the European institutional responses, which led to amend the Lisbon Treaty, set up the 
European Stability Mechanism and sign the so-called Fiscal Compact, have also influenced national 
labour law, which “has undergone profound reforms marked by a blatant explosion of inequalities and 
insecurity for workers, in many cases heedless of fundamental social rights”14. In Italy, the “parallel 
                                                            
11 The 2011 Six-pack is composed by Regulation 1173/2011; Regulation 1174/2011; Regulation 1175/2011; 
Regulation 1176/2011; Regulation 1177/2011; Directive 85/2011. The 2013 Two-pack is composed by Regulation 
472/2013; Regulation 473/2013 applicable to the euro area countries. On the economic governance effects on 
national labour systems see Barnard 2012, 127-140, and Chieco 2015. 
12 Council Recommendation 15757/09, of 30 November 2009 to Italy with a view to bringing an end to the situation 
of an excessive government deficit; Council Recommendation 15764/09, of 30 November 2009 to Spain with a 
view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit. 
13 Tuori, Tuori 2014, 83. 
14 Bruun et al. 2014, 325; see also Kilpatrick, De Witte 2014. Similar conclusions are reached by Leschke 2012. 
More recently, Sciarra 2016. Tuori and Tuori suggest that the EU crisis management has confirmed “the 
fundamental imbalance between Treaty provisions on social and economic issues”: Tuori, Tuori, 2014, 233. For a 
critical reflection around prospects for social rights in the EU and Social Europe following the 2008 crisis, see the 
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legal system”, represented by the new tools and institutions of the European economic governance, has 
strongly influenced the labour reforms under both Monti (2012) and Renzi (2014-2015) Governments, 
which have attempted to shift the protection of workers from the contract to the market and have exposed 
the industrial relations model to a considerable pressure15. Likewise, in Spain, austerity measures have 
reduced welfare rights, led to a decentralization of collective bargaining and eased the termination of 
the employment relationship16. In the crisis context, legislators have often tried to justify threats to the 
rule of law and foundations of democracy under the state of emergency argument17. 
Some of the national norms implementing austerity policies and policies oriented towards the 
flexibilisation of the labour market have been challenged before national Constitutional Courts, which 
have sought to resolve the conflict between the fundamental labour rights tackled by the reforms and 
economic interests, through balancing exercises. Overall, the Courts have been blamed for having 
applied “judicial restraint and displayed far-going understanding of government defences invoking 
economic emergency”18.   
An assessment of the relevant Italian and Spanish constitutional case law can contribute to define the 
current status of the constitutional conflict of fundamental labour rights with other interests of an 
economic nature, in national legal systems strongly influenced by the EU policies in the aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis. The constitutional case law of the two southern European countries is well suited for 
inspiring a joint reflection, inasmuch as both Italy and Spain have adopted a centralized system of 
constitutional review – albeit with certain differences – and the respective Constitutions are rich in 
principles and programmatic norms that both the Parliament and the Constitutional Court have to 
                                                            
rich anthology edited by Countouris, Freedland 2013; Giubboni 2013; Garben et al. 2017; Kilpatrick 2018. While, 
Dorssemont 2014 adopts the social partners’ point of view in the EU legal framework. 
15 Chieco, 2015, addresses the reforms of 2012 and 2015, with a view of stressing the role of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to enforce labour rights. Guarriello, 2016, assesses the changes imposed to the collective 
bargaining system following the economic crisis. However, there is not absolute consent over the criticisms made 
to these reforms, for instance Caruso, 2016, points out that the opinions over JOBS Act are various and range from 
a total disappointment, to an optimistic attitude that sees in this reform the trigger for a new way of regulating 
employment relations. See also, Tega 2014a. 
16 González Pascual 2014; Rodríguez 2014; Gil y Gil 2015; Villalón 2016. A broader analysis of the EU impact 
on national labour law from a Spanish perspective is provided by Casas Baamonde 2014. 
17 Sciarra 2014. 
18 Tuori, Tuori 2014, 240. A remarkable exception is represented by the Portuguese Constitutional Court case law, 
appreciated for having been extremely defensive of the fundamental labour rights concerned, see Cisotta, Gallo 
2014; Butturini 2016. For a first and comprehensive analysis of the post-crisis constitutional case law, see the 
contributions published in Kilpatrick, De Witte 2014.    
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translate in directly applicable legal terms. Moreover, in the aftermath of 2008, the two countries have 
been subject to considerable pressure from EU institutions to implement austerity policies and liberalize 
the labour market.  
In Italy and Spain, the so-called post-crisis reforms have been adopted in a political (e.g. exchange 
of letters, recommendations by the EU institutions), economic (economic and financial crises) and legal 
(overuse of urgency legislation, constitutional reforms of the public budget constraints) context, which 
is increasingly calling into question the content and enforcement of constitutional workers’ rights.  
Nevertheless, the Spanish and Italian judicial cases are not parallel in normative terms. The Spanish 
judgments address individual and collective labour rights in private employment, while the Italian 
judgments released so far deal with rights concerning workers in public employment and pension rights. 
However, all of these post-crisis constitutional judgments on labour and social security reforms have 
addressed norms that have limited the scope of fundamental labour rights. For the purpose of this 
research, by labour rights is meant rights aimed at protecting workers and their dignity, either during 
their working life or after retirement. In the Spanish and Italian legal systems, these rights are 
fundamental inasmuch as they are recognised and protected at constitutional level, thus representing – 
a part of – the foundation of the respective societies. 
Notwithstanding the relevant similarities in both the 2008 crisis’ impact and the constitutional 
structure – in terms of fundamental social rights and centralized system of constitutional review – the 
assessment of the legal reasoning in the selected judgments is conducted under the assumption that we 
are not in a “global age of balancing”. The technique of balancing labour and social rights with other 
interests and rights, in order to decide upon the constitutionality of a norm, is a common feature of all 
Courts. However, the research is conducted bearing in mind that balancing can take different names and 
shapes depending on the Court and the legal tradition concerned.  
The thesis aims to contribute to understand the status of fundamental labour rights’ protection, after 
the 2008 crisis, at the latest (national) stage of adjudication, under the assumption that constitutional 
labour rights must be fully enforced, albeit can be subject to limitations in order to protect other rights 
8 
 
and interests constitutionally guaranteed19. Moreover, it intends to utilize the selected judgments to 
explore the relationship between fundamental labour rights and Constitutional Courts. In order to 
achieve these goals, a number of intermediate questions need to be addressed. Therefore, the thesis 
investigates upon the role of the Constitutional Courts as regards balancing conflicting rights and 
interests and under which arguments and techniques the different Courts have developed their legal 
reasoning, bearing in mind the national judicial peculiarities20. Moreover, it identifies which interests 
and rights have been – and can be – balanced against each other, also in light of the recent constitutional 
amendments and choices of political economy. In particular, the focus is on the economic crisis 
argument(s) and to what extent it may justify restrictions to fundamental labour rights.  
Although Italy and Spain present consistent similarities in their constitutional organization, as well 
as in the structure and functioning of the Constitutional Courts, the crucial differences do not allow a 
rigorous comparison of the case law21. What makes a parallel analysis of the Spanish and Italian cases 
noteworthy is the common necessity to balance constitutional and consolidated labour rights with other 
rights and interests, in the economic crisis context. Even though the rights and principles tackled and 
discussed by the Courts do not perfectly coincide, the judgments stimulate the same questions: to what 
extent and how fundamental labour rights can be limited by the legislator? That is, under what type of 
arguments and by applying which legal reasoning? And, what role has the Constitutional Court in this 
dynamic? 
                                                            
19 On the crucial role and value of constitutional social rights see, Ferrajoli 2001. 
20 In this sense, see the recent work by Bomhoff, 2013, who argues that also because of these substantial diversities 
it would be more appropriate to talk of a balancing discourse, rather than a balancing technique. 
21 Italy and Spain are characterised by the same system of centralized constitutional review of ordinary legislation, 
inspired by Hans Kelsen theories. Indeed, both the Italian and the Spanish systems adopted the Kelsenian model 
of constitutional review, which was originally implemented by the Austrian Constitution. This model provides for 
the establishment of a separate constitutional tribunal, which is the sole Court entitled to solve all disputes 
concerning the constitutionality of secondary legislation, in order to effectively grant the rigidity of the 
Constitution (for a review see Comella 2004). However, the Austrian model was not fully transplanted in those 
European legal systems, which adopted it at a later stage. Indeed, both the Italian and the Spanish Constitutions 
are rich in principles and programmatic norms and the Constituent Assemblies have given the role to translate in 
directly applicable legal terms principles and values enshrined in the Constitution to both the Parliament, entrusted 
with the legislative power, and the Constitutional Court, which is entitled to oversee the ordinary laws (Modugno 
1982). Moreover, the Italian and Spanish systems of Constitutional review present substantial differences, one for 
all, while the Italian system does not envisage a procedure that allows citizens to appeal directly before the 
Constitutional Court, the Spanish Court can receive the so called recurso de amparo (appeal for constitutional 
protection of fundamental rights) (for an introduction to recurso de amparo, see Arroyo Jiménez, Ortega Carballo 
2014). 
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Indeed, strict comparison is not the purpose of this work, which rather aims to use the two groups of 
judgments as bases to reflect upon the different ways in which a Constitutional Court, that grounds its 
decisions upon a long and written Constitution that provides for fundamental labour rights, can develop 
its legal arguments and guarantee the latter rights in relation to other interests constitutionally protected.  
Finally, the thesis wants to represent a step towards a paramount reconciliation between 
constitutional and labour law in light of the necessity to guarantee a full enforcement of fundamental 
labour rights, independently from the economic arguments and the ever-changing labour-market 
policies. 
Chapter 1 describes and discusses the most relevant labour law reforms approved in Italy and Spain, 
following the 2008 crisis. This chapter also reviews the academic literature that has addressed the 
relevant constitutional judgments, with a view to identify the literature gap and the arguments that have 
triggered the research questions that have guided the study reported in this thesis. In both Italy and Spain, 
labour rights have been affected by consistent reforms, approved in order to implement policies oriented 
towards the flexibilisation of the labour market and in compliance with austerity policies. Law 3/2012 
is the Spanish labour reform that have had the most significant impact on the labour relations system of 
the country. The comprehensive reform has been criticized for several reasons and various provisions 
enshrined therein have been challenged before the Spanish Constitutional Court, which has ruled on 
them in two crucial judgments: Judgment 119/2014 and Judgment 28/2015. The consistent Italian 
amendments that have followed the 2008 crisis have concerned both social security and individual and 
collective employment law. The reforms at issue, on the one hand, have had a significant impact on 
public employees’ wages and pensions; while, on the other hand, have fostered the flexibilization of the 
labour market at both entry and exit-level. The Italian case offers a rich case law, mostly dealing with 
provisions aimed at enforcing the balanced budget principle. Beyond any doubt, among the numerous 
issues that the Italian and Spanish judgments have raised we can find the balancing of labour rights with 
other constitutional principles and interests. Nevertheless, albeit some authors, mostly constitutional 
lawyers, have emphasised that the Courts have operated a balancing of interests and rights, an attentive 
and comprehensive analysis from a labour law perspective, that is bearing in mind the paramount 
application of fundamental labour rights, has not been conducted. On the other hand, those labour 
10 
 
lawyers who have approached the selected judgments have not considered the relevant constitutional 
categories. Overall, an attentive and systematic analysis of the balancing approach adopted by the two 
Courts and the effects on the fundamental labour rights concerned has not been conducted, yet.  
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of pluralist constitution and reviews the neo-constitutional theories 
that explain the relationship between fundamental rights and principles as a relationship between 
founding values that have been legally positivized. These principles and rights, which are expression of 
values, are absolute, in abstract terms, but they may enter into conflict in the legislative practice. In 
simple words, the implementation of a fundamental right may violate another – conflicting – 
constitutional right. This conflict, according to authoritative scholars, can only be solved through the 
balancing exercise. The extensive – and traditional – literature on balancing, mainly provided by legal 
philosophy scholars is addressed. However, the chapter mostly focuses on the Italian and Spanish 
literature, with the aim to capture the main theoretical arguments around the key features of the legal 
reasoning conducted by the respective Constitutional Courts and build a solid basis, well rooted in the 
national judicial traditions, for the analysis of the selected judgments. The analysis of the national 
(Italian and Spanish) academic literature on the various profiles of balancing has been paramount in 
order to grasp the content of this technique as applied by the different Courts. On the one hand, the 
Italian system strongly relies on the principle of reasonableness as developed by the Italian 
Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the Spanish Court has applied – more or less consistently – the 
proportionality test originally framed by the German constitutional tradition. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the various fundamental rights theories, with a focus on the Social State theory, which 
provides the lenses used in the assessment of the Constitutional judgements conducted in the following 
chapters. 
Chapters 3 analyses the Italian case law, while Chapter 4 the Spanish case law. The two chapters 
follow the same structure. Indeed, even though the dissertation does not attempt to compare the two 
cases in a rigorous way, given that the units of analysis are too complex for allowing a proper 
comparison, structuring the analysis by focusing on the same elements is functional to emphasis 
similarities and differences and develop a joint reflection. The focus of the analysis is on four main 
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elements: first, the role of the Court; second, the technique used; third, the constitutional interests subject 
to the balancing; fourth, the fundamental labour rights in the balance. 
The Italian judgments assessed in Chapter 3 can be divided into two clusters. Judgment 223/2012, 
Judgment 178/2015 and Judgment 124/2017 concern the reduction of public employees’ wages.  
Judgment 70/2015, Judgment 173/2016 and Judgment 250/2017 regard the reduction of the revaluation 
of retirement benefits22. In all of these cases, the Italian Court performs the role of the supervisor of the 
balancing conducted by the legislator. However, a considerable exception is represented by Judgment 
178/2015, where the Court actively balances the right to collective bargaining against the public 
financial interest, in light of the reformed Art. 81 Constitution, with a ruling of supervening 
unconstitutionality. The technique used by the Court to develop the legal reasoning is not homogenous 
in all of the judgments considered. Nevertheless, some common features can be observed. The Court 
strongly and consistently relies on the principle of reasonableness, which is understood as a hermeneutic 
principle to be applied jointly with the fundamental – labour – rights at issue, while the principle of 
proportionality is not applied as a self-standing principle, but rather to support the reasonableness 
criterion. The fundamental labour rights addressed in the six judgments assessed in this chapter are: the 
right to collective bargaining (Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution), extensively elaborated also on the grounds 
of international legal sources, and the right to an adequate pension (Art. 38.2 Italian Constitution), which 
is read, to some extent, in connection to the right to a fair remuneration (Art. 36.1 Italian Constitution). 
Furthermore, in some of the cases discussed, the principle of independence of the judiciary (Art. 104 
Italian Constitution) should be read as a fundamental labour right, especially as it represents the 
instrument to grant the right to a fair remuneration to a peculiar group of workers. 
The two Spanish judgments assessed in Chapter 4 are coherent under various points of view. In both 
cases, the Court recognises a wide margin of freedom to the legislator and stresses its extensive 
discretionarily. Consistently with its recent trend, the Spanish Constitutional Court refrains from 
scrutinizing the norms under a rigorous proportionality test. While in Judgment 119/2014 the 
proportionality test criteria are not even mentioned, in Judgment 8/2015, there is an attempt to include 
                                                            
22 In the finale phase of this thesis, the Italian Constitutional Court has published Judgment 194/2018, on a 
precise JOBS Act norm. See Annex to this thesis. 
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them in the legal reasoning. However, the rigour of the proportionality test, that should guarantee 
transparency and clarity, cannot be found in these legal reasoning, where the hermeneutic principles are 
mentioned without being systematically applied. The right to work (Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution) – 
which has a twofold role in these rulings – and the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 Spanish 
Constitution) are the fundamental labour rights violated by the contested norms, according to the 
applicants. However, none of the norms of Law 3/2012 scrutinized by the Spanish Court are found 
constitutionally illegitimate and the fundamental labour rights concerned are not properly valued. The 
Court argues that the provisions at issue are justified on the grounds of other constitutional norms, such 
as the freedom to conduct a business (Art. 38 Spanish Constitution) and, especially, the public 
authority’s duty to conduct a policy aimed at full employment (Art. 40 Spanish Constitution), which are 
winners of the confused balancing exercise at the detriment of fundamental labour rights. 
The concluding chapter develops a joint reflection about the Italian and Spanish constitutional case 
law on post-crisis measures that have affected fundamental labour rights. These final thoughts contribute 
to reason on the general relationship between Constitutional Courts and fundamental labour rights, 
insofar as they are partially applicable beyond the selected cases. In particular, the final section develops 
a comprehensive reappraisal of the most interesting elements emerged from this study, following the 
analytical approached developed. The two Courts have behaved towards post-crisis labour and social 
reforms in a remarkably different way, and, in addition, the effect on the fundamental labour rights 
concerned partially diverges. However, the two clusters of rulings present interesting points of 
convergence.  
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Chapter 1 
Post-crisis labour reforms and constitutional case law in Italy and Spain 
 
Introduction 
Both the Spanish and the Italian legal systems have been remarkably affected by the EU approach to 
the post-crisis management. Especially, in both countries, the labour and social law frameworks have 
been marked by significant reforms, approved in order to implement policies oriented towards the 
flexibilisation of the labour market and in compliance with austerity policies. So far, in Spain, the 
Constitutional Court has been called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of reforms that were aimed 
at liberalizing the labour market, while the Italian Constitutional Court, up to know, has rather assessed 
the legitimacy of measures adopted in order to reduce public spending and implement the principle of 
balanced budget, at the detriment of labour rights (broadly understood as rights that relate to workers, 
whether active or retired). Therefore, in both cases a Constitutional Court has had to evaluate the 
legitimacy of norms restricting the effective enforcement of social-labour rights. Among the numerous 
issues that the case law at stake has raised we can include the balancing of labour rights with other 
constitutional principles and interests. 
Albeit key differences exist, the similarities between the two cases allow to structure the sub-chapters 
in a parallel way. Both for Italy and Spain, a review of the main social and labour reforms, introduced 
by a brief reflection on the key aspects related to the 2008 economic crisis, is provided. Once the national 
legal framework is sketched, both sub-chapters present the relevant national post-crisis case law and 
discuss the respective literature. The Spanish case offers two judgments, each of them dealing with a 
number of significant labour market reforms. While the Italian case is multifaceted and characterized 
by various judgments, addressing measures tackling either retirement benefits, or public employees’ 
wages. 
In conclusion, a careful review of the extensive and reach literature that has addressed the post-crisis 
judgments in both countries reveals that it is worthwhile to assess further the balancing of conflicting 
interests and rights and the criteria used to conduct such balancing in the constitutional case law at stake, 
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in order to understand the impact that different judicial approaches can have on the enforcement of 
fundamental labour rights, in two legal systems characterized by substantial similarities in terms of 
constitutional labour rights and social state model. Moreover, the analysis of the scholarship raises 
further and broader issues that go beyond the specific cases and pertain to the protection of fundamental 
labour rights in a democratic legal system. In particular, the judgments addressed in this chapter, 
diametrically opposite under several profiles, are a stimulating subject of study in order to investigate 
upon the diverse approaches that the supreme judges can adopt with regard to the protection of 
fundamental labour rights. 
 
1. Post-crisis labour reforms in Spain and the relevant constitutional case law 
1.1 The 2008 crisis and labour law in Spain  
Spain is one of the European countries mostly hit by the 2008 economic and financial crisis. It is 
remarkable that in 2008 the unemployment rate was at 11.3% and in 2010 it had already raised up to 
19.9%. Equally striking, in 2011, the public debt was at 11%23. A number of elements have been 
considered the causes of the 21st century great recession24. However, what is of main interest for the 
purposes of this thesis is the impact that a fiscal and economic context as such has had, more or less 
directly, on labour rights. In 2011, an exchange of letters between the Spanish Prime Minister and 
President of the ECB demonstrates the clear intention of the Spanish Government to comply with the 
ECB requests and reform the legislation on the employment contract and on collective bargaining in 
order to increase the labour market flexibility. In the meantime, precisely on 27 September 2011, a 
Constitutional amendment has reformed Art. 135 Constitution, by introducing the principle of balanced 
budget has entered into force25. 
                                                            
23 Eurostat Public deficit, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=teina200&language=en; 
Eurostat unemployment rates, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Unemployment_rate_2004-2015_(%25)_new.png. On the worrying data on 
unemployment see, inter alia, Ojeda Gutiérrez 2012. 
24 See Rocha 2014, 175; as well as Clasen et al. 2012, 17-19. 
25 See, Ridaura Martínez 2012 and Morrone 2014, 2-3.  
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The critical situation that Spain was undergoing is emphasised by the fact that on July 2012, the 
Spanish Government signed with the so-called Troika the “Memorandum of Understanding on 
Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality” (MoU), which granted Financial Assistance for the 
Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions. On the national side, this agreement required Spain to respect 
and comply with, beside bank-specific and horizontal conditionality, the recommendations intended to 
tackle macroeconomic imbalances, which included the need to implement the structural reforms of the 
labour market, which had been already adopted.  
The most relevant reform of the labour market adopted by the Spanish Government in the aftermath 
of the crisis, in order to tackle the rising unemployment and with the aim of implementing the EU 
austerity policies, is Royal Decree Law (RDL) 3/2012 of February 10, converted into Law 3/2012 of 
July 6. The importance of this measure is proved by the extensive literature, which, since 2012, has 
addressed and discussed this wide reform and has highlighted, in most cases, its numerous 
shortcomings26. Therefore, the main focus of the following subchapters is Law 3/2012 and, especially, 
the most critical aspects addressed by the legal scholarship. However, the crisis dates back to 2008 and 
it would be a mistake to think that the Spanish legislature had not intervened at all on the labour market 
and industrial relations before 2012. For that reason, before going to discuss the literature on the latest 
reform, it is worthwhile to review briefly the structural reforms of the labour market and the measures 
aimed at containing public spending adopted in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, as part of the 
emergency legislation. In the last part of this sub-chapter, the academic literature assessing the two 
judgments of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of numerous norms of Law 3/2012 is 
critically reviewed, with the aim to identify what elements of the constitutional case law need to be 
assessed further. 
 
1.2 The first post-crisis labour legislation 
The first relevant post-crisis reform is RDL 8/2010, of May 20, by which the Spanish legislator has 
adopted urgent measures to reduce the public deficit. Inter alia, the reform provided for the suspension 
                                                            
26 For a comprehensive review and assessment of RDL 3/2012, see Aa. Vv. 2013. 
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of the revaluation of numerous kinds of pension benefits for 2011, the reduction of public employees’ 
wages for the whole 2010 and 2011 and the elimination of certain social security benefits. 
On the same year, RDL 13/2010, of 17 September, and in a similar way the subsequent RDL 8/2011, 
of July 1, introduced amendments on corporate tax rates to foster employment. Still with the aim to 
contain public deficit, RDL 20/2011, of 30 December, on budgetary, tax and financial matters, provided 
for a number of measures; for instance, the extension of the public employees’ salary reduction, as well 
as the extension of the daily working time for public employees.  
Among the legislative reforms preceding RDL 3/2012, Law 35/2010, which aimed at reforming the 
labour market as well as the industrial relations system in order to tackle rising unemployment, is the 
legislative act mostly commented by the scholarship, and also the one that has attracted the most intense 
criticism27. This reform has intervened to facilitate the conclusion of fixed-term contracts and the 
dismissals for organizational reasons and to foster the so-called companies’ internal flexibility, thus 
undermining the role of social partners and collective bargaining. The Law at stake had an identical 
content to RDL 10/2010, which was adopted without taking into due account the dialogue with social 
partners that, until then, had been a distinctive element of the legislation on industrial relations28. 
However, as highlighted by Ojeda, Law 35/2010 has failed to provide a comprehensive and consistent 
reform of the labour market and has resulted in a solely partial revision of the Spanish employment 
policies29.  
The collective actors were even more tackled by the subsequent Law 7/2011 on urgent measures to 
reform the collective bargaining system. Overall, Law 7/2011 aims at supporting company level 
negotiation and, therefore, at decentralizing the collective bargaining system as a whole. In particular, 
among its various provisions, the amendments on the legitimacy to conduct collective bargaining stands 
out30.    
                                                            
27 On the overall reaction of the Spanish labour law scholarship to RDL 3/2012 , see Baylos Grau 2012a. 
28 De Val Tena 2014, 438. 
29 Ojeda Gutiérrez 2012, 96. For an assessment of Law 35/2010 see Ortega, Manuel 2010; of the same view, Morón 
Prieto 2010.  
30 On Law 7/2011 and the decentralization wave see Alfonso Mellado 2012 and Cruz Villalón 2012b; for a 
comprehensive review of the reforms adopted between 2010 and 2011, even beyond those mentioned here, see the 
report for the European Economic and Social Committee by Baylos Grau, Trillo Párraga 2013; while Clauwaert, 
Schoemann 2012.  
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Furthermore, it is paramount to mention another legislative action that has followed the letter from 
the ECB President and that we can still classify as belonging to what we have broadly identified as the 
first reforming phase. In 2011, Art. 135 Spanish Constitution was amended to include stringent public 
budget constraints upon the State, the Public Administrations and the Autonomous Communities. Given 
that the norm is formally considered a technical constitutional norm, it does not require, to be amended, 
a public referendum, notwithstanding its potential, but consistent, consequences upon social security 
and public employment. The renovated text states that public bodies must remain within a structural 
deficit as established by the European Union (the reference is to the TFEU, which provides for a 
maximum of 3% of the GDP). Consequently, Public Administrations shall give “absolute priority” to 
the payment of the public debt (Art. 135.3 Spanish Constitution)31. 
 
1.3 Royal Decree Law 8/2012: an introduction 
The emergency legislation of 2010 and 2011 has not been as emphasised and discussed by the 
scholarship as Law 3/2012, nor their provisions have been the object of a resonant constitutional case 
law, as for the 2012 reform. Notwithstanding the sensitive aspects regulated by these reforms, in matters 
of public expenditures and labour market, and the already clear tendency to maintain that labour rights 
constitute an obstacle to the creation on employment32. 
As stressed by Baylos Grau, the most striking common feature of the labour reforms adopted in the 
aftermath of the crisis is the strong deconstitutionalizing effect they have had upon Spanish labour law. 
According to the author, the amendments adopted between 2010 and 2012 have strongly undermined 
the value and content of the fundamental rights enshrined in the “democratic Constitution”33, not only 
because of the content of the legislative measures, but also due to the process that has led to their 
adoption. From a comparative perspective, the author points out that the Spanish Government, 
differently from what has occurred in Greece and Portugal, has failed to consult the civil society and to 
                                                            
31 The reformed Art. 135 Spanish Constitution gave mandate to the ordinary law to develop further its content, the 
outcome was: Ley Orgánica de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y Sostenibilidad Financiera (Ley Orgánica 2/2012, 17 
April). For a critical assessment, see Aparicio Wilhelmi 2016. 
32 Valdés Dal-Ré 2013. 
33 Baylos Grau 2012a, 19, my translation. 
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involve the popular power. Indeed, the citizens had no chance to express their opinion in a regular 
election, over the policy line to be followed in the post-crisis management34. The scarce, not to say null, 
relevance given to the social partners in the process of approving all of the above mentioned labour 
reforms has often been underlined, as well35. Moreover, Law 3/2012 has been presented as complete 
and locked. Indeed, it does not envisage the possibility for collective bargaining to intervene in order to 
clarify or regulate any aspect, nor to derogate from the law, differently from what had occurred until 
then36. 
Again from a comparative perspective, although in different terms and with the aim to understand 
the reasons why the Spanish Government has failed to achieve its objectives with the 2010 and 2012 
labour reforms, Horwitz Myant compares the German case, where strong cooperation with the social 
partners preceded the labour legislation, with the Spanish one, where the new and crucial norms were 
imposed with a rigid top-down approach37.  
In Spain, the 2008 crisis has been managed avoiding any kind of confrontation with the civil society. 
On the other hand, the structural reforms demanded by the EU austerity policies were adopted under the 
emergency argument and, as often emphasised by labour law scholars, by means of urgent legislative 
procedures38. Casas Baamonde et al. discuss the main features of Royal Decree Law 3/2012, as listed 
by the Law itself, which is allegedly “extensive”, “complete and balanced”, “coherent” and 
“immediate”. In particular, the authors argue that the immediate character of the reform has nothing to 
do with the urgency requirement, which allows the adoption through Royal Decree Law. Indeed, they 
exclude that there was a case of “urgent and extraordinary necessity”, which would have justified, 
according to Art. 86.1 Spanish Constitution, the use of a legislative decree. The authors suggest not 
mistake the desire of the Government to apply immediately the law with the “extraordinary and urgent 
necessity” requirements provided for by the Constitution. According to Paragraph VII of the preamble, 
the extraordinary and urgent necessity, justifying the Decree Law, lies on the serious situation of the 
                                                            
34 Baylos Grau 2012a. 
35 Baylos Grau 2012a; Merino Segovia 2012a; Suarez Corujo 2015, 421. 
36 Cruz Villalón 2016; Palomeque Lopez , Alvarez de la Rosa 2014, 198. 
37 Horwitz, Myant 2012, 30. 
38 Baylos Grau 2012a; de Val Tena 2014, 438. 
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labour market, characterized by a high level of unemployment, and the need to comply with the requests 
of the EU to tackle the structural problems of the Spanish labour market, as to initiate the recovery of 
the Spanish economy39. However, the authors point out that, according to the Constitutional Judgment 
68/2007, Art. 86.1 Spanish Constitution must be understood in the sense that the situation shall meet the 
characters of exceptionality, seriousness, relevance and unpredictability, in order to justify the use of a 
reduced legislative process. The authors underline that given the constant need to adapt labour law to 
the changing economic context, if Art. 86.1 Spanish Constitution would be interpreted less strictly, every 
labour reform could be adopted circumventing the parliamentary legislative procedure. A scenario as 
such would mean a structural weakening of the constitutional division of powers40. 
Moreover, according to the preamble of Law 3/2012, the measure is “balanced”, inasmuch as it meets 
the needs of those who are seeking employment, those who are already employed and, finally, the 
employers. The primary objective, which lies behind the norm and is presented as the cornerstone of the 
balanced character of this reform, is flexsecurity. This alleged aim of Law 3/2012 has been addressed 
by the scholarship, which has unanimously supported that the 2012 reform is far from providing any 
kind of security to workers, mainly due to the consistent cut in public spending. To the contrary, 
flexibility has certainly been achieved, at least on the employer side, given both the reduction of trade 
union power triggered by the decentralization of collective bargaining and the so-called internal 
flexibility that allows the employer to adapt place of work, working time, as well as the employees’ 
remuneration according to the market’s needs41.  
It has been argued that the uniqueness and echo of Law 3/2012, compared with the previous reforms, 
is due to the remarkable increase in the employer’s power this measure has allowed and triggered42. 
                                                            
39 For a reflection over the manipulatory content of the preamble to Law 3/2012 see Urrutikoetxea Barrutia 2012. 
40 Casas Baamonde et al. 2012 and Rodríguez-Piñero y Bravo-Ferrer et al. 2013. See also García Murcia, 2015, 
286, who also questions the use of the Royal Decree Law under these circumstances, given the extensive scope of 
the reform, which affects numerous and generalized elements of the of labour relations. 
41 On this view Escudero Rodríguez 2013, 12; Baylos Grau, Trillo Párraga 2012, 6; Casas Baamonde et al. 2012; 
Vicente Palacio, 2012, 31, who discusses the neoliberal concept of “employability” with regard RDL 3/2012; Baz 
Rodríguez 2012. 
42 Vicente Palacio 2012; Valdés Dal-Ré, 2013, who reflects on the mismatch between the aims declared and the 
aims pursued; see also, Baylos Grau 2012b, in an essay eloquently titled “El sentido general de la reforma: la 
ruptura de los equilibrios organizativos y colectivos y la exalatcion del poder privado del empresario en la Ley 
3/2012”; similarly arguing that the reform has deeply affected the industrial relations’ equilibrium Palomeque 
López, Álvarez de la Rosa 2014, 199 ff; on the rise in the employer’s power see also Escudero Rodríguez 2013 
and Vicente Palacio 2012. 
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Furthermore, the fact that a number of norms adopted by Law 35/2010 have been reiterated in Law 
3/2012 – for instance the support to the company’s internal flexibility – places the latest at the forefront 
of the academic debate43.  
Law 3/2012 has had a transversal impact, that is on both collective and individual labour rights. 
Therefore, the following section reviews the main academic debates around the collective and individual 
labour law reforms of Law 3/2012.  
 
1.3.1 Collective labour law in RDL 3/2012 
In Spain, the autonomy of social partners in designing the national industrial relations system is 
limited and, traditionally, the law plays a key role. Therefore, the legislator has the possibility to promote 
and support collective negotiation, through legislative acts. However, the same legislator, who retains 
the power to modify the system, can also affect the power relationship equilibrium weakening workers’ 
organizations44. The scholarship is quite unanimous in arguing that the main amendments enshrined in 
Law 3/2012 have concerned collective bargaining45. Ojeda emphasizes the importance of the 2012 
reform of collective bargaining by labelling it a “conceptual revolution”, inasmuch as, for the first time 
in Spain, it has assigned more relevance at the company level by amending Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute 
(WS)46. 
A study from 2016 has highlighted that, unsurprisingly, since 2012, there has been an increase in the 
conclusion of collective agreements at firm level, especially for the years 2013 and 2014. This tendency 
has slowed down in 2015, maybe due to the number of trials, triggered by workers’ organisations, which 
have declared those company level agreements null47. Cruz Villalón, in an essay published in 2016, 
assesses the effects of the reform over the practice of the collective negotiation, going beyond a 
superficial evaluation, which would suggest that the general normative framework has remained 
                                                            
43 Gómez-Millán Herencia 2012 carries out an attentive analysis of both legislative measures and highlights the 
common elements; see also Valdés Dal-Ré 2013. 
44 For a review of the relationship between collective bargaining and law in Spain, see the handbook by Palomeque 
López, Álvarez de la Rosa 2014. 
45 Cruz Villalón 2016, 35-36; Valdés Dal-Ré 2013; Merino Segovia 2012a. 
46 Ojeda Avilés 2013, 1. 
47 Cruces Aguilera et al. 2016, 42. 
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substantially unaltered. Overall, the author argues that the weight of the reform has been extremely 
consistent. In short, “it has caused a loss in the centrality of collective bargaining, which has lost strength 
and capacity to manage and influence the evolution of the labour market”48. The qualitative changes in 
the contractual system have been decisive in overturning the power relationship between the negotiation 
parties, a condition that affects especially those workers employed in small and medium firms not 
organized49.  
Considering the norms that have remained unchanged, it may seem that the reform has not affected  
workers’ representation. In particular, the rules on the social partners’ legitimation have not been 
touched. Therefore, a strong presence of workers’ organisations during collective negotiations is 
granted. Moreover, the erga omnes effect of – estatutarios – collective agreements, which guarantees a 
wide coverage, has not been cancelled, the freedom to determine the collective bargaining sectors is still 
recognized and the extensive content of collective agreements, which allows them to cover a wide range 
of working terms and conditions has remained unaltered. The main amendments have concerned 
matters, which are only apparently ancillary, but in fact consists of “qualitative changes”50 in the 
collective bargaining system. The main legislative novelties can be summarized in, first, less room for 
collective agreements’ ultractividad, second, a more elastic – sort of –  descuelgue process in favour of 
the employer. Let us now see how these two elements have been regulated and what the main legal 
implications are. 
 
1.3.1.1 The limited ultractividad of collective agreements 
In the Spanish legal system, the collective agreement’s effect is automatically extended from year to 
year, unless one of the parties, at the end of the first year or during the extension year, expressly declares 
(denuncia) the agreement’s termination. With Law 3/2012 and the renovated Art. 86. 3 Workers’ Statute, 
one year after the termination of the agreement has passed51 and no other contract has been negotiated 
                                                            
48 Cruz Villalón 2016, 36, my translation; in a similar way, Valdés Dal-Ré, 2012, argues that the reforms of Articles 
82.3, 84.1 and 86.3 of the Workers’ Statute have changed the industrial relations system in a structural way. 
49 Alfonso Mellado, 2012, 66, defines RDL 3/2012 as a “deep attack to the right to collective bargaining”; of the 
same view Merino Segovia 2012a, 377-380. 
50 Cruz Villalón 2016, 37. 
51 One year is considered a short period by Cruz Villalón 2016. 
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or the arbitration process has not been initiated, the agreement expires, unless differently agreed upon. 
The article adds that, in a situation as such, the collective agreement of a more general level – if any – 
applies52. 
Alfonso Mellado highlights a series of legal problems arising from this provision. First, the norm 
does not seem to consider that there are collective agreements that provide for the automatic 
denunciation and others that allow the denunciation before the agreed termination. Second, the author 
emphasises that a hierarchically superior collective agreement does not always exist, and, even where it 
exists, it is not sure whether it is sufficient to regulate the employment relationship that has remained 
uncovered. Therefore, this measure triggers a decrease in the coverage rate of collective bargaining and, 
consequently, a legal vacuum. Third, the norm has not foreseen the possibility that, once a collective 
agreement is not any longer applicable, several collective agreements may be potentially applicable. 
Last, Law 3/2012 has a retroactive effect and it imposes the disapplication of collective agreements 
already denounced before the adoption of the reform, thus strongly weighting on the social partners’ 
autonomy53. 
Although the Tribunale Supremo has clarified that if the ultra-effect of a collective agreement has 
expired, its content remains applicable unless there is an applicable higher-level agreement, Villalon 
points out that trade unions face a constant threat and because of this norm they negotiate in a weaker 
position. In practice, while, previously, workers used to take advantage of the termination of a collective 
agreement to renegotiate a new one and increase their working standards, now it is normally the 
employers’ side to uphold the termination of the contract. Albeit there are no clear data, which allow 
assessing the changes in collective bargaining coverage, the new framework has surely tackled the 
continuity between collective agreements of the same level54.  
Other authors have pointed out that while in a context of economic crisis a norm that imposes the 
disapplication of an expired collective agreement may trigger the contractual renewal, in a future and – 
hopefully – less tense economic context the temporal limitation of the ultra-effect can cause a contractual 
                                                            
52 With RDL 7/2011m the legislator has attempted to give impulse to the negotiations, in order to overcome the 
negotiation-blocks, but, as ultima ratio, the ultractividad would have applied anyway. See Sepulveda Gomez 2013. 
53 Alfonso Mellado 2012, 70-71. 
54 Cruz Villalón 2012a, 39-40. 
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immobility at the lower bargaining level, with the consequent application of the higher-level collective 
agreements, generally providing for minimum standards55. 
 
1.3.1.2 The impact on the descuelgue56 procedure 
The descueluge, or legal opt-out, regime for estatuarios57 collective agreements, set out in article 
82.3 of the Workers’ Statute has been amended by Art. 14, Law 3/2012. It now establishes that if no 
agreement is reached between social partners at company level – that is trade unions or other types of 
workers’ representatives at company level and the employer – during the consultation period and the 
dispute is not solved in any other way, each of the parties can submit the dispute to a binding arbitration 
procedure before the National Consultative Commission on Collective Bargaining Agreements 
(Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos) or similar bodies of the autonomous 
communities (Comunidades Autónomas). The result of the arbitration is binding upon workers and 
employers, however, it may concern only the conditions listed at Art. 82 WS. Moreover, paragraph 1 of 
Art. 12, Law 3/2012, has amended Art. 41 WS, on the possibility to modify terms and conditions set by 
extraestatuarios collective agreements. What has been mainly criticised by the scholarship is the impact 
that norms as such can have over the autonomy of social partners and their contractual strength.   
As a result, terms and conditions of collective agreements with erga omnes effect can be partially 
disapplied according to Art. 82.3 WS, which envisages a specific procedure58, while collective 
agreements not regulated under Title III WS are subject to the procedures of Art. 41 WS, which allows 
the employer to modify, substantially and unilaterally, working conditions if economic, technical, 
organizational and productive reasons exist. The conditions that may be unilaterally modified under the 
procedure provided for by Art. 41 WS include working time and its distribution, shifts, remuneration, 
                                                            
55 Sepulveda Gomez 2013, 23; Merino Segovia 2012b, 260. 
56 A sort of “legal opt-out”. 
57 The Spanish industrial relations system envisages two types of collective agreements: the so-called estatutarios 
collective agreements are concluded within the framework of Title III Workers’ Statute, they are negotiated and 
concluded by the most representatives social partners and have erga omnes effect. Differently, the so-called 
extraestatutarios collective agreements are not covered by Title III WS and, therefore, they do not have generally 
binding effect in the relevant sector, but their content is fully binding for workers and employers who are members 
of the negotiating organizations. 
58 For a reflection over the arbitration process provided for by Art. 82.3 WS, see Navarro Nieto 2013 and Meilán 
Delgado 2016.  
24 
 
working system and productivity. It has been observed that, while for the process of descuelge (Art. 
82.3 WS) the terms and conditions that can be modified are strictly listed, as to the substantial changes 
(Art. 41.1 WS) the article provides for an open list, envisaging the possibility to impose modifications 
on other matters59.  
In brief, the reform has allowed the disapplication of terms and conditions agreed in sectoral 
collective agreements, and hence the unilateral lowering of labour standards, when economic, technical, 
organizational and productive causes occur. Again, the social partners’ role has been seriously hit. For 
the first time substantial changes, in pejus, do not need to be agreed by the parties and they are not the 
result of a compromise, but it is simply in the freedom and power of the employer to provide in this 
sense, while workers may exclusively take the judicial way to question the employer’s decision. The 
amended Art. 41 WS and Art. 82.3 WS introduce a clear exception to both the pacta sunt servanda 
principle and the binding effect of collective agreements of various nature that the Spanish Constitution 
recognizes and protects60. 
Overall, the purpose of the norm of giving more flexibility to companies to boost employment is 
criticised by the scholarship because it rather has the sole effect of wakening social partners’ power. As 
emphasised by Merino Segovia, Law 3/2012 with its decentralization prospects wanted collective 
bargaining to be a tool to adapt the working conditions to the concrete scenario and not an obstacle. The 
reform clearly aims to foster the decentralization of collective bargaining as a tool to boost internal 
flexibility (an objective already pursued by Law 7/2011), as proved by the renovated Art. 84.2 WS, 
which allows collective negotiation at company level to be initiated at any time, on various matters, 
even though the higher-level collective agreements are still effective and do not provide in that sense61. 
A purpose as such may be understood as a declaration of discredit towards collective bargaining, 
which would cause negative effects to the economic development, damaging, in particular, 
                                                            
59 See Cruz Villalón 2012a, 411; for a review of the crucial amendments of the mentioned articles see Sepulveda 
Gomez 2013. 
60 Sanguineti Raymond 2012, 226. 
61 Merino Segovia 2012a, 35-36; Herencia 2012, 115. For a detailed assessment of the amendments to Art. 84 
Workers’ Statute, also as regards the relationship between collective agreements at different levels, see Muñoz 
Ruíz 2015. 
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competitiveness62. Sever criticism is advanced by Alfonso Mellado, who lists a number of objectives, 
that, he believes, lie behind the reform. For instance, according to the author, the norms aim to modify 
the rules on structure and articulation of collective bargaining, in order to deprive the social partners of 
the power to build an appropriate structure. Moreover, he supports that the reform has a precise intention 
to boost the flexibility of industrial relations by increasing the possibility for the employer to disapply 
terms and conditions of the collective agreement (descuelge) and to create the conditions for the public 
administration to unilaterally refuse to apply the collective agreements63. 
 
1.3.2 Individual labour law in RDL 3/2012  
As to individual labour law, RDL 3/2012 has amended a number of relevant norms with regard to 
the initial phase of the employment relationship, its development and termination. Beyond any doubt, 
the individual labour law reform most extensively assessed and commented by the scholarship is the so-
called contrato de apoyo, which has been questioned before the Constitutional Court, thus raising further 
academic debates. However, before going to review the literature on this new type of contract, in order 
to have a clearer picture of the overall impact of Law 3/2012, it is worthwhile to briefly point out some 
of the reforms that have concerned individual labour law in the various phases mentioned above. At this 
stage of the normative review, it is unsurprising that all of them have aimed at increasing the internal 
flexibility and the decisional power of the employer. 
As far as concerns the individual employment relationship, Law 3/2012 has modified the 
apprenticeship framework, by moving the age limit, for being employed in apprenticeship, from 25 
years-old to 30 years-old; it has increased from two to three years the maximum length of this contract 
and it has left very limited possibilities of intervention to collective bargaining on the apprenticeship 
duration. Moreover, it has increased the effective working time of 10% and it has reformed the 
possibility to conclude several apprenticeship contracts between the same parties. Therefore, since 2012, 
the entrepreneur can sign a further contract of apprenticeship with the same person as long as it concerns 
different tasks. All that is coupled with consistent economic incentives to the companies to foster the 
                                                            
62 Cruz Villalón 2016. 37; Sepulveda Gomez 2013, 8. 
63 Alfonso Mellado 2012a, 66. 
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use of these types of contracts64. Moreover, the reform has opened to the possibility for part-time 
employees to make extraordinary working hours. Indeed, before 2012 workers employed with this 
contract could only make the so-called complementary hours that were previously agreed with the 
employer and were taxed as regular working time. Overtime is now accessible to part-time workers too 
and, although the fiscal regime is comparable to the normal working time, the employer is free to 
demand extra hours at any time, without previous agreement65. Furthermore, the reform has facilitated 
the use of temporary agency work and reduced the severance pay in given contexts66. 
Last, substantial amendments have concerned the termination phase of the employment contract, 
further shifting the power imbalance in favour of the employer. First, Law 3/2012 has reformed the 
procedure for collective redundancy. Second, it has amended the termination for objective causes, in 
particular the termination for unsuitability and for absenteeism. Third, the 2012 reform has deeply 
restructured the legal framework for disciplinary dismissal, by providing for a substantial reduction of 
the indemnity for unfair dismissal and the suppression of the so-called “express dismissal”67.  
In particular, as far as concerns collective redundancy the 2012 legislator has remarkably amended 
the normative framework at the detriment of workers, by suppressing the need for the administrative 
authorization, thus degrading the public authority role, by extending the economic reasons that may 
justify collective redundancies and by deleting the employer’s duty to justify the reasonableness of the 
collective dismissals68.  
Together with these, and other, substantial reforms of individual employment law, Law 3/2012 has 
introduced the highly criticised open-ended employment contract in support of entrepreneurs, known as 
contrato de apoyo al los emprendedores (CAE). This norm is considered the “star” provision of the 
reform69. In short, this new type of contract, which may be used by companies employing less than 50 
                                                            
64 For an assessment of the apprenticeship reform, see Garcia Blasco 2012. 
65 Moreno Vida, 2013, 34, who also discusses the reform on Telework. 
66 Vicente Palacio 2012; for a comprehensive review of the recent reforms see the handbook by Palomque Lopez 
Alvarez de la Rosa 2014. 
67 On the latest dismissal law reforms see, inter alia, Gil y Gil 2014 who stresses the neoliberal logic behind these 
norms and reflects upon the limits that the executive has to respect when reconciling economic freedoms with 
workers’ rights, before analysing the 2012 Law; Of a similar view Suarez Corujo 2015, 420; Vicente Palacio 2012, 
28 ff.  
68 Aparicio Tovar 2012 provides a comprehensive analysis of the amended legal framework for dismissal. 
69 Ironically so defined by Moreno Vida 2012, 194; the same expression is also used by Pérez Rey 2012. 
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workers and until the Spanish unemployment rate falls below 15%, consists in a new type of full-time 
contract that carries a trial period of one year, during which unjustified dismissal is allowed70. Under the 
CAE, if, once the trial period is over, the employer hires the worker, incentives are provided. The alleged 
goal is to foster employment, whilst the business initiative should grow71. Indeed, as pointed out by 
Moreno Vida, the measure is part of Chapter II on the promotion of long-term employment contracts 
and the creation of employment72. 
One of the key criticisms moved to the one-year probationary period relates to the compatibility of 
such a long duration with the whole Spanish legal framework, including the case law. In particular, the 
Tribunal Superior, in a crucial judgment from 12 November 2007, had stated that the length of the trial 
period has to reflect the rationale behind this legal institute that is to allow the entrepreneur to evaluate 
the worker’s attitudes and the suitability of that contract of employment. Moreover, in further rulings, 
the judges have pointed out the need for the trial period to be rational and compatible with its purpose 
and function73. 
Certain scholars argue that this measure, similarly to those concerning industrial relations, strongly 
upsets the balance of power between workers and the employer, in drastic favour of the employer, by 
loosening the protection for unjustified dismissal74.  Garcia Blasco also highlights that the legitimacy of 
a norm as such is even more questionable given that it does not leave any door open to the intervention 
of collective bargaining75.  In conclusion, it is argued, the risk is that the CAE results in a legal fraud, 
becoming a de facto and unjustified (a-causal) fixed-term employment contract, with ad nutum 
termination, which is in violation of Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution76. 
                                                            
70 Indeed, in the Spanish labour law framework, the trail period is regulated and the probationary period agreement 
(pacto del period de prueba) allows unjustified dismissal; the reasons for dismissal cannot be judicially questioned, 
unless there is a violation of fundamental rights, or the causes are alien to the object of trial period agreement. 
71 Article 4, Law 3/2012; for a clear legal assessment see Garcia Blasco 2012 and Pérez Rey 2012, who analyse in 
depth a number of element of the present contract, including the economic incentives. 
72 Moreno Vida 2012, 94. 
73 Garcia Blasco 2012, 15; Moreno Vida 2012, 199; Vicente Palacio 2012. 
74 Inter alia, Moreno Vida 2012; in a similar way Vicente Palacio 2012; Diaz Aznarte 2015 expressly argues that 
the contrato de apoyo favours only the employer (on the grounds of Valdés Dal-Ré conclusions). 
75 Garcia Blasco 2012, 15. 
76 Garcia Blasco 2012; Vicente Palacio 2012. On the effective conclusion of this type contract the first months 
after the reform was approved see Arévalo Quijada et al. 2012. While, Salcedo Beltrán, 2014, 144, observes that 
up to October 2014, 246.121 of contrato de apoyo had been concluded. See, also, 
http://www.eduardorojotorrecilla.es/2015/08/reforma-laboral-y-periodo-de-prueba-de.html.  
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A number of labour law scholars have analysed the new contract of employment from the perspective 
of international norms and standards, as well. In particular, Salcedo Beltrán and Hernández Bejarano 
discuss the conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), published on 23 May 
2012, with regard to the extension of the trial period from two months to one year, introduced by the 
Greek executive with Law 3899/2010, which, according to the authors, would be applicable to the 
Spanish case, too. The Committee concludes that one year constitutes an unreasonable and 
disproportionate length for a probationary period77. Salcedo Beltrán hoped for a clear declaration of 
violation of Art. 4.4 European Social Charter from the one-year probationary period, core element of 
the new contrato de apoyo. Indeed, before the Constitutional Court Judgments on the legitimacy of the 
one-year trail period, the courts of Barcelona (19 November 2013, No. 412/13), Tarragona (2 April 
2014, No. 179/14) and Matarò (29 April 2014, No. 144/14) had already ruled on this norm. All of the 
three courts have declared that a probationary period as the one at issue is excessive and unjustified. 
Interestingly, the tribunals have grounded their ruling upon the ECSR’s conclusions regarding the Greek 
– similar – case78. 
 
1.4 The crisis-case law in Spain: two crucial cases and their interpretation 
The Spanish Constitutional Court had two main occasions to discuss the merit of Law 3/2012 and 
evaluate its compliance with the Spanish Constitution: Judgment 119/2014 and Judgment 8/201579. On 
12 February 2014, the Constitutional Court had released Auto 43/2014, dismissing the appeal against a 
number of norms enshrined in Law 3/2012 as manifestly unfounded, with two dissenting opinions. This 
peculiar type of decision, which does not have the same value as a proper Constitutional Court’s 
judgment (rather, it is a sort of warrant), is not addressed here, as it is not relevant for the purpose of 
                                                            
77 Salcedo Beltrán 2014; Hernández Bejarano 2014; Garcia Blasco, 2012, 16, points out the risk that this norm 
may infringe upon ILO Convention No. 158.  
78 Salcedo Beltrán 2014, 68. In an article from 2015, Vallecillo Gámez, 2015, also emphasises the Conclusions 
XX-3 released by the ECSR on Spain in 2014, where the Spanish labour reform is found in breach of numerous 
articles of the European Social Charter. For a detailed study of the ILO norms with respect to Law 3/2012 see, 
inter alia, Lopéz Lopéz 2012; Aa. Vv. 2014. 
79 Other attempts, eventually dismissed, to challenge the constitutionality of Law 3/2012 were made, starting from 
October 2012, see Gómez Garrido 2015, 108-113.  
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this thesis, even though it is mentioned in Judgment 8/2015, as regards the measure on salario de 
tramitacion80. 
The two constitutional judgments addressed and the counter-arguments raised by Valdés Dal-Ré 
allow a joint assessment. Indeed, many authors have analysed and discussed the rulings together81. The 
second judgment (8/2015) is strongly in line with the first one (119/2014) and it refers to it extensively, 
reiterating core arguments, to the point that it has been considered an “extended confirmation” of 
Judgment 119/201482. Given the considerable similarities, also the literature is consistent and mostly 
critical on the same aspects.  
Overall, the authors have focused on the relevance of the economic crisis and unemployment as 
crucial arguments to justify the norms of Law 3/2012. Second, they have emphasised and criticised the 
high discretionality recognised to the legislator, which seems to undermine not only the role of 
constitutional labour rights and collective actors, but also that of the Spanish Constitutional Court itself. 
Third, the use in the Court’s legal reasoning of articles traditionally not pertaining at all to the 
interpretation of labour rights has been highlighted.  
An overview of the two judgments is necessary in order to comprehend the issues dealt with by the 
academic literature. Therefore, first, Judgment 119/2014 and 8/2015 are concisely presented. Second, 
the existing literature around the two rulings is discussed with the aim to identify which elements have 
not been addressed enough, yet.  
 
1.4.1 Judgment 119/2014 
In October 2012, the Parliament of Navarra appealed to the Constitutional Court to challenge the 
constitutionality of various articles of Law 3/2012, of 6 July, on urgent measures to reform the labour 
market, claiming the violation of a number of constitutional rights. 
In particular, the applicants argued that the contract of employment introduced by Art. 4.3 of Law 
3/2012, which provides for one-year probationary period, infringes upon the right to work, granted by 
                                                            
80 For an assessment of Auto 43/2014, see de Val Tena 2014. 
81 García Murcia 2015; Cruz Villalón 2015; Diaz Aznarte 2015; Fernández López 2015. 
82 See García Murcia 2015, 284. 
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Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution. Under their view, a norm as such, which does not foresee any possibility 
for the social partners to intervene, has the effect of undermining collective bargaining autonomy. 
Second, it creates a different regime for companies with less or more than 50 employees. Third, the 
possibility to dismiss the worker during the first year of employment, without indemnity and excluding 
the judicial review of the dismissal, infringes upon the right to equal treatment (Art. 14 Spanish 
Constitution), the right to work (Art. 35 Spanish Constitution) and the right to collective bargaining 
(Art. 37 Spanish Constitution). 
The Court ruled in favour of the constitutionality of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012. In particular, the norm is 
found in compliance with Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution. Most of the Spanish labour lawyers seem to 
agree on the fact that the Court has applied the principles of reasonableness and proportionality to decide 
over the violation of Art. 35 Spanish Constitution. First of all, the Court states that the norm, and hence 
the partial infringement of the right to work, is justified by the economic and employment context. 
Indeed, it is recognized that Art. 35 Spanish Constitution is affected by a significant restriction, but, 
first, the right to work is not absolute, second, Art. 4, Law 3/2012, represents a solution to the situation 
of sever economic and employment crisis. Therefore, the reform is justified by, first of all, reasons of 
employment policy, constitutionally protected under Art. 38 Spanish Constitution, that is the freedom 
to conduct a business and especially the mandate given to the public authorities to guarantee and protect 
its exercise and the defence of productivity. Second, the restriction to Art. 35 Spanish Constitution is 
justified by Art. 40.1 Spanish Constitution, according to which the public power has to conduct a policy 
of full employment.     
Furthermore, the norm is judged proportionate, since the sacrifice of the constitutional right to 
employment stability is compensated by individual and collective advantages deriving from the boost 
of employment. Moreover, according to the Court, the new type of contract provides for enough 
guarantees to the worker, which consist, for instance, in subjective limits, both on the side of the 
company and that of the worker, and the expectation to have a long-term contract at the end of the 
probationary period83.   
                                                            
83 Suarez Corujo 2015, 425. 
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As to the reasonableness of the norm, the Court begins by referring to ILO Convention No. 158. The 
norm is found in line with ILO Convention No. 158, which, in the interpretation of the Spanish Court, 
recognizes discretionality to the legislator as to the length of the probationary period. The latest – 
according to this interpretation of the international norm – must have a reasonable duration, which, 
exceptionally, can be “relatively long”, if this is justified by a low employment rate. The Court argues 
that, also in light of the discretionality left to the legislator, the one-year probationary period is 
reasonable, and therefore in compliance with ILO Convention No. 15884.   
Salcedo Beltrán highlights that no reference is made to the European Social Charter and the 
conclusions of the European Social Committee, which were relevant for the case at stake and were 
clearly arguing that the economic crisis cannot justify restrictions to social rights. Also with regard to 
international norms, Valdés Dal-Ré dissenting opinion differs consistently85.  
Last, the Court dismisses the unconstitutionality under Article 14 Spanish Constitution, given that 
the aim of the norm, which consists in giving time to the employer to understand the suitability of the 
job, justifies its indiscriminate application, under Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution, on the grounds of its 
non-absolute character and under Art. 24.1 Spanish Constitution, since the possibility to challenge 
unlawful acts has remained untouched. 
Secondly, the claimants challenged the compliance of Art. 14.1 of RDL 3/2012, with both the 
effectiveness of rights and the effective judicial protection (Art. 24.1 Spanish Constitution), the trade 
union freedom (Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution) and the binding effect of collective agreements (Art. 
37.1 Spanish Constitution), inasmuch as it reforms Art. 82.3 Workers’ Statute and introduces a binding 
arbitration, which assigns to the Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, and 
corresponding bodies, the authority to decide upon the disapplication of terms and conditions established 
in a collective agreement, following a unilateral request. In practice, it is argued by the applicants, this 
norm gives to the employer the power to unilaterally modify the working conditions established in a 
collective agreement if a further agreement is not reached.  
                                                            
84 As pointed out, inter alia, by Suarez Corujo 2015; Salcedo Beltrán 2014; García Murcia 2015, 301-303. 
85 Salcedo Beltrán 2014, 151, 157. 
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The constitutionality of Art. 14.1, Law 3/2012, and the amended Art. 82.3 Workers’ Statute, is based 
upon the argument that, albeit collective agreements in Spain have a binding effect, this does not mean 
that terms and conditions of collective agreements are “petrified” and, hence, cannot be modified, even 
if technical or productive fluctuations arise, under the conditions established by law. Although the 
measure enshrined in Art. 14.1, Law 3/2012, represents an exception to the binding character of 
collective agreements, it pursues a legitimate aim – internal flexibility – and it carries enough limits to 
its application – as the rigid list of terms that can be modified – to be considered protected under Art. 
35.1 Spanish Constitution, Art. 38 Spanish Constitution and Art. 40.1 Spanish Constitution and, 
therefore, justified. Moreover, the challenged norm is found in compliance with Art. 24.1 Spanish 
Constitution as well. 
Again the situation of serious economic crisis and the necessity for the entrepreneur of adapting terms 
and conditions of employment to the needs of its company has led the Court to put Art. 37.1 Spanish 
Constitution, thus the right to collective bargaining, in relation with Art. 38.1 and 40.1 Spanish 
Constitution and, eventually, the right to collective bargaining has lost the balancing.  
Last, according to the claimants, Art. 14.3, Law 3/2012, which amends Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute, 
and establishes the supremacy of company level agreements infringes upon both the trade union freedom 
(Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution) and the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution)86. 
As to this provision, which introduces the priority of company level agreements and amends Art. 84 
Workers’ Statute, the Court reiterates that in the Spanish legal system a “predetermined constitutional 
model of collective negotiation does not exist”87, nor the Constitution provides for a centralized or 
decentralized system of collective bargaining. Again, the Court stresses the legislator discretionality 
over the articulation of collective bargaining and its levels, as well as over the margin of intervention of 
collective actors. In this case, the power of determining the structure of collective bargaining confers 
and absolute supremacy to the law, over the social partners’ autonomy. In addition, according to the 
Court, the norm aims at fostering productivity and sustainability of the companies, which are objectives 
                                                            
86 The claimant also suggests that the norms at stake violate ILO Convention No. 158 and No. 98. For a reflection 
over the measures challenged before the Constitutional Court in the case at stake, see Senra Biedma 2014.  
87 As pointed out by de Val Tena 2014, 462, my translation. 
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protected under Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution, Art. 38 Spanish Constitution and Art. 40.1 Spanish 
Constitution, and it does not hamper the social partners from negotiating at sectorial level88.   
 
 
1.4.2 Judgment 8/2015 
In October 2012, a number of national deputies from various political parties lodged a constitutional 
complaint against various norms enshrined in RDL 3/2012, converted into Law 3/2012, on urgent 
measures to reform the labour market. Eventually, in Judgment 8/2015, the Court concluded, once again, 
for the constitutional legitimacy of the provisions challenged. 
As anticipated, this latest ruling is strictly connected to Judgment 119/2014, not only for the overall 
conclusions which are alike, but also because the norms challenged by the plaintiffs partially correspond 
and the Constitutional Court extensively refers to its ruling from 2014.  
As to the norms already discussed in Judgment 119/2014, on Art 4.3, Law 3/2012 (one-year 
probationary period in the CAE), the Court reiterates the arguments of its previous Judgment, thus, in 
brief, it stresses that the norm is justified, reasonable and proportionate, since it aims at supporting the 
creation of stable employment in a context of economic crisis. Therefore, it states that Articles 35.1, 
37.1, 24.1 Spanish Constitution (which infringement is not claimed in Judgment 119/2014) and Art. 14 
Spanish Constitution are not violated. 
In Judgment 8/2015, the Court establishes a close link between the new type of contract and the novel 
– and justified – approach towards collective bargaining, which restricts collective autonomy. In 
particular, it argues that the legislator’s purpose to avoid that autonomous collective actors may hamper 
the achievement of the aim of the norm, that is boosting employment, is fully legitimate89. 
Issues are raised again also in relation to Art. 14.1, which amends Art. 82.3 Workers’ Statute and 
confers to a specific Commission the power to grant the disapplication of working conditions established 
in a collective agreement. Mostly, the questions were already discussed and solved by Judgment 
                                                            
88 For an attentive review of Judgment 119/2014 see, inter alia, de Val Tena and Senra Biedma 2014; in a similar 
way Suarez Corujo 2015, 434. 
89 Para. 3, also emphasised by Fernández López 2015, 262. 
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119/2014. However, in its second judgment the Court adds that the norm is reasonable and proportionate, 
since the Commission has only a residual role and “it does not substitute collective bargaining or the 
exercise of trade union freedom”. Moreover, its decision is subject to “causal, material and temporal 
restrictions”90. Finally, the challenge of unconstitutionality concerning Articles 37.1, 28.1 35.1, 40.1, 
38, 24.1 Spanish Constitution was newly rejected. 
Also Art. 14.3, which prioritizes collective negotiation at company level, was newly challenged in 
October 2014, for breaching Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution, that is the binding effect of collective 
agreements, and the freedom of association protected by Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution. Apparently, the 
new issues raised by the claimants on this norm were not persuasive enough to induce the Court to rule 
for the unconstitutionality of the reform of Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute. Indeed, in order to strengthen its 
point, the Court puts forward more arguments on the legitimate aim of the reform and it stresses that no 
restriction to negotiate for any trade union has been imposed. However, on this issue, the Court had 
elaborated more extensive arguments in Judgment 119/2014. 
Six norms of Law 3/2012 and the overall structural reform of the Spanish labour law system were 
exclusively object of the second constitutional complaint.  
The first new claim relates to the general effect of Law 3/2012. The applicants support that the new 
legal framework provided for by the reform at issue implies a deep transformation of the Spanish Labour 
Law system, in contrast with the social and democratic state and the Constitutional values and principles. 
It is stressed that the Constitution does not empower the legislator with such an extensive discretionality, 
to the point of allowing amendments in contrast with the constitutional model of labour relations. 
The Court addresses the claims on the disrespect of the constitutional labour framework as a whole 
by elaborating an argumentation that seems to be aimed at constructing the legal basis for the further 
points in law concerning the single norms91. The Court clearly sets the supremacy of the law over social 
partners as to the regulation of various “aspects” of collective bargaining. Indeed, it reiterates, also with 
regard to the one-year probationary period, that the legislator has a wide margin of discretion as to the 
structure, content and limits of collective negotiation. This statement must be read together with the 
                                                            
90 As underlined by Gómez Garrido 2015, 116, my translation. 
91 García Murcia 2015, 287. 
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assumption that the Spanish Constitution does not provide for a rigid model of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining, nor it has provided for a trade union monopoly over collective rights and their 
application. To the contrary, in this respect it has left a wide margin of appreciation to the legislator. In 
conclusion, it is up to the legislator to regulate the industrial relations system, within the constitutional 
limits92.   
The claimants challenge the constitutionality of Art. 12.1 Law 3/2012, which amends Art. 41 
Workers’ Statute, paragraphs 4 and 5, and allows the employer to impose unilateral changes to working 
terms and conditions established in extraestatutarios collective agreements, on the grounds of Art. 37.1 
Spanish Constitution, Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution, Art. 24.1 Spanish Constitution. This norm, 
according to the claimants, violates the constitutional provisions even more seriously than the reform 
providing for a “compulsory arbitration” (Art. 14.1, Law 3/2012), since, in this case, the unilateral power 
of the employer does not have any boundary. The claimants underline that every party to a collective 
agreement is bound by the pacta sunt servanda principle, which is guaranteed by Art. 37 – and indirectly 
by Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution – and cannot be at the mercy of the legislator. Furthermore, it is 
observed that, in practice, the extensiveness of the reasons justifying such modifications makes the 
unilateral amendments always possible. Consequently, the broad liberty granted to the employer does 
not guarantee the effective judicial protection, either (Art. 24.1 Spanish Constitution). 
The Court admits that the mechanism introduced by Art. 12.1, Law 3/2012, affects the content of 
collective agreements, but it justifies this interference by first arguing that a system as such is not new 
to the Spanish legal system and the purposes of the norm are in compliance with the right to work (Art. 
35.1 Spanish Constitution), the full employment policy (Art. 40.1 Spanish Constitution) as well as the 
business freedom and defence of productivity (Art. 38 Spanish Constitution). Second, it – apparently – 
applies the test of constitutional proportionality, which is eventually passed by the norms. The Court 
expressly mentions the three criteria: suitability (idoneidad), necessity (necessidad) and proportionality 
in the strict sense (proprtionalidad en sentido estricto). However, the element emphasised to conclude 
                                                            
92 In particular, the choice of such a vague word as “aspects” is highly criticised and this argument, according to 
Fernández López, was unnecessary and even dangerous: Fernández López 2015, 262; of a way less critical view 
see Gómez Garrido 2015, 114; for a deep reflection of the Court’s legal reasoning in this respect, see García Murcia 
2015, 287-290. 
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that the reform is proportionate is the aim of the norm, i.e. to tackle unemployment. Also in this case, 
the challenge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of Art. 24.1 Spanish Constitution is dismissed. As 
emphasised by Wilfredo Sanguineti, the Court asserts that given that the exercise of the entrepreneur’s 
power is subject to conditions, it does not prejudice in an unnecessary way the constitutional rights. 
However, no assessment is done as to other alternative and less harmful measures, that may equally 
achieve the aim93. 
Art. 14.2, Law 3/2012, amending Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute, is deemed unconstitutional by the 
claimants on the grounds of Articles 37.1 and 28.1 Spanish Constitution. The norm, by referring to the 
third paragraph of Art. 14, establishes an absolute priority of company level agreements and the 
complete exclusion of social partners from any decision over the hierarchy of collective bargaining 
levels. This entails the possibility to disapply the sector level agreement at any time, also in favour of 
company agreements concluded by workers’ representatives not belonging to any union, as well as the 
ineffectiveness of the agreements reached by the social partners on the collective bargaining structure. 
According to the claimants the violation of Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution and Art. 28.1 Spanish 
Constitution is plain, given the exorbitant intervention by the legislator and the lack of objectivity, 
proportionality and necessity, inasmuch as in order to allow the establishment of terms and conditions 
of employment closely to the entrepreneurs’ needs a different, and less detrimental, norm could have 
been adopted. 
Given the substantial identity of effects between this norm and the subsequent paragraph already 
decided in the previous ruling, the Court reiterates its reasoning and the conclusions reached in Judgment 
119/2014. Moreover, it adds that the new claims do not constitute solid grounds for concluding in favour 
of the violation of Articles 37.1 and 28.1 Spanish Constitution. 
The claimants raise the unconstitutional legitimacy of the second paragraph of the final dispositions 
of Law 3/2012, which amends the 10th additional provision of the Workers’ Statute. Once again, it is 
argued that the norm violates Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution and Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution, since 
it substantially restricts the trade union autonomy in an unjustified and disproportionate way by 
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declaring null the collective agreement’s clause that provides for the termination of the employment 
contract once the retirement age is reached. The claimants also deny the existence of objective reasons 
of labour public order, which would justify this reform. Furthermore, the different treatment caused by 
the norm between public servants and the other workers violates Art. 14 Spanish Constitution and the 
right to equal treatment, as well as the right to access public employment (Articles 23.2. and 103.3 
Spanish Constitution). The Court is clear in reminding that the right to collective bargaining has a legal 
characterization, therefore nothing in the Constitution excludes the possibility for the law to establish 
what issues can be dealt with by collective agreements. Moreover, even though in its case law the Court 
had recognized the legitimacy of an intervention as such from collective bargaining, it points out the 
different current context, due to the fact that the legislator has now changed its retirement policy, and it 
argues that it is legitimate not to allow the social partners to upset the new policy choices. In particular, 
this retirement policy, which is justified by both the right to work and the protection of the general 
interest94. 
Furthermore, two paragraphs of Article 18, Law 3/2012 were challenged. Art. 18.3, Law 3/2012, 
which reforms Art. 51 Workers’ Statute named “collective redundancy”, is considered disrespectful of 
the relevance of the causal element of dismissal and of the role of the judicial review. As a consequence, 
it is deemed in violation of the right to work (Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution) and the right to effective 
judicial protection (24.1 Spanish Constitution). In particular, the claimants contest the new definitions 
of economic, technical, organization and productive causes, and the emptying of their meaning, 
especially for the economic cause, and the suppression of the employer’s duty to prove the concurrence 
of causes and, hence, to justify the dismissal95. The Court bases its ruling on this norm upon a 
comparative evaluation of the definitions before and after the 2012 reform. In its opinion, Law 3/2012 
does not make significant changes to the definition of technical, organization and productive causes, 
while it does affect substantially the meaning of economic causes. However, the Court denies that the 
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norm has created an ad nutum and a-causal dismissal and, also, that the effective judicial protection is 
not guaranteed. Therefore, neither Art. 35.1, nor Art. 24.1 Spanish Constitution are infringed upon96.  
Art. 18.8, Law 3/2012, (and consequently Art. 23.1) amends Art. 56.2 WS and limits, in case of 
judicial declaration of illegitimate dismissal and reintegration of the worker, the payment of the salario 
de tramitacion, that is the amount of salary the worker would have received if he/she had not been 
dismissed. This provision, according to the claimants, violates both the right to work (Art. 35.1 Spanish 
Constitution) and the right to equal treatment (Art. 14 Spanish Constitution). In this case, the Court 
extensively refers to Auto 43/2014, which had previously dismissed the unconstitutionality of the 
provision under certain conditions. However, it adds that it is not the Court’s role to evaluate the choice 
made by the legislator and judge upon whether it is the more appropriate or the best possible option, but 
it only has to evaluate whether that choice respects the limits imposed by Art. 35 Spanish Constitution.   
Last, the claimants challenge the constitutional legitimacy of the 3rd additional disposition of Law 
3/2012, on the basis of Articles 14, 23 and 103.3 Spanish Constitution, in connection with Art. 35.1 
Spanish Constitution. The reasons attached to this claim are, first, the inconsistency with the objectives 
of the reform, that is to grant the internal flexibility, and, second, the indirect support to collective 
redundancy, which remains the only procedure for the Public Administration to operate staff reduction, 
inasmuch as the latest is excluded from the application of Art. 47 Workers’ Statute, and therefore from 
the possibility to reduce working hours and suspend employment contracts for economic, technical, 
organizational and productive reasons. The judges dismiss the claim of unconstitutionality on the 
grounds of violation of the principle of equal treatment, since different situations cannot be treated 
equally. In a similarly offhandedly way, the Court dismisses the unconstitutionality on grounds of 
Articles 23 and 103.3 Spanish Constitution.  
 
1.5 Two unexpected judgments: the economic crisis argument, the primacy of the Law and the 
redistribution of constitutional values  
                                                            
96 According to Gómez Garrido 2015, 121, the new definition of economic causes is “more objective and eliminates 
uncertainties […] in agreement with the constitutional principles and values”.  
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According to Wilfredo Sanguineti, the economic crisis has been a crucial trigger of the change in the 
constitutional case law approach: Judgment 119/2014 and Judgment 8/2015 are a clear evidence of this 
tendency, as well as Auto 43/201497. In a similar way, Baylos Grau points out that the economic crisis, 
and its consequences in terms of unemployment have been the core argument of this case law98. Salcedo 
Beltrán observes that the arguments used by the Court to uphold the contrato de apoyo are irrespectful 
of the basic social rights and inconsistent with the labour law system. The most part of these arguments, 
indeed, suggest that an economic crisis is enough to adopt whatever measure independently of the labour 
rights constitutionally protected, which are not “rights” in the strict sense anymore, but just prerogatives 
subject to the will of the legislator and the economic context99.  
This repeated use of the economic crisis as a key argument is in stark contrast to the ESCR, which 
has sharply rejected the economic crisis argument to justify the lowering of labour standards100. 
Moreover, it has been underlined, the labour market problems that Spain is facing are not due to the 
labour law system – as it was before the latest reforms – but to the Spanish productive system, which 
means that the axiom rigid labour rights entail unemployment does not hold true101. 
In particular, it has been observed that Art. 38 Spanish Constitution, which protects productivity, is 
nothing but a “rhetoric cover”, since the business freedom does not create any valid ground to associate 
the creation of employment with the lessening of labour rights102. In Suarez Corujo’s view, the most 
worrying result of the Court's reasoning is the depletion of the meaning of the right to work and the right 
to collective bargaining protected under Articles 35 and 37 Spanish Constitution. Indeed, the author 
argues that the Court seems to establish as a cornerstone of the Spanish industrial relations system Art. 
38 Spanish Constitution, the freedom to conduct a business and the defence of productivity. Thus, clearly 
converting labour law in the law that protects the business interests103. 
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According to Judge Valdés Dal-Ré, such an extensive use of Art. 38 Spanish Constitution is 
inappropriate in a social and democratic state. Indeed, the effect is the creation of a new criterion to 
judge upon the constitutionality of a norm: the economic context, while the constitutional limits must 
be independent from the economic scenario104. For instance, as to the contarto de apoyo, given that Art. 
40.1 Spanish Constitution and Art. 38 Spanish Constitution prevail over Art. 35 Spanish Constitution, 
the entrepreneur’s interest in assessing the sustainability of the contract prevails over the right to work. 
An approach as such breaks with the past case law, which had declared the interest of the worker to keep 
its employment as a fundamental interest. While, as to the right to collective bargaining, it has been 
argued that the Court ignores “the virtual character of the right to collective bargaining, which, 
paradoxically, does not seem to be well assessed, except for a comparison made with a hyper-realistic 
Art. 38 Spanish Constitution, combined with Art. 40 Spanish Constitution”105. 
Considering the numerous shortcomings identified in the post-crisis case law, Wilfredo Sanguineti 
wonders whether the Constitutional Court is renouncing to its role of supreme warrantor of the 
Constitution and it is rather welcoming an understanding of fundamental rights, which considers them 
enforceable as long as they are not in conflict with the economic policy. The authoritative scholar also 
envisages the possibility that behind the choice to favour the employment unilateral power to the 
detriment of labour rights lies an ideological choice106. In a similar way, Baylos Grau argues that this 
case law puts into question both the idea that the Constitutional Court should be a warrantor of 
fundamental rights and the legitimacy of the Court itself, which vacillates because of an approach keen 
to legitimize any legal choice, even if affecting labour rights, because of the supremacy of the 
macroeconomic policy107. 
Garcia Murcia and Gómez Garrido offer a different view. The first author argues that an appropriate 
economic structure is necessary for the enjoyment of fundamental social rights and labour legislation 
cannot protect groups’ interests, but the general interest of the whole society. Therefore, according to 
the author, it is not surprising that the Constitutional Court has balanced labour rights against the 
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necessities of the “economic constitution”, that is against Art. 38 Spanish Constitution108. Gómez 
Garrido, after having pointed out the complexity of the issues dealt with and discussed the strategy of 
the claimants – defined “maximalista” and mostly based upon unfounded arguments and the 
misunderstanding of the constitutional model – upholds the conclusions of the Court and also the 
principles expressed therein, such as that the right to collective bargaining has a legal characterization109. 
Throughout its legal reasoning the Court stresses the discretionality of the legislator and its authority 
in, for instance, justifying the one-year duration of the probationary period on the ground of the 
entrepreneur interest in understanding also the economic sustainability of that employment contract. 
This approach has been widely criticised by Spanish labour lawyers, who have argued that the Court 
has simplistically recognized to the legislator an almost unlimited discretionality in regulating the 
content of the rights provided for by the constitutional norms, failing to provide any guideline to the 
legislator to define and enforce the essential content of any right. The judgment has resulted in a hymn 
to the law and its capacity to affect collective bargaining110. 
Also with regard to collective labour law, the primacy of fundamental rights does not seem to be the 
focus of the case law anymore, instead elements like the freedom of the legislator to rule upon and 
design the industrial relations are emphasised111. To the point that the Court comes to the conclusion 
that the law has an absolute priority over social partners autonomy to establish a framework for 
collective bargaining by distorting the meaning of Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution. According to 
Fernández López, the most affected right is beyond any doubt the right to collective bargaining and the 
collective autonomy, which, as highlighted by Valdés Dal-Ré, has been repeatedly and worrying 
labelled “rights with legal characterization”. Although the dissenting judge recognises that a closed 
model of labour relations does not exist, he points out that the legislator does not have absolute freedom 
as to its regulation, especially because Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution implies the promotion of collective 
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negotiation112. Among the serious breaches of this core collective right the judge identifies the absolute 
priority of the company level agreements, introduced with the amended Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute, 
since it deprives the social partners of the possibility to come to an agreement as to the structure of 
collective bargaining, as well as the amendment of Art. 41 WS, which undermines the binding effect of 
collective agreements, as recognised by Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution. 
 
1.5.1 Around the principle of proportionality and labour rights in the post-crisis constitutional 
case law: a marginal focus for labour lawyers 
A number of authors in assessing Judgment 119/2014 and discussing the most controversial 
elements, underline the explicit reference made by the Court to the application of proportionality and 
reasonableness, especially with regard to Art. 41 WS113. However, the way in which these criteria have 
been applied and justified has not been assessed in depth and the vast majority of studies only mention 
the two criteria, or the application of the proportionality test. A large part of the labour law literature 
published after the release of the second judgment, i.e. Judgment 8/2015, and, hence, mostly analysing 
the two rulings together, also undermines, although to a lesser extent, the misuse of the principle of 
proportionality by the Constitutional Court.  
For instance, Salcedo Beltrán observes that the Court makes use of the “always complex judgment 
of proportionality”, but she does not address at all the way in which this complex judgment has been 
applied and she only mentions the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, without questioning 
the consistency of the reasoning developed under these labels114. Also Fernández López does not adopt 
a critical perspective on these principles. The author only points out that the restriction of Art. 35 Spanish 
Constitution is justified, according to the Court, by the judgments of rationality and proportionality, 
almost as if she was suggesting that the application of such principles would inevitably lead to such a 
conclusion115. 
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Suarez Corujo, after having reviewed the judgment, addresses what he considers a new 
argumentative logic used by the Constitutional Court and states that it will have serious consequences 
for the model of industrial relations. However, while looking at the legal reasoning, he does not address 
at all the issue of the application of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality by the Court. 
What the author, in his analysis, considers the “new constitutional approach” is characterized by two 
main elements. First, the use of Art. 40 Spanish Constitution, which is found surprising, since, 
beforehand, the Court had never used the argument of a “policy oriented to a full employment” to 
overcome the enforcement of labour rights, as if the goal of full employment may justify any elusion of 
labour rights. Second, the use of the economic crisis and the high unemployment as a justification for 
the reduction of both individual and collective labour rights. The Court does not take into account its 
role of democratic counterweight, which should make sure that the essential content of fundamental 
rights is preserved, while respecting the legislator discretionality116. However interesting and 
meaningful the assessment and conclusions by Suarez Corujo are, he fails to analyse the legal reasoning 
in full. Indeed, the strong focus on the merit of the constitutional rights tackled by the judgment does 
not leave any space to the evaluation of the argumentative path followed by the Court, the structure of 
the legal reasoning that allows the Court to come to such stunning conclusions. The fact that the author 
expressly mentions the test of constitutionality, as conducted with regard to the contrato de apoyo, 
which, in his view, implies an assessment of whether the norm purses a legitimate aim, and, if it is 
reasonable and proportionate, although the Court – differently from the dissenting opinion – never 
expressly refers to the test, demonstrates the mis-consideration given to this aspect117. 
Fernández López only mentions that in Judgment 8/2015, about the contrato de apoyo, the Court has 
elaborated more on the principle of proportionality, compared with judgment 119/2014, while in the 
points in law on the amendments to Art. 41 Workers’ Statute, the Court has stressed more on the 
proportionality of the norm, but in a very superficial way. However, in none of these cases the author 
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goes beyond a simple reference to this issue and is not interested in providing a proper analysis of these 
arguments118.  
Gómez Garrido highlights the decision of the Court not to evaluate the choice made by the legislator 
and judge upon whether it is the more appropriate or the best possible option, but he does not reflect at 
all upon the approach of the Court on whether it is consistent with the proportionality principle or not119. 
Garcia Murcia, who seems to adopt an acritical attitude towards the judgments as well, mentions the use 
of the proportionality test, especially with regard to Art. 41 WS and stresses the necessity of applying 
such a principle and, also, that it constitutes a consolidated technique of the constitutional case law. 
However defensive of the balancing approach he is, he completely fails to address in detail the use that 
the Court has made in these occasions of such a legal technique120. 
Only Wilfredo Sanguineti has raised the issue of the misuse of the proportionality test in a brief 
commentary, generally addressing the three judgments on the post-crisis reform. Although the reflection 
is general and concise and it does not develop a deep analysis of the judgments, it points out remarkable 
elements and offers food for thought. The authoritative author criticizes the crisis-case law of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court because of its misuse of the principle of proportionality, which is not, in 
his words “a mere judgment of rationality or arbitrarieness, that can be satisfied by the simple reference 
to the legitimate character of the aims”.  First, the suitability of the norm to achieve the aim is only based 
upon the fact that it pursues legitimate aims, no further assessment is made. The reference to “economic 
crisis”, “creation of stable employment”, etc. seems enough to find the norm suitable. Similarly, about 
the necessity criteria, which should lead the judge to assess whether the challenged norm imposes a 
sacrifice upon fundamental rights which is not necessary, since alternative and less harmful means exist, 
the Court remains vague and solely focus on the legitimate purpose of the norm121. 
Last, the author points out that the key criterion of proportionality in a strict sense aims at 
understanding whether the constitutional sacrifices caused by a provision are justified by its beneficial 
effects. Obviously, the greater is the sacrifice, the more relevant needs to be the justification. According 
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to the scholar, the Court does not elaborate enough on this crucial aspect. Overall, this judgment has 
given the impression that the proportionality test is, in this case, only a “technical expedient used to 
elaborate a decision taken in advance”122. 
Moreover, it is highlighted that no reference at all is made to the essential content of fundamental 
rights and the fact that it represents a limit for the legislator, even though this concept constitutes a key 
element strictly connected to the principle of proportionality in the Spanish constitutional judicial 
tradition. The more the right is limited, the more the essential content resists, and the more the ordinary 
law needs to be well justified. The proportionality judgment intervenes to assess this dynamic and decide 
over the constitutionality of the norm challenged, from a “garantista” perspective123. 
The Court’s understanding of the essential content of labour rights, in the post-crisis case law, is 
defined “elastic” by Baylos Grau, since it is restricted when facing business freedom and the protection 
of productivity. He considers the collapse of the concept of essential content as one of the key elements 
of the latest jurisprudential approach124. Also Diaz Aznarte refers to an erosion of the essential content 
of fundamental labour rights caused by the reform. Especially, the author underlines that the judge 
Valdés Dal-Ré had argued that the reform concerning the salario de tramitacion empties the right to 
work (Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution) of its essential content, that is of the main consequence connected 
to a wrongful and unjustified dismissal125. 
Overall, the labour lawyers who have discussed the ruling do not seem interested in questioning the 
misuse of the criteria or reasonableness and proportionality, as well as the absence of the necessity 
criteria, cornerstone of the proportionality test, but for few exceptions. Even though it seems an aspect 
worth to be investigated, since their misapplication and the choice of rights to be balanced may have 
been the basis for such stunning conclusions and the undermining of fundamental labour rights. 
Interestingly, this aspect has triggered the attention of constitutional lawyers, who have argued that, 
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even though the repeated reference made to reasonableness and proportionality may lead to think that 
the Court has actually applied these principles, a more attentive assessment demonstrates the contrary126. 
The relevance of the argumentative path followed by the Court is confirmed by the deep reflections 
developed in this sense by Valdés Dal-Ré. The dissenting opinions by Valdés Dal-Ré in both judgments 
have represented a crucial track for the academic reflections elaborated by the scholars127. Nevertheless, 
only few authors, and exclusively in relation to Judgment 8/2015, have emphasised, although not 
discussed in depth, that the dissenting opinion has also carefully addressed the misapplication of the 
interpretative criteria and that the norms of Law 3/2012 would have not passed the proportionality test128. 
 
2. Post-crisis labour reforms in Italy and the relevant constitutional case law 
2.1 The 2008 crisis and labour in Italy 
Beyond any doubt, Italy is one of the European countries mostly hit by the 2008 economic and 
financial crises. The unemployment rate has been constantly increasing since 2008, when it was at 6.7%, 
up until 2014, when it reached the pick of 12.7%129. Even though the unemployment trend does not seem 
as serious as the Spanish one, the public debt rates are quite telling about the impact of the crisis on 
Italy. Indeed, the public debt rate raised from 99.8%, in 2007, up to 132.6%, in 2016130. 
Although the Italian Government has not entered into any Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Troika, the Italian post-crisis management has been strongly influenced by the EU institutions. EU 
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unelected bodies have attempted, and then succeeded, to influence the adoption of structural reforms of 
the labour market and the implementation of austerity policies regardless of the negative impact that the 
social security system may have suffered.  
At the time I am writing this thesis, it is publicly known that in August 2011 the ECB sent a “secret” 
letter, drafted by Mario Draghi and Jean-Claud Trichet, to the Italian Government. The main suggestions 
proposed, as ways out from the critical situation of the country, concerned the modernization of the 
industrial relations system, including the reform of the collective bargaining system, in order to boost 
company level negotiation; an increase in the flexibility of dismissals, balanced by an effective 
unemployment protection and professional qualifications; and the creation of tax incentives to support 
the efficiency of the firms. 
The EU pressure did not only strongly influence the subsequent reforms, which were anyway already 
oriented towards the liberalization of the labour market, but it also triggered a political crisis, which led 
to the resignation of Berlusconi’s Government and the appointment of a technical Government led by 
Mario Monti, which approved the first reform aimed at implementing the ECB guidelines131. 
Alongside the “private” exchange of letters regarding labour market regulation and industrial 
relations, the Italian legal system was strongly influenced as regards public budget management. The 
most glaring act is a Treaty known as Fiscal Compact132. The international treaty, signed in March 2012, 
provides for the duty of the 25 signatory EU Member States to incorporate the principle of balanced 
budget into national law. The Italian lawmaker opted for a reform of Art. 81 Italian Constitution, which 
entailed a proper constitutionalization of the principle at stake. The constitutional law was approved by 
the Italian Parliament in April 2012: Constitutional Law 1/2012 (entered into force in May 2012, but 
with effect starting from 2014). However, the legislative procedure had started way before the 
conclusion of the fiscal compact. Indeed, already in September 2011 the draft constitutional reform of 
Art. 81, as well as of Articles 97, 117 and 119 Italian Constitution, was approved. Such a zeal was due 
to the fact that even before the conclusion of the 2012 international treaty the EU had given clear impulse 
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to Member States to uniform the rules on balanced budget133. In order to implement the constitutional 
reform and the fiscal compact, Law 243/2012 (“Norms on the application of the principle of balanced 
budget in compliance with Art. 81.6 Italian Constitution”) was subsequently approved. The result is a 
renewed Constitution, which obliges public administration bodies, at every level, to comply with the 
principle of balanced budget and the sustainability of public debt in relation to GDP134. 
In addition to the constitutional reforms of economic policy, the Italian legal system has witnessed 
deep amendments of individual employment contract law and social security law, which have affected 
the enforcement of fundamental social rights135. Given that the Italian industrial relations system has 
been traditionally designed and governed by the social partners, in full autonomy, the reforms of the 
latest years have tackled industrial relations only to a minor extent and mostly indirectly. However, it is 
worthwhile to mention that a research published on the European Journal of Industrial Relations has 
showed that, albeit social partners have mostly maintained their traditional role and organizational 
strength, the recent reforms, especially the JOBS Act, have indirectly concerned the industrial relations 
system, due to the faculty recognised to the most representative trade unions, thus excluding grass root 
trade unions, to negotiate collective agreements and specify a number of statutory norms136. 
A comprehensive review of the wide reform packages adopted since 2009 is beyond the scope of this 
research, which focuses on the constitutional case law. Therefore, only the key labour and social reforms 
are presented, by taking into account the main academic debates, in order to contextualize the analysis 
of the Italian post-crisis case law137. 
 
2.1.2 The first post-crisis reforms and the Monti Government’s legislation 
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From a labour law perspective, the first relevant reform triggered by the EU Institutions’ pressure is 
Art. 8 of D.L. 138/2011, enacted as Law 148/2011 (the so-called Mid-August Financial Act). The reform 
was – and still is – highly controversial, due to the fact that it strongly questions one of the cornerstones 
of the Italian labour law system: the principle of inderogablità, which entails that “all individual pacts 
between the worker and the employer aimed to change in pejus law or collective agreements are void”138. 
Art. 8 assigns to decentralized collective bargaining the power to derogate from labour conditions 
established by law or by higher level collective agreements. Albeit constitutional and international 
labour norms cannot be infringed upon, the power to derogate is substantially wide and it has been 
contested inasmuch as it can undermine even consolidated labour rights. On the other hand, those who 
support this reform point out that the derogation is left to the responsibility of the social partners at 
decentralized level, who have now the possibility to exchange some protections with other occupational 
advantages139. 
One of the first legislative initiatives of the technical Government, guided by Mario Monti, concerns 
the pension system: Decree Law 201/2011 (Decree Salva Italia) converted into Law 214/2011140. The 
economic policy manoeuvre at stake is the result of few intense days of drafting and a complete 
exclusion of social partners. Social dialogue would have been a feasible option with regard to this 
reform, inasmuch as its core pillar is a consistent amendment of retirement rules. The aim was to 
strengthen the long-term sustainability of the pension system and grant intergenerational solidarity. The 
reform is extensive, but three main elements can be identified: the unification of social security 
institutions, the increase in contributions and the modification of the systems of access and 
calculation141.  
Law 92/2012, known as Fornero or Monti-Fornero, after the Minister of Labour and Prime 
Minister’s name at the time, aimed at fostering the flexibility of the labour market at both entry and exit-
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level142. The reform intervened in the regulation of temporary employment contracts and allowed the 
conclusion of an initial fixed-term contract without the need to specify the cause that justifies the 
signature of such a contract, notwithstanding that the centrality of the open-ended contract in the Italian 
labour law system was reiterated by the reform. On the other hand, the reform provided for an increase 
in social security costs for the employer who wanted to conclude temporary employment contracts 
(Aspi). Second, Law 92/2012 aimed at promoting the use of apprenticeship to enter the labour market 
(subsequently, D.L. 76/2013, “Letta Reform”, confirmed the support to the apprenticeship system and 
expanded the incentives to employers). However, the increased flexibilities were combined with some 
crucial rigidities, such as a stricter proportion between workers in apprenticeship and workers in service.  
Last, let us briefly see the most controversial reform of Law 92/2012: the amendment of protection 
against dismissal as provided for by Art. 18 of the Labour Statute (Law 300/1970). The Monti 
Government reform on dismissal was strongly influenced by the already mentioned ECB letter, which 
was extremely critical towards what was considered the excessive rigidity of the dismissal procedures, 
due to both the employee’s right to be reinstated and to receive monetary compensation in case of unfair 
dismissal143. The result was an amended Art. 18, Law 300/1970, which undermines the reinstatement 
remedy, in favour of the indemnity protection144. Overall, the Monit-Fornero Reform has been criticised 
for showing the increasing subordination of law to economics. In the context of policies of labour 
flexibilisation, labour law has become exclusively a way to define the core concepts and it is loosening 
its role of conflict regulator145. 
 
2.1.3 The second phase of post-crisis labour and social reforms: the JOBS Act  
 By JOBS Act (JA) – which name was inspired by the Obama reforms and stands for Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act – is meant a series of reforms approved in 2014 and 2015 by the Renzi 
                                                            
142 The result of a “political compromise” according to Perulli 2012, 542; While Guazzarotti, 2016, 1032, 
emphasises the advertisement tone of the first article, which is a declaration of intents without nay normative 
content. 
143 For a more attentive assessment of the rigidities of the dismissal rules under a European perspective see Biasi 
2014, 375 ff. 
144 In general, on the Fornero Reform confront Biasi 2014 and Pizzoferrato 2015; For an authoritative assessment 
of the reformed rules on dismissal see Speziale 2013. 
145 Guazzarotti 2016. 
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Government. The first measure of the wide reform known as JOBS Act is the so-called Decreto Poletti, 
Decree Law 34/2014, converted into Law 78/2014, which has addressed certain matters already tackled 
by the Monti Government, such as fixed-term contracts and apprenticeship. However, the first 
comprehensive piece of legislation is to be found in Law 183/2014, which outlined the main purposes 
of the reform, concerning a number of aspects of employment law, and delegated extensive powers to 
the Government to regulate given matters in detail, through Legislative Decrees, that is urgency 
legislation. Overall, the JOBS Act mainly aims at increasing the job flexibility to foster employment, by 
intervening on both fixed-term and open ended contracts, as well as on the power of the employer to 
derogate from collective agreements’ terms and conditions; in addition, unemployment benefits are 
reformed146. 
Caruso has identified four academic approaches to the JA: a) the position of constitutional and 
statutarian traditionalism identifies in the JA the end of the labour law history of the 20 century; b) a 
soften variation of the first theory understands the Renzi’s reform as the misapplication of the European 
flexicurity; c) what the author names the “celebrative approach” praises the JA for being the 
concretization of the law and economics theories, which finally breaks with the statutarian positions; d) 
last, a branch of literature positively looks at the JOBS Act as a first step towards an innovation of the 
labour law paradigm147. 
The most relevant and controversial norm concerned the introduction of the Contratto di Lavoro a 
Tempo Indeterminato a Tutele Crescenti, literally an “indefinite contract with increasing protection". 
However, also other aspects were considered, inter alia, the reorganization of tasks, the use of cameras 
to conduct remote controls, the reform of social safety nets (and many others). In what follows an 
excursus on those which are considered the most relevant Legislative Decrees is provided. 
The first, and likely the most controversial, Government Act implementing Law 183/2014 was 
Legislative Decree 23/2015, which introduced the so-called Contratto a tutele crescenti. Despite the 
name used to identify this reform, whether an “increasing protection” effectively exists is disputed. 
Among the scholars mostly critical towards this provision, Carinci bluntly argues that the Decree at 
                                                            
146 For a general reflection, see Pizzoferrato 2015, 197 ff. 
147 Caruso 2016, 266. 
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issue “does not foresee any new type of contract having special and ‘increasing protection’ at all. As 
regards the employees hired after its entering into force (7 March 2015), it just worsen the prior rules 
on dismissal of indefinite contracts under section 2094 of the Civil Code”148. From the most critical 
perspective, this measure strongly undermines workers’ protection, for those hired after 7 March 2015, 
inasmuch as, albeit it is allegedly an open-ended contract the possibility to be reinstated in case of unfair 
dismissal is now limited to the hardly provable case of discrimination, while in the other cases a – pre-
established – economic compensation is the sole protection granted to the worker149. The reform has 
also been criticized from a procedural point of view. In this respect, it has been argued that the delegation 
to the Government is way too extensive and vague to be considered in compliance with Art. 76 Italian 
Constitution150, which limits the extent of the legislative power to be legitimately delegated to the 
executive151. 
A positive view over the new type of contract is offered by, inter alia, Pietro Ichino, who argues that 
the reform has simply substituted what he calls – using the English expression – the property rule, 
enshrined in Art. 18 of the Workers’ Statute – anyway already amended by the Fornero reform – with 
the so called liability rule, which envisages the payment of a predetermined indemnity. According to 
the labour lawyer, a legal framework as such is to be praised also as it is completely in line with the 
other OCSE countries152. 
Decree 23/2015 is often read together with Legislative Decree 22/2015, which has extended the 
unemployment benefits, in line with the tendency to widen the scope of beneficiaries, by creating new 
Institutes and new forms of benefits153.  
                                                            
148 Carinci 2015, 4. 
149 See an interview with Luigi Mariucci, available at https://www.internazionale.it/opinione/cesare-
buquicchio/2015/02/23/luigi-mariucci-jobs-act-licenziamenti; Giubboni 2015b, 12, who talks of a “spectacular 
backing down of guarantees in case of unjustified dismissal”, my translation; Carinci 2015; a number of criticisms 
have also been raised by Perulli 2015a. For an attentive assessment of the unjustified dismissal, also from a case 
law perspective, see Bolego, 2016; Nogler, 2015. 
150 Of this view, one for all, Giubboni 2015b. 
151 Art. 76 Italian Constitution states “The exercise of the legislative function may not be delegated to the 
Government unless principles and criteria have been established and then only for a limited time and for specified 
purposes.”, official translation. 
152 See, for all, Ichino 2015; while Caruso Del Punta 2016 encourage to assess carefully every aspect of the new 
type of contract together with the Fornero reform of Art. 18 of Law 300/1970. 
153 Ravelli 2015; for a comprehensive analysis see Fiorillo, Perulli 2015. 
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Moreover, albeit the Fornero Reform had already loosen the conditions to conclude fixed-term 
contracts, with the Renzi Government, by means of Legislative Decree 81/2015, there has been an 
“effective liberalization”154 of this type of labour contract. The reform has completely delated the causal 
requirement and it has only provided for a simple temporal limit – in line with the previous Poletti 
Decree 34/2014. With the same Act, the Executive has attempted to overcome the so-called contratto di 
lavoro a progetto155. Indeed, the delegated Act has repealed the norms that provided for the lavoro a 
progetto, while it has left untouched Art. 409.3 of the Civil Procedural Code (c.p.c.) on the para-
subordinate employment. However, the issue is controversial, especially as far as concerns the effective 
abrogation of this hybrid form of employment contract, created by the Biagi reform (D.Lgs. 276/2003), 
precisely because of the missed-intervention on Art. 409 c.p.c.156.  
It is again Legislative Decree 81/2015, Art. 3, which reformulates the provisions under Art. 2103 of 
the Civil Code, by loosening the restrictions on the employer’s power to exercise the ius variandi, in 
case the organizational framework is modified. Carinci, again very critical, argues that “the prohibition 
of any amendments is strongly softened, which […] could lead to the assignment of tasks belonging to 
statutory categories or to lower classification levels and also, if necessary, to a salary reduction”157. In 
the same vein, Article 23 of Legislative Decree 151/2015 reforms Article 4 of the Workers’ Statute and 
allows the employer’s direct remote control, as it represents a fair expression of the supervisory power, 
carried out through “instruments used by the employee to do his/her work and the instruments for 
recording accesses and attendance”158. 
Moreover, on the wave of the tight fiscal rules reiterated at EU level and implemented in the Italian 
legal system, the Stability Laws for 2013 and 2014 imposed financial constraints, affecting, among 
others, public employees’ wages and the whole pension system. 
 
 
                                                            
154 Mazzotta 2016, 339. 
155 For a comprehensive assessment of this peculiar Italian forms of employment contracts, see Borzaga 2012. 
156 Perulli, 2015b, provides a critical and careful analysis, which aims to demonstrate that the lavoro a progetto 
has substantially survived the Jobs Act. 
157 Carinci 2015, 6, my translation. 
158 Article 4, Law 300/1970, my translation. For further reflections see, inter alia, Alvino 2015; Carinci 2016. 
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2.2 The Italian post-crisis case law: a review of the most controversial cases 
In this section, the most relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court on measures aimed at 
implementing EU austerity policies are summarized and the relevant literature is reviewed. Each of these 
cases, to borrow an expression used by Lo Faro, relates to a “particular category of workers”159. 
Judgment 223/2012 is the first case of interest when addressing this topic and, given the strong factual 
similarities, it allows a joint assessment with the following Judgments 304/2013, and, especially, 
310/2013. While, Judgment 70/2015 represents the decision which have been likely mostly commented 
and discussed by the Italian academic scholarship, from several profiles. The relevant academic 
literature discussing this case offers remarkable inputs especially with regard to the technique used by 
the Court to develop the legal reasoning. The crucial role of the balancing between conflicting interests 
and rights emerges clearly also in Judgment 178/2015. Finally, the latest judgments from 2016 
(Judgment 173/2016) and 2017 (Judgment 124/2017), read in light of the previous ones, testify how 
complex it is to develop a consistent case law and fully satisfy the citizens’ legal expectations.  
Other judgments have concerned reforms implementing austerity policies. However, given that they 
have had less resonance in the literature or a minor impact in the legal system, they are not directly 
addressed here. Moreover, this chapter refers only marginally to Judgment 10/2015, which is often 
included in the reflections around the post-crisis case law, provided that it does not concern fundamental 
labour rights160. 
 
2.2.1 Striking the balance between fiscal constraints and public employees’ remuneration 
2.2.1.1 The first wave of post-crisis case law and an ambiguous judicial approach: Judgments 
223/2012, 304/2013 and 310/2013 
The first case was initiated by various Regional Administrative Tribunals (TAR), which have 
presented a total of 15 referral requests. The ordinary courts have challenged the constitutionality of 
four norms of Decree Law 78/2010, approved on 31 May 2012, on “Urgent measures for the financial 
                                                            
159 Lo Faro 2014, 66. 
160 For a brief review of the constitutional judgments on social rights, which can be included in the post-crisis case 
law see Fontana 2015, 151-159; Faraguna 2016; for analysis and comments on Judgment 10/2015 cf., inter alia, 
the commentaries by Romboli 2015; Pugiotto 2015; Ruggeri 2015. In a different way, Anzon Demming 2015b. 
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stabilisation and the economic competitiveness”, converted into Law 122/210, of 30 July 2012, for 
breaching various Constitutional articles161. Three out of four norms challenged were deemed 
unconstitutional. Of particular interest are subsections 21 and 22 of Art. 9, D.L. 78/2012, on the rise of 
magistrates’ salary cap. The referrals deemed these norms to be in contrast with four Constitutional 
provisions. First, Art. 104 Italian Constitution, on the independence of the judiciary, which, according 
to the plaintiff, is enforced also by the automatic system of salary increase that the channelled measures 
were affecting and is reinforced by Art. 6 of the ECHR. Second, Art. 36 Italian Constitution on the right 
to a fair remuneration, since the relationship between the work provided and the due retribution was 
upset. Third, Art. 3 (principle of equality) and Art. 53 Italian Constitution (on the fiscal solidarity and 
the fiscal capacity to pay) for the infringement of the principle of equality on fiscal matters.  
Eventually the claimants succeeded, since the Court ruled that the blocking of wage rises for 
magistrates was unconstitutional given that it was infringing upon the domestic and international 
principle of independence of the judiciary. The Court reiterates its previous case law on the essential 
character of the automatic remuneration system for magistrates, which is necessary to grant 
independence of a peculiar group of public employees, which cannot enjoy trade union protection. 
Moreover, it underlines that the provision causes an unreasonable reduction of the remuneration, going 
beyond a “chilling” of the salary dynamic, which had been justified in previous phases of economic 
restraint by the Constitutional Court itself. Consequently, it concludes for the unconstitutionality of the 
norm on the grounds of Articles 3 and 104, but also 100, 101 and 108, Italian Constitution. 
In addition, the salary deduction in question has the nature of a tax, given that it is not directed to the 
social security system, and it does not have a universal character. Therefore, the norms at stake are found 
in violation of Articles 3 and 53 Italian Constitution. The Court has confirmed its understanding of Art.  
53, read in conjunction with Art. 3, as immediately mandatory, an approach that contributes to grant 
                                                            
161 Overall, the constitutional norms that were considered by the claimants are Articles 2, 3, 23, 24, 36, 42, 53, 97, 
100, 101, 104, 108, 111, 113 e 117.1 Italian Constitution, the latest in connection with Art. 6 ECHR.  
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effective application of the principles of substantial equality and political, economic and social 
solidarity162. 
According to Tega, the norm at stake was subject to a very strict scrutiny, which has led the Court to 
apply the equality and reasonableness principle163. In an Anthology published in 2015, which addresses 
labour and social rights in Italy after the 2008 crisis, Fontana argues that Judgement 223/2012 constitutes 
the leading case of the Italian crisis-case law164. However, this ruling has mostly been commented jointly 
with other subsequent judgments, in particular Judgments 310/2013 and 304/2013. Furthermore, it is 
underlined, what makes this case substantially different from the following judgments is the relevance 
that the principle of autonomy and independence of the judiciary (Art. 101 ff.) has had in the Court’s 
legal reasoning165. Let us know see the core aspects of Judgments 310/2013 and 304/2013. 
In 2013, the Italian Constitutional Court released two judgments, at a short distance, both concerning 
the economic treatment of public employees, coming to similar conclusions. Indeed, the second 
judgment, which concerns university professors (Judgment 310/2013), strongly reiterates the 
conclusions elaborated in the first ruling, which deals with wage suspension of the diplomatic staff 
(Judgment 304/2013). 
In Judgment 310/2013, the Court had to assess the constitutionality of Art. 9, subsections 2 and 21 
of D.L. 78/2010, which had blocked wage rises and deactivated service seniority for university lecturers 
and professors for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013166. The Court ruled in favour of the constitutional 
legitimacy of the norms challenged. It made use of a number of arguments to support its decision and 
dismiss the claims of unconstitutionality relating to, inter alia, the inappropriate balancing between the 
necessities of spending restraint and the numerous constitutional interests tackled, the lack of 
reasonableness of the norm, the unequal treatment between public and private employees and the 
violation of the principle of the proportionality of the salary. 
                                                            
162 Bonardi 2012, 6-7; the author discusses and assesses the judgment with a focus on the relevant judicial 
precedents and reflects on the possible effects of this judgment on the legal system as a whole; in this respect, see 
also Mancini 2013. 
163 Tega 2014b, 56. 
164 Fontana 2015, 151. 
165 Fontana 2015. 
166 Considering the referral requests presented by various regional courts the constitutionality of the measure has 
been challenged on the grounds of Articles 2, 3, 9, 33, 34, 36, 37, 42, 53, 77 and 97 Italian Constitution. 
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In a short judgment, the Court recognises that the block represents a sacrifice for the employees 
concerned. However, given its limited period and the necessity to contain public spending, it cannot be 
considered unreasonable, not even for the employees subjected to the heaviest sacrifice, such as the 
researchers. Interestingly, the Court, in order to justify the length of the block and its reasonableness 
argues on the need to respect the principle of balanced budget ad enforce the reformed Art. 81 Italian 
Constitution, as well as Directive 2011/85/UE, which has imposed a medium term approach to economic 
policies (sources not mentioned at all in Judgment 223/2012)167.  Moreover, the Court asserts that the 
norms at stake do not have a tax nature, therefore the social security principles, which are allegedly 
violated, do not apply here. As to the claim that the situation addressed by the norm is the same as the 
one dealt with in Judgment 223/2012, the Court stresses the peculiarity of the judiciary sector and the 
need to grant full independence, which does not apply to the university professors, who can fully profit 
of the collective negotiation procedures. Also the principle of equal treatment is respected, according to 
the Court, since public and private sectors are not comparable in this case.  
As argued by Ferrante, the legal reasoning appears excessively hurried for the status of the subjective 
rights under discussion. A more careful and attentive evaluation of the norm would have been required, 
as well as a deeper argumentation on the reasons leading to the conclusions168. 
Fontana critically confronts Judgment 223/2012 (where the independency of the judiciary is at stake) 
with Judgment 219/2014 (where the enforcement of the right to collective bargaining is at peril) and 
reflects on whether the different conclusions in the two rulings are mirroring the Court’s understanding 
that the independency and autonomy of the judiciary has more weight than the right to collective 
bargaining. On the grounds of leading Italian constitutional scholars, the author argues that the principle 
of reasonableness in the Italian case law, when used to balance conflicting interests, becomes a tool to 
exercise a control over the merit of the norm, which is characterized by wide margins of discretionality; 
                                                            
167 See Miriello 2014, 2, the author, in a commentary to the judgment, expresses disappointment for the new 
approach of the Court, which does not seem willing anymore to be the warrantor of the interests undermined by 
the legislator. 
168 Ferrante 2014, 1. 
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differently, as the author underlines, from the rigorous German proportionality test based upon the three 
requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality in the strict sense169. 
Even more critical is Ricci, who compares Judgment 223/2012 with Judgment 7/2014 (on a norm 
affecting the Banca d’Italia employees’ remuneration) and observes that the Court creates an 
unreasonable differentiation, which implies that “certain categories are not subject to the general duty 
of solidarity, on the grounds of the doubtful link established between retribution and the principles of 
independency and autonomy of certain State ‘bodies’”170. 
Lo Faro, discussing the first three crisis-judgments (Judgments 223/2012, 304/2013, 310/2013), 
points out that this case law “has given rise to an irrational inequality among public employees, some of 
them having been ‘saved’ from the pay cuts and some of them not” and it highlights the incoherency of 
the 2013 rulings, by stating that “in the very same judgment proclaiming the unconstitutionality of the 
wage cuts the Court relied much more on the specific nature of the job performed by public employees 
at stake in that particular case, rather than on what I would call the general principles of the economic 
constitution seen in a fundamental social rights perspective”171. In particular, the labour lawyer 
emphasises that the conclusions have been reached without following a fundamental social rights logic. 
In addition, he does not find reasonable that one type of public employees, the magistrates, will not 
suffer any wage loss only on the grounds of their independency, while the rest of public employees 
will172. 
Also Tega points out the sharp difference between Judgment 223/2012 and Judgment 310/2013. In 
particular, the author underlines that in the crisis case law the Court refers to its jurisprudence, which 
allows sacrifices if reasonable, “exceptional, temporary, not arbitrary […] and consistent with the stated 
aims”173. For that reason, in the first judgment, it develops a complex legal reasoning, in order to assess 
the constitutionality of the norm under scrutiny in light of the principles of equality and reasonableness. 
While in Judgment 310/2013 not only the ruling, but also the argumentative structure are opposite. 
                                                            
169 Fontana 2014, 159. 
170 Ricci 2014 216-217, my translation. 
171 Lo Faro 2014, 61, my translation. 
172 Lo Faro 2014, 62. 
173 Tega 2014b, 55, my translation. 
59 
 
Indeed, according to the author “the judicial review of reasonableness was strongly conditioned by the 
specific features of the single issue at stake”, that is the limited sacrifice imposed and the peculiar context 
of the economic crisis and the wide scope of the measure174. Also according to Fontana, the scope of the 
norm has had a central role in the Court’s argumentation, as well as the peculiar constitutional parameter 
of independence, which belongs to the specific judiciary sector. Moreover, Fontana emphasises the use 
of Art. 81 Italian Constitution, and therefore the Fiscal Compact and the commitments taken therein, by 
the Court in what he calls the “reasonableness test”, that is a balancing between, in this case, the affected 
fundamental right and the public interest to spending restraints. It is underlined that the European 
economic commitments are used by the Court not as obiter dictum, but as proper legal grounds for the 
final decision175.  
Also Faraguna, with regard to Judgments 223/2012 and 310/2013, explicitly refers to the “balancing 
test” allegedly used by the Court in both cases, but with different outcomes. While in the judgment from 
2012 the Court does not consider the economic crisis a sufficient justification to affect the magistrates’ 
right, in the second ruling the new budget rules, consequence of the Euro-crisis, constituted a crucial 
element to justify such a long sacrifice176. While, Piera Loi points out that “the proportionality” is left 
aside in the legal reasoning of the Court, which does not make clear what are the argumentative steps 
that lead to conclude that the challenged norms are reasonable177. 
The first post-crisis case law has been approached by scholars in a more careful way, compared to 
the literature addressing the following judgments, and, maybe due to the relatively scarce objects of 
study, the various arguments are not extensively elaborated. However, already at that stage, the crucial 
issues had been raised: the economic crisis argument, the relevance of Art. 81 Italian Constitution, the 
need to protect fundamental labour rights in an extensive way and the balancing conducted by the Court, 
which has been mentioned by a couple of authors, but has not been assessed in depth. 
 
                                                            
174 Tega 2014b, 56, my translation. 
175 Fontana 2015; cf. Abbiate 2014. 
176 Faraguna 2016, 259. 
177 Loi 2016, 90. 
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2.2.1.2 The right to collective bargaining and the necessary temporary character of its limitation: 
Judgment 178/2015  
The Tribunale di Roma and the Tribunale di Ravenna contested the constitutional legitimacy of 
various norms providing for the suspension of the regular dynamic of wages and collective negotiation 
in the public sector. In particular, the following measures were challenged: the freezing of salary 
elements for the years 2011, 2012, 2013, the limitations on the remuneration of public sector workers, 
extended to 31 December 2014, the suspension of collective bargaining procedures involving the 
financial aspects for the three year period 2010-2012, then deferred until 31 December 2014, and the 
freezing of the non-renewal indemnity178. 
The referring courts claimed the violation of a number of constitutional provisions: the duty of 
solidarity and right to a fair taxation (Articles 2 and 53 Italian Constitution), the principle of equality 
between public sector and private sector workers (Art. 3.1 Italian Constitution), the protection of work 
(Article 35.1 Italian Constitution), the proportionality of remuneration (Article 36.1 Italian 
Constitution), and trade union freedom (Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution).  
The Constitutional Court rejected most of the claims of unconstitutionality for being unfounded (as 
to Articles 2, 3.1, 36.1, 39.1, 53.1, 53.2 Italian Constitution) or inadmissible (as to Articles 35.1, 36.1, 
53.1, 53.2 Italian Constitution), but it did recognize that there was an infringement of the right to 
collective bargaining, as protected by Article 39.1 Italian Constitution. The claims related to the 
violation of Art. 3 Italian Constitution were dismissed on the grounds of a consistent case law according 
to which, independently from certain similarities, the legal framework for public and private 
employment does not coincide. Also the violation of Art. 36 Italian Constitution was dismissed under 
various arguments, which were based upon an investigation of “the entire body of items comprising the 
overall remuneration of workers over a period of time of some significant length” (para. 14.1). For 
different reasons and on the grounds of a legal reasoning considering both Art. 81 Italian Constitution 
and the new Art. 97.1 Italian Constitution (on the duty of public administrations to comply with the 
balanced budget) and their multiyear dimension, as well as the programmatic character of collective 
                                                            
178 These norms were enshrined in Decree Law 78/2010 and Decree Law 98/2011, as specified by Presidential 
Royal Decree 122/2013. 
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bargaining, the violation of Art. 39 Italian Constitution, as far as it concerns the suspension of the 
negotiating procedures for the years 2011-2013, was dismissed as well179. 
The infringement of Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution, which protects trade unions’ freedom and 
consequently the right to collective bargaining, was caused by Art. 16.1.b) of Decree Law 98/2011 
(Urgent measures for financial stabilization) converted by Art. 1.1 of Law 111/2011, as specified of by 
Article 1.1.c) of Presidential Decree 122/2013, together with both the Stability Law for 2014 and the 
Stability Law for 2015. The measures enshrined in the Stability Laws for 2014 and 2015 were not 
challenged by the referring tribunals, but the Court deemed these provisions inextricably linked to the 
challenged norms, inasmuch as they provided for the prolongation of the “block” on collective 
bargaining for all of 2015. The constitutional judges concluded that, although a partial suspension of 
collective negotiation in the public sector may be justified by the contingent economic context, such a 
prolonged block – interpreted as an evidence of the intention of the legislator to give structural effect to 
the constraint – is unreasonable, since it causes an unbearable sacrifice of the right to collective 
bargaining. The same conclusions were reached as far as the block of the non-renewal indemnity is 
concerned180. Indeed, the cause of the illegitimate character of the suspension of collective bargaining 
is to be identified in the fact that the temporary and exceptional characters, features of the first legislative 
provision, faded away with the reiterations of the measure. The ruling of supervening unconstitutionality 
means that the judgment is effective from the day after its publication, which implies that the public 
spending is not tackled at all by the ruling, since the legislator does not have to reimburse the public 
employees deprived from their right to negotiate.  
In other words, the various ordinary norms discussed in this judgment provided for a double block. 
On the one hand, the public spending for public employees, which entailed the suspension of any wage 
increase, was limited for the three year period 2011-2013, then extended up to December 2015; on the 
other hand, collective bargaining procedures were suspended. In brief, the Court only identified an 
infringement of Art. 39 Italian Constitution, caused by the extension of the suspension of collective 
                                                            
179 The Italian Constitutional Court had already judged legitimate the suspension of collective bargaining for a 
three year period, aimed at complying with Art. 81 Italian Constitution in Judgments 310/213 and 219/2014. 
180 For a commentary, cf. Fiorillo 2015. 
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bargaining up to all of 2015, thus confirming that Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution entirely covers the 
freedom to collective bargaining in the public sector181.  
In a recent publication, Orlandini emphasises that, even though the challenged norms have been 
partially declared unconstitutional, in Judgment 178/2015 it is manifest that public budget constraints 
carry more weight than in the rest of the post-crisis judgments on labour rights. In particular, what strikes 
here is that the financial constraints do not concern diritti di prestazione (social rights that require a 
financial disbursement from the State), but a crucial collective labour right: the right to collective 
bargaining. The author is aware that this is not the first time in which the trade union freedom is balanced 
against “superior general interests”, however, particularly this judicial case clearly demonstrates that 
these financial interests have acquired a different status following the 2012 constitutional reforms182. 
Several elements of the Judgment are of legal interest and have been addressed by the literature. 
Among others, the remarkable use of supranational sources183 and the arguments that have led the Court 
to support that, notwithstanding the connection between Art. 39 and Art. 36, Italian Constitution, the 
latter has not been infringed upon. Even though collective bargaining is beyond any doubt a key 
instrument to guarantee the proportionate and sufficient remuneration protected under Art. 36 Italian 
Constitution, the causal relation between the violation of Art. 39 Italian Constitution and the 
infringement of Art. 36 Italian Constitution does not always occur, as in the case at stake184. Noticeably, 
the lack of violation of Art. 36 Italian Constitution implies the exclusion of compensation, as also 
specified by the Court185. Albeit the issue is beyond the scope of this thesis and it will not be discussed 
further, it is worthwhile to point out that certain scholarship has criticized the Court. One for all, 
Mocchegiani argues that the choice not to include Art. 36 Italian Constitution in the balancing is the 
                                                            
181 As noted by Zoppoli 2017, 184. 
182 Orlandini 2018, 25-27. 
183 The Court uses the international sources as interpretative parameters of Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution, which is 
considered “synchronically linked” to a number of supranational sources that strengthen the “functional link” 
between “collective exercisable rights, such as collective bargaining and trade union freedom”. In particular, the 
Court refers to ILO Convention No. 151; ILO Convention No. 98; ILO Convention No. 87; Article 11 (ECHR) of 
the European Convention. Moreover, the Court referred to Art. 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and art. 152.1 TFEU. As rightly pointed out by Orlandini, 2018, this interpretative choice, 
strongly oriented towards the international sources, represents a remarkable new element in the Italian 
constitutional case law. The use of supranational sources has been emphasised also by Fiorillo 2015 and Occhino 
2017, 9. For an early evaluation of this element of the legal reasoning, see Frosecchi 2016. 
184 See, Fiorillo 2015, who strongly agrees with the conclusions of the Court in this respect – and not only. 
185 Dalfino 2017, 178. 
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result of a cautious approach that has induced the Court not to put on the legislator a further economic 
burden, after the consistent one stemming from Judgment 70/2015, also considering the sharp criticism 
raised by the ruling on pensions’ revaluation186. 
A significant moment of the judgment concerns the relevance given by the Court to the excessive 
nature – in temporal terms – of the extension of the block, which is not justified even in times of 
economic crisis. Indeed, it is not the act of suspending collective bargaining in the public sector per se 
to be judged unconstitutional, but the “unreasonable” prolongation of such a block. A conclusion 
reached by the constitutional judges after a comprehensive evaluation of the norms that have provided 
in this sense since 2010, up to 2015187. The appropriateness of including in the legal reasoning an 
evaluation of the effects of the judgment over the public budget seems uncontroversial, although, it has 
been emphasised, this cannot lead the judge towards a political argument, nor the freedom to collective 
bargaining can be deprived of its protection and be structurally subject to financial arguments and 
interests188. It has been argued that the crucial weakness of the provision at stake – namely its prolonged 
character – and the consequent declaration of unconstitutionality has been caused by the inability of the 
legislator to achieve a reasonable balance between the right to collective bargaining and public budget 
constraints189.  
The temporal effects of the judgment has also triggered an interesting academic debate, which has, 
in certain cases, inspired a comparative analysis of Judgments 10/2014, 70/2015 and 178/2015190. 
In particular, an Italian Journal has published a series of guided opinions to analyse the key aspects 
of the temporal effects of the constitutional rulings, starting from the Judgment at issue. Barbieri has 
introduced the topic, raising the most controversial issues from a labour law perspective: the grounds 
                                                            
186 Mocchegiani 2015, 4; on the “systematic nexus” between Art. 36 and Art. 39 Constitution, see also Orlandini 
2018, 11-14. 
187 Fiorillo 2015; Zoppoli 2017, 184, who argues that the temporal element is a decisive factor in the evaluation of 
the unconstitutional nature of the block, which cannot assume a structural character.  
188 In particular confront Zoppoli 2017, 185 ff. and Occhino, 2017, 9 ff., who addresses the topic of financial 
considerations with regard to the enforcement of social rights from a broader perspective; on the public budget 
constraints in the constitutional legal reasoning of the Italian (Judgments 178/2015, but also Judgment 70/2015 
and Judgment 10/2014) cf., inter alia, Butturini 2016; For a reflection over the renovated Art. 81 Italian 
Constitution and its impact on the constitutional case law see Madau 2015. 
189 See, one for all, Butturini 2016, 29, 30. Cf. also Occhino 2017, 9. Scagliarini 2015 argues that, differently from 
the legislator, the Court, in this Judgment has achieved a “reasonable balance”. 
190 Inter alia, Butturini 2016; Diaco 2016; Occhino 2017; for an assessment of Judgment 70/2015 – and inevitably 
Judgment 10/2014 - and the respective literature, refer to Chapter 2.2.2.1. 
64 
 
for justifying the supervening unconstitutionality, the repercussion of a decision as such in the main 
proceeding and the choice to lace emphasis in the evaluation of the effects on the public finances, 
especially with regard to the type of declaration of unconstitutionality preferred191. Dalfino, who is of 
the opinion that the declaration of supervening unconstitutionality is the most interesting element of this 
judgment, stresses that, albeit the Italian legal system does not include an explicit provision on  
supervening unconstitutionality, this type of decision stems from a dialogue between the Constitutional 
Court and the scholarship192. The author acknowledges that such a technique stems from the will to 
balance different constitutional values, inasmuch as the retroactive effect may cause a worse prejudice 
to the legal system193. This supervening unconstitutionality, according to Zoppoli, must be considered 
in the strict sense, in the sense that the constitutional norm, which determines the unconstitutionality of 
the ordinary measure has been reformed after the ordinary norm has been adopted, inasmuch as the 
Court acts in a constitutional terrain substantially new (Art. 81 Italian Constitution was amended in 
2012, while the suspension of collective bargaining procedures was first provided for in 2011)194.  
Dalfino also argues that the main criticality of a declaration as such is the weakening of the nexus 
with the main proceeding, caused by the supervening unconstitutionality, inasmuch as in this case the 
constitutional ruling fails to have a concrete impact on the first one. Of the same view, Mocchegiani 
argues that a ruling as such “breaks” the relation between the two levels of judiciary195 and emphasises 
what she identifies as a core weakness of the ruling: the violation “arises and dies” at the same time, 
inasmuch as the moment in which the violation has been established coincides with its annulment196. 
Zoppoli emphasises that it is true that the declaration of supervening unconstitutionality should refer to 
                                                            
191 Barbieri 2017, 167,168. 
192 Dalfino 2017, 174. 
193 Dalfino, 2017, 172, who also recalls the phases in which the Court has made use of this technique; See also 
Madau, 2015, 15-16, who, introducing a joint assessment of Judgments 10/2014, 70/2015 and 178/2015, includes 
the modulation of the temporal effects of the judgments among the techniques used by the Court since the 1980s 
to strike a fair balance between the financial constraints and the enforcement of social rights. Especially, in this 
respect, the Court has used the so called supervening unconstitutionality, on the grounds of the principle of 
graduality, which justifies a progressive enforcement of the principle of equality in case of expensive reforms. 
194 Zoppoli 2017, 184; on the controversial choice of the Court to opt for a supervening unconstitutionality see also 
Pinardi 2015 and Diaco 2016, who reflects over the conclusions in Judgment 178/2015 and confronts this ruling 
with Judgments 10/2014 and 70/2015.  
195 Mocchegiani 2015, 3. The author, highly critical towards the judgment, emphasis the similar approach to 
Judgment 10/2014 and argues that the Court in this case has failed to justify the reasons that have led to the 
declaration of “supervening unconstitutionality”. 
196 Mocchegiani 2015, 3. 
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a specific law, so as to be linked to the entry into force of that law, however, the labour lawyer also 
highlights that the declaration of unconstitutionality effective from the day of the judgment is consistent 
with the Italian constitutional case law and in the case at stake it does not hamper workers’ organizations 
from initiating a suspensive action against further unconstitutional conducts197.  
In a comprehensive book on reasonableness and proportionality in labour law, Piera Loi reflects on 
Judgment 178/2015. The author assesses the Judgment, by attempting to frame the various steps of the 
Court’s legal reasoning within the criteria provided by the proportionality test. The author’s arguments 
can be summarized in four points. First, the legitimacy of the aim is identified in the public spending 
constraint, even more stringent due to the reformed Art. 81 Italian Constitution. Second, the suitability 
of the norm to achieve the aim is not explicitly addressed, and only indirectly the reader can deduce that 
the mean is deemed suitable. Third, also the necessity test is implicitly conducted by the Court, when it 
justifies the legislative choice on the grounds of the “solidaristic dimension of the measure”; “the 
peculiar seriousness of the economic situation”; “the temporal dimension” of the suspension based on a 
three year period. Forth, the balancing in a strict sense is conducted between Articles 36.1 and 39 Italian 
Constitution and, on the other hand, “the collective interest to contain public spending”. According to 
the author this is the “less transparent phase of the legal reasoning”, because  the balancing consists in 
accepting that “the right can be sacrificed, but for a determined period”, which means that as far as 
concerns that period, there is no balancing at all and a constitutional interest completely prevails over 
the fundamental right at issue198. 
Also Orlandini refers to the proportionality test in its concluding reflections over Judgment 178/2015. 
The scholar points out that the Court does not evaluate the context of economic crisis, it does not conduct 
an assessment which may reflect the necessity test, nor it discusses the legislator choices of economic 
policy, to the contrary, as severely  criticised by Orlandini, it starts form the – questionable – assumption 
that the suspension of collective bargaining procedure may be a reasonable mean to “solve the serious 
economic and financial situation of the country”199. 
                                                            
197 Zoppoli 2017, 187. 
198 Loi 2016, 87-90, my translation. 
199 Orlandini 2018, 27-28, my translation. 
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The extensive literature on Judgment 178/2015 is made of complex arguments and provides 
numerous inputs. However, the complex role of the Court in this ruling and the perspective of the 
balancing, that is the possibility to consider the modulation of the constitutional judgments’ effects, as 
a way to balance conflicting rights and interests has not been explored in depth.  
 
2.2.2 Retirement benefits revaluation as a questionable terrain to comply with the balanced budget 
principle 
2.2.2.1 A Constitutional Court either upstanding or irresponsible: the controversial Judgment 
70/2015 
At the end of May 2015, the Constitutional Court has released a judgment destined to become one 
of the most controversial of the latest years. The referring courts had questioned the constitutionality of 
Art. 24.25 of Decree Law 201/2011, of 6 December 2011 (Urgent provisions on growth, equity and the 
consolidation of the public accounts), converted into Art. 1.1 of Law 214/2011 (known as “Salva Italia”), 
inasmuch as, on the grounds of the contingent financial situation, it limited the automatic revaluation of 
pensions by 100 percent for the years 2012 and 2013 exclusively for pensions worth an overall amount 
of up to three times the minimum INPS pension. Overall, the referring courts consider this provision 
unconstitutional, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 23, 36.1 38.2, 53 and 117.1 of the Italian Constitution, 
the latest with regard to the duty to enforce the ECHR200. In particular, the block of revaluation of 
pensions is challenged on the grounds of Article 3 Italian Constitution (on equal treatment) Article 36 
Italian Constitution (providing for the right to a fair remuneration) and Article 38 Italian Constitution 
(on the adequacy of social security benefits), insofar as it does not comply with the principle of 
proportionality between retirement benefits and salary, as well as with the principle of equality and 
reasonableness, thus causing an “irrational discrimination to the detriment of the category of pensioners” 
(in this way, Tribunale di Palermo, para. 1). In addition, the measure is found unreasonable and 
irrational due to the fact that the means chosen to achieve the aim, that is to tackle the financial situation, 
is excessive (in this way, Corte dei Conti Regione Emilia-Romagna, para.  2).  
                                                            
200 Only the questions of unconstitutionality on the grounds of Articles 3, 36.1 and 38.2 Italian Constitution are 
founded and therefore addressed by the Court. 
67 
 
The Court makes clear that the suspension of the revaluation of retirement benefits is not new to the 
legislator, who, already in the past, had to balance the pensioners’ expectations with the containment of 
public expenditures. In this respect, on the grounds of the constitutional case law, the legislator enjoys 
a certain degree of discretionality. However, the discretionality is restricted by the principle of 
reasonableness as developed by the Constitutional Court in relation to Articles 36.1 and 38.2 Italian 
Constitution. Indeed, the legislator has to comply with the principles of proportionality and adequacy of 
the retirement benefits and avoid reiterating the block of revaluation (the Court here refers to Judgment 
316/2010), which would seriously tackle the legitimate expectations and the purchasing power of 
pensioners. In addition, the simple reference to a “contingent financial situation” is not enough to justify 
such a restrictive provision, which provides for a two year block and concerns pension brackets way 
lower than in previous reforms. The Court concludes that the provision under scrutiny is inconsistent 
with the constitutional judge’s indications, and a reiteration as such is not respectful of the principles of 
proportionality and reasonableness and therefore it infringes upon Articles 36.1 and 38.2, Italian 
Constitution, as corollary of Articles 2 and 3, Italian Constitution201. 
Judgment 70/2015 has both triggered a wide public debate and attracted the attention of several 
scholars. A number of authors, mainly constitutional lawyers, have addressed Judgment 70/2015 in 
comparison with Judgment 10/2015202. Indeed, a number of elements allow to confront the rulings. In 
most of the cases, Judgment 70/2015 has been considered a missed opportunity to continue the positive 
path traced by Judgment 10/2015. Pin Longo has divided the numerous opinions around the two 
judgments in four macro-argument: the Court has been considered either irresponsible or brave in 
Judgment 70/2015, and either realistic or shy in Judgment 10/2015203. Veronesi, who sounds nearly 
emotional in assessing the judgments, severely states that “the two judgments speak – over a distance 
                                                            
201 For a commentary cf. Cinelli 2015b; for a summary in English of the judgment see Bergonzini 2016; On follow-
up to the judgment cf. Giubboni 2015a, 532-535; Morelli 2015, 709-710; D’Onghia 2015, 349-352. 
202 In Judgment 10/2015, released few weeks before Judgment 70/2015, the Court has declared the 
unconstitutionality of the so called Robin Tax, that is a special tax put on oil companies. The Court in this decision 
has made a careful consideration of the consequences on the public budget that a full declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the measure would have caused and, for that reason, it has regulated the effects of its 
judgment in such a way to avoid the reimbursement of the amounts already paid. Indeed, thanks to this temporal 
modulation, the judgment was effective starting from the day after its publication. 
203 Pin Longo 2015, 698. 
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of few weeks – different languages”204. Instead, other authors have emphasised the points in common, 
e.g. Bergonzini, who, anyway, admits a strong inconsistency between the two rulings, observes that a 
mistrust of the Court towards the legislator can be perceived in both judgments: one limits its-own 
effects and the other intervenes in a drastic way to protect retirement benefits. Moreover, in both 
judgments it is pointed out that the fundamental principles enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 Italian 
Constitution are at risk205.  
The considerations of labour – but not only – lawyers are mostly in contrast to the dominant 
constitutional rhetoric. Employment scholars have assessed the ruling from the perspective of 
fundamental social rights, which, indeed, does not allow to ground the analysis on a systematic 
comparison with Judgment 10/2015, and have revealed the intrinsic value of this judgment, that is the 
“reaffirmation of the constitutional value of social rights”, against the tendency to push for their 
deconstitutionalization206. On this view, the Court has done nothing but fulfilling its role as guardian of 
the constitutional fundamental rights, which is also its source of legitimacy207. 
Overall, the main issues raised with regard to the Court’s argumentations are: the different use of 
Art. 81 Italian Constitution and the economic crisis argument in the legal reasoning, linked to that, the 
diverse understanding of the Court’s role with respect to the balancing technique and the principle of 
proportionality, last and to a lesser extent, the application of the judicial precedents, in particular 
Judgment 336/2010. While reviewing the critical academic literature on the judgment, this section also 
addresses the convincing counter arguments offered by those scholars who have adopted a fundamental 
social rights’ viewpoint.   
Several authors have emphasised and criticised the total absence of any reference to Art. 81 Italian 
Constitution in Judgment 70/2015, compared to the use made of this parameter in Judgment 10/2015. 
They critically observe that, while Judgment 10/2015 even intervened to regulate the temporal effects 
                                                            
204 Veronesi 2015, 692. 
205 Bergonzini 2016, 187. 
206 Giubboni 2015a, 529. 
207 Cf. Cinelli 2015b, 443; D’Onghia briefly reviews the approaches of the Court towards the "spending judgments" 
since the 1980s, and notes that while in the 1980s the Court had conducted a proper judicial activism in favour of 
fundamental rights, in the 1990s its approach has shifted towards a self-restraint more keen to support economic 
arguments: D’Onghia 2015, 328-330. Cinelli 2015c emphasises that Judgment 70/2015 recognises the full 
constitutional value of social security rights, differently from the general judicial trend that rather leans towards a 
blind recognition of the absolute prevalence of the principle of balanced budget. 
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of the judgment, in order to avoid damages to the public finances, Judgment 70/2015 did not even 
mention Art. 81 Italian Constitution and it did not take into account at all the public finance 
consequences 208. 
Anzon Demmig particularly concerned with the lack of reference to Art. 81 Italian Constitution, 
emphasises the inconsistency of the two judgments. He argues that with Judgment 10/2015 the Court 
has taken into due account Art. 81 Italian Constitution, that is the balanced budget principle (a parameter 
not mentioned by the referring Court), in the balancing with the “other rights and principles” at stake, 
in light of granting the respect of the Constitution, which was understood as homogeneous body. This 
decision is considered a turning point as to the attention conferred to the national and European 
balancing requirements and the impact of the constitutional rulings on them. However, in Judgment 
70/2015, published few weeks later, the Court, according to Anzon Demmig, completely ignored the 
principle of balanced budget and it also disregarded the constitutional precedents which would have led 
to a more careful analysis of this principle209.  
It is still on the grounds of the homogeneous character of the Constitution that Cinelli argues in a 
completely different way. He points out that Art. 81 Constitution and the principle of balanced budget 
cannot be considered a kind of "super constitutional value", as to make sure that all rights and principles 
are granted, particularly in light of the fact that the Constitution has to be considered as 
“homogeneous”210. 
Similarly to Anzon Demmig, Veronesi is very critical towards both the disappearance of Art. 81 
Italian Constitution and the undermining of the principle of balanced budget and the indifference 
towards the consequences that a declaration of unconstitutionality would have had on the public finances 
and indirectly on the most vulnerable population. According to the scholar, the Court has clearly chosen 
                                                            
208 Morelli emphasises that the fact that Art. 81 Italian Constitution has not been mentioned at all is in contrast 
with previous decisions, such as, beyond Judgments 10/2015, 304/2013 and 310/2013: Morelli 2015, 707,708; 
Antonini considers the lack of reference to the constitutional norm a thunderous silence: Antonini 2015, 719; 
Anzon Demmig refers to an unusual seesaw of the case law about the weight of the constitutional principle of 
balanced budget in the judgment of constitutionality of ordinary norms: Anzon Demmig 2015, 679. The author 
appears shocked by several aspects of judgment 70, while in a previous article he had openly praised Judgment 
10/2015, see Anzon Demmig 2015a; cf. also Veronesi 2015. 
209 Anzon Demmig 2015, 680. 
210 Cinelli 2015b, 444. 
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to support the pensioners “always and under any circumstance”211. Of the same view, Pin and Longo 
criticise Judgment 70/2015 for sacrificing “reasonableness and moderation” to the advantage of “an 
abstract defence of the pensioners' rights”, given that the ruling obliges the legislator to enforce these 
rights, irrespectively of the fact that further legislative actions in this sense will go at the detriment of 
the general welfare212. 
Of a different is Giubboni, who observes that the Court has not ignored Art. 81 Italian Constitution, 
but it has referred to it when mentioning the financial requirements, and it has rather placed Art. 81 
Italian Constitution in the right perspective, that is in relation to Articles 3, 36 and 38 Italian 
Constitution213. In this respect, Giubboni appreciates the fact that the Court, while balancing the 
conflicting interests, has gone against the tendency to assign “a sort of prejudicial hierarchical 
prevalence to the principle of balanced budget”, enshrined in the renovated Art. 81 Italian Constitution. 
This has resulted in a renovated protection of welfare social rights, anchored to the principles of 
substantial equality and solidarity, that is Articles 2 and 3.2 Italian Constitution214. The Court has ruled 
consistently with its case law, thus considering the balanced budget issue, but without "deviating" its 
conclusions because of the economic contingency. Indeed the Court has rather conducted a careful 
balancing paying due attention to the enforcement of social rights215.  
D’Onghia reminds that, albeit the Court surely has to consider Art. 81 Italian Constitution and include 
it in its balancing between social rights and balanced budget, the Court is not bound by the principle of 
balanced budget, otherwise the result would be a “complete assimilation of the Constitutional Court's 
rulings with the legislative acts”. To keep its institutional role, the Court cannot be influenced by the 
costs of its decisions, since how to distribute the resources is a political matter216. Even if a number of 
fundamental social rights are truly influenced by the public financial situation, it is also true that their 
enforcement cannot be frustrated to the point of tackling the human dignity. Indeed, Art. 81 Italian 
                                                            
211 Veronesi 2015, 695, my translation. 
212 Pin Longo 2015, 698, my translation. 
213 Giubboni 2015a, 529-530; in a similar way also D’Onghia 2015, 344. 
214 Giubboni 2015a, 528, my translation. 
215 D’Onghia 2015, 348-349. Barbieri and D’Onghia have edited a collective Working Paper, introduced by an 
asserting statement: “some good reasons to discuss a good Judgment”: Barbieri, D’Onghia 2015, 3.  
216 D’Onghia 2015, 345-346, my translation; in a similar way Cinelli, 2015b, 445, argues that the Court in 
Judgment 70/2015 has properly considered the economic context. 
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Constitution does not refer, neither directly, nor indirectly, to the duty of the lawmaker to upset the 
welfare state system in order to respect financial constraints. It is a matter of political choice the 
destination of the – even limited, but not null – resources to the welfare system. The Constitutional 
Court, which acts as a custodian of the core content of fundamental rights, is called upon to determine 
how far the economic reasons can go to the detriment of constitutionally protected rights217. 
It is still on the grounds of a comparison with Judgment 10/2015 that a number of authors have 
reflected upon the use made by the Italian Court of balancing and principle of proportionality in 
Judgment 70/2015. This point is indissolubly linked with the previous one. For instance, according to 
Lieto the absence of any reference to Art. 81 Italian Constitution is a clear evidence of the fact that the 
Court has not directly applied the balancing technique, but it has rather assessed the balancing operated 
by the legislator218.  
It is argued that in Judgment 10/2015, the Constitutional Court takes an active role in the balancing, 
as demonstrated by the choice to modulate the final decision and its effects in order to balance the 
constitutional interests. While, in Judgment 70/2015 the Court exercises a different function and it 
exclusively acts as the supervisor of the fairness of the balancing conducted by the legislator. Under the 
second approach, the balancing, in order to be reasonable, has to be founded upon a well-argued 
motivation for the measures aimed at reducing public spending at the detriment of social rights. Morelli 
observes that the different approaches adopted by the Court in the two judgments are not in conflict, 
however the criterion that leads to embrace an approach rather than the other remains obscure and should 
be clarified by the Court219. 
In this regard, other scholars have advanced more sharp criticisms. Miani Canevari clearly states that 
the balancing does not have to be conducted by the legislator, but rather by the Constitutional Court, 
and in this occasion, the Court has not complied with its duty to conduct a proper balancing220. Also 
according to Anzon Dammig, Judgment 70/2015 is placed “outside the balancing logic” and the Court 
has rather argued in favour of an absolute prevalence of the principles of proportionality and adequacy 
                                                            
217 D’Onghia 2015, 326-328. 
218 Lieto 2015, 5-6. 
219 Morelli 2015, 711. 
220 Miani Canevari 2015, 600. 
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of salaries and pensions, thus failing to correctly understand the Constitution, that is a “unitary 
document”, as suggested by Judgment 10/2015221.  
The lack of reference to both Art. 81 Italian Constitution and the consequences of the ruling in light 
of the “dramatic financial crisis of our country”222, coupled with the choice of basing the ruling upon 
the failure of the legislator to develop further the justifications, has been understood by a number of 
scholars as an escamotage to simplify the legal reasoning and avoid both to deal with the issue of the 
economic consequences of the decision and to conduct the necessary balancing between the interests at 
stake, which would have required a careful consideration of the principle of balanced budget223. 
However, also an evaluation from the Court of the economic context which strongly influences its 
decision has hidden dangers. Antonini, who generally praises the Court’s realism in Judgment 10/2015, 
highlights the risk that the Court may go beyond its limits of discretionality and fall into the legislative 
competence territory224. This observation confirms Morelli’s view that the Court, in Judgment 10/2015, 
has acted as a main character of the balancing and not as a mere supervisor. 
This risk can be perceived also in the analysis conducted by Pin and Longo on the use of the 
proportionality test in Judgment 10/2015. The author argues that, when it comes to the effects of the 
ruling, this Judgment generally refers to the proportionality principle to justify the intervention in a field, 
which is typically of a political nature, that is the temporal modulation of the effects225. 
Various authors have emphasised that, looking at the Italian constitutional case law, a proper and 
rigorous use of the principle of proportionality, which makes the ruling clear and transparent, can be 
found especially in Judgment 10/2015, but not in the subsequent Judgment 70/2015, which is seen as a 
                                                            
221 Anzon Demmig 2015, 685. 
222 Anzon Demmig 682. 
223 Anzon Demmig 2015 in particular uses the expression “escamotage”, cf. Anzon Demmig 2015, 683; of the 
same view, Veronesi also wonders whether the judges were aware of the “devastating economic situation of our 
country” Veronesi 2015, 695-696; Lieto concludes that the miss-consideration of the balancing and Art. 81 has 
led to an “uncertain argumentation”: Lieto 2015, 5; also Pin Longo 2015. 
224 Antonini 2015, 721. The choice of the Court in Judgment 10/2015 was anyway highly criticised and the judges 
have been accused of going beyond their competence that would allow them to balance a principle, but not a rule, 
as it is the case for the disapplication of the norm declared unconstitutional: a rule that the Court can only comply 
with. For a critical evaluation of this choice see Bin 2015; of the same view also Giubboni 2015a. Of a different 
view on the modulation of time-effects of the decision cf. Barbera 2015. On the legislative actions, which followed 
judgment 70/2015, which aim at making the lawmaker complying with Art. 81 Italian Constitution also after a 
decision of the Court which implies further expenses, not calculated in the state budget, Turturro 2015. 
225 Pin Longo 2015, 700. 
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step back226. Indeed, the proportionality is mentioned with regard to Articles 36 and 38 Italian 
Constitution, and it is not clearly argued whether the Court has made use of a proper scrutiny of 
proportionality to come to its conclusions (which may be anyway the same) as it has occurred, inter alia, 
in Judgment 10/2015. Moreover, they point out that the principle of reasonableness is associated in an 
unstructured way to proportionality and, it is argued, the methodological shift between the two 
judgments weakens also Judgment 10/2015227. 
From a completely different viewpoint, it is emphasised that the constitutional judges have acted 
consistently with their role and have called upon the legislator to exercise a “fair balancing”. Indeed, the 
Court does not enter the merit of the legislative choices, but it just controls whether these choices are in 
compliance with the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Indeed, the Court does not go further 
in its discretionality and does not go beyond its role – as if it had concluded with a ruling called additivo 
di principio – and declares the full unconstitutionality of the block. On this view, the decisive argument 
of the Court is that the legislator has not made clear under which criteria it has balanced the constitutional 
interests at stake and it has only vaguely mentioned the “contingent financial situation”, which does not 
allow to pass the reasonableness scrutiny. The lack of indication from the lawmaker on the balancing 
operated by the legislator does not allow the judge to fulfil its task, that is to conduct what in other legal 
systems is a crucial moment of the proportionality test, that is the evaluation over the necessity of the 
norm for the impossibility to adopt other measures less harmful228. By doing so, this Court has proven 
to be very attentive towards social security rights and careful in not allowing an “unequal balancing 
between rights of individuals and economic efficiency”229. 
                                                            
226 Inter alia, cf. Pin Longo 2015, also Bergonzini 2016, Antonini 2015. However, while Antonini argues that only 
in recent times “the principle of proportionality has been gaining a new dignity in the constitutional case law” and 
a less vague use of this principle has been made only in the latest years, for instance in the Ilva judgment (85/2013) 
: Antonini 2015, 718,; Pin and Longo support a consolidated and rigorous use of this principle by the Court: Pin, 
Longo 2015. 
227 Pin, Longo 2015, 699-700; Lieto also argues that that this second ruling weakens the decision taken in Judgment 
10/2015 and he concludes its commentary emphatically by suggesting that the oil companies may result damaged 
if compared to the pensioners and he seems to completely disregard the crucial difference that should exist in a 
social state between the protection of pensioners and that of multinational companies: Lieto 2015, 6. 
228 D’Onghia 2015, 340; cf. also Cinelli 2015b 442; Giubboni 2015a, 529, according to Giubboni, the Court has 
anyway conducted the scrutiny of reasonableness in a way in which is somehow close to the structured 
proportionality test 
229 D’Onghia 2015, 338, here the author in particular refers to the expression "unequal balancing" suggested by 
Luciani 1995, 126. In a similar way, Guiglia, 2016, 25-30, argues that the unequal balancing conducted in 
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The – opposite – fundamental social rights perspective emerges clearly from the argument that 
“fundamental rights are not born limited by financial requirements”, but it is up to the legislator to 
conduct a transparent balance to select the resources to be invested in the enforcement of these rights. 
Obviously, adds Giubboni, the “more scarce are the available resources, the more stringent the 
constitutional control has to be”230. 
Last, but strictly connected with what said above, the issue of the still uncertain powers of inquiry of 
the Court, with regard to decisions somehow concerning Art. 81 Italian Constitution and the principle 
of balanced budget, has been raised. Morelli argues that in order to enforce Art. 81 Italian Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court would need room to investigate on the financial consequences of a norm. While 
Judgment 10/2015 seems to foresee the possibility for the Court to detain a power of instructions, 
Judgment 70/2015 seems to propend for a burden of proof fully on the State Advocate231. Differently, 
Bergonzini, considering the points in common between the judgments, notices that in both judgments 
there is a “lack of any preliminary investigative activity on the Court’s part” with regard to the 
considerations on the impact on the state budget232. While this choice was made explicit in Judgment 
70/2015, in Judgment 10/2015 the analysis on the financial consequences is found apodictic and 
deficient of any preliminary inquiry, which would have been necessary and, in addition, should have 
been conducted with transparency. However, as pointed out by the author, this approach is consistent 
with Crisculo’s view, according to whom the Court does not make economic assessments233. 
D'Onghia emphasises that the Court has pointed out that during the conversion into Law 214/2011 
no technical reports or documentation on the expected revenues that should follow the measure was 
provided, which has been decisive for the Court, as it implied an objective impossibility for the Court 
to engage in an examination of the balancing operated by the legislator234. 
                                                            
Judgment 70/2015, which has not recognised to Art. 81 Italian Constitution the role of super-parameter, cannot be 
considered a constant feature of the constitutional case law, since the balancing technique is structurally unstable. 
230 Giubboni 2015a, 529, my translation. 
231 Morelli 2015, 712; cf. also Guiglia 2016, 30. 
232 Bergonzini 2016, 188, my translation. 
233 Bergonzini 2016, 189. 
234 D’Onghia 2015, 341-342; the author underlines that attaching a technical report in this sense is a duty of the 
executive since it allows to understand the balancing operated by the legislator. 
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Further criticism is raised in relation to the use of legal precedents. Inter alia, it is argued that the 
Court has forced the meaning of Judgment 316/2010 and wrenched from it a clear warning not to 
reiterate the revaluation of pensions, which was not so evidently expressed in the judgment from 2010. 
Furthermore, even admitting that the Court aimed at giving a clear warning to the lawmaker, Lieto points 
out the substantial differences between the two cases and argues that the reasonableness scrutiny should 
have been carried out taking into account a norm into effect, which regulates analogous situations and 
not with a norm approved under different circumstances. Under this view, the use of Judgment 336/2010 
as an argument supporting the unconstitutionality of the norm appears extremely feeble235.  
To the contrary, according to D’Onghia, Judgment 316/2010 included a clear warning to the 
legislator and made clear that further suspensions of the revaluation mechanism could have infringed 
upon the principles of reasonableness and proportionality and this warning had to be taken into account 
by the legislator, which rather disregarded it. The underestimation of this warning is identified by 
Giubboni as one of the main arguments supporting the Court's decision, together with the comparison 
with the previous cases of block of automatic revaluation. The precedents are crucial to, first of all, 
identify the function of the revaluation mechanism, that is to preserve the real value of the retirement 
benefits (to grant the enforcement of Art. 38.2 Italian Constitution)236. 
Those who consider Judgment 316/2010 a turning point in the constitutional case law, inasmuch as 
it states that a norm, stemming from the austerity policies, has to have a temporary character in order to 
be legitimate, argue that Judgment 70/2015 is anything but a confirmation of such case law. Moreover, 
the consistency with Judgment 316/2010 is revealed by the neat declaration of unconstitutionality and 
the fact the constitutional judges have not been influenced by the economic consequences of their 
decision237.  
                                                            
235 Lieto 2015; Anzon Demmig adds a third judgment to stress the inconsistent approach of the court, that is 
judgment 127/2015, where the Court again takes in full account the principle of balanced budget: Anzon Demming 
2015, 679. 
236 Giubboni 2015a, 527; Guiglia 2016, 24; Also D’Onghia highlights that this type of warning was not new to the 
2010 case law either and already in other occasions the Court had underlined that the lawmaker had to cautious in 
affecting the entity of retirement benefits and respectful of Articles 36 and 38: D'Onghia 2015, 331-332. 
237 Guiglia 2016, 17, 25. In a similar way, Salerno 2015. Of a different view: Morrone 2015. 
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The core argument of the Court is that the revaluation of retirement benefits aims at granting the 
respect of the adequacy criterion, that is of Art. 38.2 Italian Constitution, and therefore of the principle 
of fair remuneration, enshrined in Art. 36 Italian Constitution. This point is supported by the comparison 
with similar norms previously adopted, in order to establish whether the norm under scrutiny was in 
compliance with the principle of reasonableness, as to understand the coherence of that norm with the 
whole legal system and welfare legal framework. It is this comparison, that shows how the norm at stake 
is not consistent with the others since both its time-frame and its scope are way wider, which 
demonstrates that the legislator has not complied with the reasonableness criterion238. 
The labour lawyers’ perspective also allows to consider a crucial element of the Court’s legal 
reasoning, that is the rationale of the mechanism tackled by the provision under scrutiny, and the 
respective use of the legal precedents. Indeed, the Court, by analysing the rationale of this mechanism 
and by comparing the norm at stake with similar ones, concludes that the legislator has violated the 
principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and, consequently, the norm is unconstitutional239. In 
particular, the function of the automatic revaluation mechanism consists in preserving the real value of 
retirement benefits, and, therefore, it implements the principle of adequacy of retirement benefits, 
protected under Art. 38.2 Italian Constitution240. 
Although the legislator enjoys discretionality over the amounts of retirement benefits, with regard to 
the public budget, the automatic revaluation of retirement benefits has to be understood as a “benefit 
that (generally) cannot be restricted”. Even if the legislator acts in this sense, according to Cinelli, it has 
to bear in mind the warning expressed in Judgment 316/2010 and avoid tensions with the principles of 
reasonableness and proportionality241. A guideline to the legislator on the limits to its discretionality is 
provided by the link created between Art. 38 and Art. 36 Italian Constitution, which is “functional to 
                                                            
238 D’Onghia 2015, 334.  
239 Giubboni 2015a, 527. 
240 Cinelli 2015b, 441. 
241 Cinelli 2015b, 442. 
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the ratio of the automatic revaluation” and instrumental to the substantial equality and the enforcement 
of Articles 2 and 3 Italian Constitution242. 
In conclusion, those who have critically reviewed Judgment 70/2015 and have blamed the Court for 
having failed to apply a rigid proportionality test seem to underestimate the primacy of fundamental 
labour rights in the Italian Constitution, as well as the legitimacy of the Court to use different legal 
techniques to evaluate the constitutionality of an ordinary norm. On the other hand, the authors 
supporting the outcome of the Judgment argue that the Court has conducted a fair balance, to the point 
of advocating, in certain cases, that the Court has applied a sort of proportionality test. However, this 
perspective fails to comprehend the argumentative approach chosen by the Court and the differences 
and similarities between the latest and a proportionality test.  
 
2.2.2.2 The last episodes of a case law in search of some coherence: Judgment 173/2016 and 
Judgment 250/2017 
Four paragraphs of Art. 1 of Law 147/2013 (Stability Law for 2014) were contested in Judgment 
173/2016. Eventually, the Court declared two claims unfounded and two inadmissible. First, Art. 1.483, 
which provided for a new modulation of the percentage of automatic revaluation for all retirement 
benefits, for the three year period 2014-2016, and a block of the revaluation of pensions six times higher 
than the minimum for 2014. The Court, referring to its case law, concludes for the constitutionality of 
this measure, inasmuch as it does not provide for a total suspension of the revaluation mechanism for 
certain, relatively low, retirement benefits, as it was the case in Judgment 70/2015. Indeed, the norm, 
inspired by the criterion of graduation, is found in compliance with the principles of reasonableness and 
proportionality. 
Second, the claim related to Art. 1.486 is admitted. The norm provided for a “solidarity contribution” 
to be detracted from the highest retirement benefits (15-30 times higher than the minimum), for a three 
year period. The constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1.486 was contested by the referring court on the 
                                                            
242 D’Onghia 2015, 335, 337; Giubboni advances a criticism related to the application of Art. 36 Constitution to 
the case at stake, inasmuch as, it is argued, it does not pertain to the retirement benefits. However, the author 
emphasises that the sole application of Art. 38 would have led to the same conclusions: Giubboni 2015a, 331. 
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grounds of a number of constitutional provisions. Inter alia, Articles 2, 3, 36, 38 and 53 Italian 
Constitution were deemed violated since the norms at stake would be in contrast with the principles of 
reasonableness and solidarity, the principles of adequate retirement benefits and proportionality with the 
work carried out and the principle of legitimate expectation. After having mentioned the need to assess 
the norm with a “strict scrutiny of constitutionality”, the Court dismissed the grounds of 
unconstitutionality under the arguments that the solidarity contribution at stake does not qualify as a tax 
revenue and it is truly destined to the welfare system solidarity, and it anyway respects the criteria of 
sustainability, reasonableness and proportionality. The proportionality of this measure is to be found 
mainly in the circumstance that it is only addressed to the highest retirement benefits and it is 
temporary243. 
Judgment 173/2016 is prised first of all because, in declaring unfounded the unconstitutionality of 
Art. 1.483, refers to Judgment 70/2015, with regard to the substantial difference identified between a 
block in the revaluation mechanism and a modulation by the judgment from 2015, thus creating a 
continuity between the two decisions244. Indeed, the first issue decided by the Court relates to a new 
modulation in the retirement benefits revaluation, which concerns all pensions (and a total block only 
for pensions higher than six times the minimum) for the years 2014-2018. This significant difference 
has allowed the Court to declare the norm legitimate, since it fulfils the principles of proportionality of 
retirement benefits and adequacy, consistently with Judgment 70/2015245. Indeed, this part of the 
judgment is a follow-up to Judgment 70/2015, while the legal reasoning referring to Art. 1.486 is 
considered more interesting, since it presents innovative elements. 
In particular, Persiani discusses the reasoning grounding the declaration of constitutionality of the 
solidarity contribution introduced by Art. 1.486. The author highlights the main criteria used by the 
Court to assess the admissibility of the claim of unconstitutionality of the solidarity contribution, that is 
the principle of reasonableness, the principle of proportionality and the legitimate expectation, to be 
understood as legal certainty. While no remark is made as regard the application of the first principle, 
                                                            
243 For a commentary of the judgment, cf. Pedullà 2016. 
244 Guiglia 2016, 18; see, also, Pedullà 2016, 4. 
245 Sandulli 2016, 688. 
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traditionally used to evaluate the discretionality of the legislator in the social security legislation, doubts 
are raised as to both the application of the principle of proportionate remuneration, as enshrined in Art. 
36 Italian Constitution, and the use of the principle of legitimate expectation (that Persiani distinguishes 
from that of legal certainty) which implies that the Court considers the retirement positions acquired 
rights. However, the Court explains that the principle of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked if the 
pensioners concerned have enough awareness of the socio-economic context, and therefor in this context 
of crisis, these pensioners have to be aware that higher benefits cannot be fully granted due to the 
shortcomings of public budget. If that is the reasoning of the Court, in the scholar’s opinion, there are 
no retirement positions that can be considered acquired rights246. Doubts on the appropriateness of 
labelling the retirement benefits as acquired rights are raised also by Pedullà, who observes that it is 
hardly arguable that a right as the retirement benefit, so strongly subject to the economic and financial 
trend and which can be limited – albeit under certain conditions – by the discretionality of the legislator, 
can be easily defined an “acquired right”247. 
Persiani also focuses on the fact that the Court has confirmed the functional link between Art. 36 and 
Art. 36 Italian Constitution set in Judgment 70/2015, but, in theory, it has a mitigated the scope of this 
connection (in particular he refers to paragraph 5 of the judgment). Nevertheless, in practice the link 
seems to remain tight. It is emphasised that the Court applies the principle of sustainability of retirement 
benefits, in order to verify the compliance with the principle of proportionality and assess whether the 
benefits are proportionate to the pension contributions (Art. 36 Italian Constitution) and not to the 
adequacy of the benefit itself (Art. 38 Italian Constitution)248.  
Farther observations relate to, first, the relevance given to the temporary character of the measure 
both because the “temporal character” – emphasised by the Court to ground the constitutionality of the 
provision – does not relate at all to the concept of “adequate means” and because “it seems ingenuous 
                                                            
246 Persiani 2017, 284-285. 
247 Pedullà 2016, 7. 
248 Persiani 2017, 286. The author reflects upon the missed opportunity of defining the meaning of “adequate 
means to life needs” and the controversial application of Art. 36 Italian Constitution to measures regulating the 
retirement system, especially since the sole application of Art. 38 Italian Constitution, in his view, would have led 
to the same conclusion; in this respect see also Giubboni 2015a, with regard to Judgment 70/2015. 
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to think that the social security financial crisis is a temporary phenomenon”249. According to Sandulli, 
the temporal element is crucial, especially because the ruling does not crystallise the solidarity 
contribution and it is rather up to the lawmaker to decide, considering the developments of the financial 
crisis, whether to consolidate this measure or not and what other reforms of the social security system 
may be necessary250. A last point raised by Persiani concerns the missing assessment on whether other 
alternative and less harmful means would have been available251.  Moreover, it has been noted, that the 
Court for the first time has established a principle of solidarity and responsibility between generations, 
thus adopting an approach that understands rights and duties in a circular way, which is founded upon 
Art. 2 and Art. 38 Italian Constitution252. 
In Judgment 250/2017, the Court has declared the legitimacy of two provisions adopted with the 
explicit aim of implementing Judgment 70/2015 and amending the regulation on the automatic 
revaluation of pensions, in compliance with the principle of balanced budget and the public finance 
targets (Art. 24.25 and Art. 24.25-bis of D.L. 201/2011, as substituted by Art. 1.1-1) of D.L. 65/2015).  
The norms at issue reconsider the modulation of the automatic revaluation of pensions for the years 
2012-2013 (the automatic revaluation for retirement benefits six times as high as the minimum INPS 
benefit is ruled out and for retirement benefits between three and six times the INPS minimum the 
revaluation is based upon decreasing percentages) and its weight in the determination of the automatic 
revaluation for the years 2014-2016 (so called trascinamento).  The Court rules in favour of the 
legitimacy of the contested norms, because they have “introduced a new and not unreasonable 
modulation of the mechanism for the revaluation of pensions” (italics added).  It has been highlighted 
that the principle of reasonableness has been defined the cornerstone of the pension system, in the sense 
that should represent the centre around which the legislator conducts its activity253 
The Court legitimates the legislator’s choice by putting emphasis on the technical documents 
provided by the Parliament and the Government and by “clarifying even better the nexus between Art. 
                                                            
249 Sandulli 2016, 691, my translation. 
250 Sandulli 2016, 691the author also compares assesses Judgment 173/2016 jointly with Judgment 174/2016. 
251 Persiani 2017, 293. 
252 Pepe 2016; Pepe 2017. A different perspective over Judgment 173/2016 is offered by Procopio 2016. 
253 D’Onghia 2017, 103. 
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36 and Art. 38 Constitution”. According to D’Onghia, this ruling makes clear that the nexus between 
the right to a proportionate remuneration (Art. 36 Italian Constitution) and the right to adequate 
retirement benefits (Art. 38 Italian Constitution) is indirect, even though the principle of adequateness 
is anyway informed also by meritocratic criteria254.  
Overall, this is the last Italian post-crisis case where fundamental labour “rights” and their 
effectiveness have a central position, and the importance of ensuring coexistence between economic 
sustainability and social sustainability emerges and an equilibrium between the values concerned has to 
be found255. 
 
Conclusion 
In the Spanish Constitutional post-crisis case law, a structured proportionality test is only allegedly 
applied. However, even though the dissenting Judge has widely referred to the misuse of the 
proportionality test in both Judgments, the labour law scholarship has not assessed the missed 
application of this argumentative technique and the constitutional lawyers have done so only to a minor 
extent and, especially without focusing enough on the fundamental labour rights concerned. In these 
cases, the decisions of the Court have been accused, mostly by labour lawyers, of being oriented to 
support economic interests at the detriment of fundamental labour rights, in order to uphold the 
Government’s choices slavishly. On the other side of the Mediterranean, the Italian case offers a reach 
case law, mostly dealing with provisions aimed at enforcing the balanced budget principle, which 
appears not always consistent and coherent and it has been accused of having failed to develop a 
structured and convincing legal reasoning, which can satisfy the demands for transparency. However, 
the same case law has also been prised for an active defence of labour rights and a correct understanding 
of the Constitutional Court’s role in a democratic system based upon a rigid Constitution that enshrines 
a wide range of fundamental labour rights.  
Judgment 70/2015 of the Italian Constitutional Court provides a significant example, inasmuch as it 
has stimulated the Italian academic literature to address more closely the legal reasoning of the Court 
                                                            
254 D’Onghia 2017, 98, my translation. 
255 D’Onghia 2017, 97 and 106. 
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and the application of the balancing technique, with a peculiar focus on the relevance of the balanced 
budget principle. However, the references that can be found in the literature to this element do not take 
into due account the theoretical questions behind the key principles of proportionality and 
reasonableness in the Italian legal system, nor a comprehensive analysis of the judicial discourse of the 
crisis-case law – in its entirety – has be conducted, yet. 
The first question that a labour lawyer approaching topics such as the constitutional balancing, 
traditionally addressed by constitutional lawyers, is tempted to ask is whether priority should be given 
to the structure of the legal reasoning, or to the effective protection of the fundamental labour rights at 
issue. In other words, from a labour law perspective: is it more important to adopt a structured balancing, 
which in practice risks to be easily circumvented, or an approach that allows the Court to fulfil its role 
of warrantor of fundamental labour rights and guarantee that these rights are enforced?  
One the one hand, certain literature, mainly Italian, seems to suggest that the application of a rigid 
proportionality test is a priority, in order to assure transparency and consistency of the constitutional 
legal reasoning. This literature undermines the prominence of an effective enforcement of fundamental 
labour rights, which is instead the central argument of a number of Italian labour lawyers. On the other 
hand, the missed application of the proportionality test is beclouded, mainly from the Spanish labour 
scholarship, by the legitimate reflections on the missed protection of the fundamental labour rights 
concerned by the Spanish judgments. 
While, the arguments in favour of the application of a systematized technique as the proportionality 
test are remarkable and comprehensible, it is legitimate to wonder whether a fundamental rights’ 
discourse, as long as it is well framed and structured, should prevail over a systematised and rigid 
technique. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate what is the legitimate alternative, in terms of legal 
reasoning, on how to balance fundamental labour rights with other constitutional interests and principles, 
bearing in mind the urgency to enforce fundamental labour rights and comply with the values of a Social 
Constitution (this concept is elaborated further in Chapter 2). Linked to that, further relevant issues have 
been raised by the literature discussed in this chapter: which elements can be balanced against? Can we 
give for granted that a balancing of fundamental social rights and financial requirements on an equal 
basis is a “fair balancing”? Is the balancing between labour rights and economic freedoms (even if 
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carried out by applying the proportionality test) appropriate to the enforcement of a Constitution socially 
grounded? And, if so, to what extent fundamental labour rights can be compressed and upon which 
arguments? 
In order to properly discuss the constitutional case law, the labour law perspective cannot abstain 
from reflecting upon the constitutional categories and the impact of the legal reasoning structure on the 
effective enforcement of fundamental labour rights. The literature review conducted in this chapter 
suggests a necessity to integrate the constitutional and labour perspectives of analysis of the 
constitutional case law. In particular, such a reconciliation, as far as concerns the post-crisis case law, 
allows to address in a comprehensive way the impact of the economic crisis on fundamental labour 
rights, at the latest stage of legal analysis that of the giudice delle leggi.  
The analytical focus on the structure of the legal reasoning of the Constitutional Court cannot avoid 
the crucial aspect of an effective enforcement of social rights, considering the core values underpinning 
Constitutions such as the Italian and the Spanish ones, and vice versa. The matter is extremely relevant, 
in the opinion of whom is writing, in light of the increasing legal – and even constitutional – value that 
economic interests – both private and public - are gaining in legal systems with a strong social 
connotation, deriving from a Constitution, which reserves consistent qualitative, as well as quantitative, 
space to the protection of social and labour rights. For this reason, the next chapter is devoted to illustrate 
and discuss the relevant Italian and Spanish theories on constitutional balancing. 
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Chapter 2 
A reappraisal of constitutional balancing in Italy and Spain 
 
Introduction 
“Proportionality test” and/or “principle of proportionality”, as well as “reasonableness” are often 
used with levity by labour law scholars. For instance, it is not uncommon to find, in the Italian literature 
addressed in the previous chapter, evaluations of the Italian judgments, which give for granted that the 
Italian Court should apply the proportionality test and its sub-tests: suitability, necessity and balancing 
in a strict sense. Equally striking is that it is very rare to perceive, in the literature reviewed, a conscious 
use of the term “balancing”, not only as far as concerns its application, but also as regards the subject 
which should conduct the balancing. 
Although, obviously, the analysis of constitutional judgments and, in general, fundamental labour 
rights adjudication, as far as concerns both legal arguments and conclusions, conducted from a labour 
law perspective strongly concentrates on the labour rights’ enforcement, this viewpoint cannot 
underestimate the necessity to understand and apply properly the analytical categories traditionally 
belonging to constitutional studies. In the opinion of whom is writing, labour law scholars need to 
approach the post-crisis (but not only) constitutional case law by taking seriously the constitutional 
criteria, in order to cleanse the analysis of the constitutional interpretation of fundamental labour rights 
of cliché and inaccuracies and increase the value of a perspective usually more prone to support the 
application of fundamental labour rights and widen their scope.  
Therefore, it is necessary to address the constitutional literature on balancing in Italy and Spain, by 
carefully contextualizing this technique in the respective legal systems, as to avoid approximations and 
identify the criteria respectively used, their contents and the national judicial practice to which they 
belong. For this reason, the following pages discuss balancing in the Italian legal system, with a focus 
on the principle of reasonableness; and balancing in the Spanish legal system, with a focus on the 
proportionality principle. The necessity to approach the theoretical studies on the balancing method and 
the proportionality and reasonableness criteria in precise legal contexts – in our case Italy and Spain – 
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stems from the assumption that these are not absolute criteria, but they are inextricably linked to their 
legal and judicial terrain, composed by legal sources, judicial tradition and academic literature256. 
However, this distinction, made for systematization purposes, does not want to suggest that the 
reflections developed in the two strains of literature strictly apply only to the respective national judicial 
cases. To the contrary, they give cause for reflection, as concerns the entirety of all of the Judgments 
discussed. 
Before going to assess the two national legal approaches, the chapter briefly introduces the key 
features of the so called neo-constitutional theory, which provides the necessary conceptual basis to 
understand the theoretical justification that allows to balance conflicting rights and interests. Eventually, 
the conclusions summarise the main concepts and frame the fundamental rights’ theory that underlies 
the analysis carried out in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
 
1. Constitutional balancing and its theoretical justifications 
The increasing compression of constitutional labour rights requires a reflection upon the role that the 
constitutional balancing and the general clauses – applied in the Italian and Spanish cases – can have in 
order to limit this tendency and foster the dialogue between written norms and their context, through a 
“solid awareness of the purposes and a fine argumentative technique”257. It has been argues that, 
differently from the legal reasoning that applies in the domain of ordinary law, where the balancing 
technique is used only to found the premises of the decision, in the constitutional judgment it constitutes 
“the form of the decisions, which consists of a judgment of prevalence between different principles, 
                                                            
256 Following the global success of balancing and principle of proportionality, the academic literature has often 
addressed these concepts extrapolating them from their national legal context. See, for instance, the confusing 
international approach in Young 2017, who reflects on proportionality, reasonableness and economic and social 
rights. Bomhoff, to the contrary, starts its analysis from the assumption that “we are not in a global age of 
balancing” and the national peculiarities need to be properly considered: Bomhoff 2013. Also within the EU legal 
framework – strictly speaking –, balancing is a controversial issue, especially as concerns the Court of Justice legal 
reasoning. The proportionality test, i.e. the argumentative technique normally applied by the CJEU, is especially 
criticised when used to adjudicate cases dealing with fundamental rights; see, inter alia, De Witte 2009; Loi 2011; 
De Vries et al. 2012. For a focus on the balancing in the well-known cases Laval, Viking and Omega see, inter 
alia, Sybe 2013. 
257 Mengoni 1986, 165-178, my translation. 
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which are in conflict in the concrete case, or a judgment of coexistence and competition (concorrenza), 
where there is reciprocal limitation”258. 
Before analysing the role of general clauses and the more general balancing techniques, in relation 
to a proper enforcement of fundamental labour rights in the case law on post-crisis measures, it is 
necessary to reflect upon the constitutional balancing as it has been conducted so far by the two 
Constitutional Courts and interpreted by the relevant national scholarship. Therefore, this chapter aims 
at reconstructing the key moments and aspects of the constitutional balancing and assess the application 
of the respective general clauses – the principle of reasonableness in the Italian legal system and the 
principle of proportionality in the Spanish case law –, which serve the purpose to rationalize the 
balancing process.   
However, the reflections on the balancing of conflicting rights, principles or interests in the two 
national legal systems selected need to be introduced by a short reflection on the recent legal theoretical 
debates on modern constitutionalism and fundamental rights. In particular, the balancing of fundamental 
rights and principles is a judicial technique deemed essential by neo-constitutional theories. Neo-
constitutionalism has various shades and grades, however, this concise review does not go into detail on 
the different and elaborated neo-constitutionalisms, but only the key points of this approach are traced259. 
One of the core aspects of neo-constitutional theories is the relevance recognised to the constitutional 
principles in constitutional legal systems. Therefore, it is paramount to begin by introducing the concept 
of principle and the differences between principles and rules, under this approach. 
Certainly, in several legal systems, the application of general principles represents an efficient way 
to adapt rights to the changing economic and social context; in this sense, the combination of rules and 
principles constitutes a key feature of modern constitutional States260. Furthermore, a principles’ sub-
cluster can be identified, which is composed by fundamental principles that affect any branch of ordinary 
law261. 
                                                            
258 Mengoni 1996, 122, my translation. 
259 On the distinction between neo-constitutionlism and neo-constitutionalisms see Ratti 2015. 
260 Loi 2016, 169; see also the review on neo-constitutional theories by Ratti 2015. 
261 Chiassoni 2015, 52. 
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The centrality of the constitutional principles is well expressed by Zagrebelsky who points out that 
“only principles [and not rules] play a proper constitutional role, which is “constitutive” of the 
constitutional system”262.  In modern Constitutions, as the Italian and Spanish ones, fundamental rights 
are formally expressed by norms, but they retain the structure of and act as principles and express a 
preference for protecting certain interests over others263. Hence, constitutional principles make values 
enforceable and underpin rights and interests constitutionally protected264. In the words of an 
authoritative Spanish scholar: “[L]as reglas son formas de realizar los principios y los principios son 
formas de realizar un valor”265. 
Various theories have been developed, in order to justify and frame the distinction between principles 
and rules, in addition, the concept of principle is highly debated and the only uncontroversial feature 
seems to be its indeterminacy.   
Zagrebelsky identifies the main difference between rules and principles in the different “treatment” 
to which the two concepts are subject. Indeed, only the rules are interpreted through methods, which 
assess the wording of the legislative act, while in the case of principles “there is not much to be 
interpreted”, given that their lexical meaning is plain266. Rather than being interpreted, principles shall 
be understood in terms of the values they express, and that is because, while we must obey the rules, we 
adhere to principles, hence there is a necessity to understand the set of values to which they belong267. 
The value is a pre-legal concept that becomes legal – is “positivizzato” - once it is incorporated in a 
principle or in a fundamental right, and fundamental principles and rights are norms, albeit weaker 
norms, which need to be recognised and enforced. So, for instance, the value of freedom is legally 
                                                            
262 Zagrebelsky 1992,148, my translation.  
263 See Bin 1992, 1-8. Also, Pino 2009. 
264 Modugno 2007, 33. 
265 “Rules are ways to realize principles and principles are eays to realize a value”, Preciado Domènech 2016, 84, 
my translation. The author widely refers to Anotnion Enrique Pérez-Luno theories: Pérez-Luno 2017. 
266 Zagrebelsky 1992, 148, my translation. 
267 However, a relationship between principles and interpretation seems to exist and to be bidirectional, so that the 
principles are both functional to the interpretation and deriving from the hermeneutic activity, see Loi 2016, 168; 
a concrete example can be found in the Italian legal system and Art. 12 Civil Code, see further in this Chapter. 
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expressed in a series of fundamental rights268. No need to specify that the norm in a strict sense is a 
“strong” legislative requirement, which requires obedience269.  
Under the neo-constitutional perspective, the circumstance that a difference between rules and 
principles exists does not mean that principles are ancillary to rules and only have an integrating function 
in the legal system – as a positivistic approach would support270. To the contrary, principles have a direct 
impact on the reality and are able to shed a normative light over the factual case. Zagrebelsky 
summarizes this concept with an eloquent sentence: “each principle underpins the imperative: ‘you will 
take a stand on the reality, on the grounds of what I am stating’”271.  
When discussing neo-constitutional theories a reference to Dworkin, one of the pioneers of this 
approach, is paramount. The author argues that a rule is a norm that sets a goal, while the principle does 
not entail the achievement of a specific aim, but it can influence the final decision depending on the 
weight assigned by the judge. In practice, if two rules are in conflict, one of them is simply not valid, 
since the rule has an absolute weight. To the contrary, if two principles are in conflict, both are still valid 
and the weight of one principle has to be decided in relation to the other, so that they can be applied by 
the Judge in the most controversial cases272.  
Drawing on Dowrkin’s theory, Alexy elaborates that, while a rule is a norm that can be simply 
complied with or not, the principle represents an optimization command (Optimisierungsgebote), which 
is in a structural and indissoluble relationship with values, inasmuch as a judgment based on principles 
entails a reference to values. Principles can only be applied in relation to the judicial and factual 
possibilities of the legal system, in the sense that the enforcement of a principle requires both an 
assessment of the concrete case at stake and the legal possibilities (that is other principles and rules). 
Therefore, for both authors, a conflict of principles is inherent in a constitutional system providing for 
                                                            
268 Mengoni,1993, 257. Zagrebelsky 1992, 147, 149. The constitutional lawyer, in another occasion, clarifies the 
distinction between the rule and the principle, on the grounds that the first is a norm with closed antecedent, which 
clearly identifies the facts that trigger the application of the norm, while the principle is a norm with open 
antecedent, hence the norm does not make the triggering facts explicit: Zagrebelsky 2008, 210. 
269 Mengoni 2008, 246. 
270 Nor the neo-constitutionalism correspond to natural law, besides Zagrebelsky 1992, see the accurate distinction 
made by Mauro Barberis on the various philosophies of law, inter alia, neo-constitutionalism and natural law: 
Barberis 2011. 
271 Zagrebelsky 1992, 163, my translation. 
272 Dworkin 1967, 22 ff. 
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fundamental principles and it can be solved by taking into account the relative weight of each of them, 
hence, by balancing the principles. As a result of this rational process, no principle is declared 
inapplicable (as it would happen in case of conflict of rules), but simply slightly recessive compared to 
the other, nor an absolute prevalence of a principle over the other is established. Under this view point, 
the Constitutional Court shall have a pervasive role in the continuous construction of the legal system273.  
On the grounds of Dworkin’s and Alexy’s theories, also Luigi Mengoni advocates for the application 
of the constitutional balancing. According to the Italian authoritative scholar, the normative structures 
expressing values – that is both general clauses, as the principle of equality, and fundamental rights – 
differ from the traditional legal norms, especially in their application, which occurs through the 
balancing of “corresponding goods and interests”. Therefore, it is up to the Judge to conduct a scrutiny, 
which puts in an equality order the concurring values (giudizio di equiordinzione). Under this view, the 
scrutiny over fundamental principles and rights shall be based upon the application of the proportionality 
criterion274. Indeed, the balancing of principles requires a theory that circumscribes rigorously the 
discretionality of the Judge and avoids the “apparent collisions”, which, according to the author, are the 
result of the introduction of extraneous ideological factors. The “apparent collision” is not direct 
outcome of the application of the balancing method, but it rather stems from a weak analysis of the 
normative scope of application of fundamental rights and principles, which should be the first phase of 
this type of constitutional judgment, in order to detect when a real collision occurs275.  
The protection of several and diverse interests from the Italian and Spanish Constitutions makes the 
balancing of conflicting principles – and respective rights or interests - a crucial moment of the 
constitutional judgment in both legal systems addressed in this dissertation. Indeed, “[T]he 
constitutional judgment rather consists in the identification of the relevant constitutional principles and 
their balancing, in order to evaluate the compatibility of the ordinary norm under scrutiny, with those 
principles”276. To say it in Modugno’s way, the balancing guarantees that each value expressed by each 
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principle is protected and enforced at least to a minimum extent277. Bin argues that the Italian 
Constitution – but the same applies to the other Constitutions as the Spanish one – differently from the 
Constitutions of the 19th century, has embedded the conflict of values, rather than providing a solution. 
In other words, it does not freeze the power relationships between conflicting interests, and, hence, it 
qualifies as a pluralist Constitution. This feature makes modern Constitutions able to face the social 
complexities of modern societies278.  
Under this view, an absolute hierarchy of principles would contradict the nature of principles, which 
are legal expressions of values and, hence, cannot be classified, inasmuch as a value cannot be 
considered higher than any other. “As in abstract principles are never logically incompatible, in abstract 
it is not possible to establish an order of preference”279, differently from the norms in a strict sense, 
which can be organized hierarchically. Mengoni adds that the political character of the Constitution 
implies that its norms cannot be translated into neutral concepts responding to a pre-ordered scale of 
values (“concetti assiologicamente neutrali”). Indeed, the relationship between the person and the 
society/State cannot be pre-determined in light of a static hierarchy of values280.  
Among those arguing against an assimilation of values and rights or principles, it is worthwhile to 
mention at least Jurgen Habermas, who denies the rationality and, hence, the applicability of the 
balancing. The distinction between values and rights/principles is supported by the argument that once 
a value is translated into a norm – that is a principle –, its meaning changes, in the sense that it acquires 
a legal significance. In brief, Habermas identifies four core distinctions. First, norms show the correct 
behaviour, while values simply recommend the most suitable behaviour. Second, norms can only be 
either valid or not valid, while values establish preference relationships. Third, principles are universally 
binding; while values provide for a general estimation of what is good for the society. Last, and crucial, 
while norms can never contradict each other and shall be coherent to frame the legal system, values are 
in a constant struggle for prevailing281. 
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The renowned philosopher argues in favour of a more limited role of the judicial constitutional body, 
which should be confined to grant the proper functioning of the democratic mechanisms282. As Alexy, 
also Habermas grounds its reflection upon the German constitutional case law, but differently from its 
colleague he criticizes its role as interpreter of the constitutional values, which, in his opinion, causes 
an overlapping with the democratic decisions, given that principles, as norms, are not optimizable and 
have to be entirely applied, therefore cannot be subject to a balancing. Furthermore, the author advocates 
that it is impossible to grant rationality in the application of the balancing technique and stresses the 
subjectivity of this procedure283. 
However, also Habermas argues that principles are undetermined norms, compared to rules, but this 
does not entail an incoherence of the overall legal system. Indeed, the principles’ indeterminacy 
exclusively entails that a legal argumentation is necessary, in order to understand which principle is 
applicable. In the end, only a norm (a principle) is the valid one, in relation to the factual case, and 
applicable in the case at stake284.  
In a remarkable essay, Luigi Ferrajoli elaborates a critique to both the neo-constitutional distinction 
between rights and principles, and the respective theory on constitutional balancing. Ferrajoli argues 
that the sharp differentiation between rules and principles does not reflect a structural feature of the 
constitutional system, but it is rather a merely stylistic choice, which, however, has a practical effect: it 
weakens the normative power of principles, that is fundamental rights. The scholar proposes a different 
distinction, between Principi direttivi (that provide for general guidelines) and Principi regolativi 
(which content is imperative). With the result that a constitutional norm can either express a Principio 
regolativo or a Principio direttivo, but also both of them, in the sense that it can be regolativo as to the 
an and direttivo as to the quomodo (e.g. Art. 38.1, Italian Constitution). “Behind every rule there is a 
principle”285, and the Principi regolativi, if violated, act as rules286.  
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As a consequence, also the appropriateness of the balancing conducted by the Constitutional Courts 
is put into question. In this respect, he openly opposes what he calls costituzionalismo principialista to 
the costituzionalismo garantista – which he favours. Ferrajoli introduces its argument, by sharply 
distinguishing between judicial balancing and legislative balancing. The balancing conducted in the law-
making process is welcomed, albeit only between Principi direttivi, and the same is true when 
fundamental social rights that include both types of principles come into question, so that the full 
application of the Principi regolativi expressed therein cannot be put into question (see again the 
example of Art. 38 Italian Constitution). This is necessary in light of the fact that fundamental rights 
mutually reinforce each other, so that if social rights are not guaranteed, liberty rights cannot be properly 
exercised and, as a consequence, also political rights remain unenforced. Different is the case of the 
judicial balancing. Indeed, the costituzionalismo garantista understands the judicial power as tightly 
limited by the law and the Constitution, and requires the Court to balance exclusively factual 
circumstances and not also the norms – of any kind.  
 The author agrees with the costituzioanlismo principialista insofar as it supports that constitutional 
balancing must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, but he argues that factual circumstances and not 
principles are subject to the balancing exercise, given that principles, in Ferrajoli’s view, have an 
absolute and not relative weight and therefore cannot be sacrificed, neither partially, nor occasionally. 
If this were to happen, the Constitution would be dis-applied and the legislator authorized to exercise its 
power in conflict with the primary source, thus overly widening the Court’s discretionality and, hence, 
raising controversies over a political role of the Constitutional Judge. In light of the constitutional 
judicial tradition, judicial balancing seems to be a little more than a new word to call the old “systematic 
interpretation” …. which consists of the interpretation of the meaning of a norm in light of all other 
norms of the legal system”287, on this ground the scholar criticises what he calls an excessive emphasis 
put on the idea of judicial balancing that has become a “terminological bubble”288.  
In his most recent publication, Roberto Bin discusses a number of issues around the understanding 
and enforcement of rights. Among the various matters addressed, it is noteworthy that the authoritative 
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constitutional lawyer has decided to devote a chapter to answer a question, which is a crucial – in the 
opinion of whom is writing – precondition to analyse the balancing method: “whose job is it to balance 
rights?”. The concise reflection helps clarifying an aspect that, so far, has not been widely addressed by 
the traditional academic literature on balancing, even though it is of paramount importance to evaluate 
both the legal reasoning on a Constitutional Court and whether the Court remains within its 
constitutional competence, or it trespasses on the political domain, pertaining to the legislative power 
(even Roberto Bin, in his popular book on balancing published in 1992, did not make this element clear). 
The author’s main argument cannot be misunderstood, as he reiterates it clearly, several times: “it is up 
to the legislator to set the balancing terms”289 and “reconcile different interests”290. The balancing is 
conducted by the legislator in abstract terms, the same legislator sets the point of equilibrium in an 
ordinary law, according to its political vision. The Constitutional Court may be called upon “to verify if 
the balancing that the legislator has translated into legal terms remains within the tolerance limits”291. 
Indeed, the national Constitutional Courts do deal with the balancing of interests to verify its 
constitutional consistency, but they do not conduct directly the balancing: in a proper constitutional 
judicial balancing the balancing conducted by the legislator is the object of the constitutional legal 
reasoning292. 
 
2. Balancing in the Italian constitutional case law  
The first and paramount reason for the Italian Constitutional Court to apply the balancing method 
stems from the absence in the Italian legal system of an abstract and predetermined hierarchy of 
constitutional rights and principles293. A large part of the scholarship disagrees with the creation of an 
absolute hierarchy, since it would be in contrast with the pluralist character of the Italian constitutional 
system. Under this perspective, the pluralist system per se rejects a crystallisation of the social structure 
and a rigid approach to the relationship between social interests. Indeed, all comparable constitutional 
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interests have to be confronted on equal terms, and a system where certain interests are structurally 
defeated from others cannot be conceived294. Consistently, Luciani argues that balancing can be 
conducted only “among equals”295.  
However, a principle can prevail over another, in relation to a concrete case. In fact, it is in the 
occasion of a concrete judicial case, and in relation to factual assumptions296, that the “balancing, 
reconciliation, composition of and among different principles” takes place, without this resulting in a 
hierarchy of constitutional principles297. 
This does not mean that the fundamental principles are not subject to any limit or constraint. In the 
Italian Constitution, albeit neither a general norm on the essential content of fundamental rights, nor a 
general limitation clause were included in the 1948 Constitution298, every right is recognised together 
with its limit and, often, the limited character of a fundamental right emerges explicitly from the 
provision in which it is enshrined.  In certain occasions, the Italian Constitutional Court has considered 
the essential content of rights a necessary condition to realize the human dignity, in the sense that, in 
any case, the sacrifice of a fundamental right can go that far to obstacle the realization of personal 
dignity, or the dignity of others. A glaring example of the strict link existing between fundamental rights 
                                                            
294 Scaccia 2000, 3964. 
295 Luciani 1995, 569, my translation. This view is sharply criticised by Bin, who finds Luciani’s assumption 
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95 
 
and human dignity in the Italian Constitutional structure is provided by Art. 36 Italian Constitution, 
where the right to a decent existence is a structural feature of the right to a fair remuneration299. 
The Constitutional Court in Judgment 1146/1988 has stated that fundamental constitutional 
principles “cannot be upset or modified in their essential content”, because it is precisely the essential 
content that makes them expression of values and not simple legal requirements. Therefore, the principle 
can be tackled and derogated from as long as the underlying value is not affected. This does not exclude 
the supreme principles from the constitutional dialectic, where all principles operate a mutual 
restriction300. “The interferences take place at the principles’ margins, which remain untouched in the 
nucleus”301. 
The peculiar case of the implementation of a social right, which requires the legislator to provide for 
enough financial resources, is no exception to the rule of the essential content. In fact, albeit the legislator 
enjoys full discretionality on the allocation of the public resources, the Constitutional Court has the duty 
to hamper a “macroscopically unreasonable exercise of this discretionality”302, when the legislative 
choice “compresses the essential nucleus of a right”303. In light of the strict connection between the 
fundamental rights’ essential content and “human dignity”, “the essential content of social rights is an 
expression that refers to the services which are necessary to realize the processes of inclusion of the 
single person into the dynamics of the community. Clearly, the legal institute alludes to a minimum 
standard of constitutionally active interventions imposed to the public powers, with an immediate 
practical consequence: it means that the protection of the essential content of fundamental social rights 
occurs through remedies that can fix negligent behaviours by the legislator or the public 
administration”304.  
                                                            
299 On “essential content” and “human dignity” see, for example, Judgment 366/1991 and Judgment 293/2000, 
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Recently, in Judgment 85/2013, the Court has eloquently pointed out that “every fundamental right 
protected by the Constitution is mutually integrated, therefore it is not possible to identify one with 
absolute prevalence over the other”305, as to avoid the unconceivable scenario of the unlimited expansion 
of a right. The Court proceeds by asserting that "the point of equilibrium, dynamic and not fixed in 
advance, has to be evaluated [...] according to the criteria of proportionality and reasonableness” in such 
a way that the "essential nucleus" of fundamental rights is not sacrificed306.  
The Italian scholarship is not only divided between the absolute theory and relative theory on the 
essential content (see the chapter 3.3, on the Spanish legal system, where this theoretical debate is more 
articulated), but, especially, what is still very controversial is the convenience of applying such a 
concept. The possibility to evaluate and define the essential content of a fundamental right is strongly 
questioned by authoritative Italian authors. In a recent book, Roberto Bin explicitly refers to and share 
Giuliano Amato’s theories, by arguing that “the content of rights cannot be determined, rather we must 
investigate the origin, justification and scope of their limits”307. Bin adds that “none knows exactly” 
what is the minimum essential content that cannot be compressed, therefore the protection of a 
fundamental right cannot be constrained to the recognition of the essential content308. 
The judicial technique of balancing is therefore of paramount importance in a pluralist Constitution, 
in which concrete situations of conflict of interests occur. Indeed, the giudizio di bilanciamento has long 
been known and practiced by the Italian constitutional case law in order to apply the pluralist 
Constitution309. Its application is essential especially in the event that the legislator excessively favours 
a principle over another310.   
The balancing of interests in the constitutional case law is understood by certain authoritative Italian 
scholarship as a non-interpretative and non-deductive argumentative framework, by which the Court 
balances concurring constitutional principles and creates a hierarchical relationship311. The distinction 
                                                            
305 My translation. 
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between balancing and interpretation is stressed by Bin, who argues that the two techniques represent 
parallel legal reasoning, given that the latter concerns the text of the law, while balancing mostly not312. 
Overall, as already discussed, balancing constitutes a dynamic exercise, which is carried out on a 
case-by-case basis, without an attempt to establish an absolute hierarchy among rights and interests 
constitutionally protected. The pure balancing must be distinguished from the interpretation in the sense 
that, while the latter aims at giving a meaning to a legislative act with erga omnes effect, the balancing 
aims at solving a specific conflict of interests. Indeed, “balancing does not claim to establish the sole 
possible meaning of a provision, but to identify the point of equilibrium between the interests involved 
in the specific case”313. On the other hand, the definitional balancing, applied by the Italian Court in 
several occasions especially in its first decades, still belongs to the domain of the interpretation, 
inasmuch as it serves the purpose to understand the content of the constitutional provisions which 
provide for fundamental rights314.  
As to the terms of the balancing, without denying that the Italian Constitution does not provide for a 
formal hierarchy of constitutional values, Morrone reminds that the balancing exercise can only be 
founded upon comparable interests315. Indeed, there are cases in which the Italian Constitution itself 
recognizes a hierarchy of values and principles. For instance, Art. 42 Italian Constitution. recognizes 
and guarantees the private property, but it also provides for its limitations, which derive from the duty 
to ensure its “social function and make it accessible to everyone”. In that case, the Constitution 
establishes a so-called “garanzia d’istituto”, by which it creates an order of preference between 
conflicting interests316. 
Moreover, the precondition for conducting the balancing is the qualitative homogeneity of the 
interests to be confronted. In fact, if the interests have already been placed by the constitutional 
provisions on a different hierarchical level, the prevailing interest is set by the constitutional law. In that 
case, when the Court builds its legal argument by saying that an interest is prevalent compared to the 
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other, it does not apply the balancing reasoning, since the balancing can take place only if the interests 
are comparable. Thus, for instance, ordinary and constitutional norms cannot surely be balanced317.  
The first step of the balancing reasoning is the identification of interests and rights in conflict, that is 
the terms to be balanced, which entails that the Court shall look for the rationale of the challenged norm, 
in order to identify which interest is pursued and to what extent. Secondly, that extent has to be 
confronted with the extent of protection of the interest allegedly violated. The Court shall understand 
whether the interest protected by the norm under scrutiny can justify a limitation of the constitutional 
right affected. If that is the case, the Court shall decide whether the sacrifice of the latter right is 
excessive. In order to provide an answer to this crucial question, the Italian Court has not elaborated a 
specific test318.  
A number of scholars call sindacato interno (internal scrutiny) the process that assesses the norm 
directly and in relation to the whole legal system. As opposed to the sindacato esterno (external 
scrutiny), that is the process that retraces the justification of the legislative act, and, hence, refers to 
ethical issues, implying value judgments. Therefore, while the external evaluation concerns the 
“foundation of the premises”319, so that the Court addresses interests, values and principles overlapping 
the legislator’s evaluations, the internal control focuses on the deductive reasoning that has guided the 
lawmaker in the drafting of the norm under scrutiny and not the premises behind the logic adopted320. 
Under this view, it is in the “external scrutiny” that the balancing takes place, in order to justify the 
premises321. 
However, in the Italian experience, the constitutional balancing – an essential technique for a 
Constitutional Court operating in a constitutional system characterized by a plurality of values – is 
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applied through a criterion, which is widely identified in the principle of reasonableness, also called, by 
a minority of the literature, principle of proportionality322, and it is supposed to grant what is generally 
called a “reasonable balancing”323. Derived from the principle of equality, the principle of 
reasonableness, little by little, has gained a proper autonomy and it is now applied by the Court to 
conduct any type of balancing between conflicting interests, expressing its hermeneutic function. 
To be noted that in the Italian legal system, the application of general principles by the interpreter is 
expressly provided for by Art. 12 of the preliminary provisions to the Civil Code. The measure at stake 
establishes that if a dispute cannot be settled by applying a specific provision, the judge shall invoke the 
general principles of the legal system. However, Mengoni clarifies that Art. 12, Civil Code, refers to 
those principles which are not subject to balancing with other principles or interests, thus excluding, for 
instance, the freedom to economic initiative or the freedom to conduct collective bargaining, as well as 
all conditional social rights324.  
Given the peculiar soul of fundamental social rights, the next section briefly introduces some key 
elements of the balancing of these rights against economic interests, in the Italian legal system. 
Subsequently, in order to shed some light over the controversial application of the balancing in the 
Italian constitutional case law, it is essential to proceed with a reflection over the widely accepted 
principle of ragionevolezza (reasonableness)325, by outlining its genesis and evolution. At a second 
stage, in order to avoid linguistic misunderstandings, a reflection over the difference between the latter 
and the principle of proporzionalità (proportionality), as well as on the relationship with the rationality, 
is discussed. 
 
2.1 Some reflections on balancing from the fundamental social rights’ perspective  
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Fundamental social security rights (which partially intersect with fundamental labour rights, as 
understood for the purpose of this thesis) are strictly dependent upon the – discretional – legislative 
action, which has to take into account organizational and financial resources. According to Modugno, 
the legislative acts concerning diritti di prestazione enjoy a sort of presumption of legitimacy. As a 
consequence, these acts can be questioned by the Court only if they make the exercise of the right at 
stake “excessively difficult” or “its [essential] content is frustrated”326.  
However, the debate on the possibility to admit balancing of fundamental labour rights (thus 
including, for instance, both pension rights and the right to collective bargaining) with public spending 
necessities is extensive and mainly concerns our perception as regards the legitimacy of compressing 
these rights and, eventually, of the extent of compression allowed (e.g. only to the point of preserving 
the essential nucleus of the said right?)327, in a way that, admitting that these rights are balanced, means 
accepting that they can be compressed. A different view, in favour of balancing of fundamental labour 
rights, is offered by Piera Loi, which shifts the main focus from labour rights to the principle of solidarity 
and the right to equal treatment, upon which the principle of reasonableness is based. The author 
observes that “proportionality and balancing appear as indispensable tools of redistributive justice”, 
these instruments are seen as an efficient way to avoid the “unequal distribution of rights”328. 
The constitutionalization of the principle of balanced budget, as it has occurred both in Italy and in 
Spain, may have intervened in favour of the balancing of fundamental social rights with public budget 
interests. However, according to D’Onghia, “the Constitutional Court is neither formally nor directly 
bound to respect Art. 81 Constitution and, therefore, as regards its Judgments it can never discuss the 
issue of the quantification of financial expenditures in a strict sense, not even after the adoption of 
Constitutional Law 1/2012”. The author admits that the constitutionalization of the balanced budget 
principle may induce the Constitutional Judge to pay particular attention to the arguments in favour of 
                                                            
326 Modugno 2007, 42, my translation. 
327 The compression of the content of rights is also the object of Bin’s reflection, who repeatedly argues that 
financial means and content of rights, or, more precisely: “the limitation of means corresponds to the compression 
of rights”: Bin 1992, 102-107. Among the various views, Contiades, Fotiadou 2012 understand social rights as 
dynamic and flexible and see in proportionality and constitutional balancing a proper opportunity to define the 
content of these rights and set ground rules for the legislator. 
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the public finance equilibrium, which “carries the risk to compromise the possibility to achieve effective 
protection of social rights, both at national and local level”329. This argument is efficiently supported by, 
inter alia, a textual explanation: Art. 81 Italian Constitution, also in its renovated version, assigns to 
“the law” the duty to provide for its fiscal coverage. Indeed, even if the Court can completely disregard 
the consequences of its decisions on the public budget it is not the Constitutional Court’s duty to indicate 
the economic means, which are necessary to achieve the aim330. Modugno, drawing on Scaccia’s theories 
and on the grounds of a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional case law, observes that the Court, 
on the one hand, carefully evaluates the economic consequences of a decision of unconstitutionality, to 
the point that it may postpone the Judgment’s effects (in particular, he refers to Judgment 243/93 and 
Judgment 370/03), on the other hand, it affirms the binding nature of constitutional principles, even if 
this implies economic burdens on the State331. 
According to Mengoni, the evaluation of “foreseeable and possible practical consequences of a 
decision on the social environment”332 is one of the most interesting criteria of the balancing technique. 
The legal scholar identifies two main underlying reasons that justify a careful application of this 
criterion: the pursuit of an ethic of responsibility and the need for rationalization of the constitutional 
judgment. However, he specifies that an evaluation of the social consequences of the judgment cannot 
always prevail over other elements: “[T]he balancing model cannot be confined to a purely 
consequentialist way of thinking, especially when fundamental rights are at stake. However, the justice 
principle has to be always interpreted in a way to highlight also the collective interests (interessi della 
collettività generale) and the duty to preserve the common good”333. Implicitly, Mengoni suggests that 
the consequences do not constitute a legal argument, when he underlines that, as a general rule, they are 
discussed in order to either complement or reinforce the ratio decidendi resulting from an evaluation of 
the ordinary norm in light of the constitutional principles, or solve persisting doubts.  Under this 
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333 Mengoni 1996, 134, my translation. 
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perspective, the role of the social consequences criterion seems to be downsized and placed in an 
ancillary dimension of the constitutional judgment, not because the social consequences are an ancillary 
element per se, but because they do not pertain to the constitutional legal reasoning strictly speaking, 
inasmuch as they do not constitute a legal argument.  
However, in practice, there are cases in which the Constitutional Court has used the analysis of the 
consequences in order to assess the “necessity or suitability to achieve the aim of a limit imposed to a 
fundamental right”334. Anyway, also Mengoni, who is in favour of the use of the social consequences’ 
argument which, he argues, allows to underscore the practical effects that are simultaneous to the legal 
effects, emphasises that this approach has some crucial shortcomings. First and foremost, the 
consequences to be taken into account cannot be unlimited, but they should be restricted. The fact that 
the authoritative author fails to indicate a possible method to identify this limit, raises a doubt of 
feasibility of such an identification, which, in the opinion of whom is writing, would further complicate 
the constitutional proceeding, inasmuch as the judges should engage in an in-depth assessment in the 
sphere of the norm’s “practical effects”, hardly conceivable, especially considering a further 
shortcoming that is the impossibility to rely on a “law of evidence” for the constitutional judgment335. 
 
2.2 The principle of reasonableness and its genesis 
Albeit the principle of reasonableness is well established in the Italian legal system336, it is not 
expressly provided for by the Constitution. Indeed, the principle of reasonableness has become one of 
the key criteria to judge upon the legitimacy of the legislative choices because of a consistent case law, 
which has developed its content on the basis of the principle of equality that finds expressed 
constitutional recognition in Art. 3 Italian Constitution337.  Therefore, the principle of reasonableness 
                                                            
334 Mengoni 1996, 136, my translation. 
335 Mengoni 1996, 133-139. 
336 On the principle of resonablness in Labour Law see Perulli 2005. 
337 Art. 3: “1. All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, 
language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions. 2. It is the duty of the Republic to remove 
those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby 
impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, 
economic and social organisation of the country”. Official translation available at: 
https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf  
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can be briefly introduced as a general principle with hermeneutic origins, applied in a hermeneutic 
context338.  
Before moving to the genesis of the principle of reasonableness, it is worthwhile to spend few words 
to introduce the principle of equality in the Italian constitutional case law339. During the first phase, the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted the principle of equality restrictively, focusing on the prohibition 
of discrimination expressed in Art. 3.1 Italian Constitution. Therefore, the distinctions made by the 
norms under scrutiny were assessed exclusively with reference to the first part of Art. 3, that is the seven 
listed grounds of discrimination. In doing so, the Court aimed to avoid any interference with the 
legislative power and evade the risk to make considerations of a political nature, which would have 
infringed upon the discretionality of the legislator. The judgment was exclusively aimed at disclosing 
and prohibiting formal inequalities340 (see, inter alia, Judgment 28/1957).  
In a second phase, the Court began to interpret the content of Art. 3.1 Italian Constitution not as a 
mere prohibition of discrimination, but rather as the principle of equality, coherently with the wording 
of the constitutional provision. Consequently, a discrimination could occur also beyond the seven 
grounds listed in section one341. This new approach was triggered by the necessity to both recognize and 
protect the numerous differences characterizing the Italian society, and satisfy the need to grant different 
treatment to different cases, which may arise also in the categories listed by Art. 3.1. For instance, in 
Judgment 53/1958 the Court overcomes the concern to interfere with the lawmaker’s discretionality, in 
those cases in which situations, which are deemed to be different by the lawmaker itself, are treated 
analogously by the Law342. Therefore, during the first decade of its activity, the Court has progressively 
adopted a more open approach, which includes the scrutiny of the reasons justifying the adoption of a 
given norm343. 
                                                            
338 Modugno, 2007, 252, emphasises that the reasonableness is an interpretative criterion, rather than a proper and 
autonomous constitutional principle.  
339 For further considerations, see Aa. Vv. 2002; Ghera 2003. 
340 In this sense, inter alia, Modugno 2007, 11. 
341 Barberis 2013, 193. 
342 This judgment is considered a turning point by Modugno 2007, 11. 
343 Cheli 1999, 88, 89. 
104 
 
In order to assess the legislative choices to this extent, the Court has soon started making use of the 
reasonableness criterion. In Judgment 15/1960, the latter concept makes its first appearance; in that case, 
often recalled by the literature, the Court argues that the principle of equality is violated even if the same 
situations are treated differently, without a reasonable justification344. Consistently, the Court has then 
admitted a different treatment based upon one of the seven grounds listed at Art. 3.1 Italian Constitution 
if “reasonably justified”, eventually deducing from Art. 3 Italian Constitution the unconstitutionality of 
unreasonable norms345. 
Beyond any doubt, the principle of reasonableness has now gained complete autonomy from the 
principle of equality, despite its judicial derivation, as proved already in 1987, when the Constitutional 
Court plainly treated them as different criteria (Judgment 284/1987)346. However, a relationship between 
the two criteria still exists347.   
In the first phase of its application, the reasonableness judgment has been applied in light of a tertium 
comparationis. Indeed, the principle of reasonableness entailed an evaluation of the coherence of a 
provision “as compared to the norms adopted by the same legislator for analogous situations”348. In light 
of an approach as such, the Court declared that, albeit exemptions from the general rule are allowed, 
they cannot create unjustified discriminations (see Judgment 43/1987)349. However, a slightly different 
understanding of the reasonableness judgment seems to have consolidated in the latest decades, in 
relation to cases not concerning equal treatment, but rather “evaluations of adequateness, pertinence, 
congruity, proportionality or also internal coherence or inherent reasonableness of the law”350. Under 
this approach, the principle of reasonableness is not applied following the scheme of the tertium 
comparationis, as it is still the case for the principle of equality, and it can be violated independently 
                                                            
344 “Il principio di eguaglianza è violato anche quando la legge, senza un ragionevole motivo, faccia un trattamento 
diverso ai cittadini che si trovino in eguali situazioni”, see, inter alia, Barberis 2013, 193; Modugno 2007, 12. 
345 Cheli 1999, 90. The same author also emphasises that the constitutional case law has, thus, overcome Art. 28, 
Law 87/1953, which aimed to exclude that the Court may conduct any evaluation over the merit and purposes of 
the Law. Sandulli mentions also Judgments 108/1963 and 166/193 among the first cases in which the Court extends 
its understanding of Art. 3 Constitution: Sandulli 1975, 668. 
346 See Barile 1994, also quoted by Moscarini 1996, 98; as well as Barberis 2013, 195. To be noted that the Court, 
in some occasions, still expressly refers to the principle of reasonableness as enshrined in Art. 3 Italian 
Constitution, e.g. Judgment 113/2015. 
347 For further reflections see Morrone 2001, 37-128; Loi 2016, 95 ff. and Barberis 2013. 
348 Cheli 1999, 90. 
349 As emphasised by Cheli 1999, 91. 
350 Anzon 1990, 32.  
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from the comparison with other norms. In other words, the reasonableness scrutiny is used in order to 
“detect the objective irrationalities of the law, independently from subjective prerogatives and, hence, 
independently from trilateral schemes”351, so that the inherent unreasonableness of a norm depends on 
the ability of the norm to achieve the aims pursued by the legislator.  
Barberis distinguishes the principle of equality from the principles of reasonableness on the grounds 
of their levels of specification. The author suggests that while the principle directly expressed by Art. 3 
Constitution is aimed at hampering the discriminations between agents, the principle of reasonableness 
addresses the latter discrimination as well as a situational discrimination, thus achieving a higher level 
of abstraction. Under this argument, the principle of equality represents a specification of the 
reasonableness criterion352.  
 
2.2.1 Reasonableness and its application 
To sum up, the principle of reasonableness can be identified as a peculiar type of norm, which is 
unexpressed in the written sources of law, but stems from the interpretation of a constitutional norm 
(enshrined in Art. 3 Italian Constitution) and is the result of a “process of generalization”353. According 
to Modugno, the need for a principle of reasonableness lies in the Constitutional system itself, indeed 
the Court cannot limit its scrutiny to the conformity of the secondary norms with specific constitutional 
provisions, but it has to evaluate the overall constitutional coherence of the norm, which implies also 
the assessment of the internal “plausibility or persuasiveness”354.  
An absolute and static definition of the principle of reasonableness can be hardly given, most likely 
precisely because of the interpretative origins of this principle. However, the scholarship has extensively 
reflected upon its content and structure and has provided crucial contributions to its understanding, 
mainly on the grounds of the constitutional case law355. 
                                                            
351 Modugno 2007, 12, my translation. 
352 Barberis 2013, 196. 
353 See Loi 2016, 171, on the grounds of the distinction developed by Guastini 2010. 
354 Modugno 2007, 10. 
355 Romboli  states: “many things have been said and written about the reasonableness and often also quite different 
among themselves, but if we want to look for a common element among those who have addressed this topic, I 
think we may identify it in the argument the notion of reasonableness has pretty nuanced and elusive characters, 
which make it difficult to provide a real definition”: Romboli 2000, 89, my translation. 
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Overall, “reasonableness is exactly the logic of values” and its purpose is to evaluate to what extent 
the ordinary norm is consistent with the constitutional values, mainly expressed in principles356, and the 
application of this criterion “has the function of obstructing the infiltration in the legal system of any 
kind of fundamentalism, ethical, political or economic”357.  
According to Scaccia, the principle of reasonableness has become an “all-encompassing and 
comprehensive criterion”358, to the point that it does not represent one possible way to conduct the 
constitutional scrutiny, but the constitutional judgment “is completely permeated, is characterized by, 
the reasonableness method: it is a reasonableness scrutiny”359. Scaccia, defines the Constitutional 
scrutiny per se as the judgment over the existence of the minimum amount of “suitability, congruence, 
proportionality in respect of the fact (in a word, reasonableness)” of the legislative act360.  
Moreover, albeit the reasonableness criterion is one of the parameters that guides, and limits, the 
reasoning of the Court, it is not sufficient to develop the constitutional judgement. Indeed, this clausola 
generale361 serves the purpose to widen the content of a specific and pertinent constitutional norm, which 
varies according to the relevant right in the concrete case362. 
It has been argued that reasonableness does not constitute a proper constitutional principle, 
notwithstanding its uncontroversial genesis, but it rather is an interpretative method, which therefore 
has a bearing in every constitutional judgment363. Of a different view are other authors, as, for instance, 
                                                            
356 Modugno 2007, 46 ff.; in a similar way also Morrone reminds that the fact that the reasonableness criterion 
entails value-oriented choices is a clear element to distinguish this approach from the a-positivistic one, that would 
aim at an objective and value-unrelated solution: Morrone 2001, 387.   
357 Mengoni, 1996, 120, my translation. “…it is therefore necessary that the norm is openly in contrast with the 
reasonableness criterion, that is it constitutes, in practice, the expression of a dysfunctional use of the dicretionality, 
so evident to be a clear symptom of an ‘abuse of power…’” (Judgment 313/1995, as emphasised by Romboli 2000, 
88, my translation). 
358 Scaccia 2000, 388, my translation. 
359 In this way Modugno 2007, 50, my translation, drawing on Sciacca’s thesis. 
360 Scaccia 2000, 387. 
361 On the concept of clausola generale see Mengoni 1986. The clausola generale is a normative structure that 
expresses ethical values, as for instance Art. 2 and 3 Constitution, see Mengoni 1993,256. Litterally translated 
with “general clause”, this concept is not to be confused with the general clause as intended in common law, that 
is a sort of contractual clause. In the Italian legal system, as in other civil law systems, the expression general 
clause still identifies a norm (See the reflection upon the dangers of a misunderstanding triggered by the translation 
by Loi 2016, 145).  
362 Moscarini 1996, 111. 
363 Modugno 2007, 55 ff. Of a similar view also Rossano 1994, 169 ff. The author also underlines that the principle 
of reasonableness should have a relative role in the constitutional judgment, given that it constitutes a meta-legal 
principle. This theory seems to be in conflict with those arguing that the balancing differs from the interpretation, 
see above in this Chapter.  
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those who argue that reasonableness is a flexible and undefined concept364, or Paladin who provocatively 
wrote, in 1992, that a “principle of reasonableness does not exist” in substance, but it is only a verbal 
expression365. 
In 1975, Sandulli developed one of the first systematizations of the principle of reasonableness. The 
author identifies certain sub-criteria, which shall compose the reasonableness judgment. According to 
the scholar, the unreasonableness of a norm can be identified by its incoherence (lack of coherence). 
The constitutional incoherence can take the form of contradditorietà, impertinenza or inadeguatezza. 
Let us know see what the scholar means by these criteria. 
The contradditorietà occurs every time a legal statement/norm is in contrast with one of the following 
elements: the aims of the measure, other norms of the same Act, the text in which the norm is enshrined 
as a whole, other Legislative Acts of the legal system, or, in general, the legal system. In that case, the 
norm that appears – more – abnormal, considering the general context, has to be removed366. 
Second, the incoherence – or unreasonableness – of the norm can result in what Sandulli calls 
impertinenza, that is the “lack of logical correlation (functionality) of the legislative tool, in respect of 
the aims pursued”367. In this phase of application of the reasonableness scrutiny, the Court has to evaluate 
the norm starting from the identification of its rationale. Sandulli seems to implicitly link the principle 
of reasonableness to the principle of equality when he explains that assimilations or differentiations can 
be non pertinenti in relation to the objective pursued and, hence, lead to unjustified different 
treatments368. However, as clarified by Moscarini, in this case the unjustified different treatment is 
ancillary to the irrelevance (non pertinenza) of the means used by the lawmaker to achieve the aim369.  
                                                            
364 D’Andrea 2005, 10 ff. 
365 Paladin 1992, 163 ff. (as reported By Modugno 2007, 52); Paladin’s point is discussed further in this Chapter. 
366 Sandulli 1975, 673: the author supports his thesis by providing some examples from the constitutional case law, 
where the Court has openly reflected upon possible contrasts of the norm under scrutiny with the whole legal 
system. 
367 Sandulli 1975, 673, my translation. 
368 Sandulli 1975, 673-677, also in this respect, the author mentions a number of cases in which the Court has used 
the impertinenza argument. 
369 Moscarini 1996 112, 113. Moreover the author makes a crucial distinction between non pertinenza and 
imperizia, she argues that the two shall not be confused, inasmuch as the latter refers to an evaluation of the 
technical choices of the legislator, upon which the Court does not have, according to the author, competence to 
decide, since they belong to the factual issues: Moscarini 1996. 
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Third, the norm can incur in the so-called inadeguatezza, and hence be unreasonable, if the legislative 
tools are disproportionate in relation to the objective of the norm. Therefore, the means can be excessive 
and consequently can either have an unnecessary impact on rights constitutionally protected, or be 
unable to achieve the aims. Moreover, the latter result can also be achieved if the tools are too scarce; 
also in this case the inadeguatezza occurs. 
A further parameter of the reasonableness principle applied has been identified, 20 years later, by 
Moscarini in the incongruenza (inconsistency), which is also grounded upon a reflection of the 
constitutional judge on the ratio legis. Indeed, in order to judge upon the congruenza of the norm, the 
judge has to assess the relationship between the aims pursued (ratio legis) and the means. The lawyer 
points out that in this case the reference elements are principles and values of the legal system. So under 
this profile, the reasonableness of the norm is evaluated considering the values expressed by both the 
given norm and the more general legal field and legal system’s principles, to which the norm belongs. 
According to Moscarini, it is also a matter of incongruenza if the means are deemed excessive to achieve 
the aim pursued. Last, the author refers this criterion also as far as concerns the judgments on the 
emergency legislation, in which the Court, thanks to the judgment of incongruenza, can develop a 
comprehensive assessment and justify exceptions to the protection of fundamental freedoms, precisely 
if the latter are congruenti and reasonable370.   Last, the incoerenza serves the purpose to judge upon the 
syntax of the norm and focuses on its linguistic incoherence371. 
In a number of occasions, the Court, in line with most part of the scholarship, has opted for a 
balancing of interests conducted through the modulation of the temporal effects of its decisions. 
According to Silvestri, there is a duty of the Court to limit the retroactivity of the ruling’s effect, which 
stems from the active role of the Constitutional Court and entails a responsibility to re-establish an 
equilibrium among the interests constitutionally protected. The modulation of the temporal effects 
serves the purpose to prevent a dysfunctional effect over the public budget372 and, also for the 
                                                            
370 Moscarini 1996, 115-118, to be noted that according to the Moscarini the incongruenza corresponds to the lack 
of suitability of the proportionality test. 
371 Moscarini 1996, 119. 
372 Silvestri 1993, 81. 
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modulation of the temporal effects, the Constitutional Court is increasingly using the reasonableness 
principle both to decide upon the type of ruling and the temporal effects of the judgment373.  
One of the key applications of the principle of reasonableness relates to the considerations over the 
public budget. This element has become increasingly important in the constitutional settlement with the 
recent reform of Art. 81 Constitution, adopted in line with the obligations taken at supranational level374.  
Nevertheless, the public budget discourse has always been crucial in the constitutional case law and 
in the respective literature. In 1993, Rombli published and interesting contribution on the topic. The 
scholar reflects upon the general principle of balanced budget and the balancing of constitutional values 
conducted by the Constitutional Court and, hence, the applicability of Art. 81 Constitution to the Court’s 
decisions. In particular, reference is made to the previous Art. 81.4 Constitution375, which, according to 
Romboli, was not directly applicable to the Constitutional Court decisions, since it pertained to the 
legislative power376. However, a crucial clarification is made, also on the grounds of the constitutional 
case law377: albeit the Court does not have a duty to include in its legal reasoning Art. 81.4 Constitution, 
it has to consider the general principle that stems from this provision, that is the principle of balanced 
budget (equilibrio finanziario). This approach is coherent with the balancing technique and the 
subsequent application of the principle of reasonableness, inasmuch as this criterion entails a 
comprehensive evaluation of “all constitutional principles and values involved in the controversy”378. In 
this respect, Romboli suggests three methods that the Court could use to include the public budget in its 
arguments. First, the contextual economic situation of the country could constitute a guideline. Second, 
the Court could decide the weight of the principle of balanced budget in each specific case on the 
grounds of the principles allegedly violated. As a tendency, the result may be that the principle of 
balanced budget would be predominant if only the general principle of equality is concerned, while it 
                                                            
373 Modugno 2007, 8. 
374 See Chapter 1. 
375 Now Art. 81.3 Italian Constitution: “Any other law involving new or increased spending shall detail the means 
therefor” (official translation). 
376 Romboli, 1993, stresses that the same point is supported by Onida 1993 and Zagrebelsky 1993. Moreover, also 
the Court had always rejected the applicability of this norm to the constitutional judgments.  
377 However, Romboli 1993 points out that the Court has never expressly referred to Art. 81 Constitution in its 
decisions, even in those cases in which it has applied the principle of balanced budget. The author hazards that the 
Court seems to have a sort of “fear” in making the use of Art. 81 explicit and it rather leaves the financial argument 
in the background: Romboli 1993, 194 (quoting also Mortati 1970). 
378 Romboli 1993, 187. 
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would be recessive if also other constitutional principles come into play. Third, in the case of sentenze 
additive379, a feasible criterion is the consideration over the economic burden upon the State, stemming 
from the constitutional ruling380. 
As to the form in which the Court shall express the criteria and the arguments that have led to decide 
in favour of a principle prevailing over another, the author argues that “the balancing between different 
values and interests constitutionally granted, simultaneously involved, but not jointly enforceable, to the 
contrary should always be extensively and clearly justified”381. A clear justification would be a necessary 
prerequisite to create a scale of values, which, according to Romboli, is essential in order to allow the 
Court to judge even upon the most politically sensitive cases. A scale of values, which allows to 
understand under which arguments Art. 81 Italian Constitution is considered prevalent or recessive, on 
the one hand, would allow the Court to intervene more easily even as regards issues considered highly 
political and, on the other, it would “grant more homogeneous judgments and allow a supervision of the 
public opinion […] as well as constitute a guide to the balancing of different constitutional values 
operated by the Parliament during the legislative activity”382. 
However, this point of view does not deny that the Italian constitutional hermeneutic has a “dialectic 
way of developing a legal argument, not connected by deductive chains and definite procedural rules”383. 
Judge Cartabia points out that in the Italian constitutional case law the strict argumentative 
framework inspired by the German tradition has never been applied. However, the single criteria which 
form the so-called proportionality test are used by the Italian Court, although without a systematic and 
progressive approach. A number of authoritative scholars argue in favour of an increase in the 
structuration of the use of this principle, or even for the strict application of the test. On this view, to 
formalize the argumentative approach could have positive effects in terms of coherence and 
persuasiveness of the motivation, as well as on the legitimacy of the Court384. 
                                                            
379 A decision by which the Court declares the unconstitutionality of a norm “for the part in which it does not 
provide for…”. 
380 Romboli 1993,190. 
381 Romboli 1993, 195, my translation. The expression “to the contrary” refers to the fact that the Court has refused 
such an approach and it has rather left the economic argument in the background. 
382 Romboli, 196, my translation. On the role of – the previous – Art. 81 Constitution in the constitutional case law 
and in the balancing between rights and interests see also Mazzù 2008. 
383 Mengoni 1996, 124. 
384 Cartabia 2013, 6,7; see also Cheli 1999, 97. 
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Indeed, over the decades, the increasing “political” power of the Constitutional Court has triggered 
wide debates385. According to Cheli, the tendency to interfere with the political discretionality may be 
inextricably linked with the principle of reasonableness, or, better, with the lack of a systematic approach 
to its application. The constitutional lawyer identifies a solution to this confusion over the institutional 
roles in a clear, transparent application of the reasonableness principle, which refers to precise criteria. 
“In other words, it shall be properly argued with arguments meeting the common sense”386. In order to 
achieve a legal reasoning responding to these requirements, Cheli suggests to reconsider the application 
of a systematic technique, such as the proportionality test applied in other legal systems, with the 
respective three sub-criteria. A rationalization of the application of the principle of reasonableness, 
together with a comprehensive understanding by the Court of the overall dynamics of the constitutional 
system would bring long term benefits to the role of the Court and its case law387.   
Also Romboli, although without referring to the proportionality test, argues that the Court should 
provide a substantial motivation that clarifies the criteria applied to decide which value prevails over the 
other, in order to decide especially on the most "political" matters. Otherwise, as far as these most 
political cases are concerned, according to the author, the Court should refrain from deciding. In 
addition, an approach as such would first guarantee an easier "control of the public opinion", second, it 
would provide a guideline to the legislator in the balancing of conflicting constitutional values388. 
 
2.2.2 Reasonableness, proportionality and rationality 
The distinction between the principle of reasonableness and proportionality represents a 
controversial issue for the Italian scholarship and the constitutional case law does not provide clear 
                                                            
385 This debate has raised the controversial issue of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court in the Italian legal 
system, see, inter alia, Mezzanotte, 2014; Mezzetti 2010; Modugno 1982. 
386 Cheli 2011, 33. 
387 Cheli 2011, 33-36. Also in favour of a formalized approach to the application of the principle of reasonableness 
or proportionality see Luciani 1994 and Paladin 1992 who supports the introduction of a rigid proportionality test 
in order to give content and strength to the balancing reasoning of the Court. To the contrary, Modugno argues 
that it is the reasonableness criterion itself that traces an obligatory path for the constitutional judges: Modugno 
2008, 255. Indeed, a number authoritative scholars argue for the appropriateness of a more structured use of this 
principle, or even for a strict application of the test, in order to strengthen the legal reasoning in terms of coherence, 
transparency and persuasiveness and to make sure that the Italian Constitutional Court is not excluded from a the 
international courts’ dialogue, see, inter alia, Cartabia 2013, 7, and Pino 2014. 
388 Romboli 2000, 90-91. 
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answers, either389.  Indeed, differently from other supreme courts, the Italian Constitutional Court makes 
use of various terms that refer, more or less directly, to the concept of proportionality and 
reasonableness, e.g. razionalità, adeguatezza, non arbitrarietà, congruenza and many others. The terms 
are also often used as synonymous in the same judgment, or they seem to be overlapping390.  
Drawing on the Italian academic literature and on the grounds of authoritative theories, Piera Loi has 
summarized this plurality of views. On the one hand, a number of constitutional law scholars argue that 
the connection between reasonableness and proportionality is so strict to the point that the two either 
coincide completely or, at least, proportionality is a subcategory of reasonablness391. To the contrary, an 
assimilation of the two concepts is rejected by certain academic literature where it is argued that the 
feeble, not to say null, formalization of the legal reasoning founded upon the principle of reasonableness 
does not allow any connection between the two392. 
As a matter of fact, in latest years the Constitutional Court has increasingly referred to the principle 
of proportionality especially when the infringement of social rights has been at stake, notwithstanding 
that it does not apply the principle by means of a structured method, as it is the case in, for instance, the 
German Constitutional Court393.  
A close connection between the principle of reasonableness and proportionality has first appeared in 
Judgment 1130/1988, where clear reference is made to the principle of proportionality, understood as 
“suitability or relationship means-aims”394. According to Penasa, in the judgment from 1988, the Court 
develops both the teleological nature and the substantial features of the principle of reasonableness. In 
particular, the Court maintains that the reasonableness scrutiny, does not entail the use of absolute and 
abstract criteria, but “it is developed through reflection related to the proportionality of the means chosen 
                                                            
389 This research does not investigate the principle of proportionality as enshrined in Art. 36 Italian Constitution 
and related to the proportionality of remuneration. The principle of proportionality is here intended especially with 
regard to the legal technique used by the Court. 
390 Cartabia 2013, 2. 
391 Anzon 1990; or Di Gregorio 2002, 237 ff., who concludes that the principle of reasonableness is an autonomous 
principle in the Italian legal system and structurally corresponds to the Principle of proportionality applied in the 
German legal system. 
392 See, inter alia, Morrone 2002, 285 ff., who argues for a complete difference in the nature of the two concepts: 
See also the review by Piera Loi 2016, 81 ff. 
393 According to Cartabia, the Constitutional Court regularly uses the so called "giudizio di ragionevolezza" and 
“giudizio di proporzionalità", literally "reasonableness judgment" and "proportionality judgment", whether 
explicitly or implicitly: Cartabia 2013, 1. See also Loi 2016, 5. 
394 Loi 2016, 84, my translation. 
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by the lawmaker in its unquestionable discretionality with regard to the objective needs to be covered 
or the aims pursued, taking account of the circumstances and the concrete limitations”395.  
Notwithstanding the reference to the proportionality, the Court did not seem to be looking at the 
principle of proportionality as applied in the German constitutional tradition, given that neither the 
necessity requirement nor the proportionality in the strict sense have been discussed. Indeed, in 
Judgment 1130/1988, the Court only addressed the proportionality as suitability to achieve the aim, 
therefore it has applied the suitability test, rather than the proportionality test396. 
However, the Court itself has clearly reiterated the strict link between the principle of proportionality 
and that of reasonableness, in 1995: “the principle of proportionality represents a direct expression of 
the general principle of reasonableness" (Judgment 220/1995). 
Constitutional judge Cartabia makes clear that the “the Italian Constitutional Court does not make 
any distinction, neither explicit nor implicit, between the principle of reasonableness and the principle 
of proportionality, which are often used in a completely fungible way, so that a disproportionate 
provision is unreasonable and viceversa”397. Under this view, the proportionality has always been used 
as a guiding principle and requirement, which, according to Cartabia, also in the Constitutional Court is 
applied in a similar way as in other courts, at least in the merit (an), although it has not been formalized 
and systematized in a progressive fashion, yet (thus stressing a difference from the other judicial 
constitutional traditions, in terms of quomodo).  
However, the relationship between the two principles appears way less fluent in the academic 
literature, or at least, not so uncontroversial. According to Pino, "the instrument to assess whether a 
limitation is reasonable is, indeed, the proportionality criterion". In particular, this criterion is applied in 
order to structure the reasonableness requirement, when fundamental rights are at stake, in order to 
measure whether the sacrifice imposed upon a constitutional right is legitimate398.  
                                                            
395 See Penasa 2009, 818, my translation. 
396 Bindi 2014, 15-18; See also Rauti 2002, 378 ff. 
397 Cartabia 2013, my translation. 
398 Pino 2014, 6; Bindi 2014, instead, calls it “test”, rather than “principle” or “criterion” as more often done, in 
relation to the reasonableness. 
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Zagrebelsky subdivides reasonableness in three sub-criteria, namely rationality, equality and justice. 
And it is precisely in the latter case that the proportionality, as a tool for balancing, arises, inasmuch as 
the justice criterion is founded upon principles – not only rules – and the application of principle 
inevitably needs a form of balancing399. Zagrebelsky’s theory put emphasis on a further concept to be 
distinguished from that of reasonableness, that is rationality, which, in his understanding, is the logic 
coherence of the norm with regard to the whole legal system400. The assumption that the two concepts 
are different, but interconnected is way less controversial than in the previous case. However, the nature 
of this distinction is still debated. 
Without going into much detail on this extensive debate, let us see some key theories.  
Moscarini reflects over the possible legal meanings of reasonableness in the Italian legal system. 
First, reasonableness is understood as equality, where the norm is interpreted through the tertium 
comparationis seen above. Second, reasonableness is applied as an autonomous parameter, based upon 
the assessment of the rationale of the norm. Third, it can be understood as proper application of the law. 
Forth, reasonableness may reflect the rationality of a norm, understood as coherence and non-
inconsistency of the provision401. Hence, a similar approach to Zagrebelsky’s one.   
Also in Scaccia’s opinion rationality is an aspect of reasonableness; the scholar argues that the 
reasonableness criterion can be divided in systematic rationality, that is coherence, and a prupose-
oriented efficiency (that is pertinenza, congruenza, imperizia, proporzionalità) and, last, justice-
equity402. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, in Judgment 172/1992, has made a distinction between 
the razionalità pratica (practical rationality), which is expressed by the principle of reasonableness, and 
the razionalità formale (formal rationality), understood as a logic principle of non-contradiction (a 
distinction recently reiterated in Judgment 113/2015)403. 
It has also been argued that, the principle of reasonableness expresses a "reinforced reason", more 
careful about the concrete context and aware of the legal system as a complete evolving system.  
                                                            
399 Zagrebelsky1994.  
400 Zagrebelsky 1994. 
401 Moscarini 1996, 88 ff. 
402 Scaccia 2000. 
403 Rivera 2016; Cartabia 2013, 16; on the role of reasonableness and proportionality in labour law and other 
branches of law see Perulli 2005 and Loi 2016. 
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3. Applied balancing in the Spanish constitutional case law and the principle of proportionality 
The Spanish constitutional system, as pluralist as the Italian one, does not foresee a clear hierarchy 
of constitutional rights and freedoms, to the contrary it is characterized by a ductile character, which 
“makes the Constitutions particularly suitable to become sustainable projects of coexistence”404. 
Therefore, as expressly argued by Prieto Sanchis, the conflicts arising among them can only be solved 
on a case-by-case basis, albeit the method used to figure out normative antinomies clearly triggers 
controversies, “and that’s what is called balancing”, in Spanish: ponderacion405. In 1986, it was the 
Spanish Court itself to point out that rights and interests constitutionally protected do not respond to a 
fixed hierarchy, which necessarily implies a “balancing on a case-by-case basis” (Judgment 104/1986). 
On this view, the ponderacion does not entail the establishment of an everlasting hierarchy of interests 
and rights, but only an order of preference applicable to the specific case406.  
According to Gonzales, in 1981 the balancing discourse has entered the Spanish case law with 
expressions such as "natural balancing of values" and "balanced rationality”. The scholar offers a very 
critical perspective over the use of constitutional balancing. His criticism is mainly based upon the 
argument that balancing constitutes an argumentative path, rather than an interpretative technique, 
which takes several names, as “razonabilidad, la adecuación, la proporcionalidad, y la ponderación” 
and has gained a central role without being founded upon any legal basis. The author grounds his 
argument on a number of cases in which the ponderacion – that is in general the balancing approach – 
has been adopted by the Constitutional Court. He identifies the first cases in which the Spanish 
Constitutional Court has used a balancing approach. The first one is the Auto 29/81, where the Tribunal 
mentions the "natural balancing of values" and argues that the Constitutional Court, in order to solve a 
conflict between interests and values, has to evaluate their scope and content by applying a "weighted 
rationality" (ponderada racionalidad). The second case of interest deals with the relationship between 
                                                            
404 Preciado Domènech 2016, 79. 
405 Prieto Sanchis 2000, 436. 
406 Prieto Sanchis 2000, 442, 443. On the prevalence of one principle against another in circumstantial and concrete 
cases, as well as on the various understandings of the term “ponderacion”, see also Prieto Sanchis 2001 and Prieto 
Sanchis 2002. 
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different evidence items: the Constitutional Court states that the balancing allows to judge upon the 
meaning and importance of each evidence (Judgment 31/1981). In Auto 375/83, the Court asserts that 
it is up to the Law to conduct the necessary balancing in order to harmonize the different values and 
interests constitutionally relevant “y a este Tribunal compete corregir, en su caso, los errores que pudiera 
cometer el legislador al efectuarla”407. 
In Judgment 53/1985, where a serious conflict between the right of life of the unborn child and the 
right to life and dignity of the woman was at stake, the Court, in a key judgment for the evolution of this 
case law, affirmed that, given that “none of those rights can be said to be absolute, the constitutional 
interpreter is obliged to balance the interests and rights”. A further well known case in which the Court 
has used the balancing argument is Judgment 53/1986, where it has addressed the relationship between 
the right to strike and the public interest to essential services408.  
A different viewpoint is offered, inter alia, by Francisco Fernández Segado, who, with reference to 
a conflict between the right to honour and the freedom of expression, argues that “it is unnecessary to 
assert that in case of conflict between rights or between a right and an interest constitutionally protected 
it is necessary to conduct the adequate balancing”, to the point that it is in the Constitutional Judge’s 
competence to revise the correct balancing conducted by an ordinary judge409.  
Differently, Bernal Pulido argues that a first use of the principle of proportionality can be found, 
already before the entrance into force of the Spanish Constitution in 1978: Tribunal Supremo, Judgment 
5/1959. The scholar refers to a judgment delivered during the Franco regime by the Tribunal Supremo, 
which, in his opinion, pioneered the use of balancing and, more precisely of the principle of 
proportionality, by arguing that the aim pursued may have been achieved by more “appropriate 
measures”410. However, given that the Spanish Constitution and, hence, the Constitutional Court is from 
1978, it is hardly conceivable a use of the principle of proportionality, in the current sense, beforehand.  
Overall, Spanish constitutional judgments have often balanced conflicting interests by applying the 
principle of proportionality. It is quite uncontroversial that the Spanish Constitutional Court has used 
                                                            
407 Gonzalez 2003, 11-12, italics added, my translation. 
408 Sánchez Gonzalez 2003, 11-13, my translation. 
409 Fernández Segado1993, my translation. 
410 Bernal Pulido 2005, 50 ff., my translation. 
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the proportionality principle in an intuitive and informal way from the very beginning of its activity. 
Indeed, according to a number of authors, the principle of proportionality is embedded in the 
constitutional system and it is structural of the Spanish legal system, especially because of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case law of the respective Court 
(ECtHR), which has often used the proportionality principle and has, in this respect, influenced the 
Spanish Court411. However, the actual application of the principle of proportionality, by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, is the outcome of a process started decades ago.  
From the 1980s to 2015, 494 judgments using, either explicitly or implicitly, the principle of 
proportionality have been identified. Although the constitutional case law must be considered as a 
continuum, three main phases of application of this principle from the Constitutional Court have been 
identified412. In a first phase, ended in the mid-1990s, the Constitutional Court started using this 
principle, while increasing, little by little, its formal application413. Indeed, albeit the Spanish 
Constitution does not expressly provide for a principle of proportionality, this concept has appeared 
already in an early phase of the Constitutional Court’ activity, albeit as an “argumentative formula 
semantically vague”. According to González Beilfuss, what fostered the use of the proportionality 
principle in the Spanish constitutional case law was the ECtHR case law on the principle of equal 
treatment. The author refers to a real “fascination” of the Spanish tribunal towards the Strasbourg Court, 
based upon Art. 10.2 Spanish Constitution, which provided for the duty to interpret the fundamental 
rights envisaged by the Spanish constitution consistently with the ECtHR case law414. Indeed, in a 
number of judgments (e.g. Judgments 21/1981, 34/1981, 75/1983, 6/1984) the Constitutional Court 
made use of the proportionality argument to interpret the principle of equality in the sense that the 
different treatment must be proportionate to the aim pursued by the differentiation. The application of 
                                                            
411 González Beilfuss 2015, Barnes 1998a; Medina Guerrero 1998. However, the appropriateness of the application 
of the principle of proportionality in the Spanish constitutional case law is not so uncontroversial: a different 
perspective, mostly critical towards the balancing approach and the use of terms such as “reasonable” and 
“adequate” is offered by Gonzalez 2003, where the author argues for the absence of a legal justification, in both 
the Spanish Constitution and the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court, for the adoption of such an approach 
(see further in this Chapter). On the value of ECHR see Perello Domenech 1997, 70, the author also agrees on the 
progressive, but uncontroversial, incorporation of the principle of proportionality in the Spanish case law. 
412 A distinction proposed by González Beilfuss 2015. 
413 On the fragmented use of this principle in the first years of activity of the Spanish Constitutional Court, see 
also Medina Guerrero 1998. 
414 González Beilfuss 2015, 21. 
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this principle was slowly extended to many other fundamental rights, as the right to a fair trial, trade 
union freedom and right to property415. 
However, even if already in the first phase of the Court’s activity, the principle of proportionality 
has been applied, a clear and uniform understanding was missing and its use was still “informal and 
intuitive”. Therefore, there was a lack of clarity over the normative content of this principle, as well. 
However, various elements of the proportionality test were already present in the Spanish constitutional 
case law, although they were still disconnected and mostly unstructured. Overall, two main elements 
were: public authorities had to expressly justify the restriction of a fundamental right and the restriction 
had to be really proportionate. In this phase of the Spanish constitutional case law, we can already find 
the concept of “adequate provision” (e.g. Judgment 142/1993), as well as that of “necessity” of the 
measure subject to constitutional scrutiny (e.g. Judgment 178/1985). Last, and starting from 1985, the 
Court slowly introduced the evaluation of the concrete proportionality of the challenged measure and 
the aim pursued. Moreover, the judgments, in this phase, were mostly concluding in favour of the 
proportionality of the provision at issue: a case law, in González Beilfuss words, “respetuosa con el 
legislator”416. 
In a second phase, started in the mid-1990s, the Constitutional Court introduced and openly made 
use of the so called German test of proportionality, grounded upon three criteria: suitability (idoneidad), 
necessity (necessidad) and proportionality in the strict sense (proprtionalidad en sentido estricto); 
concepts only vaguely mentioned in the earlier stage417. In this phase, started with Judgment 66/1995418, 
the Court expressly referred to the “proportionality judgment” and used the three requirements in a tidy 
and structured way, thus formalizing the principle of proportionality, analogously to the German Court, 
                                                            
415 González Beilfuss 2015. One of the uncontroversial features of the principle of proportionality is its paramount 
application in relation to fundamental rights see Perello Domenech 1997, 73. 
416González Beilfuss 2015, 40.  
417 González Beilfuss 2015,16. 
418 González Beilfuss 2015, Prieto Sanchís 2001; The turning point is identified also by Perello Domenech 1997,  
72 ff., in Judgment 66/1995; on the gradually more systematic approach from the Spanish Court, since the mid-
1990s, see also Villaverde 2008. 
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without, however, expressly referring to the German origins of this technique419. The first occasions in 
which the Court expressly referred to the principle of proportionality concerned criminal law norms.  
In a judgment from 1996, the Spanish Court clarified that the proportionality principle is based upon 
constitutional norms, especially those providing for fundamental rights, which is also its main scope of 
application (Judgment 55/1996)420. However, already in previous judgments, the Court had pointed out 
that the principle of proportionality stems from various explicit constitutional principles, such as the 
value of justice (Judgment 160/1987; Judgment 50/1995), or the principle of the Estado de Derecho 
(Judgment 160/1987)421. 
In 1999, the Court reiterated, in a sole ruling, that the principle of proportionality is a “general 
principle, which can be derived from various constitutional provisions” and stems “from the value of 
justice [...], the principle of Estado de Derecho [...], the prohibition of arbitrariness of public powers [...] 
and the human dignity”. Moreover, express reference is made here to Art. 1.1 and Art. 10.2, Spanish 
Constitution, and Articles 10.2 and 18 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (Judgment 49/1999)422. 
A turning moment in the evolution of the Constitutional Court case law has been identified in 
Judgment 136/1999, where the Court, fully and expressly applying the proportionality test, for the first 
time concluded for the violation from the legislator of the proportionality principle423. However, there 
was no unanimity within the Court over the application of the test. Indeed, a clear dissenting opinion 
came from judge Conde Martín de Hijas, who argued that an approach as such was a source of 
uncertainty for the criminal legal system. The judge pointed at the absence of conceptual clarity of the 
proportionality requirement, which was due to a failure of the Court to sufficiently explain its 
                                                            
419 González Beilfuss 2015, 42. See also Preciado Domènech 2016, 141. Also Stone Mathews, 2008, 161, argue 
that the German tradition has strongly influenced the adoption of the proportionality adjudication by European 
Constitutional Courts. 
420 See González Beilfuss 2015, 43. 
421 See Perello Domenech 1997, 73. 
422 As discussed in Pereira 2004, 1048, my translation. 
423 These and other first cases in which the principle of proportionality was applied concerned issues of 
criminal/penal law. E.g. of non-structured application of the test: Judgment 76/1996; Judgment 107/1996) 
Structured application: Judgment 207/1996; Judgment 161/1997; Judgment 37/1998. Judgment 49/1999 (less 
rigorous application. Cf. also Preciado Domènech 2016. 
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entrenchment in the constitutional system. Consequently, in his opinion, the Court should refrain from 
applying proportionality as a constitutional criterion424.  
Even though, also in the latest decades, the Court has referred, more or less explicitly, to the 
“principle of proportionality” in several judgments, since 2000 the Constitutional Court has applied the 
proportionality test in a more relaxed and inhomogeneous way. Indeed, at the beginning of the century 
the alleged third phase of the principle of proportionality in the Spanish constitutional case law begins. 
For instance, in Judgment 98/2000, the Court used the German test criteria without explicitly mentioning 
them and in an unstructured fashion, while few months later, with the same judge rapporteur, in 
Judgment 186/2000, the German test was again applied in a structured way. However, since 2000, only 
in isolated cases the judges extensively and rigorously applied the proportionality test, thus assessing 
whether the norm was idonea, necessaria and proporcionada425. 
It has been argued that, in the latest decade and a half, the constitutional case law has increasingly 
applied the principle of proportionality in an informal and vague manner, which is giving rise to both 
the “deconstitutionalization” of the principle of proportionality and the development of questionable 
lines of reasoning on fundamental rights and their normative content. The lack of a dogmatic approach 
risks making this principle nothing but an “empty category” used to justify decisions taken on extra-
legal grounds, as well as hampering any predictability over further decisions426. The judgments that we 
are going to assess in the next Chapters provide emblematic examples of this tendency. The misuse of 
the principle of proportionality may be one of the causes of the strong criticism that certain authors 
advance as regards its application by the Spanish Constitutional Court427.  
Bernal Pulido groups the critical arguments against the application of the principle of proportionality 
in five clusters: 1) the lack of conceptual clarity of the principle of proportionality; 2) the absence of a 
legal basis; 3) the incommensurability argument, which rejects the idea that elements which are too 
                                                            
424 Gonzalez 2003, 20; Pereira 2004, 1048. 
425 A structured application can be found again in Judgment 48/2005, or Judgment 11/2006, or Judgment 60/2010. 
426 González Beilfuss 2015. Also Pereira Sáez 2004, 1049-1051, who discusses judgments from 2000, albeit with 
a different analytical method, emphasises that the Court mostly applies the principle of proportionality without 
mentioning and strictly following the proportionality test and, in some cases, the proportionality appears related 
to the essential content, in other judgments it seems to be coinciding with the necessity scrutiny, or composed by 
the three sub-requirements: suitability, necessity, proportionality in the strict sense, as in Judgment 14/2003.  
427 Beyond Gonzalez 2003; see also Pereira 2004, 1060, who critics that the application of the principle of 
proportionality by the Court, because of its partiality. 
121 
 
different to be compared and balanced; 4) the difficulties in identifying the rights and interests to be 
balanced; 5) the subjectivity and irrationality of the application of the principle of proportionality. The 
author carefully dismisses each of these critiques and proceeds with a reflection over a further counter-
argument put forward by the academic literature: the lack of legitimization of the Constitutional Court 
to apply the proportionality principle. According to this critical view, every time the Constitutional Court 
addresses the legal questions by balancing fundamental rights and interests constitutionally protected 
extends its competence in an illegitimate way and, hence, reduces the – legitimate – scope of action of 
the legislator, democratically elected. Bernal Pulido argues that, in fact, the conflict is not between the 
legislator and the Constitutional Court, but it is endemic to the democratic legal systems that, on the one 
side, provide the legislator with the competence to produce normative acts, but, on the other, binds it to 
respect the fundamental rights. These two elements (fundamental rights and democratic principle) enter 
into conflict during the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court, which cannot be empowered with an 
unlimited competence to solve this conflict, but cannot even be denied this competence and intervene 
in the legislative action, and that's because the limits to the legislative competence cannot be always 
determined in advance and in abstracts terms. Therefore, the difficulty resides in finding the criterion 
that offers the best solution to manage the endemic tension that arises in the concrete cases. According 
to the author the criterion that offers the most rational solution to delineate the competence of the 
legislator and of the Constitutional Court is the principle of proportionality. After having dismissed – 
with an attentive analysis – the alternative techniques to interpret the fundamental rights and solve the 
conflicts, the author emphasises that the proportionality principle, if applied in a rigorous and rational 
way is the best tool not only for the interpretation of the Constitution, but also in order to reduce as much 
as possible any doubt as to the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court to apply this technique428. 
 
3.1 The – minor – role of the principle of reasonableness   
Before moving to discuss the features of the principle of proportionality – and its correct application 
– as well as other related concepts, let us now briefly dwell on the principle or reasonableness. The 
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principle of reasonableness per se has played a way less crucial role in the Spanish constitutional case 
law, compared to the Italian case. In what González Beilfuss has identified as the first phase of 
application of the proportionality principle by the Spanish Constitutional Court (see chapter above), the 
Court was, according to the author, strongly linking the principle of proportionality with that of 
reasonableness, as demonstrated by the use of expressions such as “reasonable proportionality” (e.g. 
Judgment 178/1985). However, already in 1981, the Court had declared that a different treatment is 
allowed only if justified in an “objective and reasonable” way (Judgment 22/1981). Judgment 22/1981 
can be understood in the sense that the Court has applied both the principle of reasonableness and the 
principle of proportionality. It has been argued that the Court has made use of the reasonableness 
criterion “which implies that the distinction shall pursue a legitimate aim, as well as that the mean shall 
be suitable to achieve the aim”429, and together with this requirement, it has applied the principle of 
proportionality, albeit inexactly, and has investigated over the proper balancing of the conflicting 
interests. This understanding seems to suggest that the Court, in the first phase of its activity, was 
equating the principle of reasonableness with one of the sub-tests of the proportionality test, where the 
suitability is evaluated, while the principle of proportionality consisted in the latest phase of the German 
test, that is balancing in the strict sense. Moreover, interestingly, this case is one of the firsts in which 
the two principles emerge and it concerns the right to equal treatment. Indeed, as pointed out by Perello 
Domenech, the principle of proportionality has been often used to judge upon the infringement of the 
principle of equality430. In this respect, that is in judicial cases concerning the right to equal treatment, 
Prieto Sanchis argues that the principle of reasonableness is translated in a need to balance the 
conflicting principles. Under this perspective, “a law is justified when it is reasonable, that is when the 
violation of a right is reasonable in light of enforcing another right”431. 
According to González Beilfuss, although in the proportionality adjudication the reasonableness 
corresponds to the assessment of the suitability of the law examined, therefore in the first phase, it also 
                                                            
429 Perello Domenech 1997, 71, my translation. 
430 Perello Domenech 1997, 71, my translation. On the Spanish constitutional case law on the principle of equality 
up to 1994, see Carmona Cuenca 1994. 
431 Prieto Sanchís 2000, 75. 
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constitutes an autonomous parameter432. Indeed, Roca Trias emphasizes that the principle of 
reasonableness (razonabilidad) plays/has played a crucial role in the constitutional case law especially 
with regard to the right to equal treatment and the right to a fair trial. In the first case, the influence was 
clearly from the ECtHR (as also expressly referred to in/stated in Judgment 22/1981)433. The autonomy 
of the reasonableness requirement is limited, in fact it is normally applied jointly with other criteria. For 
instance, in a case concerning the right to equal treatment, the criteria selected in order to conduct the 
scrutiny were the reasonableness of the norm and its necessity, as expressly done in Judgment 103/1983. 
In that case, the necessity requirement was applied independently, therefore beyond the scope of 
application of the proportionality principle.  
A further example is provided by a case on the right to a fair trial, the second criterion selected by 
the Court was the arbitrariness, and the conclusion was that the judicial decision is constitutionally 
illegitimate if the legal reasoning is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable (Judgment 214/1999)434. 
Perez, drawing on the latest mentioned judgment (Judgment 214/1999) argues that the reasonableness 
adjudication is based upon the formal coherence of the measure assessed, together with the absence of 
evident unreasonableness435. According to the scholar, the “reasonableness judgment” coincides with 
the content of the constitutional scrutiny, but it also constitutes its limitation, inasmuch as only what is 
reasonable is constitutional and the Court can validly conclude for the constitutional legitimacy of a 
norm, only if it is cleared of any arbitrariness. However, the author is aware of the indeterminacy of the 
legal concept of reasonableness and, by quoting a judgment from 2002 he argues that, in order to provide 
reasonableness with a content, it is necessary to start from the assumption that “the validity of a 
reasoning is, from a purely logical perspective, independent from the truthfulness or falseness of its 
premises and conclusions” (Judgment 164/2002, my translation). In other words, what the 
reasonableness scrutiny investigates is the coherence of the norm436.  
                                                            
432 González Beilfuss 2015, 83. 
433 Roca Trias 2013. For an analysis of the constitutional case law over the principle of equal treatment and the 
legal reasoning and methods used, that is also the principle of proportionality see Barnes 1998b, 337-343. 
434 See Roca Trias 2013 (also on reinforced reasonableness). 
435 Perez 2014; also in this respect, the use of the reasonableness principle, Gonzalez, 2003, 22, is critical, in the 
sense that in his opinion this concept is too vague to constitute a valuable criterion for the constitutional case law.   
436 Perez 2014, 9-10, my translation. 
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3.2 Principle of proportionality and its content 
The structured application of the proportionality principle in the Spanish legal system is, at least 
theoretically, consistent with the way in which other Courts, both national and regional, make use of 
this principle. Indeed, a proper application of the proportionality principle, by the Spanish Constitutional 
Court, would mean a first assessment of whether the provision is able to achieve the aim pursued, that 
is its suitability. Second, the Court shall focus on the necessity of the norm, in the sense that a more 
moderate provision, equally achieving the aim, is not feasible. In the third phase, the Court shall evaluate 
whether the provision is proportionate in the strict sense and it results in more advantages to the general 
interest, than prejudices to other interests or values. The added value of such a structured proportionality 
test is the possibility for the Court to assess beforehand the aim of the provision under scrutiny, giving 
relevance to the means-purpose relation, so that a provision pursuing an aim prohibited by the 
Constitution would be rejected at hand. It is worthwhile to underline that, according to the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, the aim pursued, to be legitimate, does not need to be expressly phrased in the 
Constitution, but it is enough that it is allowed by the Constitutional norms437.  
In the development of the Spanish constitutional case law the introduction of the so-called German 
test438 has helped clarifying the already existing principle of proportionality, introducing an – at least 
apparent – rationality. It has provided what in the words of Stone Mathews is an “argumentative 
framework” or “analytical procedure”, and in Bernal Pulido’s view a “methodological criterion”439, 
which “clearly indicates to litigating parties the type and sequence of arguments that can and must be 
made, and the path through which the judges will reason to their decision”440. Therefore, under this view, 
the German test increases, first of all, certainty and transparency of the decision.  
                                                            
437 González Beilfuss, 2015, 42-56; Roca Trias, 2013. 
438 “German test”, as it has been systematically designed for the first time by the German constitutional court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), for an analysis of the work of the German Constitutional Court see, one for all, Alexy 
2010. 
439 Bernal Pulido 2005, 77, my translation. The author, writing in 2005, was arguing that this “criterio 
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Interestingly, the literature that describes the normative content of the principle of proportionality in 
the Spanish legal system, draws extensively on the relevant German studies, first and foremost Alexy’s 
theory441. 
Indeed, while the three requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality in the strict sense 
are acknowledged pretty unanimously by the literature, there is some inconsistency over the phase or 
phases that can be considered preparatory to the, so-called, proportionality test442. 
One of the leading Spanish scholars, while assessing the principle of proportionality in the Spanish 
legal system, as well as in other legal systems, has identified five steps that characterize, in his view, the 
application of the principle of proportionality. The first two represent the precondition and the second 
three the proper application of the proportionality principle. On this view, first, it comes the 
identification of the fundamental right concerned and its enshrinement in a fundamental right’s 
provision. Second, the judge has to verify whether the secondary law examined is related to the relevant 
fundamental right provision443. Another authoritative scholar, Prieto Sanchis, breaks down the 
application of the proportionality principle in four phases, each of them based upon different elements 
to be evaluated by the judge. First, and as a precondition for the following three steps, the interference 
in the domain of a fundamental right must pursue a constitutionally legitimate aim, otherwise the 
balancing cannot take place, inasmuch as a main element is missing, that is the term of comparison444. 
This theory is consistent with the constitutional case law, which often addresses, as a first step, the 
constitutional legitimacy of the aim pursued445.  
The necessity to apply the proportionality criterion stems from the need to conduct a balancing. 
Under this perspective, the proportionality entails the establishment of an order of preference related to 
the concrete case and it does not provide an answer always valid. Therefore, the result of the application 
                                                            
441 To the point that Gonzalez 2003 argues that the principle of proportionality has been completely borrowed by 
other legal systems and does not belong to the Spanish constitutional tradition at all; Pereira 2004 also refers to 
Latin American studies to introduce, from a theoretical perspective, the principle of proportionality in the Spanish 
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442 While in the literature discussing the application of the proportionality principle by the CJEU the use of the 
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González Beilfuss 2015, and Perez 2014. 
443 Bernal Pulido 2005, 131. 
444 Prieto Sanchís 2000, 445. 
445 E.g. see Judgment 169/2001, para. 9. 
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of the principle of proportionality is a “mobile hierarchy, which does not lead to the declaration of 
invalidity of one of the interests or values in conflict, nor to the permanent demotion of one face to the 
other”446. 
The relationship between the proportionality test and the more general concept of ponderacion is 
addressed by Prieto Sanchis also in other occasions. The author argues that that the “law of balancing”, 
a “peculiar exercise of rationality”447 precisely comes into play in the latest stage of application of the 
proportionality principle: the assessment of the proportionality in the strict sense. This element also 
makes the last step the key one to solve the conflict between the, inevitably, conflicting interests in a 
neo-constitutional state448.  
Although a number of authors have argued that, so far, the Constitutional Court has failed to clarify 
the exact role of these criteria449. It is worthwhile to acknowledged that, albeit in 1992 (Judgment 
219/1992), the Court had stated that the principle of proportionality was just one of the ways in which 
the balancing judgment (juicio de ponderacion) could be carried out, in subsequent and consistent case 
law the Court reiterated that the balancing mandate is an integral part of the principle of proportionality, 
in particular it relates to the proportionality in the strict sense450. 
 
3.3 The principle of proportionality, fundamental rights and their essential content 
The crucial role of the principle of proportionality in the fundamental rights’ adjudication is often 
addressed by the literature451.  It has been argued that this principle serves the purpose to structure the 
legal reasoning needed to determine, or redefine, the essential content of fundamental rights452. The 
                                                            
446 Prieto Sanchís 2001, 216-217, my translation. 
447 Prieto Sanchís 2000, 450. 
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strong normative content and a key role of the judicial control and represents a formula for the concretization of 
the Rule of Law. 
449González Beilfuss 2003; Sánchez Gonzalez 2003; Sánchez Gonzalez 2015, 84; Barnes 1998a; Rodríguez Ruiz 
1999. 
450 E.g. Judgments 50/1995, 66/1995, 161/1997 y 53/2002, as referred to by Gonzales 2003, 19. 
451 For a review on the TC case law on fundamental rights, and especially fundamental social rights, see Baylos 
Grau 2015. On the concept of fundamental rights confront Villalon 1989. On the specific case of the “derechos 
fundamentals inespecificos” before the Constitutional tribunal, and the application of the proportionality principle 
see, inter alia, Goñi Sein 2014. 
452 Bernal Pulido 2005. 
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Spanish Constitution expressly refers to the protection of the essential content of rights and freedoms453. 
Indeed, Section 53.1 states that the exercise of rights and freedoms recognised by the Constitution can 
be regulated “only by an act which in any case must respect their essential content”. This norm derives 
from Art. 19 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany454, but it differs from the German 
provision, in two crucial aspects. First, in Spain, the constitutional provision allows the ordinary law to 
interfere in the exercise of any freedom, independently from the existence of specific norms expressly 
providing for such legislative capacity. Second, and more subtle, in the Spanish Constitution the norm 
on the essential content seems to be addressed to any legislative act, including – but not only – those 
that limit rights and freedoms455.  
In light of a constitutional norm establishing that fundamental rights are characterized by an essential 
content that must be respected in any case, the application of the principle of proportionality also serves 
the purpose to provide the legislator with an understanding of which duties must be fulfilled in order to 
enforce the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution456.  
Consistently, in the implementation of a fundamental right the legislator can establish restrictions or 
put conditions upon the exercise of the given fundamental right, for the purpose of protecting or 
enforcing other rights or interests equally protected by the Constitution. However, restrictions as such 
cannot be established in an unlimited fashion: a “limit to the limits” is needed. It would be enough to 
read Judgment 2/1982 where it is plainly declared that “unlimited rights do not exist” 457 and this limited 
character is grounded upon the need to protect also other constitutional rights, as well as other interests 
constitutionally protected458.  
                                                            
453 The legal scholarship has clearly borrowed the concept of “contenido esencial” or “nucleus” from the sciences, 
where it has a concrete and tangible meaning (e.g. the nucleus of a cell), while in law it acquires a metaphoric 
significance; see Bernal Pulido 2014, 512. 
454 The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the constitutional law, was approved on 8 May 1949. 
455 Prieto Sanchis 2000, 70. 
456 Bernal Pulido 2005; Villaverde 2008; According to Prieto Sanchis, the judicial balancing comes after the 
legislative balancing operated by the legislator during the legislative phase (2002, 105, 106). 
457 Judgment 2/1982. 
458 For a discussion, both from a European and Spanish perspective, of the limits to fundamental rights see also 
Aguiar de Luque 1993. Inter alia, the author highlights that the Spanish constitution does provide for a specific 
provision dealing with the limits to fundamental rights, while it does provide, at Article 53, that the legislator has 
to regulate the exercise of such rights. 
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The first of these limits is provided for by the already mentioned Article 53.1 Spanish Constitution, 
inspired by the German tradition, which states that the exercise of fundamental rights can be regulated 
“only by an act which in any case must respect their essential content”459.  
Two main theories have been developed to frame the concept of essential content in the Spanish legal 
system: teoria relativa and teoria absoluta. The first theory strictly connects the content of the essential 
content to the justification of the provision that imposes the right’s sacrifice, with the result that the 
essential content is the portion of the right that survives, once a justified or valid limitation of that right 
has been imposed, which – in theory – may entail even the complete sacrifice of that right, if the 
protection of the conflicting right requires so. The teoria absoluta argues for a strong nucleus of the 
right, which must be preserved in any case, even though a justification for its limitation exists. However, 
it has been noted, also this theory harbours dangers. In particular, the risk is that once the essential 
content is respected the law is free to interfere in the implementation of a given right, without being 
subject to compliance with the “peripheral content”. This deficiency may be overcome by understanding 
the essential content as the latest possible boundary not to be crossed in any case, the insurmountable 
one, not the only one460. 
According to Medina, the case law has rejected the teoria relativa that equates the limit of the 
essential content to the limit of the principle of proportionality, and it has instead adopted the teoria 
absoluta, which maintains the existence of an essential core of each fundamental right, which cannot be 
touched upon by the legislator, independently whether the provision adopted is proportionate or not. 
Therefore, the proportionality principle represents the second limit, to be applied jointly with the first 
one461. 
Bernal Pulido, in his enlightening monograph on the principle of proportionality and fundamental 
labour rights462, assesses a further theory on the essential content, supported by renowned Spanish 
scholars, such as Perejo, Prieto Sanchis and Medina Guerrero. The author groups this approach under 
                                                            
459 Article 53.1 Spanish Constitution, official translation. 
460 Prieto Sanchis 2000, 70, 71. 
461 Medina Guerrero 2008; Aguiar de Luque 1993; the “limit to the limits” issue is widely addressed also by Prieto 
Sanchis 2000, 437-441. 
462 Bernal Pulido 2014. 
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the name of teoria mixta del contenido esencial463. This theory combines the absolute theory with the 
proportionality principle, as a criterion to bind the legislator to comply with the fundamental rights. 
Under this view, the hard core of the fundamental right remains stable and cannot be sacrificed for any 
reason and to any extent, to the contrary the peripheral zone can be affected by ordinary norms and the 
proportionality principle is applied to assess whether the intervention of the legislator on the peripheral 
zone complies with the criteria of suitability, necessity and proportionality in a strict sense. In particular, 
Medina Guerrero points out that the essential content and the proportionality principle are the “limites 
de los limites” of fundamental rights that operate independently from each other464. However, according 
to Bernal Pulido, while this theory has the merit to improve the absolute theory by envisaging a method 
to protect the fundamental right beyond the essential content, it does not overcome a crucial shortcoming 
of the absolute theory, in particular, he argues that a rational criterion that allows to separate sharply the 
essential content from the periphery of the fundamental right does not exist465. In conclusion, according 
to the scholar, the theory of the essential content and the proportionality principle are incompatible in 
terms of theoretical structure. Therefore, it is necessary to get rid of the abstract idea of essential content 
and apply plainly and exclusively the principle of proportionality. However, he adds, the mixed theory 
can inspire a rule to be applied in the course of the proportionality assessment, especially in the phase 
of the balancing in the strict sense: the most intense sacrifices to fundamental rights can be admitted 
only exceptionally466. 
It is quite uncontroversial that the concept of essential content, significant as it is, is an unpredictable 
and open concept, which could be defined differently, depending on the values applied. However, its 
significance is justified, according to Prieto Sanchis, by two core arguments. First, it reminds the 
legislator and the judges the centrality of fundamental rights in the Spanish Constitution. Second, it 
obliges the legislator to provide an extensive justification for the limitation of the rights concerned. 
                                                            
463 Bernal Pulido assesses and develops counter arguments of a number of theories on fundamental rights and their 
essential content, one for all Habermas’ theory, see Bernal Pulido 2014, 509-621. 
464 Medina Guerrero 1996, my translation.  
465 Bernal Pulido 2014, 452-544. 
466 Indeed, according to Bernal Pulido, the theory of the principle of proportionality offers a stronger protection to 
fundamental rights and binds the legislator more tightly, than the essential content theory, see Bernal Pulido 2014, 
in particular 551. 
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Indeed, the duty to provide detailed justifications has a central role in the process of limiting the 
enjoyment of a fundamental right467. 
Bernal Pulido, drawing on the assumption that a full objectivity in determining the essential content 
of fundamental rights is nothing but a fascinating utopia, argues that methodological interpretative 
approaches are necessary to reduce the normative indeterminacy of such rights, and the proportionality 
principle offers the most rational interpretative method468. This is especially true if the fundamental 
right’s content is not made explicit in the text of the constitutional provision, which is not exhaustive 
enough and makes the provision characterized by a high degree of normative indeterminacy. In other 
words, the intrinsic, but not the explicit, limits to fundamental rights, and, at the same time, the explicit 
constitutional recognition of an essential content, imply the need to find an efficient interpretative 
pattern. Nevertheless, this should not exclude the joint application of other techniques and principles469. 
Preciado Domènech comes to different conclusions as to the relationship between the essential 
content and the principle of proportionality. He clearly interprets the essential content (Art. 53.1 Spanish 
Constitution) as the content of the constitutional norm, which is directly applicable, independently from 
the intervention of public authorities – such as the legislator – in the sense that “it precedes and exceeds 
the exercise of the legislative power”470. The only authority which can determine the scope and meaning 
of a fundamental right’s essential content is the Constitutional Court, while the remaining extent of the 
right at stake, that goes beyond the essential nucleus, can be subject to the legislator’s interpretation471. 
Moreover, the author points out that a norm may respect the essential content of a fundamental right, 
but, at the same time, be disproportionate. However, the other way round is not as true: a norm not 
fulfilling the essential content of a fundamental right cannot be proportionate. This argument follows 
from the assumption that a norm infringing upon the core of a fundamental right is never suitable to 
achieve a constitutional aim, unless violating a fundamental right is necessary in order to implement 
                                                            
467 Prieto Sanchis 2000, 73 ff. 
468 Bernal Pulido 2005, 68; in a similar way see also Stone Mathews 2008. 
469 Aguiar de Luque 1993, 17. See also Medina Guerrero 1998. 
470 Preciado Domènech 2016, 77, my translation. 
471 The reason for this crucial distinction between the interpretative powers of the Constitutional Court and, on the 
other hand, of the legislator, lies in the fact that “the Constitutional Court has to guard the permanent distinction 
between the objectivity of the constituent power and the implementation from the constituted powers, which will 
never be entailed to go beyond the limits and the competences set by the former” (Judgment 76/1983, 5 August 
1983, my translation). 
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another fundamental right472. According to the scholar, which seems to adopt the teoria absoluta, to 
distinguish essential content and proportionality we need to look at the different phases in which the two 
are considered: the essential content is determined at an earlier stage, “at the moment of the delimitation 
of the content of the right” and, secondly and consequently, the proportionality can be evaluated473. 
However interesting this view is, it does not help clarifying how the core content can be determined.  
Parejo Alfonso traced the meaning of the essential content and the method used by the Court to 
identify it, on the grounds of a Judgment of 1981 (Judgment 11/1981). The author argues that the 
essential content of a fundamental right is “that part of the right's content, which is absolutely necessary 
so that the interests legally protected, that enliven the right, result real, concrete and truly protected”. 
This content is not general, but “essential” in the sense that it concerns the elements which are paramount 
to legally recognize the right at issue, both in its meaning and in its justiciability. In addition, according 
to the 1981 Constitutional Court, the essential content must be understood in relation to the historical 
context in which the judicial case is decided. However, according to the author, it constitutes an 
“undetermined legal concept”, which becomes a tool for the assessment and protection of a fundamental 
right, with due regard to both its original meaning, that is the intention and will of the constituent 
assembly, as well as the "evolutionary adaptation" that it has undergone over the years474. Bernal Pulido 
identifies a further weakness in the absolute theory in the importance given by the Court to the historical 
context in the determination of the essential content of a fundamental right. Under this view the absolute 
theory is dismissed by the Constitutional Court, inasmuch as, while the Court emphasises the role of the 
temporal dimension, the theory at issue considers the right’s nucleus as a static and abstract element and 
fails to contemplate the historical context as a crucial criterion, with the effect of supporting an 
“ahistorical idealization” of fundamental rights’ essential content. This deficiency makes the teoria 
absoluta inapplicable in the practice of a legal system475. 
In order to identify whether the essential content of a fundamental right is violated, the Constitutional 
Court, in its renowned judgment from 1981, identifies two methodological ways. The first technique 
                                                            
472 Preciado Domènech 2016, 143; see also González Beilfuss 2015, 86-88. 
473 Preciado Domènech 2016, 143, my translation. 
474 Parejo Alfonso 1981, 186-190, my translation. 
475 Bernal Pulido 2014, 531, 532. 
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lies on the assumption that the interpreter shall be able to identify the “tipo abstracto del derecho”, which 
pre-exists the legislative act, in the ordinary law under scrutiny. However, the “tipo abstracto” is not 
fixed and absolute, but it reflects the collective idea in a precise historical context, which is shaped by 
the legal scholarship and the case law. Therefore, the Judges have to conduct a comparison between 
what the legislator has produced and how the right at stake is normally understood. The second step 
does not concern the internal dimension of the fundamental right, but rather the beam of faculties that 
emanate from a given right, that is the various elements that compose the interest protected. Therefore, 
in light of the two key elements pointed out (the consistency with the “abstract type” and the satisfaction 
of the interest protected), the essential content is violated when the ordinary law does not comply with 
the abstract category of the said right, or when, even if the abstract category of the constitutional right 
is reflected in the ordinary norm, the latter limits or complicates the exercise of the said right, or its 
justiciability, in an unreasonable way476. 
It has been argued that the Constitutional Court has made a prudential use of the concept of “essential 
content”, without sharply dividing the constitutional rights into two parts: the core one and the one that 
can be left aside and does not need to be enforced. Indeed, according to Prieto Sanchis, for an ordinary 
norm to be legitimate, the degree of impact upon the essential content of a fundamental right must be 
directly proportionate to the extent of the justification provided by the norm, in other words: “the more 
a right is scarified, and therefore the more we get close to touch the essential content of it, the more 
justified the restricting provision must be”477. 
 
Conclusion: balancing, hermeneutic criteria in Italy and Spain and the Social State theory 
The enormous food for thought provided by the constitutional literature addressed cannot be 
constrained in a single and all-embracing definition of balancing. To the contrary, the scholarship’s 
production demonstrates the complexity of the criterion at issue.  
                                                            
476 Parejo Alfonso 1981, 186-190. Also Solozabal Echavarria 1991 refers to Judgment 11/1981, to identify the 
scope of the essential content of constitutional rights. However, the meaning and interpretation of the concept of 
“essential content” of fundamental rights is controversial, for an attentive review of the academic literature by 
Rodríguez-Armas 1996; See also Martìnez Pujalte 1997; Prieto Sanchìs 2003. 
477 Prieto Sanchìs 2000, 441, my translation. 
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Besides those authors who challenge the existence of a balancing procedure tout court and/or the use 
of balancing as a valid and effective way for deciding disputes over conflicting rights and interests, 
others have recently questioned the assumption that we are in an “age of balancing”, a theory developed 
in certain academic literature, mostly since the end of the 1980s478. The authors who advocate this 
argument tend to emphasize the points of convergence of the case law of various national and 
supranational legal systems, even though they do acknowledge that some differences exist479. Jacco 
Bomhoff disagrees and calls into question what he characterizes as the “global age of balancing: an age 
in which even those wanting to emphasize differences between legal systems find themselves having to 
rely on this unifying language to make their point”480. He aims to show that, even though “basic 
similarities” cannot be denied, “crucial differences” still exist in the way in which the Courts balance 
conflicting interests and rights, starting from and especially because of the differences in the “language 
of balancing”481. The Italian and Spanish experiences are far from providing a clear example in support 
of the assumption that we are not in a global age of balancing, but the consistent differences cannot be 
underestimated, both in the merit and in the so-called “language of balancing”. 
Indeed, in the Italian and Spanish case law addressed, the balancing of conflicting rights and interests 
is a central element, albeit it still is highly controversial among the scholars and not clearly defined by 
the case law.  
The fact that in the Italian legal system the essential content of fundamental rights is not explicitly 
protected by a constitutional provision, as it is in the Spanish case, but it finds explicit recognition in the 
case law of the Constitutional Court, which has elaborated this concept in line with the Spanish system’s 
understanding, is one of the elements that suggests that, beyond the differences in terms of quomodo, 
the two constitutional judicial traditions share considerable similarities with regards to the approach to 
fundamental rights. 
                                                            
478 The expression was coined by Aleinikoff 1987 and it refers to the widespread use made by the Courts, all over 
the world, of the balancing technique.  
479 One for all, recently, the idea that we live in an “age of constitutional balancing” has been reiterated by 
Gardbaum 2010. 
480 Bomhoff 2013, 15. 
481 Bomhoff, the author draws his theory upon the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the US Supreme Court’s case 
law. 
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However, the most striking difference certainly lies in the criteria chosen by the Courts to apply and 
rationalize the balancing. The Italian Constitutional Court relies way more on the principle of 
reasonableness, which has been extensively applied and framed, and the concept of proportionality that 
has appeared in recent years and with an ancillary role. While, on the one hand, the Italian Court has 
been framing the reasonableness criterion and has – recently and occasionally – began to associate it 
with the proportionality requirement; on the other hand, the Spanish Court has been constructing – more 
or less consistently – the principle of proportionality, which has been relatively linked with the 
reasonableness criterion. In both cases, the scholarship, which has widely assessed and discussed these 
concepts, especially on the grounds of the constitutional case law, has not defined one for all the 
distinction and content of these two principles, nor their correspondences (considering the respective 
applications of the two criteria). Even though, the theory in favour of an overlapping of the two concepts 
seems quite accredited, especially in the Italian literature, in light of the analysis conducted in this 
chapter, it would be contrived and reductive to attempt to find a correspondence between the 
reasonableness criterion and the principle of proportionality. The principle of reasonableness is 
structurally unable to allow a definitive comparison with the proportionality test. Indeed, the principle 
of proportionality has been disseminated across modern legal systems once it had already been 
systematized by the German Constitutional Court (at least in its core content), the principle of 
reasonableness, as applied by the Italian Court, is peculiar of the Italian constitutional system and it is 
in constant evolution, which does not allow the academic literature, either, to come to a definitive (as 
definitive as could be) definition of this principle. While the proportionality test is clearly – at least 
formally – composed by the suitability test, the necessity test and the balancing in a strict sense, the only 
certain element of reasonableness seems to be that it serves the purpose to assess the internal coherence 
of the norm, that is evaluating the relationship means-aim (which may be compared to the suitability 
test), and the coherence with the overall legal system, especially in relation to fundamental rights and 
principles (which may only superficially seem to correspond to the necessity test).  
Nevertheless, albeit the criteria applied do not precisely coincide, both Courts balance conflicting 
rights and interests, in order to establish an order of preference, which is not absolute, but is pertinent 
only to the concrete case under scrutiny.   
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The necessity to apply the balancing stems precisely from the structure of the two Constitutions, 
which provide for fundamental rights and principles, which are absolute, in the sense that they are not 
hierarchically ordered, but limited, in the sense that their enforcement cannot infringe upon other rights 
and principles equally granted by the Constitution. This feature of fundamental rights and the evolving 
economic and social context lead to assess the legislative acts in a dynamic way, as it is the case with a 
balancing technique, which determines the recessive and the predominant constitutional value, and 
hence principle, on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, an absolute hierarchy would be in contradiction with 
the pluralist character of the constitutional systems under assessment and would cause a “tyranny” of a 
value over another482. 
However, the strength of such an approach fades away if the conflicting terms of the balancing do 
not express comparable values, and therefore, it is arguable whether they can be addressed through this 
legal reasoning. The choice of the elements to be balanced is likely the most sensitive moment of the 
constitutional reasoning.   
The first and most problematic moment is the identification of the rights and/or principle eligible for 
a proper balancing, that is those that are in “real conflict” with each other. For instance, assuming that 
public budget necessities must be taken into account by the Court, does this mean that the balanced 
budget principle shall become an element of the balancing, that is a “real conflict” occurs between that 
principle and a fundamental right (or any other labour right and an economic driven need, such as that 
of flexibilisation)? Therefore, should the balancing be conducted or the two principles are not 
homogenous and hence no balancing should occur? In the latter case, how could the Court include the 
other arguments in the legal reasoning? The magnitude of these questions does not allow this thesis to 
suggest definitive answers, however, drawing on the theoretical reflections reviewed, the constitutional 
judgments assessed in the next chapters contribute to shed light over these controversial issues. 
The strong similarities in the constitutional setting and in the general approach of the Courts allow 
addressing the way in which the two national Courts have approached to the balancing in the case law 
on post-crisis measures in a parallel fashion. However, the criteria of proporcionalidad and that of 
                                                            
482 In particular, Zagrebelsky 1992, 160, uses the expression “tyranny”, my translation. 
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ragionevolezza do not seem to be strictly comparable in any respect, especially because of their 
application in the legal reasoning of the Courts: the – not always consistent – application of a rigid test 
in the first case and a more dialectic approach in the second.  Nevertheless, the concept of proportionality 
is being increasingly introduced in the Italian case law and that of reasonableness seems to have a role 
in the Spanish Court’s legal reasoning.  
The assessment of the most recent case law on labour and social security norms of the two Courts, 
under this perspective, has the purpose to contribute both – and mainly – to define the current status of 
the constitutional conflict of fundamental labour rights with other interests of an economic nature in 
national legal systems strongly influenced by the EU policies, as well as to the reflection over the most 
recent developments in the use of the balancing method in the respective legal arguments. 
The reviewed carried out in this chapter, besides providing the essential notions to assess the 
constitutional case law under the balancing perspective, has identified the most sensitive aspects of this 
process. Therefore, it allows a better understanding of what elements of the case law selected need to be 
investigated and provides a guideline for approaching the units of analysis. 
Moreover, the theory on fundamental rights adopted, that is the lenses with which we look at the 
constitutional labour rights at issue, has a significant, or even decisive, role in the interpretation of the 
fundamental rights enshrined in a Constitution483. The same can be said when the analysis of the 
Constitutional Courts’ arguments is conducted, in the sense that the interpretative framework selected, 
as regards fundamental rights, constitutes a strong underlying assumption, which conditions the 
assessment of the Court’s legal reasoning, as well. In other words, certain steps of the analysis of the 
balancing of fundamental rights conducted by a Constitutional Court certainly hinges on a specific 
understanding of the Constitution, and, precisely, of the value and role of the fundamental rights 
provided therein. 
 Preciado Domènech, drawing on Böckenförde484, reviews five theories of fundamental rights485. The 
liberal theory, grounded upon the favour libertatis, entails that the State has the exclusive competence 
                                                            
483 See Preciado Domènech 2016, 107. 
484 Böckenförde 1993, 44-83. See also Künkler Stein, 2017. 
485 These theories, according to the author, are not independent and self-standing, but, to the contrary, they all 
provide for key interpretative criteria, complementing each other. 
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of guaranteeing the enjoyment of constitutional freedoms, on the other hand, the citizens shall simply 
comply with the generic rule that “everything that is not forbidden is allowed” and, under these view, 
fundamental rights work as the “law of the jungle”486. According to the institutional theory, a Statute or 
any legal provision that concerns a fundamental right, on the one hand, facilitates the exercise of the 
liberty enshrined in that right, but, on the other, directs that liberty to a specific goal, so that the law 
becomes the framework of that liberty. The axiological theory puts emphasis on the values expressed 
by each fundamental right, which are crucial and coherent tools that lead the State in the construction of 
an integrated and homogeneous society, insofar as they inspire every normative intervention. The 
functional-democratic theory (an evolution of the institutional theory), divided in functionalist-
institutional theory and multifunctional theory, in brief, stresses on the institutional dimension of public 
freedoms487.  
The Social State theory is the latest theory addressed by the Spanish author, as it is the theory that 
permeates the Social state and, in both the Italian and Spanish legal systems, finds explicit grounds in 
the Constitutional norms that provide for the duty of the public authorities to grant the substantial 
equality among citizens, which goes way beyond the “non-interference” and requires positive actions 
by the State bodies (see Art. 3.2 Italian Constitution, and Art. 9.2 Spanish Constitutions). If equality 
were not elaborated also in substantial terms, rights and freedoms would be purely declarations and they 
would fail to become real tools488. The establishment of a society founded upon substantial equality is 
guaranteed by the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights, the so called rights of second 
generation (which are not rights of subordinate importance) and allow to realize both the positive 
freedoms and the social equality. This follows the nature of the fundamental rights at stake, which are 
both welfare rights and require a positive action consisting in the allocation of resources, as well as 
liberty rights, as the right to strike and the trade union freedom. A proper enforcement of these rights, 
and, hence, the full implementation of the substantial equality are the necessary preconditions for the 
                                                            
486 Preciado Domènech 2017, 108, my translation. 
487 Preciado Domènech 2017, 107-112. 
488 Bin 2007, drawing on Karl Marx’s arguments (Marx 1974) points out that this was one of the features of the 
French Constitution of 1848, which was a mere declaration of rights and freedoms. 
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human freedom489. The Italian Constitutional Court, in Judgment 15/1975, underlines that the Italian 
Constitution recognizes and protects also “fundamental liberty rights, mostly covered in the category of 
inviolable rights generally included in Art. 2 Constitution and recognised both to the individuals and the 
social groups where human personality is expressed. Beyond any doubt, the assembly and trade union 
freedoms, at Articles 18 and 39 [Italian] Constitution, fall into the inviolable human rights”490. 
The very first sentences of the two Constitutions are expressive of the dualistic dimension of the 
legal systems they are designing, which is built around both the individual and the collective dimension 
of labour. Art. 1.1. Spanish Constitution declares: “Spain is hereby established as a social and 
democratic State”. In a similar way, Art. 1.1 Italian Constitution states that “[I]taly is a democratic 
republic, founded on labour”.  
Furthermore, the thesis calling into question the justiciability of this cluster of rights is deemed 
obsolete, by now. Indeed, on the one hand, there is no legal ground upon which the justiciability of these 
rights could be denied and, on the other hand, international and national judges are strengthening their 
justiciability and effectiveness491. In addition, also the argument that only welfare rights impose upon 
the State the duty to allocate resources is to be dismissed, given that is now widely accepted that the 
enforcement of every right entails a public financial allocation, for instance, the right to judicial 
protection requires the State to set up a judicial system made of structures and employees492.  
Preciado Domènech acknowledges the economic constraints imposed by the reformed Art. 135, 
Spanish Constitution, which corresponds to the renewed Art. 81, Italian Constitution, and provides for 
an obligation upon the State to respect the principle of balanced budget. However, the author advances 
a proposal, which sounds as an open criticism to the political and social direction the EU has taken. He 
                                                            
489 The economic, social and cultural rights are recognised also by international Charters and Conventions, as the 
ECHR and the numerous ILO Conventions. As to the interplay between socio-economic rights and political rights 
in the ECHR see, inter alia, Thornton 2014; as to the social rights protection by the ILO, see, one for all, Kott, 
Droux 2013.  
490  Bin also notices that “the Constitutional Court often identifies in the constitutional provisions a favour for 
social interests, which are not among the traditional fundamental rights, as, inter alia, the favour for employees 
recognized in Art. 35 (Judgment 180/984) and Art. 38.2 (Judgment 286/1987)”: Bin 1992, 4. 
491 On the compatibility of social rights with political and civil rights, in terms of structure and scope, see Pino 
2016; on the justiciability of economic cultural and social rights, see Saura Estapà 2011 and, with particular 
reference to social rights, see Aa. Vv. 2010. Cf. also Rey Pérez 2007. 
492 The same is true for the liberty rights, given that “very few rights are inexpensive, especially in the complex 
contemporary socio-political systems”: Ruiz Miguel 1994, 660, my translation. 
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wonders why it is not possible to establish a mechanism to ascertain the responsibility of the State that 
fails to fulfil a minimum level of enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights, while, to the 
contrary, the member States have to respond to the EU as to the implementation of the balanced budget 
principle, given that there are not legal constraints to a mechanism as such493. 
Without denying the significance of all of the mentioned theories, nor their interaction, the analyses 
of the Italian and Spanish judgments are conducted wearing the lenses of the Social State theory, which 
implies an understanding of the Constitution as the tool that grants substantial equality among citizens: 
a “socially oriented” Constitution494. Labour rights, understood for the purpose of this thesis as rights 
aimed at protecting workers and their dignity, either during their working life or after retirement, are 
traditionally included in the cluster of economic, social and cultural rights, as they encompass both 
welfare rights and liberty rights of workers. Under this perspective, both these types of rights, grouped 
under the hat of labour rights, necessitate the intervention of the State in order to be effective. Indeed, 
the public authority has to intervene not only to allocate the resources for the effective enjoyment of 
welfare rights, but also to “remove the obstacles” (expression used in both by Art. 3.2, Italian 
Constitution, Art. 9.2, Spanish Constitution) that hamper the full enjoyment of the liberty rights; in fact, 
an abstentionist attitude from the State, towards labour liberty rights, would lead to greater power 
inequality and would fail to balance in an equal way the interaction of social forces. Contemporary 
democracies, based upon the Social State, do not consider economic rights as absolute and immune from 
democratic rights. In order for this principle (which stems from various constitutional norms) to be 
applied, the active participation of workers and their organizations must be not only allowed, but also, 
granted and favoured. Therefore, public powers must actively promote the collective participation, 
which means that, for instance, in order to allow the exercise of the trade union freedom, the State cannot 
simply adopt a tolerant and abstentionist attitude495.  
                                                            
493 Preciado Domènech 2016, 107-119; on the Social State theory see also Bernal Pulido 2007, 352-402. 
Consistently, Ciolli 2012b argues that the only way to overcome the recent crisis is to reintroduce the centrality of 
the Constitutional norms, in order to promote social equality. 
494 Expression recently used by Bavaro, in a brilliant essay on the relevance of the material Constitution for the 
enforcement of labour – social – rights: Bavaro 2018, 261.  
495 See the essay by Antonio Baylos Grau on the relationship between private powers and fundamental rights in 
Baylos Grau 2017, 10. On the qualification of social rights as fundamental rights see, inter alia, Prieto Sanchís 
2016. On the value of labour in modern Constitutions, cf. the latest book by Ruth Dukes, where the author reflects 
on the meaning of “labour constitution” in current times and in the EU context, drawing on Sinzheimer’s and 
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On the grounds of the theoretical discussions addressed in this Chapter and the theoretical framework 
adopted – the Social State theory – the following chapters assess the Italian and Spanish judgments in 
detail, by focusing on the type of rights and interests subject to the balancing, the way in which they 
have been balanced (principles applied and technique used) and by which institutional actors (legislator 
and/or the Courts). Even though, the main aim of the judgments’ assessment is to identify the outcome 
in terms of enforcement of fundamental labour rights and the role of Constitutional Courts in this respect, 
in countries seriously affected by the 2008 crisis, it is also considered whether, in these cases, the legal 
reasoning is consistent with the respective national constitutional case law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Kahn-Freund’s theories about the economic constitution as a way “to meet the need for the organisation of 
economic life, to put to an end to the anarchy of so-called ‘economic freedom’, and to ensure that the economy 
was run so as to fulfil social ends” (Dukes 2014, 18) and the labour constitution, invoked in Germany in the 1920s, 
which provided for the concepts of workers’ organisation, industrial action and arbitration, at a very early stage 
compare to other legal systems: Dukes 2014. 
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Chapter 3 
The Italian post-crisis case law and balancing of fundamental labour rights 
 
Introduction 
The broad investigation on the application of the balancing technique in the Italian constitutional 
case law, and the referring principles, conducted in the first part of the previous chapter, is functional to 
the evaluation of a number of judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court that constitute the Italian 
constitutional post-crisis case law on labour rights, that is the constitutional rulings, which have decided 
upon legislative measures, whose adoption has been triggered by the 2008 crisis and its consequences 
on the national economic context.  
The selected judgments can be divided into two groups: those concerning the reduction of public 
employees’ wages and those on the reduction of the revaluation of retirement benefits. Namely, 
Judgment 223/2012, Judgment 310/2013, the extensive legal reasoning of Judgment 178/2015 and the 
recent Judgment 124/2017 belong to the first cluster. While, the controversial Judgment 70/2015 and 
the subsequent and consistent Judgments 173/2016 and 250/2017, the most recent of which was 
published in December 2017, concern the pension system. 
As seen in the first chapter, most of these judgments have been widely discussed in the academic 
literature from various perspectives, but a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the balancing 
conducted by the Court and its effects on the fundamental labour rights concerned has not yet been 
developed, even though a number of scholars have provided interesting insights also in this respect. 
Therefore, this section analyses the selected judgments, by focusing on the legal reasoning of the Court 
in terms of elements subject to the balancing, with special emphasis on the constitutional status of 
fundamental labour rights,  the use of the constitutional  principles, the overall structure of the balancing 
discourse and the role played by the Court – either an active balancer or the supervisor of the balancing 
conducted by the legislator. 
These Judgments may be addressed under various profiles, however the following pages 
circumscribe the analysis to the elements that are significant to trace the balancing conducted by the 
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Judge and its effects on the relevant fundamental labour rights, leaving aside the other, significant and 
anyway controversial, aspects (see Chapter 1). 
Clearly, the Italian constitutional case law is far richer than the cases discussed in this thesis. Indeed, 
this section does not claim to systematise in an absolute and all-encompassing manner the Italian 
Constitutional Court’s approach, but rather it aims to highlight some elements common to the most 
recent Judgments on fundamental labour rights, in order to trace constitutional trends in the application 
of the balancing technique and identify the current status of the relationship between fundamental labour 
rights and other interests of an economic character. 
The line of thoughts of the various judgments are not fully consistent, but the analysis conducted still 
allows to identify common and recurrent elements, as well as highlight significant differences. First, the 
chapter addresses the role of the Court; second, the technique used to carry out the legal reasoning; third, 
it identifies which rights and principles have been the subject of the balancing exercise; last, it draws 
some preliminary conclusions on the effects of this case law on the scope of the fundamental labour 
rights concerned. Before focusing on the assessment of the judgments under these four profiles, a brief 
summary of the factual circumstances of the selected judgments is provided496. 
 
1. The selected judgments: a recapitulation 
1.1. Public employees’ wage reduction before the Court  
What has been identified, for the purpose of this thesis, the first – in a chronological order – Judgment 
on post-crisis measures evaluates a norm, which had the effect of suspending the automatic adjustment 
mechanism of the Judges’ salaries and reducing progressively indemnities that are peculiar to the 
Judiciary members. In other words, the provision at stake was freezing a number of salary items for an 
overall period of 5 years, from 2011 to 2015. The Court explains that the legal mechanism affected by 
the norm under scrutiny provides for the salary of Judges to be automatically adjusted every three years, 
according to a percentage calculated by the General Statistics Office (Istituto Centrale di Statistica) and 
                                                            
496 The Italian judgments’ quotations are translated from Italian by Giulia Frosecchi, but for Judgments 70/2015 
and 178/2015, which have been officially translated in English, by the Italian Constitutional Court’s staff. 
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approved by Prime Minister Decree  (para. 11.2) and concludes that the principle of independence of 
the judiciary (Art. 104 Constitution) has been sacrificed in an unreasonable way. 
In Judgment 310/2013 – that strongly reiterates the conclusions of Judgment 304/2013 on the wage 
block of the diplomatic staff – the Court has to assess the constitutionality of Art. 9.2 and Art. 9.21 of 
Decree Law  78/2010, which had provided for a block of wage rises and deactivated service seniority 
for university lecturers and researchers for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013497. The Court rules in favour 
of the constitutional legitimacy of the norms challenged. In a concise judgment, the Court recognises 
that the block represents a sacrifice for the employees concerned. However, it cannot be considered 
unreasonable, not even for the employees subject to the heaviest sacrifice, such as the researchers, 
because of three main reasons: its limited period and the necessity to contain public spending, as well 
as the general character of the sacrificed imposed. This is one of the first occasions in which, the Court, 
in order to justify the length of the block and its reasonableness, emphasises the need to respect the 
principle of balanced budget and enforce the reformed Art. 81 Constitution, as well as Directive 
2011/85/UE, which has imposed a medium term approach to economic policies. 
The second relevant judgment concerns the right to collective bargaining and the necessary 
temporary character of its limitation. In November 2013, the Tribunale di Roma and, in March 2014, 
the Tribunale di Ravenna initiated the proceeding concerning the constitutionality of certain measures 
provided for by reforms aimed at urgently addressing the economic and financial situation; these 
measures were adopted by Decree Law in 2010 and 2011 , the effects of which were partially extended 
by the Stability Laws for 2014 and 2015. A number of subjects, including trade unions, intervened in 
the proceeding. In particular, the employees of the Ministry of Justice and the CONFSAL-UNSA 
brought the reasonableness and proportionality arguments to the forefront. They argued that the further 
extension of the block of collective bargaining (for the economic part) operated with the Stability Law 
for 2015, had balanced in an unreasonable and disproportionate way Articles 35.1, 36.1, 39.1 
Constitution, with the aim of achieving economic recovery, and in particular, with the principle of 
balanced budget enshrined in Art. 81 Constitution. Although in Judgment 178/2015, the Court had the 
                                                            
497 Considering the referral requests presented by various regional courts the constitutionality of the measure has 
been challenged on the grounds of Articles 2, 3, 9, 33, 34, 36, 37, 42, 53, 77 and 97 Italian Constitution. 
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occasion to discuss a number of provisions and elaborate on the right to a fair remuneration (Art. 36.1 
Constitution) as well, this analysis focuses on the legal reasoning concerning the freezing of the 
bargaining procedures for the economic part and the right to collective bargaining provided for by Art. 
39 Constitution. Eventually, the Court concluded that a number of subsequent provisions limiting the 
right to collective bargaining in the public sector for an overall period of five years constitutes an 
infringement of Art. 39.1 Constitution, which protects trade union freedom and, hence, the right to 
accede bargaining procedures. In particular, the constitutional legitimacy of the restriction imposed by 
Art. 9 of D.L. 78/2010, which had already been scrutinised in previous Judgments from 2013 and 2014, 
are reiterated and the Court briefly recalls the legal grounds used in its case law to conclude in favour 
of the reasonableness of this norm (para. 12). Subsequently, the Court assesses the legitimacy of Art. 
16.1.b), D.L. 98/2011, which authorized the adoption of a regulation providing for the extension until 
31 December 2014 of the provisions limiting the increase of financial remuneration. Already at a very 
first stage of its argumentation, the Court points out that, in order to decide upon its constitutionality the 
contested provision has to be read in conjunction with the Stability Law for 2014 (the Court talks about 
an “Inseparable link”) (Art. 1.453, Law 147/2013) for the part that provides for the suspension of the 
bargaining procedure on the economic aspects for 2013 and 2014. In other words, these norms have the 
effect of suspending for additional two years the collective negotiation in the public sector (para. 13). 
After having concluded for the non-unreasonable sacrifice of Art. 36.1 Constitution, that is the principle 
of proportionate remuneration, and, consequently, having dismissed the claims for damages (see paras. 
14.1, 14.2), the Court finds “a clear violation of the trade union freedom”, based on the fact that the 
suspension of collective bargaining was “so prolonged over time” (para. 15). This conclusion is 
supported by the evaluation of another provision that further prolonged the block of collective 
bargaining up until the end of 2015: the Stability Law for 2015 (Art. 1.254, Law 190/2014). 
In 2017, the reduction of public employees’ wages has been discussed again by the Constitutional 
Court. Even though Judgment 124/2017 has not attracted much the attention from academic and legal 
scholars (indeed, Chapter 1 could not provide an articulated literature review on this Judgment), it needs 
to be briefly addressed, since the judicial reasoning makes use of certain elements that are recurrent in 
the case law under assessment, namely the use of the principle of reasonableness, the supervision over 
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a proper balancing of different constitutional principles and the relevance of the economic context and 
the general character of the measure under scrutiny, as well as the discretionality of the legislator. The 
first measure discussed provides for an all-encompassing maximum limit for the economic treatment of 
any person working for the public administration, whether employed or self-employed, which shall not 
exceed the economic treatment perceived by the First President of the Supreme Court (Corte di 
Cassazione), currently set at 240000 euros (Art. 23-ter D.L. 201/2011, converted by Law 214/2011 and 
Art. 13.1 D.L. 66/2014, converted by Law 89/2014). The second provision assessed (Art. 1.489 of Law 
147/2013 (Stability Law for 2014)), considered by the Court to be the development of the previous norm 
(para 9.1), prevents public bodies to pay the remuneration to those who already receive a retirement 
benefit, in a way that the total amount received, by summing up remuneration and retirement benefit 
(including annuities), exceeds the limit of 240000 euros per annum. Both norms have passed the test of 
constitutionality and have been found reasonable beyond any doubt. 
 
1.2. Retirement benefits revaluation and the modulation of the Court 
The extremely controversial Judgment 70/2015 discusses the constitutional legitimacy of a provision 
providing for a limit to the revaluation of pensions by 100%, for the years 2012 and 2013, concerning 
pensions worth an overall amount of up to three times the minimum INPS (National Institute of Social 
Security) pension, namely, Art. 24.25 of Decree Law 201/2011, converted with amendments into Art. 
1.1, Law 214/2011. The Court discusses the questions of unconstitutionality on the grounds of Art. 36.1 
Constitution (providing for the right to a fair remuneration) and Art. 38.2 Constitution (on the adequacy 
of social security benefits), read in light of Article 3.2 Constitution (on the right substantial equal 
treatment). Eventually, the block of revaluation of pensions is declared in violation of all of these 
constitutional norms.   
In Judgment 173/2016, the Court evaluates the legitimacy of two norms of the Stability Law for 
2014: Articles 1.483 and 1.486 of Law 147/2013. Both provisions have passed the test and have been 
declared consistent with the constitutional sources. The first measure addressed provided for a new 
modulation of the retirement benefits revaluation, which concerned all pensions, for the years 2014-
2018. The legal reasoning of the Judge, which has declared the claim of unconstitutionality against this 
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norm unfounded, widely refers to Judgment 70/2015. Indeed, the Court does not develop a proper legal 
reasoning as to this norm, but rather it reiterates the crucial distinction between a block and a modulation 
in the revaluation of pensions, which has allowed to declare Art. 1.483 legitimate. Therefore, the analysis 
of this Judgment focuses on the legal reasoning developed as regards the second norm evaluated by the 
Court, Art. 1.486, that provided for a solidarity contribution to be detracted from the highest retirement 
benefits (14-30 times higher than the minimum INPS pension), for a three year period (2014-2016). The 
contested provision is found reasonable, “albeit to the limit”. This parenthetical element of Court’s 
conclusion is meaningful since it suggests that the solidarity contribution under scrutiny is at the edge 
of violating the essential content of the right to adequate retirement benefits (Art. 38 Constitution).  
Overall, the line of thought of the Judge is brief and at times hasty, but it offers interesting elements to 
be added to the general reflection on the post-crisis constitutional case law.  
The last episode of a case law in search of some coherence is represented by Judgment 250/2017, 
released in December 2017, which responds to fifteen questions of unconstitutionality raised by several 
ordinary Courts and assesses the legitimacy of three norms concerning the automatic revaluation of 
pensions. One of them, namely the question referring to Art. 1.483, has been solved mostly on the 
grounds of previous case law. Therefore, this section focuses on the other two norms and the elaborated 
legal reasoning that have declared their constitutionality. Art. 24.25 and Art. 24.25-bis of D.L. 201/2011, 
as substituted by Art. 1.1)-1) of D.L. 65/2015, have been adopted with the explicit aim of implementing 
Judgment 70/2015 and amend the regulation on the automatic revaluation of pensions censured by that 
Judgment, in compliance with the principle of balanced budget and the public finance targets. In 
particular, paragraph 25 rules out any automatic revaluation for retirement benefits six times as high as 
the minimum INPS benefit and provides for a revaluation based upon decreasing percentages for 
retirement benefits between three and six times the INPS minimum, for the years 2012-2013. Paragraph 
25-bis has to do with the so-called trascinamento: the norm regulates the percentage of the revaluation 
for the years 2012-2013 recognised in order to determine the automatic revaluation for the years 2014, 
2015 (20%) and 2016 (50%). Both provisions are declared legitimate because they do not affect the 
adequacy of the retirement benefits, precisely due to the application of the progressivity criterion, which 
ensures the conservation of the purchasing power and resistance to the erosion. 
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2. The role of the Court 
In these Judgments, the Court has not conducted directly the balancing, but rather it has assessed the 
balancing conducted by the legislator, acting as a supervisor of the legislative initiatives, in dialogue 
with the legislator and with due regard for its discretional competences. In this respect, a sentence of the 
controversial Judgment 70/2015 is representative: “the legislator must operate on this terrain in striking 
a correct balance whenever the need to make cost savings arises”. In light of this, the Court draws 
attention to the generic justification provided by the legislator for the contested norm, arguing that it 
fails to explain “why financial requirements should necessarily prevail over the rights affected by the 
balancing operation”, nor it is supported by technical documents produced for this purpose. This 
paragraph confirms that the Court unquestionably understands the legislator as active balancer of 
conflicting interests. Indeed, it concludes that the right of pensioners to maintain the purchasing power, 
protected by constitutional norms, “has been unreasonably sacrificed in the name of financial 
requirements which are not illustrated in detail” (para. 10).  
Similarly, in Judgment 124/2017, the Court states that the legislator has "to balance numerous values 
of a constitutional status", considering that the limited resources available have to be allocated in a 
proper and transparent way (para. 8.1). In this occasion, probably with the aim of providing guidance to 
the legislator, the Court makes some examples of constitutional value that may be subject to the 
balancing process, for this purpose, i.e. Art. 3 Constitution (equal treatment), Art. 36.1 Constitution 
(proportionate remuneration), Art. 38.2 Constitution (adequacy of the retirement benefits) and Art. 97 
Constitution on the smooth running of the public administration. Quoting from its case law, the Court 
adds, already at this stage of the judicial reasoning, that also the establishment of a maximum limit for 
the combination of remunerations and pensions affects various constitutional values, again it makes 
what seems to be a non-exhaustive list, which aims to give the legislator certain indications, by 
mentioning Art. 4 on the right to work, Art. 38.2 and Art. 2 on the “solidarity between the different 
generations that interact in the labour market” (para. 8.2). However, the Court stresses that this 
interference is allowed if the values concerned are balanced and the measure is not manifestly 
unreasonable. In the same judgment, as concerns the second norm under scrutiny, the Judge underlines 
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that “the legislator is called upon to ensure a systematic, and not fragmented, protection of the 
constitutional values at stake” (para. 9.2, italics added). Therefore, the Court is making clear that it is up 
to the legislator to conduct the reasonable balancing, while the Court is intervening only at a later stage 
and in a dialectic way with the legislator. 
In Judgment 223/2012, by quoting Judgment 111/1997, the Court points out that also as regards 
public fiscal matters and the compliance with the principle of proportionate and progressive tax 
contribution (Art. 53), which is expression of the principle of equality (Art. 3), “the scrutiny of the Court 
…. consists of a ‘judgment on the reasonable, or unreasonable, use of the legislator of its own 
discretional power’” (para. 13.3.1). Hence, the Court does not interfere with the competence of the 
legislator and its main faculty, that is the discretionality, but rather it intervenes to recall the limit of this 
discretionality (paramount in a democratic system), that is a reasonable exercise. 
In addition, in Judgment 223/2012, the Court carries out the legal reasoning by considering, first of 
all, the reasons why the legislator has originally put in place the automatic mechanism tackled by the 
norm under scrutiny and how these reasons have been elaborated by the relevant case law. In a similar 
way, in Judgment 70/2015, the Court investigates on the rationale of the overall legislation on the 
automatic revaluation of pensions in order to identify the aim pursued. This evaluation, carried out by 
reviewing norms providing for temporary suspension, or reduction, of such a mechanism – and the 
respective constitutional judgments where they exist –, allows the Judge, as a first step, to identify the 
intention of the legislator who has designed such a mechanism, consolidated in the Italian legal system 
also thanks to a consistent constitutional case law. So, for instance, the assessment of a previous 
judgment on an analogous norm serves the purpose to identify the criterion to be applied in order 
determine the legitimacy of a provision that imposes a sacrifice on a fundamental right (in that case the 
defence of the purchasing power of pensions is the criterion that justifies the sacrifice of Articles 36.1 
and 38.2 Constitution). The assessment in light of the norm’s rationale, and respective case law, reflects 
the will of the Court not to be the main character of the balancing process, but rather the supervisor of 
the consistency with the whole legal system of the new balancing of interests conducted by the legislator 
and expressed in the norm under scrutiny.  
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In few cases, the legal reasoning has helped to define the labour rights at stake and their content. 
However, it cannot be said that the Court has conducted what has been called in the academic literature 
the “definitional balancing”, that is a balancing finalized to an advanced understanding of a fundamental 
right. Indeed, the only moment in which it has actively conducted the balancing is the decision to declare 
the supervening unconstitutionality of the provisions discussed in Judgment 178/2015. This ruling of 
supervening unconstitutionality is the only case in which the Court has acted as an active balancer, by 
modulating the effects of its judgment to balance the right to access collective bargaining procedures, 
which has been unlocked by the Court starting from the day of the publication, with the aim to preserve 
the stability of the public budget, which, in fact, has not been touched by the ruling. Indeed, the Court 
declares the “supervening unconstitutionality” of the freeze of collective bargaining procedures, with 
effect from the day after the publication of the Judgment. As a consequence, the perpetration of the 
effects of the norms at issue beyond the publication date is to be considered unconstitutional, which, in 
practice, imposes upon the public body a duty to initiate the bargaining procedures with the public 
employees’ representatives as soon as possible. On the contrary, the situation created by the norms under 
scrutiny in Judgment 178/2015 up to the day of the publication is accepted as constitutionally legitimate. 
The choice to adopt this kind of constitutional decision – quite controversial in the academic literature 
– can be attached to a will of the Court to tackle the intention to give structural effect to the block, and 
its possible future crystallization, rather than the norms per se, thus completely avoiding the risk of 
interfering with the legislator’s discretionality.  
At the same time, in substantial terms, with the new start of the collective negotiation the social 
partners cannot demand, for the new collective agreement, a restoration of the missed improvement that 
would have been achieved if the collective negotiation would have taken place regularly, inasmuch as 
the interruption of the bargaining procedures is constitutionally illegitimate only starting from the day 
of publication and not for the whole 5 years of effective block. Hence, this type of ruling saves entirely 
the effects of the suspension, that is the public expenditure restraint and the collective interest in a 
“rational distribution of resources”. In that sense, the modulation of the temporal effects of the Judgment 
constitutes the balancing operated by the Court, which consists properly in condemning the attempt to 
structurally sacrifice the right to collective bargaining, while at the same time preserving its public 
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financial effects. On the contrary, in the course of its legal reasoning the Court acts as a supervisor of 
the balancing operated by the legislator. It is noteworthy that this rare case in which the Court has 
actively balanced the constitutional interests in conflict has been strongly conditioned by an attentive 
evaluation, by the Court of the financial context and the public economic needs (on the role of the 
economic and legal context in the selected judgments, see further in this Chapter).  
However, besides the concluding moment in which it has released the ruling of supervening 
unconstitutionality, also in Judgment 178/2015, the Court has acted as a supervisor, as proved by the 
attentive analysis of the norms concerned, which has been carried out in order to detect the intention of 
the legislator, which is a decisive element to understand whether the provision is reasonable. In a similar 
way, in Judgment 173/2016 and Judgment 124/2017, the assessment of the intention lying behind the 
norms under scrutiny has been crucial to conclude for their legitimacy. In particular, in the latter case, 
the intention of the legislator to set a “foreseeable and general limit” to the high professional’s 
emoluments has been an important argument in favour of the legitimacy of the contested norm. 
Last, in several occasions, the Court stresses the relevance of the discretionality of the legislator, 
reiterated, for instance, in the already quoted Judgment 223/2012, as well as in Judgment 173/2016 (see 
para. 8.6). In Judgment 124/2017, the concluding points made by the Court emphasise the discretionality 
of the legislator, which is allowed to reconsider the limits on the combination of remunerations and 
pensions for persons working for the public administration, in light of public spending trends in the 
economic and social context. However, in this forward-looking statement the Court does not fail to point 
out that the legislator can exercise its discretional power only if an attentive assessment of the long term 
effects of further restrictive measures is conducted (para. 9.4). While in Judgment 70/2015, the 
discretional power of the legislator is not put into question, but it is pointed out that this discretionality 
must be exercised in compliance with Art. 36.1 (right to a fair remuneration) and Art. 38.2 (right to an 
adequate pension), that, read jointly, guarantee a full implementation of the principle of substantial 
equality (Art. 3.2) (para. 8). The relevance given by the Court to the discretionality of the legislator is a 
crucial feature of the entire Judgment 250/2017, not only because the legal reasoning initiates by 
pointing out that the discretionality of the legislator does exist, but is limited by the reasonableness 
criterion, but also because of the dialogue established with the legislator. In fact, the Judge recognizes 
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that the legislator, in the attempt to implement Judgment 70/2015, has newly balanced the values and 
constitutional interests at stake by adopting the provisions under assessment. Therefore, says the Court, 
the norms at stake, in their new formulation, do not represent a “mere reproduction” of the provisions 
declared unconstitutional in 2015, to the contrary they are characterized by “relevant novelties” and 
have been adopted promptly (paras. 6.1, 6.2). The consideration given to the technical reports attached 
to the measure under scrutiny to justify the economic restrictions on retirement benefits is a further 
confirmation of the respectful attitude towards the legislator’s competence. Also in this latest Judgment, 
the Court has acted as a supervisor, which is confirmed by an uncontroversial sentence, where it states 
that the technical reports explanatory of the legislative choices “represent an instrument for the 
verification of the legislator’s choices” (6.5.1, italics added) (although the reference to the technical 
documents carries along other criticalities, addressed in the next section). 
The capability of the Court to remain a warrantor of the balancing conducted by the legislator and 
do not become a direct balancer of conflicting interests solves the doubts, often raised by both the 
academic literature and the public opinion, on the danger of a political role of the Constitutional Court, 
since it tackles the root causes of the problem: the Court does not invade the legislator’s competence, 
but carries out a supervision at a second stage, in case an ordinary Court raises doubts over the legitimacy 
of the legislative act.  
Furthermore, the different role of the Court is expressed also by the evidence that, while, in general, 
the ordinary norms are not preceded by a structured justification of the balancing conducted, which shall 
include an extended reflection over the constitutional rights eventually sacrificed and, on the other hand, 
the reasons that make this sacrifice legitimate, the constitutional judgments (albeit with the due 
differences and without a recurring scheme) provide for a rich legal reasoning that investigates the 
alleged balancing of the legislator. The fact that a ruling may result in the unconstitutionality of a norm, 
and therefore its cancellation from the legal system, which entails that the matter concerned turns out to 
be regulated differently from what the latest legislator had decided, does not mean that the Court has 
acted as a legislator. Indeed, the Government and Parliament remain entitled to adopt a new regulation 
on the matter, which modifies the legal state of play as set by the constitutional judgment, as long as this 
new act is respectful of the constitutional rights, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court. In this sense, 
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in Judgment 178/2015, final paragraph, the Court states: “it will be up to the legislator to restart the 
usual dynamic of collective bargaining”. The external role of the Court, which provides guidelines to 
the legislator, is exemplified in Judgment 70/2015, where the Court strongly refers to its case law 
(Judgment 316/2010) and grounds its conclusions on a warning given in a previous ruling, which was 
advising the legislator that an “indefinite suspension” or a “frequent repetition” of measures as the one 
at stake would have affected the purchasing power of pensions, therefore exposing “the system to 
evident tensions with the mandatory principles of reasonableness and proportionality” (para. 9). This 
scenario, in which the Constitutional Court and the legislator build a constructive dialogue, is nothing 
but the fulfilment/enforcement/application of the division of powers that grounds the contemporary 
democracies.   
 
3. The technique applied 
Ascertained that the Italian Constitutional Court mostly exclusively supervises on the balancing 
conducted by the legislator, let us focus, at this stage, on the criteria and technique applied by the Court 
to carry out its warrantor role as well as on the evidence that the post-crisis case law provide in this 
respect. This aspect is addressed by assessing, first, the extent of systematization of the legal reasoning 
(having in mind the proportionality test model) and, second, the indications provided from the selected 
judgments as regards the meaning of the principle of reasonableness and its relationship with the 
criterion of proportionality in the Italian legal system. 
 
3.1 Seven judgments and the inconsistent structure of the legal reasoning  
As far as concerns the structure of the legal reasoning, the judgments assessed are heterogeneous 
and, although in some cases the Court has attempted to systematize its arguments, they fail to provide a 
clear and consistent idea of the argumentative technique applied by this Court. Moreover, the selected 
case law can be hardly used to argue that the Italian Constitutional Court implicitly applies the 
proportionality test. Even thought, some moments of the proportionality test are encountered throughout 
the legal reasoning, as in Judgment 124/2017, where the legitimacy of the aim pursued, that is the general 
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interest, plays a decisive role and is also based on the evidence that the resources saved by the contested 
provision have been reallocated for the public benefit.  
Judgment 178/2015 provides a clear example of the relevance of the assessment of the contested 
norm’s aim, for the Italian Court. Here, by describing the content of the norm, the Court reconstructs 
how the aim is achieved and, where the aim is deemed legitimate, it assesses the suitability of the 
measure to achieve its aim. However, the Court has never built its line of thought following the 
proportionality test. Indeed, overall, we see that the Court has plainly opted for a different approach. 
And, even where it has made an effort to systematize its legal reasoning and it has clarified in advance 
the criteria applied to conduct the scrutiny, it has done so without referring to the proportionality test, 
neither implicitly nor explicitly.  
As a first step and consistently with its case law, the Court makes clear that in order to evaluate 
whether the challenged provisions are compatible with the constitutional norms at issue it is necessary 
to reconstruct both their rationale and their aims (para. 10) and, in particular, to decide whether a block 
on the bargaining procedures is unconstitutional an assessment on a case-by-case basis must be 
conducted (para. 10.2). 
First, the Court scrutinises Article 9 of Decree Law 78/2010 and observes that the policy line of the 
norm is expressed explicitly in the title: “[c]ontaining expenditure in public sector employment” (para. 
11). The Court does not elaborate on the constitutionality of this aim, but it seems implicit from previous 
considerations that the purpose of the reform is legitimate precisely in light of the reformed Art. 81.1 
Constitution. It is exactly the legitimacy of the aim that allows the Judge to proceed with the 
constitutional balancing, given that the precondition for the balancing is met, that is the ordinary norm 
pursues a constitutionally protected purpose. Second, by describing the content of the norm, the Court 
reconstructs how the aim is achieved. This step of the line of reasoning corresponds, in practice, to the 
suitability sub-test of the systematized proportionality test. 
Still in Judgment 178/2015, but as regards the second provision scrutinized (Art. 16.1.b), D.L. 
98/2010, the Court begins by addressing the aim of the norm in the attempt to identify whether it is 
legitimate or not. Therefore, the evaluation of the aim, which has constituted the first step of the legal 
reasoning also for the first measure, is again the starting point. Nonetheless, as regards Art. 16.1.b), the 
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conclusions are different, not because of the aim per se, which is, in fact, the same as that of the previous 
provisions, but rather because of the repetition of the aim in subsequent provisions. In sum, the latest 
norms have the effect of putting the block “on a structural footing” and a comprehensive assessment of 
the norms – and their analogous aim – highlights that the impact on the constitutional values at stake is 
“anything but episodic” (paras. 15.1, 15.2), a circumstance that has the effect of altering the dynamic of 
negotiation as a whole (para. 17). Given that the provisions are found illegitimate at the first stage of the 
reasoning because of the analysis of the aim, there is no reason to proceed further with the assessment 
of the norms in relation to both the legal and/or economic context. 
An implicit application of the proportionality sub-tests newly arises in the assessment of Judgment 
250/2017, where the Court emphasises that the technical reports, as well as any other document that 
elaborates upon the financial measures, “represent an instrument for the verification of the legislator’s 
choices” (para 6.5.1). In fact, the possibility to accede to explanatory and technical documents seems 
crucial for the Court to rule for the constitutional legitimacy of the norms at issue. In particular, the 
Court denies the unreasonableness of the provisions by insisting on the fact that the reformed paragraphs 
were aimed at complying with Judgment 70/2015 and by adding that a “Report”, a “Technical Report” 
and an “Examination of the quantifications” provide for accounting data. Without going into detail, nor 
presenting any of the mentioned data, the Court concludes that the documents provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the amended paragraphs 25 and 25-bis and a highlight the “financial needs taken into 
account by the legislator in the exercise of its discretionality”. 
The choice of the Court to demand for and refer to an appropriate justification, or better to technical 
documents is extremely interesting (in Judgment 70/2015 it had explicitly required the legislator to 
provide such documents). At first, the Court’s request appears uncontroversial, since it seems obvious 
that the weaker is the justification, the harder is for the Court to conduct a supervision of the legislator’s 
balancing. However, the paragraph in judgment 250/2017 that refers to the “Report”, a “Technical 
Report” and an “Examination of the quantifications” raises further questions. Indeed, this formulation 
leaves the impression that it is sufficient that these data are provided for the justification to be proper. It 
is not clear whether those documents were accurately analysed by the Court itself or they were just read 
and accepted. A further elaboration on the reasons why these data can be considered a sufficient 
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justification, which goes beyond the mere mentioning of the documents’ names and the fact that they 
provide for accounting data, would have clarified which features a technical document needs to have in 
order to serve its justification purpose. In this sense, the reference to the technical documents seems just 
a first attempt to consider the financial reasons of the legislator and a more extensive explanation would 
have been necessary to clarify which accounting data can justify an impact on the enforcement of 
fundamental social rights.  Moreover, if the Court decides to build its legal reasoning not only on the 
grounds of a proper enforcement of fundamental rights, but also on the basis of the financial 
justifications – still an open question for whom is writing – , it is legitimate to wonder whether it should 
also make a step further and enter into the merit of the whole State expenditure, considering whether the 
resources taken at the detriment of labour rights could have been found somewhere else, for instance by 
cutting on expenditures which do not serve the purpose to implement a fundamental right. In other 
words, by applying what in a number of foreign legal orders would be called the necessity test. 
Another attempt to provide the legal reasoning with a marked structure can be found in the first of 
this series of judgments. In Judgment 223/2012, after having legally framed the principle allegedly 
violated by the norm under scrutiny, principle of independence of the judiciary (Art. 104 Constitution), 
the Court draws on its case law (in particular Judgment 299/1999), in order to identify the abstract 
criteria to be applied to the case under assessment and understand whether the sacrifice imposed upon 
the principle of independence of the judiciary is constitutional. The Judgment from 1999, taken as 
reference point by this Court, had addressed a sacrifice of the emoluments of public employees – hence 
not specifically judges – which salary was set according to an automatic adequacy mechanisms. On this 
ground, the Court sets out the criteria that may justify the sacrifice of the fundamental principle at stake 
and allow to declare the norm under scrutiny legitimate. First, there must be a need to recover the 
balanced budget, caused by a problematic phase of the national economy; second, the imposition of 
economic sacrifices shall be generalized; third, the sacrifice imposed shall be “exceptional, transitory, 
non-arbitrary and suitable to achieve the aim; last, the Court underlines the relevance of the non-
unreasonable temporal extent of the economic restriction (para. 11.5). As a consequence, the reader of 
the Judgment would have expected that the assessment of the norm would have faithfully reflected the 
rigorous criteria traced in the first part of the legal reasoning. However, when it comes to the analysis 
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of the norm it fails to apply these criteria with the same strictness. In fact, it refers only indirectly to the 
public financial reasons of the norm – without even mentioning the constitutional interest and respective 
article protected – and it does not explain exactly in what sense the provision does not meet the criteria 
deduced from its case law (“exceptional, transitory, non-arbitrary and suitable to achieve the aim”). 
A positive example of structured legal reasoning, which, however, does not follow the 
proportionality test structure, is offered by Judgment 70/2015. This complex legal reasoning, that makes 
a wide use of the constitutional case law as well, can be systematized as follows. First, the Court 
identifies the rationale and aim of the automatic adjustment system provided for by the law reformed by 
the contested provision; second it detects the constitutional principles that have been implemented by 
the affected system; third, it explains which criterion shall guide the legislator that, with its acts, imposes 
a sacrifice over those fundamental principles, that is the reasonableness criterion. Subsequently, it 
derives from Judgment 316/210 the reasons that have justified – and may justify – the constitutionality 
of a measure which interferes with the automatic revaluation mechanism. In the concluding paragraph, 
the Court illustrates which constitutionally protected interest has been violated by the contested norm 
and, in line with the mentioned case law, concludes that this sacrifice is in breach of the principle of 
reasonableness as assessed with reference to the fundamental labour principles enshrined in Articles 
36.1 and 38.2 Italian Constitution. Eventually, the Court points out that the “unreasonable sacrifice” of 
the constitutional right at stake is not supported by a sufficient justification. Therefore, as last statement, 
it concludes for the unconstitutionality of the contested provision. 
In the following Judgment, strictly related to Judgment 70/2015, a further attempt to systematize the 
legal reasoning is made. Indeed, in Judgment 173/2016, in order to evaluate whether the constitutional 
principles concerned have been complied with, the Court states that a “’strict’ scrutiny of 
constitutionality” (inverted commas at ‘strict’ in the original text) shall be conducted. Consequently, the 
judge has to determine if three requirements have been met by the contested measure, namely the norm 
is required to be “surely reasonable, not unpredictable and sustainable” (para. 11.1). First, the Court 
attempts to elaborate these concepts, then, the norm is assessed – allegedly – consistently.  
Eventually, the norm “passes the ‘strict’ scrutiny of constitutionality” because: it acts within the 
overall social security system, which is undergoing a crisis phase; it contributes, as other structural or 
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occasional reforms adopted to manage this phase, to finance this troubled system, hence it pursues a 
strong solidarity goal; it only affects the higher pensions and, providing for increasing rates, fulfils the 
proportionality criterion. In addition, it is sustainable because of its temporary character (para. 11.2). 
The train of thought of this Judgment is surely interesting especially for the effort made to systematize 
and clarify in advance the technique applied to investigate on the constitutionality of the contested 
provision. However, it is striking that the Court has elaborated the described scrutiny without referring 
to its case law. The self-standing character of this systematization weakens its weight, at least as long 
as the Court does not reiterate it in its forthcoming case law, thus corroborating its validity. 
 
3.2 Reasonableness: tracing its meaning 
The Judgments assessed in this section allow to identify some crucial features of the principle of 
reasonableness, especially in its relationship with fundamental labour rights. For instance, in Judgment 
250/2017, the Court reiterates that the reasonableness criterion, that shall guide the exercise of the 
discretional power by the legislator, has to be interpreted in relation to Articles 36 and 38 Constitution 
(para. 5.2) and it represents a proper “limit” that the legislator cannot circumvent (para. 6.5.1). In this 
recent ruling, the Court underlines that the principle of reasonableness is principio di sistema to be 
applied by the legislator when dealing with the legal framework for retirement benefits. In other words, 
it constitutes the cornerstone of the retirement benefits’ legislation, and a proper justification for the 
sacrifice imposed upon fundamental labour rights seem to be a crucial factor for the legitimacy of a 
measure with an effect as such (para. 10). 
However, the whole of post-crisis case law offers valuable indications to frame this concept in light 
of the recent legal and economic trends. 
In Judgment 310/2013, drawing on its case law the Court points out that the "unreasonableness" of 
the contested provisions has to be excluded if the provision at issue meets certain requirements, namely: 
exceptionality, transitorieness, non-arbitrariness, suitability to achieve the aim; it is temporarily 
limited; and it responds to the need to contain public spending (see also Judgment 223/2012, mentioned 
above) (para. 13.2). Indeed, in Judgment 310/2013, the fact that the norm was enshrined in an Act 
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(decree law 78/2010) that provided for a wide economic intervention concerning the whole of the public 
employees has been a crucial factor of legitimacy for the restriction under assessment (para. 13.11). 
In Judgment 178/2015, the Court explains that the reasonableness follows, first, from the general 
application of the contested provision (in that case Art. 9, D.L. 78/2010) to the whole public sector (as 
stressed also in Judgment 310/2013) and, second, from the “particular seriousness of the economic and 
financial international context” and the “repercussions on the national economy”, which were clearly 
pointed out in the preparatory works (especially in Seduta della Quinta Commissione del Senato – 
Commissione Bilancio – del 16 giugno 2010). Further, and the third point, the reasonableness of a 
provision as such also derives from the suggestion of the Court of Auditors to urgently intervene with 
measures to contain remuneration in the public sector. Forth, the reasonableness derives from the fact 
that these measures, framed in a programmatic dimension limited to a three-year period, met the 
requirement of governing the public spending and the whole dynamic of remuneration in the public 
sector, which was substantially higher than in the private sectors of the economy (para. 12.2). In short, 
according to the Court, the reasonableness of this provision resides in the rationale of the provision 
itself, in the legal context in which it is framed and in the economic context to which it responds. Also 
other Judgments selected for the purpose of this dissertation confirm that the "reasonableness" of a norm 
strictly pertains to the "overall legal-economic framework, both national and European" (as explicitly 
stated in Judgment 310/2013, 13.4). In addition, according to the Court, it is paramount that the solidarity 
contribution scrutinised in Judgment 173/2016 is not “detached from the socio-economic reality”, of 
which the pensioners are aware and, the reader can infer, the fulfilment of this requirement makes the 
contribution not-unpredictable. However, the context, continues the Court, does not justify a reiteration 
of the contribution, as to transform it in a stable “mechanism to feed the social security system”. In other 
words, also in this case the measure is reasonable, and hence tolerated, if it is exceptional (para. 11.1). 
A general understanding of the role of the principle of reasonableness can be derived from Judgment 
70/2015. Here, the Court emphasises that it is precisely the constitutional case law on the principles 
enshrined in Art. 36.1 Constitution and Art. 38.2 Constitution that helps to identify the function of the 
reasonableness criterion, which “circumscribes legislative decisions and subjects its choices to the 
adoption of solutions consistent with the Constitution” (para. 8). This step of the legal reasoning 
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contributes to the definition of the reasonableness criterion, since it identifies the purpose of the 
hermeneutic principle.  In conclusion, it is argued that the right of pensioners to conserve the purchasing 
power, protected by constitutional norms, “has been unreasonably sacrificed in the name of financial 
requirements which are not illustrated in detail” (para. 10). From this concluding reasoning of the Court, 
it follows that the “unreasonable sacrifice” is not a consequence of the lack of sufficient justification, in 
the sense that the contested provision is not unreasonable because it is not properly justified, but it is 
unreasonable because it violates Articles 36.1 and 38.2 Constitution, by reaching what is called in the 
judgment the “critical levels”, which in the case of retirement benefits, are represented by the “detriment 
of purchasing power”. Even though the Court does not mention the “essential content” of the 
fundamental labour right to adequate and proportionate pensions, this concept seems to find full 
application in the case at stake and it is reflected precisely in the conservation of the purchasing power. 
Indeed, the words of the Court suggest that the principle of reasonableness aims to strengthen and 
underline the value of the fundamental labour rights concerned from time to time, as well as to delineate 
their essential content. Under this view, the reasonableness criterion helps the interpreter to identify the 
inviolable core of a fundamental labour right, which cannot be infringed upon, not even in order to adopt 
a norm, which implements – competing – constitutional interests. The connection between the principle 
of reasonableness and the “essential content” of fundamental rights emerges also in Judgment 173/2016, 
where the Court argues that a contribution, deducted from the retirement benefits, has a solidarity 
character and is reasonable – in the sense that it does not violate Art. 38 (and the linked Art. 36 
Constitution) – if it only affects the higher benefits, to be identified taking into consideration the 
“essential nucleus” of the pension rights, that is the minimum INPS retirement benefits.  
In addition, a legislative act that partially sacrifices the principle of legitimate expectation of pension 
rights may anyway be “incontestably reasonable”, as long as it results from a careful weighting of 
various factors as “the international economic crisis and its impact on the national economy” and it 
constitutes a measure of “strong solidarity” – not only intergenerational – which has the effect of 
supporting the most vulnerable part of the population and is contextualized in the overall social security 
system’s regime (Judgment 173/2016, para. 11.1). 
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3.1 Reasonableness: the relationship with the criterion of proportionality 
In the selected judgments, it can be observed that the Court does mention occasionally the concept 
of proportionality, and, even if the relationship between reasonableness and proportionality remains 
uncertain and there is no full consistency in this respect, some of the judgments provide guidance as to 
the relationship between these two concepts, which, anyway, remains highly controversial and unclear. 
Some moments of the lines of thought suggest that proportionality – as hermeneutic principle – in the 
Italian constitutional tradition does not enjoy an ontological autonomy and it is used as a synonymous 
of reasonableness, normally as a way to emphasise it.  
An emblematic case is Judgment 178/2015, where the reasonableness criterion is expressly 
mentioned in a number of occasions, while the concept of proportionality seems to partially lie behind 
the entire reasoning of the Italian Constitutional Court, but there is no explicit reference to either the 
proportionality test and the three requirements nor to the proportionality principle in the legal reasoning. 
The concept of proportionality is, indeed, mentioned only in the concluding paragraph on Art. 9 of 
Decree Law 78/2010, when the Court states that the – first – sacrifice imposed to the right to a fair 
remuneration and the right to access collective bargaining is “neither unreasonable, nor 
disproportionate” (para. 12.2). Used in these terms, it seems that the concept of proportionality is applied 
to reinforce and complement a principle proper to the Italian constitutional case law, that is the 
reasonableness criterion, rather than as a self-standing criterion or a systematised tool to balance 
conflicting interests498. However, in the attempt to understand the “disproportionate” at para. 12.2, 
Sandulli’s view could be adopted and “reasonableness” could be the principle applied to evaluate the 
coherence of the norm with the legal and economic system, while “proportionality” could be interpreted 
as the criterion used to measure the interference on the fundamental rights affected, in relation to the 
aim of the contested norms499.  
                                                            
498 The principle of proportionality is expressly mentioned by the Italian Constitutional Court only with regard to 
the proportionality of the remuneration, a key principle enshrined in Art. 36 Constitution. Therefore, judgment 
178/2015 corroborates the thesis that the principle of proportionality is not a key criterion of the legal reasoning 
of the Italian Constitutional Court, despite the fact that the Court does conduct a form of balancing, albeit 
discursive. 
499 Sandulli 1975, see chapter 2.3.1. 
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In Judgment 70/2015, the Court has referred to the principle of proportionality alongside the 
reasonableness criterion - although only in one occasion - on the wave of Judgment 316/200. However, 
if we address this ruling in detail, in order to ascertain whether proportionality shall be understood as a 
stand-alone concept or as a term added to reinforce the concept of reasonableness, we can observe that 
the Court ruling in 2010 had used the concept of proportionality as an interpretative tool, but only in the 
concluding cited sentence, while the reasonableness criterion had been used frequently alongside the 
legal reasoning, therefore suggesting that even in this case the will of the Judge was not to provide 
autonomous status to the aforementioned concept. 
The subsequent case law does not help to clarify this distinction. Indeed, even more confusing is 
Judgment 173/2016, where it is stated that pensions can only be affected within “sustainable limits” and 
the call rate “cannot be excessive” and have to comply with the “principio di proporzionalità, which is 
criterion of reasonableness of the provision” (para. 11.1). However, the Court fails to explain what is 
meant here by principio di proporzionalità, if it refers to the proportionality principle of remuneration, 
which completes the principle of adequacy of retirement benefits, or to an interpretative principle that 
supports and develops the reasonableness criterion. A puzzle, which is not solved by looking at the 
argumentative context either, insofar as also the meaning of “excessive” is not examined. 
In Judgment 124/2017, it is underlined that the balancing between conflicting values must be 
conducted in compliance with the principle of reasonableness, hence, the Court says, the balancing is 
not “manifestly unreasonable” if all of the conflicting interests are guaranteed in an “adequate and 
proportionate way” (para. 8.3). Here, it expressly refers to “proportionality” as a parameter, together 
with “adequacy”, and it clarifies that, in abstract terms, a measure is proportionate if, on the one hand, 
it rationalizes the public spending consistently with the available public resources and, on the other, it 
fully guarantees the exercise of fundamental labour rights. As far as concerns the case at stake, the 
reasonableness of the contested provisions is justified by two main features: the long-term perspective 
that frames these measures, the general interest pursued and the general character of the measures in 
terms of its addressees (a crucial criterion also in Judgments 310/2013 and 178/2015). In particular, 
what makes the remuneration limit (the first measure contested) reasonable is the objective pursued, that 
is the rationalization of public spending: "the provision at stake pursues the aim of containing and 
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rationalizing the public spending, in order to guarantee the other constitutional interests concerned, 
given the limited resources" (para. 8.4). As to the second norm reviewed, the Court points out that the 
Stability Law for 2014 does not impose an arbitrary and “disproportionate” sacrifice to the right to work 
of pensioners (para. 9.3). Again, the terminology used by the Court varies around the criterion of 
reasonableness. The concept of “arbitrariness” seems to refer to the fact that the sacrifice is objectively 
justified by the economic constraints. While the concept of proportionality – used in its contrary as 
disproportionality – is clarified by the following sentences, which point out that the right to work of the 
pensioner remains effective, as it can be enjoyed by the interested persons (para. 9.4)500, the 
“arbitrariness” criterion is not elaborated further. Judgment 173/2016 contributes to frame the concept 
of arbitrariness in relation to the reasonableness criterion. Here, the Constitutional Judge recognizes the 
legislator’s faculty to introduce a solidarity contribution on retirement benefits, but it stresses that a 
legislative intervention as such shall be supported by a “comprehensive degree of reasonableness” way 
higher than what is normally considered lack of arbitrariness. The message is clear, and it helps to 
further understand the content of the hermeneutic criterion applied by the Court: it is not enough to 
detect the absence of arbitrariness in the legislator’s choices, in order to declare a norm reasonable (para. 
11.1). 
In the latest judgment, the proportionality criterion bears an analogous meaning to that of the 
principle of reasonableness, as seen in the previous Judgements assessed in this chapter: it serves the 
purpose to identify the essential content of the fundamental labour right tackled by the contested 
provision. According to the Court, the norm under scrutiny is the result of a fair balance. Indeed, the 
Court states: “the proportionality criterion was also respected”, because the “substance of the pension 
rights” is not touched and the modulation of the revaluation of pensions, as provided for by the 2015 
reform, does not constitute an exorbitant burden and, thus, it does not infringe upon the fundamental 
                                                            
500 Also in this judgment, the Court has used the proportionality principle expressly with respect to a fair wage, 
which, indeed, according to Art. 36 Constitution, must be proportionate to the work performed. However, in a 
couple of cases it has referred to the proportionality of the norm per se. Nevertheless, an attentive reading of the 
whole legal reasoning suggests that the concept of “proportionality” is used as a synonymous to the reasonableness 
and it does not enjoy an ontological autonomy. 
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right to retirement benefits (Judgment 250/2017, para. 6.3). This sentence seems to corroborate the 
argument that proportionality is used as a synonymous of reasonableness. 
In conclusion, as to the technique applied to conduct the constitutional scrutiny, the Italian Court 
confirms its tendency to adopt a less structured, albeit still logical legal reasoning, grounded upon the 
application of the principle of reasonableness, given that the legislator must conduct a “reasonable 
balance between the constitutional values” (Judgment 70/2015, para. 8). The analysis conducted 
suggests that the principle of reasonableness is an interpretative criterion, which serves the purpose to 
supervise the balancing of conflicting interests conducted by the legislator in the process of adopting an 
ordinary norm. This principle allows the Judge to evaluate whether the legislator, in the exercise of its 
legitimate discretionality, has acted not only in absence of arbitrariness (Judgment 173/2016), but also 
in compliance with the essential content of fundamental labour rights.  
Indeed, the principle of reasonableness contributes to define the “critical levels” (expression used in 
Judgment 70/2015) that the legislator has to respect when it causes a sacrifice to a fundamental labour 
right. Which means that an effective enforcement of fundamental labour rights necessarily requires the 
intervention of, or better the compliance with the reasonableness criterion, which is used to identify 
where these critical levels are. 
 
4. The terms balanced 
In all of the assessed Judgments the balancing focus is, on the one side, on fundamental labour rights 
and, on the other, on the general financial interest. Overall, the fundamental labour rights concerned are 
the right to collective bargaining, the right to a proportionate remuneration and the right to an adequate 
pension (See the next section for a focus on the fundamental labour rights concerned). 
Looking at the selected case law, it emerges that a careful attitude of the Court in explicitly admitting 
the balancing between fundamental labour rights and the principle of balanced budget enshrined in the 
reformed Art. 81 Constitution. Indeed, rather it often recalls, with various expressions, the general 
economic interest, as in Judgment 223/2012 where it refers only indirectly to the public financial reasons 
of the norm – without mentioning the precise constitutional interest and the respective article 
implemented, here the Court concludes its legal reasoning by stating that “[T]he exceptionality of the 
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economic situation that the State has to face is such as to allow the legislator to make use of exceptional 
instruments, in balancing the satisfaction of financial interests and the guarantee for services and 
protection needed by every citizen.” (Para. 13.3, italics added). In this sentence, two main elements can 
be identified. First, the Court emphasises the economic context in which the measure has been approved 
and, second, it suggests that the terms of the balancing operated by the legislator are, on the one hand, 
the public financial interests, and, on the other, the social rights protected in the case at stake. Neither 
Art. 81 Constitution, nor the principle of balanced budget are mentioned expressly. Given this – 
methodological – premise, the Court elaborates on the relationship between fundamental rights and the 
economic and financial context: “… it is up to the State to guarantee, also under these conditions, the 
compliance with the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, which, obviously, is not 
indifferent to the economic and financial circumstances, but, with just as much certainty, [the economic 
and financial circumstances] cannot allow to derogate from the principle of equality that grounds the 
constitutional system” (para. 13.3). In this first ruling, the Court sets a clear boundary to the legislative 
action, by pointing out that the derogation from the founding constitutional principles on economic and 
financial grounds cannot be unlimited. 
While at first sight Judgment 310/2013 seems to adopt a different approach, also in this case, as 
already mentioned in the previous chapter, the Court includes in its reasoning the financial reasons, 
which have supported the contested measure, but this element is not presented as one term of the 
balancing, it is rather used to put emphasis on the economic and legal context in which the measure has 
been adopted, thus going beyond a purely legal approach. In a key paragraph of the judgment, we can 
observe how the principle of balanced budget is not clearly placed in the balancing framework, while it 
is considered an element to be taken into account as it represents the recently amended legal context: 
“there is no alternative to consider the evolution of the overall legal-economic framework, both national 
and European” (para 13.4, italics added). The Court continues by stating that “[T]he recent reform of 
Art. 81 Constitution …. and the introduction of the expenditure rules, as well as Art. 119.1 Constitution, 
emphasise the duty of the public administrations to comply with the balanced budget, also in light of the 
general European economic context”. In addition, as a unique case in the post-crisis case law, the Court 
refers to Directive 2011/85/UE on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (para. 
165 
 
13.4), with aim to draw a clear picture of the legal European framework. In conclusion, still without 
referring to the balancing of conflicting values, the Court states that “the expenditure restraint and 
rationalization, that implements the policy of balanced budget, imply serious sacrifices, as those under 
assessment, that find justification in the context of economic crisis” (para. 13.5, italics added).  
In Judgment 70/2015, the Court makes a step further and points out that the mere generic reference 
to a “contingent financial situation” in the legislation under scrutiny is precisely the reason for the 
unconstitutionality of the contested provision, given that the legislator has failed to provide enough 
indications as to the terms that have been balanced in the process of approving the norm at stake. In 
addition, in the introduction to the official English translation of the judgment, it is specified that “the 
overall design of the legislation does not establish why financial requirements should necessarily prevail 
over the rights affected by the balancing operation, against which such highly invasive initiatives are 
adopted”. “Whilst the right to an adequate pension was not absolute, any sacrifice in the name of 
budgetary requirements must be justified in detail.” Therefore, not only the broad reference to the 
financial situation, as a supposed parameter of the balancing, is criticised by the Court, but also the lack 
of sufficient justification for the sacrifice imposed upon the right to an adequate pension (Art. 38 
Constitution), counter-term of the balancing of interests, is considered a source of illegitimacy of the 
contested measure. 
Consistently, the Court does not dare to make explicit reference to Art. 81 Constitution, inasmuch as 
the legislator itself has not referred to this parameter in the process of balancing conflicting interests and 
approving the contested measure. Furthermore, differently from the cases considered so far, in this 
occasion the Constitutional Judge does not even underlines the peculiarity of the economic context, 
limiting itself to conduct a legal reasoning, based upon the legal sources put forward by the legislator. 
Not even the legal reasoning of the strictly connected Judgment 250/2017 includes a reflection on 
the economic context. However, this ruling represents a remarkable case, given that, in the attempt to 
build a dialogue with the legislator, the Court emphasises the fact that the legislation under scrutiny has 
expressly mentioned as a justification for the sacrifice imposed upon the pensioners’ rights (in particular 
the right to an adequate pension at Art. 38.2 Constitution, as read jointly with Art. 36.1 Constitution (on 
the right to a fair remuneration) the principle of balanced budget (that, as already explained, is now 
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enshrined in Art. 81 Constitution). The absence of any explicit reference to this interest constitutionally 
protected had been the crucial for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the norm discussed in 
Judgment 70/2015 and the Court recognises that the legislator has properly understood the Court’s 
guideline.  
It is noteworthy to underline that Judgment 173/2016 just refers to the “context of crisis of the welfare 
state system”, without identifying the constitutional article that protects the interest pursued by the 
ordinary norm assessed. However, here the relevance of the financial context is highlighted when the 
Court points out that the legitimate expectation of the pensioners is not infringed upon if the solidarity 
contribution “is not disconnected from the socio-economic reality, of which the pensioners are aware 
and in which they are involved” (“la realtà economico-sociale, di cui i pensionati stessi sono partecipi e 
consapevoli”) (para. 11.1, italics added). 
The tendency to adopt a careful approach towards the inclusion of the principle of balanced budget 
among the terms of the constitutional balancing is not confirmed by a significant Judgment, which deals 
with the public employee’s wage reduction: Judgment 178/2015, on the freezing of collective bargaining 
in the public sector. This ruling raises a major issue as regards the status of the principle of balanced 
budget enshrined in the amended Art. 81 Constitution. To be balanced here are, on the one hand, the 
rights protected under Articles 36.1 and 39.1 Constitution against, on the other hand, “the collective 
interest of containing public spending”, which, in turn, has to be addressed bearing in mind the 
“progressive deterioration of the equilibriums of the public finances”. Although the Court had already 
addressed the legitimacy of a measure providing for collective bargaining suspension, caused by public 
financial constraints, it considers a careful evaluation of the specific case even more necessary given the 
recent reform of Art. 81 Constitution, from 2012, which has introduced into the Constitution the 
principle of balanced budget, by making “today’s measures … more stringent” (para. 10.3). In short, it 
follows from this premise to the proper Court’s legal reasoning that the principle of balanced budget, 
which has acquired constitutional status following the 2012 reform aimed at implementing the Europlus 
Pact, is going to be balanced against the fundamental rights protected under Articles 36(1) and 39(1). 
According to the Court, this evaluation is necessary to understand whether the protection of another 
constitutional “interest” justifies the sacrifice of the collective autonomy perpetrated by the ordinary 
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norms under scrutiny. The Court cannot be misunderstood: it adopts this approach on the grounds of its-
own case law by adapting it to the current – recently changed – constitutional framework. However, a 
controversial element already arises: the Court clearly frames the dispute as conflict between rights and 
interests, which therefore have to be balanced in order to assess the constitutional legitimacy of the 
contested norm. In other words, it accepts the balancing between constitutional norms protecting 
fundamental rights and a constitutional norm, which is expression of a general interest.  
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the reformed Art. 81 Constitution is the normative 
expression of a general – and constitutional – interest in containing public spending, hence, in order to 
clarify this link an extensive elaboration from the Court would have been necessary. Moreover, the 
constitutional balancing is founded upon the assumption that conflicting constitutional principles and 
rights are expression of founding values and values cannot be hierarchically ordered in absolute terms, 
hence they have to be balanced on a case-by-case basis with the aim to solve the single conflict. 
Therefore, in light of this, the choice to accept the balancing of the principle of balanced budget with 
fundamental labour rights seems to imply that the principle introduced in 2012 into the Italian 
Constitution is expression of a founding value of the Italian legal system. Provided that the principle of 
balanced budget, as it is now enshrined in Art. 81 Constitution, is a novelty of the Italian legal system, 
a further elaboration on the value – presumably – expressed by the amended Art. 81 and the respective 
principle would have been necessary.  
Remarkably, the ruling released two years later (Judgment 124/2017) is more careful in attaching to 
the recently introduced principle of balanced budget the status of constitutional principle – in neo-
constitutional terms – representing perhaps an evolution in the Italian case law on the terms of the 
constitutional balancing. In this occasion, the Court recalls the need to consider, on the one hand, the 
"resources concretely available" and, on the other hand, the constitutionally protected value of highly 
professional jobs (Judgment 124/2017, para. 8.3) and it implicitly suggests that the balancing must occur 
between the collective interest to an adequate management of public resources and individual 
fundamental rights not clearly identified in this paragraph. However, from the overall text of the ruling 
we can deduce that it refers to the right to work (Art. 4 Constitution), right to a fair remuneration (Art. 
36.1 Constitution) and right to an adequate pension (Art. 38.2 Constitution). In the next paragraph, the 
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Court, by underling the aim pursued by the contested provision reiterates which is the element balanced 
against the fundamental labour rights and it does so, once again, only in general terms, by referring to 
the rationalization of public spending (para. 8.4). Also in this case, the economic argument is not relevant 
only as an element of the constitutional balancing, but it becomes part of the broad legal reasoning of 
the Court, as well. Indeed, the limitedness of the resources plays again a crucial role and justifies the 
comprehensive predetermination of the payments the public administration can guarantee, as provided 
for by the norm under scrutiny. The Court stresses the value of the peculiar context, which does not 
allow a relative consideration of retirement benefits, on the one hand, and remuneration, on the other 
(para. 9.2). Albeit it is not specified at this stage, from the above, “peculiar context” shall be likely 
understood in both economic and legislative terms, concerning both the limited public resources and the 
reforms of latest years leaning towards a reduction of the public spending. 
Next to the fact that in Judgment 124/2017 the Court never refers to Art. 81 Constitution, but it only 
mentions the need to consider the “resources concretely available”, which is not exactly as referring to 
the constitutional principle of balanced budget, it develops a legal reasoning which is remarkable, insofar 
as the Court seems to lean towards a less incisive strength of the economic principles constitutionalized 
by Constitutional Law 1/2012.  Here the Court indirectly provides some food for thought in relation to 
the weight of Art. 81 Constitution, even though expressly referring only to Art. 97 Constitution. In this 
ruling, the Court briefly mentions a key factor of the constitutional order, namely that the constitutional 
principles are expression of constitutional values, which have to coexist in the legal system. It shall be 
emphasised that, next to the social principles mentioned, when the Court refers to Art. 97 Constitution, 
it does not refer to the first paragraph of the renovated Art. 97, introduced by Constitutional Law 1/2012, 
which provides for the duty of the public administrations to ensure the balanced budget and the 
sustainability of the public debt, coherently with the EU legal order, but it rather includes among the 
norms expression of constitutional values the general principle of buon andamento (smooth running) of 
the public administration. The Court seems to take a clear stand in including among the values, which 
are founding the Italian constitutional order, this principle that belongs to the Italian Constitution since 
its enforcement in 1948, and not that of balanced budget recently and offhandedly included following 
the international institutions’ pressure, because of a contingent economic situation.  
169 
 
 
5. Fundamental labour rights in the balance 
The supervision of the balancing conducted by the legislator and the respective application of the 
reasonableness criterion, which have occurred in these judgments, has offered an insight into the scope 
and effectiveness of the fundamental labour rights concerned, in the current political, legal and economic 
context. Although openly and repeatedly admitting the possibility for the legislator to impose a sacrifice 
on fundamental labour rights, in the legitimate exercise of its discretionality, the Court has been very 
careful in assessing the legitimacy of the contested provisions and, especially, their justification. This 
section addresses, first, the judgments concerning public employees’ wage restrictions, second, those 
that have scrutinized the norms affecting the regular retirement benefits system. 
In the first relevant Judgment (Judgment 223/2012) the principle violated by the norm under scrutiny 
– the principle of independence of the judiciary (Art. 104 Constitution) – is not directly a fundamental 
labour right, since it immediately pertains to the division of powers in a democratic legal system and the 
referring articles are enshrined in Part II on the “Organization of the Republic”. However, its content, 
as elaborated by the Court in the first part of the legal reasoning, strongly pertains to the domain of 
judges’ labour rights, especially, in practice, it guarantees the enforcement of the right to a fair 
remuneration, given the impossibility of this group of public employees to access collective bargaining 
procedures (Art. 36.1 Constitution). 
First, the Court suggests that, while a temporary “freezing” of the salary dynamics may be legitimate, 
the “unreasonable reduction” of acquired economic rights perpetrated by the contested provision goes 
beyond an acceptable sacrifice of the constitutional right. Indeed, the norm exceeds in an illegitimate 
way the temporal limit of three years (2011-2013), which is, instead, the time limit of the legislative 
emergency action that concerns the generality of the public employment. Therefore, we can observe that 
the legitimacy of a restriction as such, of a fundamental right, is also linked with the overall legal context. 
Second, the lack of a transitory character of the norm under assessment, and hence its illegitimacy, 
stems from its non-reversible effect, in the sense that this measure influences the amount of certain 
salary items for the future, as well. 
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In conclusion, the Court stresses on the fact that this provision has the effect of creating “permanent 
effects of the block” of the automatic adjustment mechanism exclusively for the members of the 
Judiciary and it is only apparently time-limited, which triggers a violation of both the principle of 
equality (Art. 3 Constitution) and the various principles that protect the independence of the judiciary 
(Articles 100, 101, 104, 108 Constitution).  As a result, the mechanism introduced by the norm under 
scrutiny rather than being a protective mechanism is the source of an “unreasonable discrimination”, 
which damages only one category of public employees (para. 11.7). 
However, it is widely explained that the main cause of unconstitutionality shall be identified in the 
surpassing of the temporal limit, which may refer to both a lack of exceptionality and transitoriness. 
Furthermore, the fact that the extended restriction only affected a certain type of public employees may 
be a signal of arbitrary decision, albeit the text of the judgment does not allow a clear conclusion in this 
respect. 
Similarly, the subsequent judgment (Judgment 310/2013) deals with a reduction of public 
employees’ wages (by means of freezing of the adjustment mechanisms). However, the outcome is 
different. The Court reiterates the conclusions of Judgment 223/2012 and underlines the difference 
between the previous and the present case on the grounds of the specific role of the public employees 
concerned with the norm discussed in the 2012 ruling and the fundamental principle that protects their 
function: the principle of independence of the judiciary (Art. 104 Constitution). To the contrary, 
Judgment 310/2013 deals with a provision that has involved university lecturers and professors, not 
covered by the aforementioned constitutional norm. However, unfortunately, despite the emphasis on 
this normative element already clarified in the previous ruling, in this judgment the Court does not take 
the opportunity to elaborate, not even indirectly, on any of the constitutional principles quoted, but for 
Art. 36 Constitution, to which it devotes a short paragraph. Here, it is pointed out that the legitimacy of 
an ordinary norm in light of Art. 36 cannot be assessed looking at the “single elements of the economic 
treatment”, but rather at the “overall remuneration”, hence given that the contested provision does not 
tackle the overall structure of the university lecturers and researchers’ wages it is no illegitimate (para. 
13.9). 
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Already at the first stage of the legal reasoning developed in Judgment 178/2015 and on the grounds 
of the relevant case law, the Court reiterates that a restriction of Art. 39.1 Constitution may be legitimate 
in “exceptional and eminently transitory situations, provided that the ‘safeguarding of higher general 
interests’ is at stake” (para. 10.2). 
As regards the specific case discussed in Judgment 178/2015, the Court underlines that the structural 
character of the block persists even though the collective negotiation on the normative part is not 
suspended, given that “[t]he bargaining procedure must allow a comprehensive position to be stated 
regarding every aspect pertaining to the determination of employment conditions, which invariably also 
impinge upon the significant issue of financial aspects” (para. 15.2). On this occasion, the Court provides 
additional elements to define the content of the right to collective bargaining, which is not exclusively 
functional to the determination of financial aspects, but it is deemed to regulate the employment 
relationship comprehensively, thus including terms and conditions of employment in the widest sense. 
This argument is crucial to explain an infringement of Art. 39.1 Constitution by a legislative act, which 
is found in compliance with Art. 36.1 Constitution. 
The structural character of the block, says the Court, “violates the principle of trade union freedom”. 
The connection between the right to access collective bargaining procedures and the trade union freedom 
explicitly granted by Art. 39.1 Constitution and the fact that the bargaining autonomy is a “necessary 
complement” of, and functionally linked to, the trade union freedom can be derived not only from the 
national case law and scholarship, but also from the international sources, which apply in the Italian 
legal order. It is remarkable that the Court referred to both ILO Conventions and case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Strasbourg Court broadly interpreted, in the Demir and 
Baykara judgment, that trade union freedom, guaranteed by Article 11 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also includes the right to conclude 
collective agreements for public workers.  
With regard to ILO sources, three ratified conventions were mentioned: Convention No. 151, which 
guarantees the right to organize and negotiate conditions of employment in the public sector; Convention 
No. 98, which protects the right to organize and to collective bargaining; and Convention No. 87, on 
freedom of association and the right to organize. The latest Convention must be read in light of the Court 
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the interpretation provided by the Digest on Freedom of Association, which underpins the right to 
collective bargaining as an essential corollary to the freedom of association in both the public and the 
private sector501. The Court also found direct support for the protection of the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements in two other sources. The first is provided by the Council of Europe, 
namely Article 6 of the European Social Charter. The second is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, Article 28, which has the same legal value as the European Union Treaties, since 
the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in December 2009. Last, the judgment 
contextualizes and therefore upholds the right to collective bargaining in the EU by referring to another 
primary source, specifically, Article 152.1 TFEU, which aims to promote dialogue between social 
partners without infringing on their autonomy (para. 16). 
In addition, to corroborate the argument that the suspension of the bargaining and contractual 
provisions cannot be “extended at will”, the Italian Judge expressly refers to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, which envisages in the time-limit a key element to determine whether 
a fair balance between fundamental rights of the individual and the general interest of the community is 
met (para. 17). 
Throughout its legal reasoning, the Court makes use of expressions that refer to the circumstance 
that, in particular, the temporal limit has been exceeded, which had the effect of unbalancing the 
relationship – as in para. 17 where it refers to a “repeated prolongment” (para. 12.2, last paragraph). 
Furthermore, and still in light of its case law, the Court insists on the strict relationship between the 
three-year duration of the contractual rounds (collective bargaining) and the multi-year nature of 
budgetary policies  (para. 12.1). This consideration contributes to identify a further element of the right 
to collective bargaining’s content, that is the programmatic dimension of collective bargaining in 
relation to both the normative and the economic part. 
In light of the generous legal reasoning developed, the Court concludes that what makes the sacrifice 
of the right to accede collective bargaining not any more bearable is “[t]he now structural nature of this 
suspension” (para. 17, italics added).  
                                                            
501 Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the 
ILO, 5th ed. (Geneva: International Labour Office), especially paras. 880–1064. 
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In Judgment 124/2017, the violation of Art. 104 Constitution, the principle of independence of the 
judiciary comes once again at the forefront, however in this case its violation is excluded (as opposed 
to the ruling in Judgment 223/2012) (para. 8.5). Indeed, in the case at stake, the general scope of the 
contested provision (read in a comprehensive way), together with the maximum limit set at the 
remuneration of the Supreme Court's President (a decent and fair wage) excludes the violation of the 
principle of independence of the judiciary. The element of "generality" of a norm affecting labour rights, 
in order to assess its legitimacy, had already been applied in 310/2013 and 178/2015. Therefore, the idea 
that the effective enforcement of a fundamental labour right (understanding, in this context, the principle 
of independence of the judiciary as a specification of the right to a fair remuneration under Art. 36 
Constitution) depends also on the normative context, in the sense of the extent of generality of the 
sacrifice, is being strengthened.   
Moreover, the legitimate limit is not only general, but also foreseeable, as can be understood from 
paragraph 8, in which the Court points out that the fact that the limit is steadily set at 240000 euros per 
annum reveals the intention of the legislator to establish a foreseeable and general limit and high-level 
professionals are respected inasmuch as the maximum limit is set taking as parameter the remuneration 
of a high and prestigious office (of the Supreme Court's President) (para. 8.6). The respect of the 
professional level of the work performed entails that the sacrifice is reasonable, inasmuch as it does not 
touch upon the core of the right to work of the claimants (Art. 4 Constitution), nor does it infringe upon 
their dignity. Further on, the Court recalls that "the legislator is called upon to ensure a systematic, and 
not fragmented, protection of the constitutional values at stake", in the specific case it refers to the 
principle of proportionality between remuneration and work performed (Art. 36 Constitution). The 
circumstance that the resources are limited plays again a crucial role and justifies the comprehensive 
predetermination of the payments the public administration can guarantee, as provided for by the norm 
under scrutiny, hence corroborating the relevance of a foreseeable limit. In quantitative terms, the Court 
expressly refers, also in this case, to the point of reference taken to set the limit, that is the First President 
of the Supreme Court's salary, which implies that the right to a proportionate remuneration is not 
sacrificed in an illegitimate way (para. 9.2).  
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As already seen in the first part of this chapter, in Judgment 70/2015 the question of 
unconstitutionality is discussed on the grounds of Art. 36.1 Constitution (providing for the right to a fair 
remuneration) and Art. 38.2 Constitution (on the adequacy of social security benefits), read in light of 
Article 3.2 Constitution (on substantial equal treatment). In particular, the Court argues that Art. 36.1 
Constitution (right to a fair remuneration) and Art. 38.2 Constitution (right to an adequate pension), read 
jointly, guarantee a full implementation of the principle of substantial equality (Art. 3.2 Constitution) 
(para. 8). Therefore, the combination of these two constitutional principles results in a further 
elaboration – and concretization – of the principle of substantial equality. In the case at stake, the Court 
identifies in Art. 36.1 and 38.2, as development of Art. 3.2, the fundamental rights that ground the 
automatic adjustment system for retirement benefits. However, it also admits that these principles can 
be partially sacrificed by a reform of the said automatic system (para. 8). 
In this occasion, the Court argues for a “strict connection” between Art. 36.1 and Art. 38.2 
Constitution, on the grounds of its case law and, in particular, it stresses that in order “to avoid the 
occurrence of ‘an untenable mismatch’ between pension increases and salary trends, the legislator 
cannot disregard the limit of reasonableness” (see Judgment 226/1993) (para. 8, italics added). In other 
words, the principle of fair wage and that of adequate pension have to be matched by the legislator in a 
reasonable way. 
This case is interesting in terms of content of fundamental labour rights especially because, it is the 
first occasion – among the judgments assessed in this dissertation – in which the Court identifies the 
core content of the principle of adequate retirement benefits. In this ruling, the contested provision is 
unreasonable, because it violates Articles 36.1 and 38.2 Constitution, by reaching what is called in the 
judgment the “critical levels” (para. 10), which in the case of retirement benefits, are represented by the 
“detriment of the purchasing power”. Even though the Court does not mention the “essential content” 
of the fundamental labour right to adequate and proportionate pensions, this concept seems to find full 
application in the case at stake and it is reflected precisely in the conservation of the purchasing power.  
The normative element subject to the balancing in Judgment 173/2016 can be identified by assessing, 
especially, paragraph 11 of the judgment. The evaluation of the legislator’s balancing, according to the 
Court, should be conducted bearing in mind the necessity to balance “the legitimate expectation of legal 
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certainty, with other values constitutionally protected” (para. 11). What is meant by “legitimate 
expectation of legal certainty” becomes more clear in the following paragraph, where it is argued that 
the principle of reasonableness, the principle of legitimate expectation and the principle of the social 
security protection shall be applied jointly, in order to assess whether the solidarity contribution does 
not exceed the mandatory “limits”. Indeed, the Court, while pointing at these three principles, only refers 
to Art. 3 and Art. 38 Constitution. Considering that Art. 3 provides for the reasonableness principle and 
Art. 38 for the principle of adequacy of the social system benefits, it may be deduced that the legitimate 
expectation, which constitutes one of the elements subject to the balancing exercise, is understood, for 
the purpose of this Judgement, as the legitimate expectation to an adequate pension, which turns out to 
be an aspect of the right protected under Art. 38.2 Constitution (para. 11.1). 
In addition, in this judgment explicit reference is made to the essential nucleus of the fundamental 
rights concerned, which is also clearly identified. The Court argues that a contribution deducted from 
the pensions has a solidarity character and is reasonable, in the sense that it does not violate Art. 38 (and 
the linked Art. 36 Constitution), if it only affects the higher benefits, to be identified taking into 
consideration the “essential nucleus” of the pension rights, that is the minimum INPS retirement benefits 
(para. 11). In this occasion, the Court modulates the relationship between the principle of fair 
remuneration and that of adequateness of retirement benefits by arguing that Art. 38 Constitution is 
“coupled also to Art. 36 Constitution, but not in a constant and strictly proportional way” (para. 11.1). 
In addition, also in this case the measure is tolerated because it is exceptional (para. 11.1). 
In the last episode of this case law in search of some coherence, Judgment 250/2017, Art. 36.1 and, 
especially, Art. 38.2 are again at the forefront of the balancing exercise, as interpreted by the Court. 
Also in this case, it is stressed that the right of pensioners can be sacrificed only in a partial and 
temporary way. This argument is supported by reasonable choices of the legislator, namely the fact that 
the revaluation of pensions is modulated according to a decreasing percentage in favour of the lower 
benefits, considering that the higher benefits have a stronger resistance to inflation (para. 6.5.2). The 
Court asserts that the negative impact of the contested provisions on the higher retirement benefits is 
not sufficient to affect their adequacy, which is safeguarded even if the automatic revaluation is 
temporary suspended, as it is the case for retirement benefits six times higher than the INPS minimum. 
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Indeed, these pensions enjoy a higher margin of resistance to the erosion of the purchasing power caused 
by the inflation (para. 6.5.3.1). 
Overall, two main elements are recurrent: the relevance of the temporal element to justify the 
sacrifice of a fundamental labour right (exceptional transitory measures) and an increasing emphasis on 
the concept of core content of the fundamental labour rights, even if expressed in various ways, for 
which the tool of the reasonableness criterion has been paramount. Although an attentive analysis of the 
previous case law has not been conducted, from the case law mentioned by the Court in these judgments, 
we can infer that the “critical levels” of the both the right to an adequate pension and the right to 
collective bargaining have moved a bit further, in the sense that apparently their core content has been 
reduced, following the post crisis reforms.  
Indeed, in the six cases selected, we can observe that the Court, on the one hand, assesses the 
connection between the budgetary needs and the contested provisions, in light of the overall normative 
context, which shall go in the direction of reducing public spending, so that there is an equal distribution 
of the sacrifice. On the other hand, it focuses on the temporal scope of these restrictions as a crucial 
element to determine whether the core content of a fundamental right has been infringed upon. The 
reasonableness criterion has crossed all of these moments of the legal reasoning, giving a key 
contribution in the definition of the essential content of the said rights. 
 
Conclusion 
In the six judgments assessed in this chapter, the Italian Court acts as a supervisor of the legislative 
choices and it does so in a dialogical sense. The Court attempts to complement the recognition of the 
legislative competences with general warnings – hence going beyond the cases at issue –, as far as 
concerns which rights and interests can be balanced against and how this balancing must be conducted. 
In particular, it emphasises the reasonableness of this balancing. Indeed, on the one hand, it recognises 
the discretionality of the legislator and, on the other hand, it underlines the limits of the discretional 
power, circumscribed by the principle of reasonableness and by the duty not to infringe upon 
Constitutional rights.   
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So, for instance, it states that “the legislator must operate on this terrain in striking a correct balance 
whenever the need to make cost savings arises” (Judgment 70/2015, para. 10), or that the legislator has 
“to balance numerous values of a constitutional status” (Judgment 124/2017, para. 8.1). Consistently, in 
most of the cases, the Italian Court does not attempt to balance rights and interests in conflict, but rather 
it looks for the norm’s justification, not in the form of simple statements but proper technical documents 
that may explain why an interest should prevail over the other. However, the Court does not offer an 
analysis of these documents, where they exist, but it just refers to the fact that they were provided by 
the legislator. Alternatively, it attempts to identify the legislator’s intention expressed by the contested 
norm, by reconstructing the legal and historical evolution of the legal institution. 
The so called “definitional balancing” has not been conducted by this Court, either. Nevertheless, a 
single case in which the Court has behaved as an active balancer has been observed: Judgment 178/2015. 
Here, a ruling of supervening unconstitutionality has modulated the judgment’s effects, in a way that 
the legislator could have not perpetrated its violation any further, but, at the same time, it was not obliged 
to impact on the public finances to reimburse the workers in view of the violation perpetrated. Also in 
this case the Court does not renounce to support the dialogue between democratic powers and invites 
the legislator to recreate the usual dynamics of collective negotiation in the public sector.  
As far as concerns the techniques applied, the Italian judgments are not homogeneous and a common 
structure can be hardly traced, but some commonalities do exist. The judgments have different shades 
of rigorousness of the legal reasoning structure, and the most systematized and consistent legal reasoning 
can be found in Judgment 70/2015. In certain phases, the Court’s interpretation reflects some steps of 
the proportionality test, or, at least, they present very similar features. For instance, the focus on the aim 
is recurrent and, in most of the cases, the Court starts by identifying whether the norm’s aim is legitimate 
and, if so, it proceeds by assessing the suitability of the norm to achieve its aim. Nonetheless, the 
judgments assessed do not allow to conclude that the Italian Court implicitly applies the proportionality 
test.  
The principle of reasonableness is confirmed as the interpretative criterion, which is applied by the 
Italian Constitutional Court in the evaluation of the legislative choices and shall guide the legislative 
action, in a way that goes beyond the mere absence of arbitrariness. The Court clearly affirms that this 
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principle is to be applied in conjunction with the fundamental rights at issue, as a guideline to their 
interpretation and application. 
The norm’s reasonableness must be assessed in light of both the rational of the norm and the 
economic context. In the peculiar case of a norm that aims to contain public spending, the principle of 
reasonableness indicates that this necessity has to be connected to a peculiar and particularly serious 
economic phase. 
Overall, the principle of reasonableness suggests that a norm, to be constitutionally legitimate, has 
to limit fundamental labour rights in an exceptional, transitory (temporarily limited) and non-arbitrary 
way.  Furthermore, as far as concerns the subjective scope of a fundamental labour right, the sacrifice 
imposed on a given right cannot concern, and hence affect, only a precise group of workers, but it has 
to be a generalized sacrifice in application of the principle of solidarity. 
The relationship between the principle of reasonableness and proportionality cannot be ultimately 
defined by looking at the selected judgments. However, it is hardly arguable that the Court applies the 
proportionality as a self-standing principle. Indeed, it rather seems to be used as a rhetoric support to the 
concept of reasonableness. 
In these judgments, the Italian Court timidly introduces the concept of essential content of 
fundamental rights in a couple of occasions. As regards the fundamental labour right to adequate and 
proportionate pensions, it uses the expression “critical levels”, which, for retirement benefits, hence for 
the fundamental labour rights to adequate and proportionate pensions are represented by the “detriment 
of the purchasing power” (Judgment 70/2015, reiterated in Judgment 205/2017). However, the 
protection recognised to the retirement benefits seems to go beyond that essential nucleus, which, 
therefore, remains a floor of protection and does not become a ceiling. 
The Court is careful in allowing the legislator to balance fundamental labour rights with the recently 
reformed Art. 81 Constitution, i.e. the principle of balanced budget, and it expressly refers to the 
economic context and the general financial interest only in some of the Judgments assessed, with various 
expressions and at various degrees. Moreover, in those cases where the economic context is identified 
as a justification for the contested norms, the Court specifies that this element cannot just be mentioned, 
but the causal link with the provision at issue must be explained (see especially Judgment 70/2015).  
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Art. 81 Constitution and the respective principles are never expressly recognised as terms of the 
balancing, even though this conclusion cannot be generalized in equal terms for all of the Judgments. 
For instance, Judgment 310/2013 puts strong emphasis on both the Article and the principle enshrined 
therein. A glaring exception is Judgment 178/2015, where the Court highlights the changed relevance 
of Art. 81 Constitution, following the 2012 reform, which becomes – in the Court’s understanding – the 
normative expression of a general interest, which is to be balanced against the fundamental labour right 
concerned, that is the right to collective bargaining. 
The selected case law contributes to define the right to collective bargaining, inasmuch as it 
underlines the programmatic dimension of collective bargaining in relation to both the normative and 
the economic part and the fact that it is not exclusively functional to the determination of the financial 
aspects, but it is deemed to regulate the employment relationship comprehensively, thus including terms 
and conditions of employment in the widest sense. About the right to collective bargaining the most 
interesting element of the case law at issue is surely the wide use made by the Court, in Judgment 
178/2015, of international legal sources, which are not applied as proper parameters of legitimacy of the 
contested provision, but they still have a significant interpretative role. Indeed, ILO Conventions, the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights become hermeneutic tools, which corroborate the 
understanding of trade union freedom as including the right to collective bargaining. Moreover, the 
Court refers to other supranational sources, as the European Social Charter (Art. 6) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art. 28). One of the main features of the right to collective 
bargaining that we can derive from this case law concerns the boundaries that the legislator cannot 
overcome, in particular the temporary character of its limitation. 
As far as concerns the compliance with Art. 36.1 Constitution, that is the right to a fair remuneration, 
the Court clarifies that the interpreter has to take as reference point the overall remuneration and not its 
single elements. In Judgment 70/2015, Art. 36.1 Constitution is understood as strictly connected to Art. 
38.2 Constitution, which guarantees the right to an adequate pension. However, this jurisprudence is not 
confirmed in a subsequent ruling, where the link between the right to a fair remuneration and the right 
to an adequate pension is weakened, albeit still recognised (Judgment 173/2016). 
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As to the right to an adequate pension (Art. 38.2 Constitution), this case law suggests that the core 
of this right is not only the minimum INPS pension, which can never be sacrificed, but also the 
conservation of the purchasing power of the retirement benefits, which derives from the duty to fulfil 
the legitimate expectations of workers. 
Last, the principle of independence of the judiciary (Art. 104 Constitution) becomes, in the context 
of the first Judgment assessed, a fundamental labour right, in as much as it is structurally interrelated 
with the right to a fair remuneration of this peculiar category of public employees. This principle, 
apparently not belonging to the fundamental labour rights’ cluster, serves the purpose of protecting one 
of the cornerstones of the labour system, that is the right to a proportionate remuneration, under Art. 
36.1 Constitution, in relation to a group of workers that cannot determine the salary dynamics through 
collective bargaining. We can observe that the mentioned right (the right to a fair remuneration which 
also goes true the right to independence of the judiciary) cannot be limited in a structural way, nor the 
legislator can impose a sacrifice only on one precise category. While, in general, as regards Art. 36.1 
Constitution, a generalized and foreseeable limit that respects the professional level of the work 
performed is allowed. 
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Chapter 4 
The Spanish Constitutional Judgments on the right to work and the right to collective 
bargaining 
 
Introduction 
As for the Italian case law addressed in the previous chapter, also the analysis of the Spanish 
judgments selected is conducted drawing on the constitutional balancing theories developed by the 
Spanish scholarship and jurisprudence, which have been discussed in the second chapter of this 
dissertation. In particular, the extensive studies reviewed suggest that the Spanish constitutional case 
law should adopt the proportionality test as a technique to balance conflicting rights and interests of a 
constitutional nature and decide over the legitimacy of the contested norms. Furthermore, a peculiarity 
of this constitutional tradition is the relevance of the essential content of a fundamental right to assess 
and identify the unconstitutionality of contested provisions.  
The Spanish constitutional case law on post crisis measures discussed in this chapter deals with a 
number of norms of a unique, but comprehensive and significant, Act: Law 3/2012, of 6 July on “urgent 
measures to reform the labour market”.  
The applicants maintain that these norms are infringing upon certain fundamental rights protected by 
the Spanish Constitution. Overall, the constitutional provisions concerned are: Art. 14 (equality before 
the law), Art. 23.2 (equality in participation of citizens in public affairs), Art. 24.1 (right to effective 
judicial protection), Art. 28.1 (trade union freedom), Art. 35.1 (right and duty to work502), Art. 37.1 
(right to collective bargaining) y Art. 103.3 (civil servants status) of the Spanish Constitution. The focus 
of the next pages is on the right to work and right to collective bargaining, mostly because the claims 
concerning the other constitutional articles have been dismissed rather hastily. The claimants raised a 
substantial number of issues and most of them concerned the lack of proportionality of the measures 
                                                            
502 “All Spaniards have the duty to work and the right to work, to the free choice of profession or trade, to 
advancement through work, and to a sufficient remuneration for the satisfaction of their needs and those of their 
families.” 
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adopted, indeed the principle of proportionality was, in several cases, already invoked by the claimants 
themselves.  
The two judgments selected are rich, extensive and consistent with each other. Overall, as already 
emphasised in the first chapter, the hermeneutic principles are applied in a way that raises doubts over 
a possible strategic use of the legal reasoning.  Indeed, both in Judgment 119/2014, and in Judgment 
8/2015, the Spanish Constitutional Court has ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged 
legal provisions, to the point that its approach has been defined “maybe close to the government”503 and 
surely very cautious.  
Without denying the relevance of the numerous elements of these judgments that would deserve an 
attentive evaluation, this chapter focuses exclusively on the legal reasoning developed by the Court in 
order to justify the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and on the fundamental labour rights 
concerned.  
Judgement 119/2014 has been triggered by a question of constitutionality submitted by the 
Parlamento de Navarra in October 2012. According to the claimant, Articles 4; 14.1, 14.2 and 14.3 and 
the fifth attached provision were infringing upon Articles 14 (principle of formal equality), 24 (right to 
effective judicial protection), 28 (trade union freedom and right to strike), 35 (right to work) and 37 
(right to collective bargaining and the right to engage in industrial disputes), Spanish Constitution.  
Nevertheless, the Spanish Court admits only the questions of constitutionality as regards Art. 4 and Art. 
14, paragraphs 1 and 3, of Law 3/2012. 
From a labour law perspective, the latest relevant post-crisis constitutional judgment is Judgment 
8/2015. On 5 October 2012, 104 deputies of the Socialist Group in Parliament and 11 of the 
parliamentary group Izquierda Plural challenged the constitutionality of a number of norms enshrined 
in Law 3/2012. In particular, the present chapter addresses the legal reasoning related to Articles 4.3, 
12.1, 14.1 and 2, 18.3 and 8, which were deemed unconstitutional by the applicants because in violation 
of various Constitutional norms: Articles 14, 23.2, 24.1 (right to participate in public affairs), 28.1, 35.1, 
37.1 and 103.3 (statute of civil servants) Spanish Constitution. Some of the questions of constitutionality 
                                                            
503 Fontana 2016, 147. 
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raised in this case had already been raised, discussed and solved in Judgment 119/2014. The Court points 
out, at a very first stage, that the legal reasoning on those norms reiterates the same arguments developed 
in Judgment 119/2014 (Judgment 8/2015, para. 1, c). In addition, this Court devotes the first part of the 
judgment to dismiss a general claim against Law 3/2012, according to which the Law at issue “was born 
outside of the constitutional coordinates”, in other words the applicants argue that Law 3/2012 ignores 
the structural and axiological framework of  labour relations designed by the Spanish Constitutional 
model (Judgment 8/2015, para.  2). 
The analysis conducted in the present chapter is structurally similar to the previous chapter. Before 
assessing the selected rulings and in order to have a clear picture of the legal provisions discussed by 
this case law, it first summarizes the content of the contested norms and the main arguments of the 
applicants, where relevant. Subsequently, it reflects on the role of the Spanish Court in relation to the 
legislative power. Third, the technique used to conduct the legal reasoning and present the arguments 
that support the legitimacy of the contested provisions is reviewed. Last, it identifies the constitutional 
rights and interests balanced against the fundamental labour rights allegedly violated. In conclusion, the 
chapter recapitulates the main elements that can be drawn from the selected case law and their effects 
on the scope of the fundamental labour rights referred to504. 
 
1. The contested norms 
As already mentioned, all of the provisions contested in Judgments 119/2014 and 8/2015 are 
enshrined in Law 3/2012 and all of them have been declared legitimate, hence the questions of 
constitutionality have been entirely dismissed. The first, and maybe more controversial, norm among 
those discussed in both rulings, is Art. 4, paragraph 3, of Law 3/2012, which provides for an open-ended 
contract of employment with a probationary period of one year, known as the open-ended entrepreneur-
support contract, contrato de apoyo a los emprendedores (CAE). This contract can be applied in 
companies with less than 50 employees. In particular, the norm at stake (Art. 4.3) is deemed 
unconstitutional, by the Parlamento de Navarra, as it is considered in violation of the right to work, that 
                                                            
504 The Spanish Judgments’ quotations are translated from Spanish by Giulia Frosecchi. 
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includes the right “to the free choice of profession or trade, to advancement through work, and to a 
sufficient remuneration for the satisfaction of their needs and those of their families” (Art. 35.1 
Constitution); the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 Constitution); the right to a fair trial (Art. 24 
Constitution) and the principle of equality (Art. 14 Constitution) (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3). 
Second, the Parliament of Navarra also raised question of constitutionality as concerns Art. 14.1, 
Law 3/2012, which amends Art. 82.3 Workers’ Statute. The contested measure provides the Comisión 
Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, and the respective bodies in the Autonomous 
Communities, with the power to allow the disapplication of terms and conditions agreed by workers’ 
and employers’ representatives in the generally binding collective agreements (regulated by Title III of 
the Workers’ Statute). According to the claimants, this norm violates Art. 37.1 Constitution, in the sense 
that it infringes upon the constitutional recognition of the biding effect of collective agreements; Art. 
28.1 Constitution, inasmuch as it hampers the exercise of the trade union freedom; Art. 24.1 
Constitution, that is the effective judicial protection (Judgment 119/2014, para. 4). Only a specific norm 
of the amended Art. 82.3, Workers’ Statute, is questioned: the possibility for each of the parties to appeal 
to these specific Commissions, in case the negotiating process fails. Therefore, neither the possibility to 
disapply the collective agreement, nor the procedures to come to a further agreement are addressed by 
the Court. The provision at issue establishes that “when the period of consultation between workers’ 
representatives and the company ends without agreement”, either of the parties can turn to the Comisión 
Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos – or the respective bodies of the Autonomous 
Communities – in order to reach a final decision. The disagreement can be solved with a decision 
released directly from the Commission, or with a decision taken by a mediator appointed by the same 
Commission. The norm clarifies that this unilateral decision, taken by a public body, has the same legal 
effect as the agreements concluded during the consultations. So, in short, following this provision, a 
public body can solve a controversy over the dis-application of a generally binding collective agreement, 
following the request of only one of the parties concerned, without the need for the parties to agree upon 
the Commission’s intervention (see also the review of the norm provided by Judgment 119/2014, para. 
5). 
185 
 
Third, in both Judgments, the applicants also question the constitutionality of Art. 14.3, Law 3/2012, 
as being in violation of Art. 37.1 Constitution and Art 28.1 Constitution. The contested norm amends 
Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute, which now provides that, as regards certain subjects, the application of terms 
and conditions set in a company level agreement, which can be negotiated at any time, has priority over 
the higher level collective agreements. The same provision establishes that the company level 
agreement’s priority cannot be modified by inter-professional or sectorial collective agreements either. 
In particular, the constitutionality of this provision is questioned on three main grounds. First, it gives 
priority to the application of company level agreements as regards a number of subjects; second, it 
provides that company agreements may be negotiated at any time during the validity of a collective 
agreement of a superior level; third, neither the inter-professional agreements, nor the sectoral collective 
agreements (those regulated under Title III) can modify the priority recognised to company agreements 
by law. The subjects in which the company level collective agreement has priority are various, the Court 
summarizes them as: “given aspects linked to remuneration, working time and holidays, professional 
categories, systems of negotiation or work-life balance” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6). 
The following provisions have been, instead, challenged only in Judgment 8/2015.  In particular, the 
second  
group of applicants argue that Art. 12.1, Law 3/2012 infringes upon Art. 37.1 Constitution and, 
consequently, Art. 28.1 Constitution, because of the unilateral power given to the employer to amend 
conditions of employment set by collective agreements. Indeed, this authority recognised to the 
entrepreneur is a novelty of Law 3/2012. As also the Court underlines, the contested provision concerns 
the disapplication or amendment of terms and conditions established by the so called “extraestatutarios” 
collective agreements, which are not generally applicable, but apply only to the signatory parties and 
their members, which are not regulated by Title III of the Workers’ Statute (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, 
a). 
A further norm contested only at a later is stage is Art. 18.3, Law 3/2012, which reforms Art. 51 
Workers’ Statute on collective redundancy. The norm at issue provides for the power of the employer 
to terminate the employment contracts, following a consultation period with the workers’ 
representatives, on the basis of certain circumstances, that is if “economic, technical, organizational and 
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productive causes” exist. What is contested of the said norm are the ambiguous definitions of the causes 
that may justify the collective redundancies and the possibility for the employer not to justify further the 
application of a given cause. The applicants argue that the causes’ contents, as framed by the legislator, 
violate the right not to be dismissed without a just cause (Art. 35.1 Constitution) and the right to an 
effective judicial control over the dismissal’s causes (Art. 24.1 Constitution) (Judgment 8/2015, para. 7, 
a). 
The last ruling assessed in this chapter concerns Art. 18.8, Law 3/2012, that amends Art. 56.2, and, 
consequently, Art. 23 Workers’ Statute. The contested norm provides for the possibility for the 
employer, in case of unfair dismissal, to decide whether to reintegrate the worker by paying given 
indemnities (salarios de tramitación) or to pay an economic indemnity. This provision is challenged for 
being in violation of Art. 35.1 Constitution and Art. 14 Constitution (Judgment 8/2015, para. 8). 
 
2. The role of the Court  
The wide margin of discretion enjoyed by the legislator is a recurrent and strong argument in the 
selected case law. The Court refers to the libertad (freedom) of the legislator in several occasions, and 
mostly as far as concerns the opportunity and efficacy of the contested norms.  
In Judgment 119/2014, with regard to the first norm contested (Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012), the Court starts 
by constraining its role and that of the judgment of constitutionality. Indeed, both the state attorney and 
the applicant had questioned, in their allegations, whether a long period, as the one conceived by the 
contested provision, can be considered a probationary period in the proper sense, or whether, to the 
contrary, a norm as such alters the legal substance of the probationary period as envisaged and allowed 
by Art. 14, Workers’ Statute (Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores). Interestingly, the Court pulls itself 
out of this debate, upon the argument that the probationary period in the employment contract does not 
constitute an institution expressly provided for by the Constitution. It points out that, even though the 
legislator is entitled to provide for a probationary period on the grounds of Art. 35.2 Constitution, the 
probationary period itself is not a constitutional institution. Therefore, it is up to the legislator also the 
determination of its length and possible conditions. However, the Court clarifies that, albeit in this field 
the legislator has a wide freedom, it cannot overcome the constitutional limits. Therefore, it concludes 
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that the debate on whether the institution of a “probationary period for the employment contract” is 
respected is not relevant for the Constitutional Court, while it is relevant whether the provision enshrined 
in Art. 4.3 of Law 3/2012 violates or not Art. 35.1 Constitution. The Court immediately presents itself 
as the supervisor of the consistency of an ordinary norm - exclusively - with regard to the Constitution 
and not the overall normative framework built by the legislator. Indeed, in this case, the Court does not 
look for a general consistency of this legal institution in light of its normative development. However, 
the fact that the Court needs to stress on this point is surprising, since if we admit that an illegitimate 
probationary period is in compliance with the legal institution “probationary period”, we accept that the 
institution itself can be unconstitutional. In fact, it can be argued that, stating whether the CAE 
probationary period is legitimate or not could help to define the boundaries, and, hence, the features of 
the employment contract’s probationary period in the Spanish legal system (Judgment 119/2014, para. 
3). 
Nevertheless, in the following paragraph, the Court contradicts itself, by referring directly to the 
Workers’ Statute in order to support the legitimacy of the norm’s aim and the strengthen the value of 
the implementation by the legislator of Art. 41 Constitution (see further). The mentioned ordinary 
provision “provides the Government with the power to adopt reservation measures […] that aim to 
facilitate the placement of unemployed workers” and support stable employment, as well as conversion 
of fixed term contracts into permanent ones (Art. 17.3, Workers’ Statute) (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, 
A, e). 
In Judgment 8/2015, the Court expresses clearly the extent of its own margin of action, denying its 
competence to enter into the merit of the legislative choice. In particular, it argues that “it is not the 
Court’s competence to establish if the solutions adopted by the contested Law are the most correct from 
a technical point of view, or if they constitute the most appropriate among possible alternatives, in order 
to achieve the aim pursued” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, g). To strengthen this argument, and hence its 
limited scope of action, it quotes a recent constitutional judgment, that excludes the possibility for the 
Court to “examine the necessity of the legal provision to decide whether it is the most appropriate or the 
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best among the possible options”505. The sole aspect that, according to the Court, can be subject to its 
analysis is if a contested provision “complies with the mandates, rules and principles that the 
Constitution imposes upon the legislator”. Indeed, it is again by quoting previous Judgments, that the 
Court argues that “every legislative option … is admissible from a constitutional point of view if it 
complies with the constitutional rules”506 (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, g). It is noteworthy that these strong 
and clear statements on the role of the Court in the supervision of the legislator’s activity are either 
supported by, or direct quotations of Judgments from 2013507, while the rest of the rich case law quoted 
dates back to various and diversified periods.  
Therefore, essentially, in this paragraph, where the Court has not yet began to properly conduct the 
scrutiny of constitutionality of the contested norms, it denies the application of the proportionality test 
and justifies the Court’s - limited – role, by underlining the wide scope of action of the legislator. That 
is a first and crucial moment of the Court’s legal reasoning. 
Also further on, in the same judgment (Judgment 8/2015), the Court, by quoting a recent judgment, 
points out that it is not up to the Court to evaluate upon the “appropriateness or convenience of the 
legislator’s choice”508, but it only has to assess whether the option picked by the legislator “in the 
exercise of the competence attributed by the constitution” is respectful of the “reasonable margin of 
freedom recognised by Art. 35 Constitution” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 7, a). 
The same case law is quoted in the following decision (on Art. 18.8). Indeed, it newly quotes the 
Constitutional judgment from 2012: “it is not our duty/function to declare/state the opportunity or 
convenience of the choice made by the legislator, in order to establish whether it is the most appropriate 
or the best possible”509. The Court can only determine if the option adopted by the legislator goes beyond 
the margin of freedom provided for by Art. 35 Constitution, which means that the justification of the 
norm cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. Also in this case, the Court concludes that “given that the 
                                                            
505 Here the Court quotes literally Judgment 17/2013, 31 January, para. 11. 
506 Here it quotes Judgment 20/2013, 31 January, para. 3. 
507 Judgment 20/2013, 31 January, and Judgment 17/2013, 31 January. 
508 Judgment 198/2012, 6 November, para. 11. 
509 Judgment 198/2012, 6 November, para. 11. 
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justification cannot be qualified as unreasonable” it is sufficient to legitimize the contested norm 
(Judgment 8/2015, para. 8, b). 
The case law selection made by this Court to build this legal reasoning seems to confirm that in 
recent times  (2012 and 2013) the Spanish Constitutional Court has leaned towards a less invasive 
approach to the legislator’s action, as well as a less rigid application of the proportionality test (see next 
section), and this Court seems determined to confirm the trend.  
The same concept is expressed in the first Judgment where the Court states that it is not its 
competence “to judge upon the opportunity and efficacy” of the contested norm. A statement as such 
contradicts what stated in the previous paragraphs, that is that the provision at issue can achieve the aim 
pursued (Judgment 119/2014, on Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, para. 3, A, f). Indeed, either a Court can evaluate 
the efficacy of a norm, hence, the suitability of the norm to achieve its aim, or it cannot. In that occasion, 
the Court upholds the State attorney argument, by arguing that “in a crisis context as the present one” 
such a probationary period allows to understand if the working position is economically sustainable 
(Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). However, the link between the phase of crisis of the country and the 
need to make use of a full year to understand whether the working position can be maintained is not 
explicated at all. Nor the Court seems to look for such a causal link in the words of the Law. Indeed, 
assuming that the Court shall act as a supervisor, is to be excluded that it should provide such causal 
link itself, but, surely, it should check on the arguments put forward by the legislator.  
In a similar way, in Judgment 119/2014, paragraph 6, thus referring to the regulation of the collective 
bargaining structure, it states that “it is not up to this Court to evaluate the opportunity or efficacy of the 
legislative decision” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, e). 
This contradiction between the theory and the practice of the Court, that on the one hand argues that 
it is not entitled to enter the merit of the legislative choice, but on the other supports the existence of a 
– invisible – causal link between the contested measure and its purpose, legitimately raises suspects of 
a blind support from the Court to the legislator. 
Even though the Court never expressly mentions the “discretionality” of the legislator, but rather it 
uses words as “freedom”, as a matter of fact what the Court does is to recognise a wide margin of 
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discretion to the legislator. At the same time, in the first Judgment, the Court does not even build a real 
dialogue with the legislative process.  
The only moment it seems willing to build a dialogue with the legislator can be found in Judgment 
119/2014, on Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012. Here, the Court links so strictly the decision to the current economic 
context that it feels the need to conclude by stating that the future amendments to the probationary period 
needs to be subject to a new and further analysis “not necessarily conditioned by the solution adopted 
here” (Judgment 119/2014, Par. 3, A, f). In addition, in a couple of cases, Judgment 8/2015 traces the 
legislative evolution of the legal institution under discussion, but only with clarification purposes (see, 
for instance, Judgment 8/2016, para. 7, a).  
The discretionality of the legislator is also an implicit light motif, in those cases where the Court has 
to evaluate the compliance with Art. 37.1 Constitution (right to collective bargaining and binding force 
of collective agreements), as when it states: “[T]he legislator enjoys a wide margin of freedom in the 
elaboration of the right to collective bargaining”, in the first part of Judgment 8/2015, to answer the 
general claim according to which Law 3/2012 would be in contrast with the Spanish constitutional 
model. The Court starts by pointing out that the Constitution assigns an exclusive competence as 
concerns both labour law (Art. 149.1.VII Constitution) and the “regulation of the basic conditions 
guaranteeing the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of their rights and in the fulfilment of their 
constitutional duties” (Art. 149.1.I Constitution). These provisions have to be read in conjunction with 
other two constitutional norms. First, Art. 35.2 Constitution, that states that “the law shall establish a 
Workers’ Statute”, in order to stress the unity of the labour system as regulated by the legislator, the 
Court emphasises that this Constitutional article refers to one single Workers’ Statute. Second, Art. 53.1 
Constitution, which establishes that the exercise of labour rights and liberties provided for by Cap. II, 
Title I, may be regulated only by law (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, a). 
Subsequently the Court assesses the constitutional trade unions’ role and their relationship with 
collective bargaining. While trade unions are recognised an important position in the Spanish system, 
collective bargaining is not their prerogative510. Therefore, still relying extensively on its case law, the 
                                                            
510 On the right to collective bargaining under Art. 37 Constitution and its interpretation from the Court see further 
in this chapter. 
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Court concludes that, given that the Constitution recognises to the legislator the power to guarantee the 
right to collective bargaining, and this right represents “essentially a right of legal configuration”511, “the 
legislator enjoys a wide margin of freedom” to regulate various aspects of the said right, as: “collective 
bargaining’s structure, content, scope and limits” and that’s because, adds the Court, the law has “a 
superior position in the normative hierarchy” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, e). 
The Court concludes that “the 1978 Constitution does not draw a closed model of labour relations, 
nor of collective bargaining”, thus, it is up to the legislator to provide for “what it considers more 
appropriate in each moment”512 (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, f). Indeed, the legislator enjoys enough 
freedom to choose among possible alternative options and realize its “legal concept”, by taking into 
account “the economic circumstances” and the “social needs” that the legislator wants to address 
(Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, g).  
The Court, in order to support the margin of action of the legislator in this field, points out that, since 
1978, it has modulated the labour relations model has represented “different legislative options at the 
service of a concrete economic and social policy of the Government or Parliament of each time” 
(Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, g). 
The margin of freedom left to the legislator in shaping the national labour relations system is 
mentioned often in these rulings. As in Judgment 8/2015 on Art. 18.8, when the Court simply states that 
the Court concludes that the norm is compliance with Art. 35.1 Constitution, because the legislator has 
acted within the margin of freedom the Constitution guarantees as to the configuration of the labour 
relations (para. 8, a). In the same ruling, the Court stresses that it is up to the legislator to decide on the 
consequences of unfair dismissal “in view of the economic and social circumstances” (Judgment 8/2015, 
para. 8, a). 
Last, the Court recognises great relevance to the preamble of Law 3/2012. For instance, in Judgment 
119/2014 the Court interprets the contested norm, and contextualizes it to the case under discussion, in 
the sense that the reforms on the duration of the employment contract are a “typical variable” for public 
                                                            
511 It expressly quotes Judgment 85/2001, 26 March, para. 5. 
512 Here it refers to a Judgment which has been a milestone for the Spanish labour system, Judgment 11/1981, 8 
April, para. 7. 
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authorities, “especially in periods – as the present one – of emergency as to the employment levels”. 
Therefore, the Court concludes, the contested provision “represents just a new provision of the legislator 
on the length of the labour contract and the stability of the employment”, it continues by asserting that 
this represents an attempt “to offer an appropriate answer to the situation of serious crisis of 
employment, as referred to in the preamble to Law 3/2012” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). 
In conclusion, the role of the Constitutional Court in these judgments is surely not that of a “direct 
balancer”, in the sense that it does not conduct a constitutional balancing. Therefore, one could argue 
that the Court supervises the balancing of the legislator, even though the following chapter illustrates 
how this supervision is conducted in a – surprisingly – de-structured way. What arises from the analysis 
conducted so far is mainly a precise intention of the Court to frame its role and shrink it as much as 
possible, in order to recognise a wide margin of discretion to the legislator. 
 
3. The technique applied 
An evident evolution marks the construction of the legal reasoning from Judgment 119/2014, to 
Judgment 8/2015. In particular, a change in the use of the proportionality test criteria, as well as the 
essential content can be observed. 
Overall, and with simplification purposes, we can observe that the Court tend to adopt the same 
structure in the first phase of its argumentation. First, it identifies the Constitutional article(s) allegedly 
violated. Second, it discusses the aim of the norm. Third, it evaluates if the aim is legitimate and if it 
implements a constitutional norm. To the contrary, the following steps, as the distinction between the 
legitimacy of the aim and the legitimacy of the norm are, are relatively more disorganised. 
Before going to assess profoundly the – formally – different approaches and the substantial analogies 
between the two Judgments, it is noteworthy to underline that in both cases, the use of judicial precedents 
is quite wide. The Court not only quotes its case law to support its arguments, but also dialogues with 
its case law in “negative” terms, in the sense that it highlights the differences with the actual case that 
do not justify similar conclusions. For instance, in Judgment 119/2014, on the power attached to the 
Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, the Court devotes a whole paragraph to assess 
the difference between the case at stake and previous judgments in which an analogous norm has been 
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declared illegitimate. Indeed, according to the Court, the substantial differences do not allow to come to 
the same conclusions. In particular, the Court insists on the tripartite composition of the Commission 
(workers and employers’ representatives and public administration), the fact that it is not a labour 
authority and the need for the Commission to identify the concrete causes that justify the disapplication 
of given labour conditions. The Court also stresses again the justification of the norm: it is a measure 
aimed to favour competitively and sustainability of the companies, as an alternative to unemployment513 
(Judgment 119/2014, para 5, A, c). 
In both Judgments, most of the time, the Court develops a dialectic argumentation and adopts the 
hermeneutic criteria imprecisely, to the point that, for instance, in certain cases the Court declares that 
it is analysing the proportionality and reasonableness of the norm, while in others the reasonableness of 
the justification. In addition, the reasonableness of the norm is, in most of the cases, assumed without 
being supported by insightful analyses. For instance, in Judgment 8/2015, assessing Art. 12.1, Law 
3/2012, the Court starts by making some short considerations over Art. 37.1 Constitution, which has 
been allegedly violated by the contested provision. Second, it evaluates the aim to establish whether it 
is legitimate. Also in this case, the Court takes into account the general aim of Law 3/2012: legitimate 
aim is “to favour the internal flexibility of the companies as an alternative to job losses”, which allows 
the companies to adjust the organization to the “economic situation” and “facilitates the rational 
adjustment of the productive structures to the unexpected market evolutions”. The Court argues that this 
aim is justified and legitimate because it implements constitutional provisions and it plainly deduces 
that the norm has a “reasonable justification from a constitutional point of view”. Here, apparently, the 
Court infers that the justification is “reasonable” for the only fact of being consistent with constitutional 
provisions (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a). 
The following sections bring evidence of the formal differences between the two Judgments, as 
regards the technique used to conduct the balancing and, especially, as far as concerns the application 
of the suitability and necessity criteria. In addition, the ambiguous application of the ILO sources in 
Judgment 119/2014 is highlighted.  
                                                            
513 The Court refers to Judgments 11/1981, 8 April, and 92/1992, 11 June. 
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3.1 The rejection of the proportionality test criteria: Judgment 119/2014 
In the first judgment, the Court never refers to the proportionality test, nor to its sub-tests and 
structures the legal reasoning in a highly informal way, mostly focusing on the constitutional legitimacy 
of the aim and the counterweights provided to each contested provision. A glaring example is offered 
by the legal reasoning on the legitimacy of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, on the grounds of Art. 35.1 
Constitution. First, the Court declares the limits of its role and scope of action (see above). Second, it 
elaborates on the constitutional norm allegedly violated (Art. 35. 1 Constitution), in light of the contested 
provision (see the next section). Third, it identifies the conflicting constitutional right, implemented by 
the contested provision (Art. 38 Constitution) and relates it to Art. 35 Constitution. The Court follows a 
very clear path and points out that the enjoyment of the selected fundamental right can be subject to 
restrictions. Indeed, the third step of the Court consists in pointing out that the “right to work”, enshrined 
in Art. 35.1 Constitution, is not “absolute and unconditional”, but “it can be subject to justified 
limitations in order to comply with other rights and goods constitutionally protected” (Judgment 
119/2014, para. 3, A, c).  
Fourth, the Court elaborates on and frames the legal institution at stake (the probationary period) and 
its justifications, making use of ILO sources, too. The Court continues and illustrates that the legislator, 
in the exercise of its “already mentioned libertad de configuración” (Judgment 119/2014, Para. 3 A, c, 
italics added) – in practice its discretionality - has instituted the probationary period, which allows the 
unilateral contractual termination from both parties and without justification. Thus, the probationary 
period represents an exception to the “causal character” that the termination of the employment contract 
by the employer must have. Interestingly, the Court adds that “as reiterated by the Court, the motivation 
for termination of employment is limited by the necessary compliance with fundamental rights and the 
principle of non-discrimination”514, but no further elaboration on the principle of non-discrimination is 
provided. Furthermore, at this stage, the Court uses the International legal sources to support the 
legitimacy of the probationary period per se. In particular, it quotes ILO Convention No. 158 concerning 
                                                            
514 In particular, it refers to Judgment 94/1984, 16 October, para. 3; Judgment 166/1988, 26 September, para. 4. 
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Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer that allows the Member States to exclude 
from “all or some of the provisions of the Convention: (b) workers serving a period of probation or a 
qualifying period of employment, determined in advance and of reasonable duration” (Art. 2.2).  
Subsequently, the Court identifies a further constitutional norm that may justify the contested 
provision: Art. 40.1 Constitution. By doing so, it identifies the constitutional interests in the balance, 
although it never expressly uses this concept at this stage. 
Subsequently, the Court reviews the limitations allowed to Art. 35.1 Constitution (see further) and 
points out that, in abstract terms, a limitation to the right to work, to be constitutional, must be: justified 
by legitimate reasons; not absolute; reasonable and “proportionated to the aim pursued”. In mentioning 
this last requirement the Court could have easily used the concepts of “suitability and necessity”, 
however, it keeps avoiding to mention the proportionality test criteria. Nevertheless, this introduction 
seems to work as a theoretical description of the argumentative path that it is going to be applied. In 
other words, this paragraph may look like an anticipation of the technique applied to scrutinize the 
legitimacy of the contested norm (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, c). However, immediately after, it 
clearly states what it is going to determine with its legal reasoning: “if the limitation to the right to work 
under Art. 35.1 Constitution, that can derive from this norm, provides a reasonable and proportionate 
justification, with the aim to guarantee other constitutional rights and goods” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 
3, A, c), while the other possible steps mentioned earlier are set aside. 
To assess the rationale of the norm, the Court firstly refers to the preamble of Law 3/2012, focusing 
in particular on the “negative consequences of the economic crisis” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). 
In addition, the Court finds the aim clearly stated in Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012: “[T]he aim and objective of 
the norm at stake is [….] the promotion of permanent contracts and the creation of stable employment 
for companies with less than 50 employees, while fostering the business initiative”. On the basis of these 
elements, the Court confirms the strict link between the contested norm’s content and its objectives, 
constitutionally legitimate under Art. 40.1 Constitution as well as because of an ordinary norm (see next 
chapter) (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). The probationary period is understood as one of the 
incentives to favour companies and support employment, that is the aim of the norm, as it is, says the 
Court “an additional instrument to encourage the creation of employment” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 
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3, A, e). A statement as such, not elaborated further and not placed in the context of the suitability test, 
seems to contradict the will of the Court not to judge upon the opportunity and efficacy of the norm (see 
above, “the role of the Court”). 
At this stage, the Court newly refers to the mentioned ILO source, in order to support the legitimacy 
of the aim of the norm that provides for the one year probationary period. The Court finds the objectives 
of the norm in line with the ILO interpretation of Art. 2.2, ILO Convention 158, according to which 
States are authorized to exclude from the protection of the Convention “workers serving a period of 
probation or a qualifying period of employment”. The Court adds a crucial condition and it recognises 
that the probationary period that allows such an exclusion must be “determined in advance and of 
reasonable duration” (Art. 2(2,b), ILO Convention No. 158). By referring to an ILO Report from 
November 2007 concerning a reform approved by the French government, the Court finds a peaceful 
solution to the issue of the interpretation of the wide concept of “reasonable”. In the 2007 Report, the 
ILO Director General has pointed out that it is up to each State to solve this issue (reiterated in Paragraph 
242, ILO Report 2014). However, the Court does recognize that the international institution imposes 
some constraints on the Member States, which, however, it says, are still open to interpretation. 
According to the ILO, the probationary period cannot be “excessively long”. However, it can be 
“relatively long” if this is motivated by justified reasons, as the promotion of full employment. The 
Court points out that, in the case discussed by the ILO bodies in 2007, the two year duration of the 
probationary period was not found in compliance with ILO Convention No. 158, and in that occasion it 
was specified that “the period of exclusion from the protection [of Convention No. 158] normally 
considered reasonable is 6 months”. However, adds the Court, “the Committee cannot exclude that a 
longer period may be justified in order to allow the employer to assess the economic viability and the 
perspectives of development of its company” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). In the Court’s view, 
the aims identified by the ILO Committee that may justify a probationary period longer than 6 months 
are consistent with those of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012. Provided that these arguments do not relate to periods 
of crisis, nor to the promotion of employment, but they may rather concern specific sectors (on the side 
of the employer) or tasks (on the side of the employee), to evaluate the sustainability of the employment 
in exceptional sectors and/or tasks, the use of the ILO norms appears stretched to the point that it 
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legitimizes doubts over a strategic use of this international source, with the aim to support a strategic 
judicial reasoning.  
The Court elaborates this point further and states that the contested provision allows “not only the 
reciprocal knowledge” and “the verification/observation of the worker’s skills”, but it also “facilitates 
and promotes the creation of employment in small and medium enterprises”, in the sense that with such 
a probationary period the uncertainties are reduced and, thus, the employer is more inclined to conclude 
open-ended contracts (Judgment 119/2014, Para. 3, A, e). What strikes here is the reiteration of the 
relevance of the specific aim to favour the creation of stable employment, that is: boosting the business 
initiative. In fact, this is the real justification for such a length, as it can be considered, or, better, it is 
considered by the Court as the direct implementation of a constitutional provision: Art. 40 Constitution. 
It is not clear, however, how such a long probationary may be useful to this aim. In other words, the 
causal relation is left unspoken. 
When it comes to assess the reasonableness of the norm, the Court starts reminding that the ILO (ILO 
Report, June 2014) had been called upon to evaluate the reasonableness of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012. 
However, the international body refrained from providing an opinion on this point, because it missed 
sufficient grounds to elaborate a strong conclusion. Differently, the Court states, it is in its full 
competence and duty to assess the reasonableness of the provision. However, suspects of a strategic use 
of the ILO sources arise again given that the Court does not even mention the following paragraph of 
the same Report, which states: “Consequently, the Committee invites the Government to provide 
information on the evolution of the “open-ended entrepreneur-support contract” and, in light of the 
information available, to examine the possibility of adopting measures, in consultation with the social 
partners, to ensure that this contractual arrangement is not terminated at the initiative of the employer in 
order to avoid in an abusive manner the protection provided for in the Convention.” (ILO Report, June 
2014, para. 247). 
The analysis of reasonableness and proportionality of the contested measure must be conducted, says 
the Court, by taking into account a number of elements of the CAE. At this stage, it partially anticipates 
its conclusions by stating that the contested duration of the probationary period “is subject to important 
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limitations or legal conditions, some of which translate into parallel guarantees in favour of workers and 
employment” (Judgment 119/2014, para. A, 3, f). 
Therefore, in the process of assessing reasonableness and proportionality, the Court points out that, 
first, Law 3/2012 sets a temporal limit, which is based on the unemployment rate criterion: the CAE is 
not any longer applicable as soon as the unemployment rate falls below 15%. This element, according 
to the Court, is expression of the fact that the legislator conceives this measure as having a short-term 
nature, thus it reflects the intention of the legislator not to make the one-year probationary period 
structural. Second, the Court points out that also the “objective scope” of the norm is limited: only 
companies with less than 50 employees can make use of the CAE. The Court adds arguments in support 
of such a rationale: these are the companies that most rarely conclude open-ended employment contracts, 
“because of the economic risks and vicissitudes”. Third, the Law sets cautionary provisions (cautelas) 
“aimed at dissuading the employer from declaring the dismissal before the probationary period has 
expired”. In short, the Law allows the employer to enjoy the economic incentives only if the worker is 
not dismissed before three years have passed, and the overall employment level remains stable during 
the first year of CAE (both apply only in case of unjustified dismissal) (see Art. 4.7, Law 3/2012). 
Considering especially the third point, the Court seems to suggest that the norm is reasonable and 
proportionate because there are economic disincentives to unjustified dismissals. Which can be 
rephrased as follows: in theory, it is illegitimate to dismiss the worker in that case, but given that the 
state pays the employers not to do so, the worker’s right can be considered respected, or at least violated 
in a reasonable way. 
Last, the Court argues that the contested provision is connected to other measures that “can contribute 
to temper the burdensome character the one-year probationary period may have for the worker”. These 
provisions are: the contribution accumulation for the purposes of unemployment benefits, which are 
paid once the contract is over; the consolidation in open-ended unemployment contract once the 
probationary period has finished (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, f). Nevertheless, this is a structural 
feature of the contract, that impacts on the right of the worker once the probationary period is over, it 
does not protect in anyway the worker’s right during the probationary period. 
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The Court, in light of the “appropriate balancing of constitutional rights and goods/interests in 
conflict”, concludes that the contested norm that introduces a probationary period of one year, 
constitutes a reasonable measure, given both the current economic context and the link with the 
unemployment levels. The Court adds that the norm passes the “rule of adequate proportionality between 
the sacrifice to the right to a stable employment and the benefits that it can represent for the individual 
and collective interest to the promotion and creation of stable employment” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 
3, A, f). The linguistic nuance can get lost in translation, hence it is important to emphasise that the 
Court has not used the expression “test of proportionality”, but it has opted for “rule of adequate 
proportionality”.  Indeed, we can observe that even if the Court, in its conclusions, talks about a 
balancing, it has not structured the legal reasoning following the technique applied by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, that is the proportionality test.  
When it comes to judge upon the constitutionality of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, with reference to Art. 
37.1 Constitution, the Court follows a partially analogous path. First, it defines and frames in abstract 
terms the right to collective bargaining, with a strong focus on the limits of this right. Second, it evaluates 
the legitimacy of the norm. Indeed, addressing the contested measure specifically, it admits that a norm 
as such constitutes a limitation of the right to collective bargaining. Therefore, for this limitation to be 
legitimate it must provide a “reasonable and proportionate justification, in compliance with 
constitutional rights and goods”. Hence, says the Court, the analysis of the legitimacy of a norm that 
restricts the scope of action of the collective negotiation must be analysed on a case by case basis 
(Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, C, b). The principles of reasonableness and proportionality are mentioned 
again by the Court, as features that the norm’s justification must have to be legitimate.  
In order to discuss the legitimacy of the norm’s justification, the Court expressly refers to the legal 
reasoning conducted as regards the alleged violation of Art. 35.1 Constitution, by the norm providing 
for the one year probationary period. It peacefully states that the norm has the “same legitimate, 
reasonable and proportionate justification”, given that “the arguments presented apply also here”. 
Henceforth, the Court summarizes synthetically the legal reasoning developed as far as the violation of 
Art. 35.1 Constitution is concerned. It underlines the “serious economic crisis context” and the “high 
unemployment rate”; it recalls the duty of public powers to adopt a policy oriented to the full 
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employment (Art. 40.1 Constitution), which is an aim pursued by this measure; it stresses that the 
application of the contested provision is subject to certain legal constraints. All that make the norm 
reasonable and proportionate (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, C, b). 
To scrutinize the remaining contested provisions, in Judgment 119/2014, the Court extensively relies 
on the previous legal reasoning, in both structure and content. For instance, the whole ruling on the last 
norm assessed is quite dismissive, compared to the previous ones and the Court immediately anticipates 
that the allegations against the norm are rejected because of “the mandate given by Art. 37.1 Constitution 
to the legislator to guarantee the right to collective bargaining and the binding force of collective 
agreements”, already assessed in the same judgment (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6). 
In analysing the compliance of Art. 14.1, Law 3/2012, with Articles 36.1 and 28 Constitution, the 
Court expressly reiterates some features of the right to collective bargaining already discussed with 
regard to the norm providing for the one-year probationary period and it clearly states that the pattern 
that it is going to follow is the same as for the analysis of the other norms contested (Judgment 119/2014, 
para. 5, A). 
Hence, it elaborates on Art. 37.1 Constitution, which, the Court concludes, is a right subject to 
limitations. Once it has traced the main features of the fundamental labour right allegedly violated, the 
Court scrutinizes the contested norm: Art. 14.1 (Judgment 119/2014, para. 4, B). First, it defines the 
norm an “exception” to the right provided for by Art. 37.1 Constitution, not a violation. Then, the Court 
observes that this norm has a constitutionally legitimate aim, and, also in this case, the Court points out 
that the protection of the employment levels is a duty of public powers, as provided for by a precise 
constitutional norm: Art. 40 Constitution (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5). The Court addresses the 
concrete normative case. It starts by assessing the contested provision in light of Art. 37.1 Constitution 
“and, by extension, of Art. 28.1 Constitution” and it recognises that a norm as such (that is a decision of 
the Commission according to the procedure provided for by Art. 82.3) may have an impact on and 
restrict the binding effect of the collective agreement (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5, A). 
Therefore, first it assesses whether “the restriction to collective negotiation procedures and binding 
force of collective agreements that stems from the amended Art. 82.3 Workers’ Statute reflects a 
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legitimate aim, in order to guarantee other constitutional rights and goods, and if, in addition, it complies 
with the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5, A).  
The Court plainly (in the sense that it does not analysis the various factors) states that a norm with 
an aim as such attempts to “facilitate the business sustainability and avoid recourse to the extinction of 
the employment contracts”. According to the Court this is a “constitutionally legitimate aim” that 
implements specific constitutional provisions (Art. 35.1 Constitution; Art. 38 Constitution; Art. 40.1 
Constitution) (Judgment 119/2014, para 5, A, a). 
Second, once the legitimacy of the norm’s justification is declared, the Court assesses whether the 
contested norm is reasonable and proportionate, in order to decide if it is constitutionally legitimate. In 
order to do so the Court addresses the functioning and structure of the procedure ex Art. 82.3 Workers’ 
Statute (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5, A, b). In this analysis, the Court identifies 6 points that shall 
support the reasonableness of the norm.  
First, in case the causes to justify the dis-application are met, the Commission will be able to adjust 
the final decisions in light of a general evaluation and it may also consider the disapplication of 
employment terms with “varying degrees of intensity”. 
Second, the Court underlines that the Commission cannot decide to disapply the whole agreement, 
but only given subjects listed at Art. 82.3, which in sum, concern working time, including shifts, 
remuneration system productivity and tasks. The fact that these subjects are numerous and regard 
delicate and substantial aspects of the employment relationship does not ring any bell to the Court as to 
the possible violations of workers’ rights, that may arise from different points of view. What matters is 
that not all elements of the collective agreement can be deregulated: the quantity is saved, the quality is 
not an issue. Furthermore, when it says that “the employment conditions and subjects selected by the 
legislator are directly connected with the causes that justify the disapplication”, it enters into the merit 
of the legislative choice, upholding it, without, however, explaining this statement further. Furthermore, 
the Court links these causes to the “aim to defend the companies’ productivity and the respective 
consequences on the employment levels”. 
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Third, the Court emphasises that the Commission’s decision is subject to a temporal limit. Either the 
decision itself sets a limit of effectiveness for the disapplication, or, in any case, the arbitral decision 
ceases its effects at the moment a collective agreement applicable to the company comes into force. 
Forth, the Court highlights the “subsidiary character” of the Commission’s interventions. Indeed, the 
Court reconstructs the steps to be taken before Art. 82.3 becomes applicable. First, the parties (company 
and workers’ representatives) have to proceed with a consultation, which can lasts up to 5 days, with the 
aim to achieve an agreement on the disapplication. In case the parties do not reach an agreement in these 
5 days of consultation, either of the parties can trigger the second step, which consists in submitting the 
disagreement to a commission composed by workers and employers’ representatives that has 7 days to 
decide. If the commission is not requested, or it does not come to a decision, the parties have to apply 
the procedures provided for by inter-professional collective agreements. Only if these procedures are 
not applicable or do not succeed in reaching a decision, either of the parties can request the 
Commission’s intervention.  According to the Court, this procedure shows that “the contested provision 
gives priority to the collective autonomy to solve the conflict”, given that the Commission represents 
the means of last resort, if the parties do not reach an agreement in any of the possible ways. In addition, 
the Court identifies a further norm that demonstrates the will of the legislator to give priority to collective 
autonomy: Art. 85.3, Worker’s Statute. This provision states that the collective agreement have to 
provide for procedures to solve the disagreements that may arise in case of disapplication ex. Art. 82.3.  
Fifth, the Court includes among the features that make the norm at issue reasonable nature and 
features of the body delivering the final decision. In particular, it underlines the tripartite and equal 
composition of the Commission, which is attached to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 
but it is an independent and fully autonomous body. The Commission is composed by representatives 
of the State administration and the most representative workers’ and employers’ organisations. The 
decisions are taken “preferably by consensus”, but if not possible, by absolute majority. This system 
should be a guarantee precisely because of the role of the public administration’s representatives, as 
understood by the Court. Indeed, on the one hand, the administration cannot take decisions unilaterally, 
on the other hand, “there is no reason to suppose that the public administration representatives’ vote 
would be in favour of the disapplication of the agreement”. According to the Court all of these elements 
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make the Commission independent and impartial. Last, the ordinary courts can exercise judicial control 
over the arbitral decision (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5, A, c). 
Overall, we can observe that the legal reasoning developed in Judgment 119/2014, except for the 
very first steps, does not follow a clear path, neither in theory, nor in practice and disregards completely 
the proportionality test and respective criteria. Furthermore, it alternates, incoherently, the assessment 
of the justification’s reasonableness and proportionality with the norm’s reasonableness and 
proportionality.  
 
3.2 A – formal – evolution and the empty hermeneutic categories: Judgment 8/2015 
In Judgment 8/2015, the Court does refer to the three mentioned interpretative criteria that compose 
the proportionality test: suitability, necessity and balancing in a strict sense. At the same time, it does 
not apply the mentioned criteria in a rigorous and structured way. To the point that, in practice, it refuses 
to assess the necessity of the norm.  
When the Court has to newly evaluate the legitimacy of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, it strongly reiterates 
what already argued in Judgment 119/2014 on this point (Judgment 8/2015, para. 3). Only as far as the 
scrutiny as regards Art. 35 Constitution is concerned, some interesting elements can be identified. The 
Court briefly concludes that the contested provision is in compliance with the proportionality 
requirement. In other words, there is an appropriate balancing between the sacrifice imposed to the 
workers’ guarantees and the individual and collective benefits of this provision. The Court adds 
something to what had been already stated in Judgment 119/2014: “the measure is, equally, necessary 
and suitable to achieve the legitimate aim”. It justifies such a conclusion with the argument that the 
employer has a concrete chance to assess both the abilities of the workers and suitability of the job. 
What is surprising here is not – only – the merit of the discourse, but especially the – approximate – use 
of criteria that had been “rejected” in the first part. 
However, these criteria are used in a very vague way. In addition, all of the arguments used to support 
the constitutionality are not properly and rigorously attached to these categories. However, the misuse 
(or superficial use) of “suitability and necessity” is not surprising considering the premise to the proper 
rulings, where it has been argued that it is not up to the Court to assess whether other and better measures 
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would could have been approved (see above, “the role of the Court”). Indeed, it is doubtful how could 
the Court truly assess suitability and necessity of a norm, without judging upon the “opportunity and 
efficacy” of the said norm.  
Interestingly, the Court concludes by recognising that “the legislator could have adopted other 
alternative measures”. However, it adds that, “from a strictly constitutional perspective” (italics added), 
the one year probationary period ex. Art. 4.3 Law 3/2012 does not violate Art. 35.1 Constitution (while 
it legitimately implements Art. 40.1 Constitution) (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, b). The reasoning is quite 
disorganised and the impression is that the Court admits that the legislator could have adopted different 
measures, but, on the other hand, this is not a direct concern for the Court, which rather considers enough 
for the contested provision to be legitimate the fact that it does not violate a constitutional norm. 
Therefore, consistently with the premise to Judgment 8/2015, the Court does not evaluate upon the 
necessity of this precise provision, hence, the necessity test is not needed to judge upon the 
constitutionality of the legislative measure.  
As to the violation of Art. 37.1 Constitution, the Court just reiterates that also in light of Art. 37.1 
Constitution, the justification is legitimate reasonable and proportionate (Judgment 8/2015, para. 3, c). 
Again in Judgment 8/2015, on Art. 12.1, Law 3/2012, the Court starts by introducing the criteria of 
the proportionality test that it is going to – theoretically – apply. This is the first, and only, time in the 
case law discussed in this dissertation that the Court expressly refers to the three criteria and frames 
them from a theoretical perspective, before proceeding with the legal reasoning. In particular, it asserts 
that “in order to demonstrate if it is proportionate to the aim pursued”, it has to assess whether the norm 
is: a) suitable to achieve the aim; b) necessary, “in the sense that other measures, less 
harmful/detrimental, do not exist to achieve the aim with the same effectiveness”; c) if the suitable and 
necessary measure is balanced, in the sense that it brings more advantages to the “general interest”, than 
prejudices to the constitutional interest at issue. 
As to the necessity requirement, the Court specifies that “the necessity evaluation is up to the 
legislator” and the Court can only assess whether the norm “has sacrificed in a clearly unnecessary way 
the constitutional rights” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a). 
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Forth, the Court applies the three criteria, even though very superficially. It starts by listing the 
constraints linked to the measure, in order to justify the suitability of the norm. In particular, the 
constraints to which the unilateral modification of the employment conditions ex. Art. 41 Workers’ 
Statue is subject. First, it can only affect extraestatutarios agreements. Second, it is exclusively 
alternative to the failure of the collective negotiation previously conducted. Third, it does not exclude 
the application of alternative procedures set by collective agreements. Firth, it does not exclude that the 
party can opt for mediatory or arbitrary procedures, either. Fifth, the unilateral amendments can be 
decided only if “proven economic, technical, organizational and productive reasons occur”. Sixth, in 
certain cases the employee enjoys the right to withdraw from the contract and receive indemnities. Last, 
the employer’s decision can be subject to the judicial control (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a).  
From these constraints, the Court deduces that “the measure passes the suitability test, being adequate 
to achieve the aim legitimately pursued”. In other words, the Court argues that the existence of 
conditions that the employer has to comply with before unilaterally amending the working conditions, 
and other collateral measures, means that the norm is suitable to achieve the aim. This conclusion is 
controversial given that the collateral measures, which function as shock absorbers, may refer to the 
extent of impact the contested norm may have on the constitutional right allegedly violated and not on 
the suitability of the measure to achieve the aim pursued. Indeed, in order to explain the suitability of 
the norm the Court should have elaborated on the causal relationship between the aim of the norm and 
its content. For instance, given that the aim here is identified as “avoiding job losses, by adapting 
employment to the concrete companies’ conditions/necessities”, it is legitimate to wonder how could 
the judicial control contribute to achieve this aim. 
Also the necessity test is passed, according to the Court. That is because the contested provision has 
not created a “clearly unnecessary sacrifice of the constitutional rights”. The necessity of the measure is 
explained by pointing out, first, the constraints to which the employer’s power is subject and, second, 
the fact that this power is recognised to the employer only “following the failures of the negotiations 
with the employer’s representatives”. The relevance of this argument vacillates because the Court does 
not explain what is meant by failure and it completely disregards the fact that if the failure consists in 
not reaching an agreement within a certain time, this scenario can be easily achieved by the employer. 
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Nor it is explained why the sacrifice imposed to the fundamental labour right concerned could not be 
considered “clearly unnecessary”. 
Last, the norm “passes the proportionality test in a strict sense, given that the measure is balanced” 
and this positive result, also in the third sub-test, is given to: first, the limits and guarantees provided for 
by the legislator; second, because its implementation implies more advantages to the right to work, than 
disadvantages to the right to collective bargaining” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a). The contradiction 
between the right to work and right to collective bargaining is not clear. If the advantages are to the right 
to work and not to the labour market, it is confirmed that the right to work is understood exclusively in 
quantitative terms, being the right to a decent work, granted precisely by the dialogue between social 
partners and, especially, by the workers representatives’ role in collective bargaining, is considered less 
urgent and of a minor value. 
When the question of constitutionality of Art. 14.2, Law 3/2012, is raised for the second time, the 
applicants challenge the necessity of the norm that provides for a priority of application of the company 
level agreement. In particular, it is argued that the legislator could have “opted for other options, less 
harmful of the right to collective bargaining and of the binding effect of collective agreements”. The 
applicants also provide examples of these possible alternatives (Judgment 8/2015, para. 6, b). In other 
words, they expressly challenge the necessity of the norm. However, instead of proceeding with the 
necessity test the Court recalls the conclusions reached in Judgment 119/2014 and argues that the 
legislator has legitimately decided to give priority to the criterion of “closeness” of the workers’ 
representative to the company, when it comes to regulate labour conditions related to given subjects. 
Moreover, this norm does not hamper the collective negotiation at higher level, which makes it 
consistent with both Art. 37.1 and Art. 28.1 Constitution. In essence, none of the arguments presented 
by the applicants are strong enough to subverts the conclusions reached in Judgment 119/2014 
(Judgment 8/2015, para. 6, c). Also in this case, we can observe that the legal reasoning is not articulated 
at all and the conclusion is reached in a cursory way. 
In conclusion, formally the technique used in the second judgment seems way more structured and 
respectful of the proportionality test, but in practice it is not more rigorous that in Judgment 119/2014. 
This – formal – shift in the Court's approach, in the development of the legal reasoning, may be due to 
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the critiques moved to the 2014 Judgment. Indeed, not only the academic literature had expressed a clear 
dissent as to the missed application of the proportionality test, but especially the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Valdes Dal Re to that judgment, which to the contrary elaborates its counter-arguments by 
following the three criteria, may have pushed the Court, in this second occasion, to refer to the mentioned 
hermeneutic principles.  
 
4. The terms balanced  
The Court often reiterates that the constitutional labour rights at issue can be limited by a norm that 
provides a “reasonable and proportionate justification and aims to guarantee other constitutional rights 
and goods” (e.g. in Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, c). 
In the selected Judgments, first, Art. 35.1 Constitution, allegedly violated by a number of the 
contested provisions, enters into conflict with the implementation of Art. 38 Constitution. Art. 38 
Constitution provides for the freedom to conduct a business, which includes, according to the Court, the 
mandate to the public authority to guarantee its exercise and the “defence of productivity”. Here the 
Court peacefully identifies the constitutional right to be balanced against the right to work. On the 
grounds of its case law, it points out what is included in the right protected under Art. 38 Constitution: 
the adoption of norms that provide the entrepreneur with a power of extinction of the contract of 
employment, as part of its power of management of the company. However, the Court specifies that this 
cannot prejudice the “necessary limits” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, c). 
Second, Art. 35.1 Constitution also – and mainly – comes into conflict with Art. 40.1 Constitution. 
By explaining the scope of Art. 40, the Court also traces the limits of Art. 35.1 Constitution (see next 
section). Art. 40.1 Constitution states that public authorities “shall in particular carry out a policy aimed 
at full employment”. This provision, according to the Court, “shapes the collective dimension of the 
right to work” and can legitimate limitations to the fundamental right under assessment. The collective 
dimension, that founds the policy aimed at full employment, becomes a crucial element in the legal 
reasoning of the Court, that quotes its case law and states that “a given restriction to the individual right 
to work ‘is constitutional if it pursues the aim pursued by the employment policy: that is, in case of 
unemployment, it guarantees that with a given limitation is provided/offered a job opportunity to the 
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unemployed people, which could not lead, in any case, to a decrease in employment’”515 (Judgment 
119/2014, para. 3, A, c). 
The Court elaborates on the reasons that justify the provision of such a contract of employment 
(CAE) recalling the pertinent Transitional provision 9, Law 3/2012, which, in the Court’s view, confirms 
the strict link of the contested norm with its objectives. Transitional provision 9 limits the effectiveness 
of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, until the unemployment rate falls below 15%. The Court interprets this 
normative framework as perfectly consistent with the duty of public authorities to adopt a policy oriented 
to full employment, hence in line with Art. 40 Constitution. Indeed, it states: “[W]e are in front of a 
conjunctural measure, bound to a concrete situation of the labour market, of very high unemployment 
and that, beyond any doubt, is linked with the already mentioned duty of public authorities to realize a 
policy oriented toward full employment (Art. 40.1 Constitution)” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). 
The main point is that the contested provision is legitimate, especially because it allegedly responds to 
the “specific aim to foster the business initiative”, this aim is consistent with Art. 41.1 Constitution, 
which gives to the legislator the mandate to develop a policy oriented to full employment (Judgment 
119/2014, para. 3, A, e).  
What strikes here is the reiteration of the relevance of the specific aim of the contested measure to 
favour the creation of stable employment, that is “boosting the business initiative”. In fact, this is the 
real justification for such a length, and it is considered by the Court the direct implementation of a 
constitutional provision: Art. 40 Constitution. It is not clear, however, how such a long probationary 
may be useful to this aim. Let us say that the causal link here is left unspoken. Therefore, the Court does 
not provide substantial indications about the content of this constitutional norm. Indeed, the Court finds 
new arguments to support that the contested provision is justified in a legitimate way, because the 
reasons behind such a norm find explicit recognition in a constitutional provision. However, it shall be 
emphasised that this is not a fundamental constitutional right, but it relates to the duty of public 
authorities to implement a general interest.  
                                                            
515 The judgment quoted by the Court is Judgment 22/1981, 2 July, paras. 8 and 9. 
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Likewise, as regards Art. 37.1 Constitution, the conflicting interest is enshrined in Art. 40.1 
Constitution. The Court summarizes synthetically the legal reasoning developed as far as the violation 
of Art. 35.1 Constitution is concerned and it underlines the “serious economic crisis context” and the 
“high unemployment rate”; it recalls the duty of public powers to adopt a policy oriented to full 
employment (Art. 40.1 Constitution), which is an aim pursued by this measure; it stresses that the 
application of the contested provision is subject to certain legal limits (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, C, 
b). However, in this case the “collective dimension of labour”, as expressed by collective rights such as 
the right to collective bargaining is not mentioned at all. 
Therefore, as far as concerns the scrutiny of Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, the Court offers a clear picture of 
the rights that have been balanced against Art. 35.1 Constitution: Articles 38 and 40.1 Constitution. 
However, Art. 38 Constitution seems to have a minor weight for the Court in the case at issue, given 
that when the Court links the aim of the Law with a constitutional norm it only refers to Art. 40.1 
Constitution.  
When assessing the possible violation of Art. 37 Constitution from other norms enshrined in Law 
3/2012 the Court puts in the balance not only Art. 40.1 and Art. 38 Constitution, but also Art. 35.1 
Constitution, which instead of the constitutional right allegedly violated, in this case, becomes, 
according to the Court, the right implemented by the contested norm (specifically on Art. 35.1 
Constitution, see next section). In light of what stated in the preamble to the Law, the main objectives 
pursued are “the defence of productivity and sustainability of the company and, eventually, 
employment”. The Court plainly (in the sense that it does not analyses the various factors) states that a 
Law with an aim as such attempts to “facilitate the business sustainability and avoid recourse to 
dismissals”. According to the Court, this is a “constitutionally legitimate aim” that implements three 
constitutional provisions: Art. 35.1 Constitution, the right to work; Art. 38 Constitution, the public 
powers’ duty to protect productivity; Art. 40.1 Constitution, that is the already mentioned duty to adopt 
policies oriented to full employment. In addition, the Court also refers to a general “necessity to face the 
serious unemployment situation” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5, A, a). 
The Court also argues that this aim is relevant especially because of the high number of small 
companies that characterize the Spanish system, which do not have workers’ or employers’ 
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representations and therefore do not negotiate company level agreements (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, 
c). 
Again in Judgment 8/2015, Art. 37 Constitution is balanced against the same three constitutional 
norms. Likewise, the Court takes into account the general aim of Law 3/2012. So, the legitimate aim is 
“to favour the internal flexibility of the companies as an alternative to job losses”, which allows the 
companies to adjust the organization to the “economic situation” and the fact that it “facilitates the 
rational adjustment of the productive structures to the unexpected market evolutions”. The Court argues 
that this aim is justified and legitimate because it implements constitutional provisions. In particular, 
“the citizens’ right to work (Art. 35 Constitution), through the adoption of a policy oriented to full 
employment (Art. 40.1 Constitution), as well as the business freedom and the defence of productivity”. 
This is enough for the Court to plainly deduce that the norm has a “reasonable justification from a 
constitutional point of view”. Therefore, we could infer that  the justification is “reasonable” for the only 
fact of being consistent with constitutional provisions, given that how this aim is achieved is never 
discussed, coherently with the intention of the Court to recognize a wide margin of freedom to the 
legislator, as, inter alia the efficacy of a norm (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a). 
The economic context is mentioned several times, especially, but not only, as “unemployment 
situation” (recurrent in scrutiny on Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012), but it is never used as a term of the balancing 
conducted by the legislator (for instance as in Judgment 8/2015, para. 3, where it refers to the legislator’s 
necessity to take into account the “context of serious economic crisis”). 
Already in the evaluation of the first contested provision in judgment 119/2014, the Court uses the 
economic crisis argument as referred to by the legislator and it quotes the preamble to identify the 
reasons for such a norm, and the reasons why this norm is targeted to this type of companies. In a way, 
scrutinizing the new CAE, the Court starts looking at the norm’s justification, which is not only the 
economic crisis, but “the negative consequences of the economic crisis” (see judgment 119/2014, para. 
3, A, c). 
In practice, in the first ruling addressed (on Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012), the Court argues that the “context 
of serious economic crisis and high unemployment”, together with the aim “to foster business initiative” 
(Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e) allow a limitation of the right to work. While as concerns the norms 
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contested as allegedly infringing upon the right to collective bargaining, the violation is not found 
illegitimate as it implements, inter alia, the right to work.  Overall, the Court peacefully accepts that the 
economic circumstances play a decisive role in the legislator’s decisions (especially as far as concerns 
the measure on the one year probationary period), however it does not balance directly the economic 
crisis with the fundamental labour rights concerned. On the same line is the scrutiny of Art. 18.8, Law 
3/2012, which provides a further example: it is up to the legislator to decide on the consequences of the 
unfair dismissal “in view of the economic and social circumstances” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 8, a). 
As far as concerns the norms that impose a direct sacrifice on the right to collective bargaining, the 
economic crisis argument has a remarkably minor role. Only in the preliminary phase of the legal 
reasoning on Art. 14.4, Law 3/2012, (that reforms the access procedure to the Commision consultiva), 
the Court refers to the economic crisis. In Judgment 119/2014, it points out that the “challenged norm 
has been adopted in a context of serious economic crisis” (para. 5, A, a). This sentence is reiterated in 
Judgment 8/2015 (para. 5, b). The limited use by the Court of the economic crisis argument raises some 
concern as to the possibility to allow such restrictions of the fundamental right to collective bargaining, 
in principle, at any time. 
 
5. Fundamental labour rights in the balance 
The selected cases provide many elements on two fundamental labour rights: the right to work and 
the right to collective bargaining. Both constitutional norms are widely addressed and assessed in 
abstract terms, especially as far as concerns the first contested provisions evaluated in each judgment. 
As regards the norms assessed at a later stage, in each of the Judgments, the Court extensively relies on 
the legal reasoning developed in relation to the contested measures evaluated at first. Moreover, in 
Judgment 8/2015, as far as concerns the norms already scrutinized in Judgment 119/2014, the Court 
reiterates briefly the main points of the arguments presented in the first Judgment. 
 
5.1 Right to work 
As a very first step of the legal reasoning aimed to ascertain the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 4.3, 
Law 3/2012, the Court defines the right to work on the grounds of its case law and states that the right 
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to work represents, “in its individual version, the right to enjoy continuity and stability of employment, 
that is, the right not to be dismissed without a cause”516, as well as the right to an “‘appropriate reaction 
against dismissals or redundancies, which configuration, in the definition of its methods and extent is 
left to the legislator”517 (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, b). However, when the Court points out that 
Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, cannot be related in any way to a discussion on the cause for dismissal, nor the to 
the reaction to the a-causal dismissal, because the termination during the probationary period is not a 
dismissal, but rather it is the “formalization, by a declaration of will, of the resolution, affirmative and 
arbitrary (positiva y potestativa), expressly accepted by the parties at the time the contract was signed” 
(Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, b), it seems to suggest that the applicability of Art. 35.1 Constitution 
shall be excluded.  
Nevertheless, the Court proceeds by recognising that the fact that the contract can be terminated – 
during the probationary period – only upon declaration of will of one of the two parties implies that the 
probationary period as it is framed by the legislator “can act as a limitation to the right to employment 
stability – which is greater, the longer is its duration – and, for this reason, is linked to Art. 35.1”. 
Therefore, the Court ascertains that Art. 4.3 has to be examined in light of Art. 35.1 Constitution. Thus, 
it has identified the interest protected by this constitutional norm, that is the right to employment 
stability.  
In brief, the right to work, as defined at first, would not cover the probationary period, but the 
probationary period “provided for and framed by the legislator” is anyway “connected to art. 35.1”, 
inasmuch as it causes a limitation to the right to stability of employment.  
Subsequently, the Court points out that the enjoyment of the selected fundamental right can be 
subject to restrictions. As already mentioned, the second step of the Court consists, indeed, in pointing 
out that the “right to work”, recognised by Art. 35, Constitution, is not “absolute and unconditional”, 
but “it can be subject to justified limitations in order to comply with other rights and goods 
constitutionally protected” (Judgment 119/2014, 3, A, c). In particular, it refers to Art. 40.1 Constitution, 
which states that public authorities “shall in particular carry out a policy aimed at full employment”. 
                                                            
516 in particular it refers to Judgments 22/1981, 2 July, para. 8 and 192/2003, 27 October, para. 4. 
517 Judgment 20/1994, 27 January, para. 2. 
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This provision, according to the Court, “shapes the collective dimension of the right to work” and can 
legitimate limitations to the fundamental right under assessment (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, c).  
The limitations have to fulfil certain criteria: they have to be supported by a legitimate justification; 
they cannot be absolute; they cannot frustrate the fundamental right beyond what is reasonable518; they 
have to be, in any case, “proportionated to the aim pursued”519. In other words, using the proportionality 
test terminology, the Court has established that, in abstract terms, a limitation to the right to work, to be 
legitimate must be: justified by legitimate reasons; not absolute; reasonable; and suitable to achieve the 
aim  (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, c, see also Chapter 4.2). 
However, with regard to the first norm scrutinized, that is Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, the Court is very 
cautious in explicitly recognising that the norm at issue affects workers and, hence, presumably the right 
to a stable employment. Indeed, the recognition of the negative effect of the contested provision on the 
mentioned fundamental right can be deduced only when the Court states that the contested provision is 
connected to other measures that “can contribute to temper the burdensome character the one-year 
probationary period may have for the worker” (Judgment 119/2013, para. 3, A, f).  
The second time the Court assesses Art. 4.3, it recalls that the contested provision had been declared 
in compliance with Art. 35.1 Constitution, since “it provides a legitimate justification, it results 
reasonable and proportionate with respect to the aims pursued” (as reiterated also in Judgment 8/2015, 
para. 3, b). It summarizes the legal grounds that have justified the declaration of constitutionality of the 
contested norm in 2014: the context of serious economic crisis; the aim, that is to foster the conclusion 
of open-ended contracts, given the context and the serious situation of unemployment; the time-limited 
character of the norm, linked to the decrease of the unemployment rate; the limited subjective scope of 
application; fiscal benefits that the company can enjoy only if the employment relationship continues 
after the probationary period and the employment level is maintained; other related norms that moderate 
the negative effects of the measure, that is the legal context (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, f, and 
Judgment 8/2015, para. 3, b). These “legal limits”, to which the application of the one year probationary 
                                                            
518 Judgment 195/2003, 27 October, para. 4; Judgment 110/2006, 3 April para. 3. 
519 Judgment 292/2000, 30 November, para. 15; or Judgment 196/1987, 11th December, para. 6; Judgment 37/1989, 
15 February, para. 8; Judgment 112/2006, 5 April, paras. 8 ff.  
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period is subject, reduce the impact the contested provision has on the workers’ right to employment 
stability, which, therefore, is not violated by the provision of one-year probationary period.  
Interestingly, the Court adds, among the arguments that shall justify the legitimacy of the contested 
norm, an apparent hierarchy between the fundamental rights protected under Art. 35 Constitution. 
Indeed, it argues that the “both from a logic and a chronologic point of view”, the right to access 
employment, which constitutes the “essential content” of the right to work, ex. Art. 35.1 Constitution, 
comes before the right to a stable employment (Judgment 119/2013, para. 3, A, f). This phase of the 
legal reasoning that seems to establish an absolute hierarchy between the right, and hence the value, of 
a decent work above the right (and value) of having a job is inconsistent with the fundamental 
assumption of a constitutional order, where values and respective fundamental rights have, in principle, 
the same values and only on a case by case basis can be “ordered” by the legislator. To the contrary, in 
this passage, the Court seems to suggest that, in absolute terms, a decent employment does not have the 
same constitutional weight as being employed. The two rights are not, under this view, integrated in the 
social constitution, but they are hierarchically ordered. Furthermore, the Court is telling that the 
fundamental rights in conflict, that – apparently – need to be hierarchically ordered, are protected by the 
same constitutional Article, which essential content is “the right to work”, while, by exclusion, we can 
deduce that (although the Court does not explain this clearly) the right to a stable employment is not 
expression of the essential content of the fundamental right to work. 
 
5.2 Right to collective bargaining 
Even though all of the rulings discussed refer to Art. 37.1 Constitution, the first part of Judgment 
8/2015 surely provides the most comprehensive assessment of the fundamental right to collective 
bargaining, from the perspective of the constitutional trade unions’ role. This section is devoted to 
explain the labour relations model designed by the Spanish Constitution. Here, the Court contributes to 
define the role of trade unions, especially as regards collective bargaining and, therefore, it provides 
important indications as to the subjects entitled to conduct collective negotiations. 
The Court emphasises the “singular role” of trade unions in the Spanish system, which is defined as 
a “social and democratic State” (Art. 1.1 Constitution). To strengthen this point, the Court quotes Art. 7 
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Constitution: “[T]rade unions and employers’ associations contribute to the defence and promotion of 
the economic and social interests which they represent”. This norm, according to the constitutional 
Judge, includes trade unions among the fundamental institutions/bodies of the society entrusted with the 
duty to defend, protect and promote collective interests of worker520 (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, b). 
In a similar way, it develops the same point in Judgment 119/2014. Indeed, in order to underline that 
Art. 37.1 Constitution does not frame an abstract and rigid model of industrial relations and/or collective 
bargaining, the Court quotes also Art. 1.1 Constitution to underline that the “political pluralism”, as one 
of the “superior values of the legal system”, admits various legal solutions to regulate the industrial 
relations system, still remaining within the constitutional framework (Judgment 119/2014, para. 4, A). 
This argument is made in a comparable way in the legal reasoning that discusses the legitimacy of 
the norm that entrusts a specific Commission, at national or autonomous communities’ level, with the 
power to establish working conditions (Art. 14.1, Law 3/2012, amending Art. 82.3 Workers’ Statute). 
Supported also by the constitutional case law521, the Court states that Art. 37.1 Constitution merely 
recognises the right to collective bargaining, “which protection is assigned to the legislator”, and 
identifies the right holders, that is workers and employers’ representatives, and the legal effect of the 
collective bargaining outcome, i.e. the binding effect of collective agreements. In light of this the Court 
comes to the conclusion that “[T]he legislator enjoys a wide margin of freedom in the elaboration of the 
right to collective bargaining, even though this freedom is not absolute” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 4, 
A).  
In addition, trade unions are entrusted with the specific responsibility “to determine the content of 
the employment relationship, together with the minimum regulation by the legislator”. In light of its 
case law, the Court also points out that it is conducted by the social partners in the exercise of the right 
to collective bargaining and, given that collective agreements are “sources of the employment 
relationship”, they have binding force. The Court continues by pointing out that collective bargaining 
                                                            
520 The Court also quotes a number of constitutional judicial precedents that underline the relevance of this 
institution in the Spanish constitutional system, e.g. Judgment 11/1981, 8 April, para. 11 that defines trade unions 
“basic bodies of the political system”. 
521 In particular, the Court quotes Judgment 210/1990, 20 December, para. 2. 
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improves the working conditions, as well as workers’ lives, and, hence it is “an essential tool to manage 
the employment relationship”522 (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, c). 
The Court keeps making a large use of its case law to stress on the constitutional role of trade unions 
as warrantors of workers’ rights and interests, as well as on the relevance of the collective negotiation 
as main expression of the trade union action and crucial part of the essential content of the trade union 
freedom523 (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, c). 
Once the trade unions’ prerogatives in the Spanish constitutional system are well framed, the Court 
makes a step further and specifies that “surely, the Constitution, by institutionalizing the labour 
collective rights (strike, collective negotiation and collective conflict) has not reserved their regulation 
exclusively to trade unions”524. In particular, it highlights that while Art. 7 Constitution institutionalizes 
trade unions as fundamental bodies of the constitutional system and Art. 28.1 Constitution recognises 
trade union freedom as a fundamental right, Art. 37.1 Constitution does not recognise “collective 
bargaining as a right that belongs exclusively to the trade union domain”. Indeed, also in Judgment 
8/2014 the Court underlines that the right to collective negotiation is not a trade union prerogative, but 
it is recognised to workers’ representatives in the widest sense, hence also to those organisations, which 
are workers’ representatives, but are not covered by Art. 7 Constitution. In sum, the Constitution does 
not recognise the right to collective bargaining exclusively to trade unions (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, 
d). On the other hand, in Judgment 119/2014, the Court points out that the collective bargaining 
conducted by social partners is part of the essential content of “the right to trade union freedom”, 
protected by Art. 28.1 Constitution, inasmuch as the collective negotiation is a “necessary mean for the 
exercise of the trade union activity” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 4, A). 
In addition, the “principle of collective autonomy can be derogated from, only if its limitation is 
found justified”525. Therefore, quoting from its case law, the Judge concludes that the Law “can limit 
the collective negotiation, and, on an exertional basis, it can retain the regulation of certain subjects, by 
                                                            
522 Inter alia, the Court quotes Judgment 151/1994, 23 May, para. 2, and Judgment 208/1993, 28 June, para. 4. 
523 See, for instance, Judgment 222/2005, 12th September, para. 3 and Judgment 118/2012, 4 June, para. 4. 
524 Also as regards this point the Court makes wide use of its case law, see. Inert alia, Judgment 134/1994, 9 May, 
para. 4; and Judgment 95/1996, 29 May, para. 3.  
525 It mentions Judgment 11/1981, 8 April, para. 24. 
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excluding them from the collective negotiation” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 2, e). Indeed, the essential 
content of the right to collective bargaining includes the freedom to conduct collective negotiations and 
the freedom to conclude a collective agreement, understood as the faculty to select subjects and topics 
to be negotiated. However, the Court adds that this freedom “is not absolute but, for justified reasons, 
can be limited by the law”. To stress the legislator’s discretionality here the Court rapidly refers to Art. 
35.2 Constitution, which provides for a legal competence to establish a workers’ statute. The Judge 
makes use of this norm only to reinforce its interpretation of Art. 37 Constitution and to stress that it is 
the legislator’s competence to regulate the labour relations’ system526 (Judgment 119/2914, para. 3, C).  
Art. 37.1 Constitution provides for a legal competence in guaranteeing the right to collective 
bargaining and the binding effect of collective agreements. The constitutional case law has specified 
that the limits to the right at stake are “beyond the social partners’ control”527. To corroborate its 
argument, the Court adds that Art. 53.1 Constitution provides for a general competence of the legislator 
to regulate the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised in the section to which Art. 37 belongs. 
Therefore, it concludes that it is constitutionally legitimate for the legislator to limit the scope of 
collective bargaining with regard to given aspects and subjects (Judgment 119/2914, para. 3, C, a). The 
hierarchical relationship between these two sources of regulation of the employment relationship is 
clear: no collective agreement can be considered the sole legal source of employment terms and 
conditions and the law is surely hierarchically superior to any collective agreement528 (Judgment 
119/2914, para. 3, C, a). 
Consistently, the Court underlines that “beyond any doubt”, the collective agreement “as any other 
act of private autonomy has to comply with the law”. The Spanish Court had already addressed an 
analogous question, and it had stated that the law, “on an exceptional basis”, can limit the scope of 
collective bargaining and identify certain subjects that cannot be discussed and regulated by collective 
                                                            
526 It refers to its case law: Judgment 20/1994, 27 January, para. 2. 
527 In particular, the Court refers to: Judgment 136/1987, 22 July, para. 5; and Judgment 208/1993, 28 June, para. 
3. 
528 Judgment 210/1990, 20 December, para. 2; also, on the legal supremacy over collective agreements the Court 
refers to Judgment 58/1985, 30 April; Judgment 177/1988, 10 October; 62/2001, 1 March and Judgment 110/2004, 
30 June. 
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agreements529. This Court interprets the judicial precedent as a validation of the point that it is not 
unusual for the labour legal framework to provide for imperative norms that cannot be 
amended/deregulated by collective negotiation, without, however, emphasising the element where 
“exceptionality”, underlined in the Judgment from 1985, can be found here (Judgment 119/2014, para. 
3, C, a). 
Art. 37.1 Constitution cannot be read in such a way to interpret the freedom to conduct collective 
bargaining as a “sphere free from interference”. The legislator has the duty, continues the Court, to 
implement the right at issue, “without prejudice to the legislator’s possibility to set restrictions to the 
binding effect of collective agreements in order to protect or preserve other rights, values or goods 
constitutionally protected or constitutional interests”530. It can also “exclude given subjects from the 
collective negotiation and provide for imperative norms that cannot be deregulated by collective 
agreements”. In addition, the principle of legal certainty is not violated even if the legislator amends 
terms and conditions set by collective agreements still in force when the relevant legislative act is 
implemented531. On the other hand, it is underlines that the mandate given to the legislator by Art. 37 
Constitution to guarantee the right to collective bargaining and the agreements’ binding effect does not 
frustrate the direct effectiveness of the constitutional norm at stake. Indeed, it is unquestionable that the 
faculty of workers’ and employers’ organisations to negotiate in order to regulate the respective interests 
is recognised by Art. 37.1 Constitution (Judgment 119/2014, para. 4, A). 
So, for instance, according to the Court, Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, does constitute a limitation to the right 
of collective bargaining (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, C, b). Nevertheless, this restriction is justified on 
the grounds of the same arguments that validate the limitation to the right to the employment stability. 
Indeed, when assessing the violation of Art. 37.1 Constitution, from Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012, the Court 
summarizes synthetically the legal reasoning developed as far as the violation of Art. 35.1 Constitution 
is concerned. It underlines the “serious economic crisis context” and the “high unemployment rate”; it 
recalls the duty of public powers to adopt a policy oriented to the full employment (Art. 40.1 
                                                            
529 Judgment 58/1985, para. 3. 
530 Here it expressly refers to Judgment 11/1981, 8 April, para. 24. 
531 Here the Court refers to Judgment 58/1985, para. 3; Judgment 177/1988, para. 4; Judgment 210/1990, para. 2; 
Judgment 62/2001, para. 3. 
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Constitution), which is an aim pursued by this measure; it stresses that the application of the contested 
provision is subject to certain legal constraints. These arguments support the reasonable and 
proportionate character of the contested provision, in this case as well.  
The conclusion, says the Court, is the same as concerns Art. 35.1 Constitution, therefore the contested 
provision – an imperative norm that introduces the one year probationary period and cannot be modified 
by collective agreements – is not infringing upon Art. 37.1 Constitution, either. In particular, the Court 
lists (but does not elaborate) two reasons that corroborate such an argument. First, the imperative norm 
aims to avoid that collective bargaining “may reduce or delete” the incentive to conclude open-ended 
contracts that the legislator has introduced; second, it contributes to prevent the collective autonomy 
from frustrating the legitimate objective of creation of stable employment (Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, 
C, a). On the one hand, the Constitution recognises the role of trade unions as fundamental bodies, as 
well as bodies authorized to conduct collective bargaining and conclude collective agreements with erga 
omnes effect. However, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court suggests that the collective 
autonomy must be constrained and the legislative prerogatives maintained, since the collective 
autonomy may hamper the creation of stable employment. In other words, here social partners (and not 
just trade unions) are implicitly considered potential enemies of the employment stability (and hence of 
the right to work under Art. 35 Constitution). However surprising this conclusion may sound, the Court’s 
approach is not inconsistent with the rest of the Judgment, to the contrary such a vision of the trade 
unions’ role is coherent with the logic that places the job creation at a higher level than decent jobs (see 
above, the reflection on the internal hierarchy of Art. 35 Constitution).  
As concerns the binding force of collective agreements, the Court reiterates that Art. 37.1 
Constitution provides for a legislator’s duty to guarantee the right to collective bargaining and the 
binding force of the agreements, without, however, imposing upon the legislator the adoption of a 
precise option. In implementing this norm, says the Court, the legislator has legitimately decided to 
recognise general binding effect to those agreements that have respected precise procedural and content 
rules (estatutarios collective agreements), while the agreements that do not apply the rules provided for 
by Title III Workers’ Statute have a personal limited scope and they follow the norms of civil law 
(extraestatutarios collective agreements) (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a). 
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Therefore, the Court points out that Art. 37.1 applies to, and hence protects, both types of collective 
agreements, having both a “binding force”, albeit to a different extent. At this point the Court is clear 
“it is clear that the contested measure impacts on the mentioned constitutional right, by allowing the 
disapplication of the extraestatutarios collective agreements upon the decision of the entrepreneur”. 
However, the Court adds right away that this does not imply necessarily that this “interference is 
unconstitutional”, indeed, “it can be legitimate if it provides a reasonable justification, proportionate to 
the aim” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 4, a). 
The court does not define the content of the right to collective bargaining, but it mostly focuses on 
the scope of action left to the legislator in relation to the right to collective bargaining (however not 
defined). The scrutiny of Art. 14.1, Law 3/2012, (which entrusts the Comisión Consultiva Nacional de 
Convenios Colectivos with the power to disapply terms and conditions set by collective agreements), 
offers interesting elements to understand the boundaries that circumscribe the right to collective 
bargaining.  First, in case the causes to justify the dis-application are met, the Commission will be able 
to adjust the final decisions in light of a general evaluation and it may also consider the disapplication 
of employment terms with “varying degrees of intensity”. Second, the Court underlines that the 
Commission cannot decide for the disapplication of the whole agreement, but only for given subjects 
listed at Art. 82.3, which in sum, concerns the working time, including shifts, remuneration system 
productivity and tasks. The fact that these subjects are numerous and regard delicate aspects of the 
employment relationships, allowing for substantial modifications, does not ring any bell to the Court as 
to the possible violations of workers’ rights, that may arise from different points of view. What matters 
is that not all elements of the collective agreement can be deregulated: the quantity is saved, the quality 
is not an issue. Third, the Court emphasises that the Commission’s decision is subject to a temporal 
limit. Either the decision itself sets a limit of effectiveness for the disapplication, or, in any case, the 
arbitral decision ceases its effects at the moment a collective agreement applicable to the company 
comes into force. Forth, the Court highlights the “subsidiary character” of the Commission’s 
interventions. Indeed, the Court reconstructs the steps to be taken before Art. 82.3 becomes applicable. 
First, the parties (company and workers’ representatives) have to proceed with a consultation, which 
can lasts up to 5 days, with the aim to achieve an agreement on the disapplication. In case the parties do 
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not reach an agreement in these 5 days of consultation, either of the parties can trigger the second step, 
which consists in submitting the disagreement to a commission composed by workers and employers’ 
representatives that has 7 days to decide. If the Commission is not requested, or it does not come to a 
decision, the parties have to apply the procedures provided for by inter-professional collective 
agreements. Only if these procedures are not applicable or do not succeed in reaching a decision, either 
of the parties can request the Commission intervention. According to the Court, this procedure shows 
that “the contested provision gives priority to the collective autonomy to solve the conflict”, given that 
the Commission represents the means of last resort, if the parties do not reach an agreement in any of 
the possible ways. In addition, the Court identifies a further norm that demonstrates the will of the 
legislator to give priority to the collective autonomy: Art. 85.3, Worker’s Statute. This provision states 
that the collective agreement have to provide for procedures to solve the disagreements that may arise 
in case of disapplication ex. Art. 82.3.  Fifth, the Court includes, among the features that make the 
contested provision reasonable, the independency and impartiality of the Commission, demonstrated 
both by its composition (tripartite body) and by the procedures to come to a decision, which is taken 
“preferably by consensus”, but if not possible, by absolute majority532. As a last element, the Court 
points out that the ordinary courts can exercise judicial control over the arbitral decision (Judgment 
119/2014, para. 5, A, c). 
When discussing the Art. 14.3, Law 3/2012, that amended Art. 84.2 Workers’ Statute and gives 
priority to the application of company level collective agreements as regards a number of subjects, the 
Court provides some insights on the value of Art. 37.1 Constitution with respect to the possibility to 
decentralize collective bargaining, by means of legislative acts. We can observe that, apparently, Art. 
37.1 does not provide any indication as to the relationship between centralized and decentralized 
collective bargaining, nor it sets a priority between the two levels. Indeed, the Court rejects the claim of 
                                                            
532 This system should be a guarantee precisely because of the role of the public administration’s representatives, 
as understood by the Court. Indeed, on the one hand, the administration cannot take decisions unilaterally, on the 
other hand, “there is no reason to suppose that the public administration representatives’ vote would be in favour 
of the disapplication of the agreement”. And that’s because of a series of constitutional norms that the 
Administration has to comply with: “La Administración pública debe servir con objetividad los intereses generales 
(Art. 103.1 CE), que evidentemente no están sólo integrados por la defensa de la productividad y la libertad de 
empresa (Art. 38 CE), sino también por el respeto a los demás derechos, bienes y principios constitucionales, como 
el derecho a la negociación colectiva (Art. 37.1), el derecho al trabajo (rt. 35.1 CE), o la realización de una política 
orientada al pleno empleo (art. 40.1 CE).” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 5, A, c). 
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the Parliament of Navarra, who argues that Articles 37.1 and 28.1 Constitution impose upon the 
legislator the duty to regulate the collective bargaining system in a given way and would envisage a 
priority of centralized collective agreements. The Court states: “both a legislative policy that gives 
priority to collective agreements at sectorial level and a legislative policy that gives preference to the 
company level collective agreement are constitutionally legitimate”. Once again, the Court underlines 
that the right to collective bargaining ex. Art. 37.1 Constitution is a “right of legal configuration” and 
the legislator is entitled to restrict or extends the scope of intervention of the collective autonomy 
depending on the context. Indeed, the Court reminds that the legislator had already intervened in order 
to decentralize collective bargaining procedures, in favour of intermediate levels (autonomous regions 
and provinces) (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, a). 
A further argument in favour of the constitutional legitimacy of the amended Art. 84.2 Workers’ 
Statue, according to the Court, is the fact that “it does not hamper the negotiation of sector level 
collective agreements”, hence it does not restrict the trade union freedom to determine collective 
bargaining levels, the contested norm only intervenes on the relationships between these levels, which, 
according to the Court is perfectly legitimate under Art. 37.1 Constitution (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, 
b). Therefore, in other words, as long as the parties are free to negotiate, Art. 37.1 Constitution is not 
violated, even if, in practice, they negotiate in vain. 
The Court wants to draw attention to the fact that “the contested provision does not exclude 
completely the intervention of collective bargaining in the establishment of the negotiation structure”, 
since the inter-professional agreements can still regulate some aspects, as the rules to solve possible 
conflicts between collective agreements at different levels. In addition, Art. 84.2 Workers Statute do not 
oblige the social partners not to regulate certain subjects within the sector level collective agreements. 
Indeed, in those companies where a company level collective agreement does not exist the sector level 
agreement’s conditions will continue to apply (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, c).  
The Court then underlines that the company level agreement, concluded later then the higher-level 
agreement, has priority only in relation to some of the labour terms and conditions. These subjects are 
listed in an imperative way. Which corroborates the conclusion that collective bargaining at higher levels 
is not hampered by the contested norm (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, d). The Court argues that 
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recognising a priority to the company level agreement does not mean that the collective negotiation 
conducted by trade unions is undermined. Indeed, it is true that at company level the collective negotiate 
can be conducted by bodies which represent workers, but are not trade unions, as the company 
committees. However, the Court emphasises that Art. 37.1 Constitution does not legitimate only trade 
unions to conduct collective negotiation, but it refers, in general, to “workers’ representatives”, which 
could be also representatives elected at company level and not belonging to any trade union (Judgment 
119/2014, para. 6, e).  
To support this argument the Court refers to the ILO CFA Report, No. 371 of March 2014, Para. 
454, where it states that “the determination of the bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to the 
discretion of the parties”, which shall demonstrate how a reform as the one at issue is consistent with 
the ILO indications, given that it does not tackle the social partners’ autonomy in determining collective 
bargaining levels. However, this quotation disregards completely not only the context in which the 
sentence was placed533, but also the following paragraph, in which the “the Committee stresses the 
importance of ensuring that the essential rules governing the system of labour relations and collective 
bargaining are shared, to the maximum extent possible, by the most representative workers’ and 
employers’ organization. It, therefore, invites the Government to “promote a tripartite dialogue on Act 
No. 3/2012 in order to achieve this goal from the perspective of the principles established in the ILO 
Conventions on collective bargaining that Spain has ratified” (para. 455), which has not been done by 
the Spanish Government. This passage allows supposing a strategic use of the ILO Committee Report 
by the Court (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, b). 
In sum, nor Art. 37.1 Constitution, neither any other constitutional provision establishes a rigid 
constitutional collective bargaining system. First, Art. 37.1 Constitution entrusts “the law” with the duty 
to guarantee the right to collective bargaining and the binding force of the agreements, in other words: 
                                                            
533 The whole para. 454 states: “The Committee further notes that article 14, paragraph 2, of Act 3/2012 introduces 
new rules for private sector collective bargaining and the structure thereof, including by giving enterprise collective 
agreements priority of application over higher level collective agreements on certain matters, which, as the 
Government points out, were not covered by the previous legislation. The Committee also notes that the 
complainant unions and other complainant organizations have clearly expressed their opposition to this new 
legislation and recalls its position that the determination of the bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to 
the discretion of the parties.” (ILO CFA Report, No. 371 of March 2014, para. 454). 
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the right to collective bargaining is a “right of legal configuration”534. Second, as any other right, the 
right enshrined in Art. 37.1 Constitution is not absolute and can be subject to limitations. Third, the 
limits to this right are accepted if justified and, in the specific case of arbitration, a valuable justification, 
in light of the constitutional case law, is represented by the need to avoid that the conflict between parties 
may damage the general interest535. 
In conclusion, Art. 37.1 Constitution recognises the right to conduct collective bargaining and 
conclude collective agreements; it identifies the negotiating parties; it establishes the binding effect of 
the negotiation’s outcome. The Court also underlines that the legislator enjoys a wide margin of freedom 
to frame the right to collective bargaining and its implementation (Judgment 119/2014, para. 6, a).   
 
Conclusion 
Neither in Judgment 119/2014, nor in Judgment 8/2015, the Spanish Court goes beyond a – timid – 
supervision of the legislator’s choices. Indeed, it is highly respectful of the legislator’s prerogatives, to 
the point that it refuses to judge upon “appropriateness and convenience” of the legislative actions (see, 
for instance, Judgment 8/2015, para. 7, a), or their “opportunity or efficacy” (Judgment 119/2014, para. 
6, e). The emphasis on the discretionality of the legislator is even stronger when the Court comes to 
evaluate upon the possible violation of Art. 37 Constitution: not only the margin of discretion is 
extensive as to the implementation of the right to collective bargaining, but also when the whole 
industrial relations’ system is at stake. This respectful attitude is so extensive that, in various parts of 
the rulings, it is even questionable whether the Court conducts a supervision of the legislative provisions, 
or rather it constructs a series of arguments that shall justify its submissive attitude. Interestingly, in 
order to justify and support the limits of its competence, the Court only quotes and refers to its most 
recent case law: Judgments from 2012 and 2013, where the margin of intervention of the Court is framed 
as strongly constrained. 
This element seems to confirm the recent trend of the Spanish Court, suggested by the academic 
literature, which tends to renounce to develop a strict assessment of the legislative actions and end up 
                                                            
534 See, inter alia, Judgment 8/2015, para. 6, a, on Art. 14.2, Law 3/2012. 
535 The Court refers to Judgment 11/1981, 8 April, paras. 19 and 24. 
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constructing unclear and weak legal reasoning, without applying the proportionality test. One could 
wonder whether the wide margin of freedom recognised to the legislator is a reason (or a pretext) not to 
apply properly the proportionality test. 
Indeed, the hermeneutic criteria are not applied rigorously either. While in Judgment 119/2014 the 
legal reasoning is plainly informal and there is no reference at all to the proportionality test, understood 
as test of suitability, necessity of the norm and balancing in the strict sense, in Judgment 8/2015 the 
Court apparently adopts a different technique and it refers in numerous occasions to suitability and 
necessity, as well as to a certain “proportionality rule”. However, the mentioned criteria are not applied 
rigorously, nor systematically, suggesting that the reference made to them should have worked as a 
consolation for those scholars and practitioners, which, after the 2014 Judgment publication, had 
underlined the Court’s failure to apply the proportionality test. 
While, the proportionality test is, in practice, never applied, the reasonableness criterion appears in 
various occasions, even though there is no attempt to build a systematized legal reasoning on its grounds, 
nor it is clarified how it is applied. For instance, when the Court wants to assess the “reasonable margin 
of freedom recognised by Art. 35 Constitution” (Judgment 8/2015, para. 7, a), or as concerns an alleged 
scrutiny of the reasonableness of the norm and the norm’s justification. In this regard, the Court refers 
to the reasonableness and proportionality alternatively in relation to either the norm’s justification or the 
norm itself. 
The economic crisis argument is expressly used in assessing the constitutionality of the one year 
probationary period, applicable to the CAE and strictly linked to it (“in a crisis context as the present 
one” Judgment 119/2014, para. 3, A, e). However, the Court fails to investigate on the link between the 
context of crisis and the fact that for a whole year the worker is not protected against unfair dismissal. 
Moreover, the economic crisis argument is coupled with the main aim of the norm: boosting the business 
initiative. 
Different is the case for those norms that are scrutinized on the grounds of Art. 37 Constitution, 
where the economic crisis argument is not used so openly, the Court rather refers to elements such as 
the necessity to “facilitate the business sustainability and avoid recourse to dismissals” and “the internal 
flexibility of the companies as an alternative to job losses”. These provision, in sum, increases the 
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employer’s power to modify terms and conditions of employment and, therefore, they have a long term 
effect and impact on the labour law system in a permanent way. While the CAE and its one year 
probationary period will be no longer applicable once the unemployment rate will be below a given 
threshold (hypothetically, a sign that the economic crisis’ effect are over). 
The right to work (Art. 35.1 Constitution) and the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 
Constitution) are the two main fundamental labour rights at issue in the assessed Judgments. Overall, 
their content and protection hardly benefit from the legal reasoning addressed in this chapter and the 
Court main concern seems to be underlying that the fundamental rights at stake are “limited” and “not 
absolute”, although it recognises that the limitations must be justified and legitimate. The right to work, 
says the Court, can be applied to the probationary period as it includes the right to employment stability. 
Nevertheless, everything considered, the Court maintains that the right to access employment is 
hierarchically superior to the right to a stable employment, by applying the essential content principle 
in a way that excludes the right to a stable employment from the core of the right to work. In other 
words, it denies the inextricable link between having a job and having a decent job.  
From the commented judgments, we can derive that the right to collective bargaining does not belong 
exclusively to trade unions, but to workers’ representatives in general, hence including workers’ 
representatives at company level, which are, therefore, allowed to conduct plant level negotiations with 
any content. This element, coupled with the facts that the Spanish Constitution, according to the Court, 
does not provide for a rigid model of industrial relations and the law remains hierarchically superior to 
collective agreements makes the norms under assessment, including those supporting the 
decentralization of collective bargaining, legitimate. When the Court refers to and elaborate on Art. 37.1 
Constitution, it mentions only in a minor way the “essential content” of the fundamental right in the 
balance, by stating that it includes the right to conduct collective negotiations and conclude collective 
agreements. However, the absolute supremacy of the law over collective bargaining substantially 
undermines the effective value of this “essential content”. 
Overall, in practice, the Court does not balance the fundamental labour rights concerned with the 
economic crisis, but it admits a balancing between the right to work (Art. 35.1 Constitution) and the 
freedom to conduct a business (Art. 38 Constitution), which is interpreted as providing for a positive 
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duty of public authorities to defend productivity, as well as between the right to work and the public 
authority’s duty to conduct a policy aimed at full employment (Art. 40 Constitution). These latest term 
of the balancing is strongly dominant over the Art. 38 Constitution and, understood as protecting a 
general interest to full employment, it is the main element that legitimates the contested norms. 
Furthermore, Art. 40.1 Constitution is often linked with the defence of productivity, which becomes, in 
the Court’s discourse, as a sort of super-value. 
Also the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 Constitution) is balanced against Art. 40.1 
Constitution, Art. 38 Constitution, as well as against Art. 35.1 Constitution. Indeed, when it comes to 
assess the violation of the right to collective bargaining the right to work’s position is reversed, as it 
becomes one of the constitutional rights implemented by the contested norms. Overall, the Court’s 
argumentation in this respect demonstrates an understanding of one of the main collective labour rights 
as disconnected from the individual right to work. 
Last, it is noteworthy to emphasise the misuse of ILO sources. While in Judgment 8/2015 the 
international tools are not even mentioned by the Court, in Judgment 119/2014, there is an extensive, 
but questionable, use of ILO Convention No. 158 and the respective ILO Report as regards the norm on 
the one year probationary period, and just a quick and misleading quotation of an ILO Report on norms 
allegedly infringing upon the right to collective bargaining. Indeed, the sentence quoted by the Court, 
in order to support and justify the limitation imposed by the contested norm to the right to collective 
bargaining, has been completely extrapolated from its original context. If interpreted and applied 
properly, the ILO tool would have arguably upheld the Spanish legislative action. Furthermore, in both 
judgments a number of supranational instruments, such as the European Social Charter or ILO 
Conventions (e.g. ILO Convention No. 158, ILO Conventions No. 87 and 94) would have been perfectly 
applicable, but the Court completely disregards them.  
In conclusion, the missed application of the proportionality test together with the ambiguous use of 
ILO legal sources reinforce the argument that, in both Judgments, the Court has deliberatively developed 
strategic judicial reasoning. 
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Conclusions: an inclusive reappraisal of the Spanish and Italian judgments 
 
The analytical approach adopted for assessing the selected post-crisis judgments has been developed 
drawing on the Italian and Spanish academic literature on constitutional balancing. It has been designed 
in order to answer a number of questions that the labour law scholarship reviewed has not properly and 
comprehensively addressed yet, with a view of reconciling the constitutional and labour perspectives. 
Moreover, this structured analysis allows to evaluate the judgments in a systematic way, which 
facilitates a joint assessment of the Italian and Spanish cases. 
The evaluation is based upon the Social State theory and, therefore, upon the assumption that the 
Italian and Spanish Constitutions are social Constitutions that guarantee full enforcement of social 
rights. In particular, the focus of this work is on fundamental labour rights, which are understood as 
rights aimed at protecting workers and their dignity, either during their working life or after retirement.  
The four angles of analysis of the Italian and Spanish judgments are: the role of the Court; the 
technique used by the Courts; the rights, principles or interests subject to balancing; the fundamental 
labour rights at issue. Obviously, these profiles do not constitute tightly separated areas of analysis as 
they interlink and mesh in various occasions, but they simply provide a systematic guideline to conduct 
the analysis and organise the main findings. 
The focus on the role of the Court has shed light over the discussion on the political role of the 
Constitutional Court536. That Roberto Bin has recently felt the need to elaborate on the role of the Court, 
with regard to constitutional balancing, is telling of the lack of clarity over this crucial element537. 
Indeed, this aspect is of paramount importance, since the less the Court can be accused of overcoming 
the boundaries of its competence the more its authoritativeness is recognised and its conclusions 
accepted by the legislator and the civil society. The relationship the Court establishes with the legislator 
demonstrates to what extent it recognises its discretionality. In several cases, the Mediterranean Courts 
have explicitly underlined the discretionality of the legislator, as “discrezionalità” for the Italian Court 
(e.g. see the conclusions in Judgment 124/2017) and as “libertad” for the Spanish Court (one for all, see 
                                                            
536 One for all, Cheli, 2011, had raised this danger. 
537 Bin 2018; to the contrary, in favour of a balancing-Court is, inter alia, Miani Canevari 2015. 
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the first section of Judgment 8/2015). Nevertheless, the legislative competence is recognised also 
indirectly, as in some of the Italian judgments, where the Court establishes a dialogical relationship with 
the legislator by providing clear and direct indications as to the principles to be complied with by future 
reforms (in particular, see Judgment 70/2015 and the consequent Judgment 250/2017).  
Consistent is also the attempt to detect the intention of the legislator, which emerges, for the Italian 
case, already in Judgment 223/2012, as well as in Judgment 173/2016, Judgment 124/2017 and, more 
incisively, in Judgement 178/2015, while, among the Spanish rulings, it is decisive in Judgment 
119/2014, where it is used to uphold the constitutionality of Art. 4.3 Law 3/2012. To the contrary, in the 
Spanish Judgments, the legal reasoning on the industrial relations system and collective bargaining does 
not discuss the intention of the legislator, in line with the unconditional acceptance of the legislative 
prerogatives. 
The only relevant exception to the supervisor-role is observed in the Italian Judgment 178/2015, 
where the Italian Court with a ruling of supervening unconstitutionality has, in fact, actively balanced 
the conflicting elements: the right to conduct collective bargaining procedures and the general interest 
to a balanced public budget. However, even though the Italian scholarship has discussed this ruling very 
critically538, the decision of postponing the Judgment’s effect on the grounds of a careful evaluation of 
the public financial situation is nothing new to the Italian Court539.  
The assessment of whether the Court directly conducts the balancing or rather supervises the 
balancing carried out by the legislator can concretely contribute to understand whether a Constitutional 
Court borders into an area, which is beyond its competences. The political character of a constitutional 
judicial decision is avoided if the Court acts as a supervisor and not as a direct balancer. Indeed, 
addressing this profile first allows to assess the proper legal reasoning without bias, which may affect 
also the analysis of the arguments developed by the Court. One for all: if the Court does not apply the 
proportionality test, it runs the risk to trespass into the political role.  
The assessment of the technique used by the Court, and the respective criteria, has emphasised the 
peculiarities of each approach and has enabled to identify the most sensitive moments of each legal 
                                                            
538 For instance, severe is the criticism by Mocchegiani 2015. 
539 See Modugno 2007 and Zoppoli 2017 on the specific case. 
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reasoning. Moreover, while the Italian judgments are, at times, discontinuous, as far as concerns the 
structure of the argumentation, the Spanish judgments are consistent, in substantial terms. 
The technique traditionally applied by the Italian and Spanish Constitutional Courts to decide upon 
the constitutionality of ordinary norms is considerably different. In extremely synthetic terms, while the 
Spanish system has endorsed the German test of proportionality, even though the Spanish Constitution 
does not explicitly provides for such a method, the Italian Constitutional Court has developed the 
principle of reasonableness as main hermeneutic criterion and it has, quite consistently, applied it over 
the years. While the Italian case is, approximately, in line with its tradition, the Spanish judgments rather 
confirm a recent trend, which sees the same Court not applying rigorously the principle of 
proportionality. More precisely, in Judgment 119/2014 and in Judgment 8/2015 the test is not applied 
at all. 
The Italian Court extensively refers to the principle of reasonableness, as the main criterion to 
determine the legitimacy of the challenged norms and to assess the violation of fundamental rights. The 
principle of reasonableness is strictly linked with the fundamental labour rights at issue, to the point that 
the scrutiny over the violation of such rights would be impossible without applying the reasonableness 
criterion, that has the merit of moving the analysis beyond the mere “absence of arbitrariness” from the 
public powers. Consistently, inter alia, the Court expressly refers to it as the cornerstone of the pension 
system. 
Even though the principle of reasonableness, as applied in the selected cases, does include some steps 
which are common to the proportionality test, as the relationship means-aim, a systematic analogy with 
the principle of proportionality can hardly be observed540. To the contrary, proportionality seems to be 
used just as a synonymous to strengthen the concept of reasonableness, but it does not enjoy ontological 
autonomy541. 
Although there is coherence as to the criterion applied, in terms of logical flaw of the legal reasoning, 
a real consistency among the seven Italian judgments has not been observed. In this respect, the most 
remarkable cases of the Italian Court are those where the Court introduces and describes the 
                                                            
540 Cartabia, 2013, is one of the main authors that argue that the two principles are substantially very similar. 
541 Of a different view, Morelli 2015. 
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argumentative structure it is going to apply to decide over the constitutionality of the challenged norm, 
even if the theoretical structure and the actual reasoning are not always coherent and consistent (e.g. 
Judgment 70/2014 or the attempt in 173/2016). The absence of a structured test is accepted by 
authoritative scholars, inasmuch as the constitutional argumentation, which refers to binding legal 
norms, has a “dialectic way of arguing, not linked by deductive chains and certain procedural rules”542. 
From the Spanish perspective, if coherence is a value for the constitutional case law, Judgments 
119/2914 and 8/2015 should be praised. Indeed, not only the second ruling completely confirms the 
conclusions of the Judgment 119/2014, the two judgments are coherent also from the perspective of the 
legal technique applied: the Spanish Court does not apply the proportionality test in any of the cases. 
Both rulings are grounded upon a dialectic legal reasoning, which does not consider in a substantial 
manner the three criteria: suitability, necessity and balancing in a strict sense. Indeed, even if in 
Judgment 8/2015 the Court does mention these criteria, in practice, it fails to apply them. 
In the Spanish case, the Court has not even attempted to correct the – potential – “mistakes” that the 
legislator may have made in balancing the conflicting values and interests543, mainly because it has 
rejected ab origine that the legislator has made any mistake. As a consequence, a comprehensive 
analysis of the Spanish Court’s legal reasoning that draws on the constitutional literature on balancing 
can be hardly conducted, exactly because the Court keeps away from the traditional categories. 
The proportionality test shall envisage the assessment of the necessity of the norm, which precisely 
consists in evaluating if the norm represents the most appropriate option among the possible alternatives, 
as well as its suitability, that is its effective ability to achieve the aim pursued, and balancing in a strict 
sense. 
Regrettably, the Spanish Constitutional judgments discussed do not allow to comment on the 
appropriateness or effectiveness of the proportionality test, inasmuch as in these occasions the Iberian 
Court has not applied the test at all. Indeed, while in Judgment 119/2014 it has not even mentioned the 
said criteria, in the following Judgment it has just mentioned them. Without effectively conducting the 
proportionality test. 
                                                            
542 Mengoni 1996, 124. 
543 As it should have done according to, among others, Gonzalez 2003. 
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Therefore, this Spanish Court’s legal reasoning could be potentially equated to the Italian one, where 
a more dialectic legal reasoning is developed and, in principle, there is no reason to contest an approach 
as such, as long as it is supported by a logical structure and argumentative coherence, independently 
from the form of the legal reasoning. However, in practice, the Spanish Court not only does not apply a 
systematic technique, but it also fails to build a strong logical flow, independently from the extent of 
rigidity of the technique. That is even truer in Judgment 8/2015, where the Court hides behind a formal 
reference to the proportionality criteria, which confirms that if a dogmatic approach is not adopted the 
proportionality principle becomes an “empty category”544. 
One of the main elements of uncertainty in the Spanish Court legal argumentation derives from the 
fact that, while in some cases the Court asserts of being assessing reasonableness and/or proportionality 
of the norm’s justification, in others it refers to the reasonableness and/or proportionality of the norm 
itself (still referring to reasonableness and proportionality in an approximate fashion). While the Italian 
judges have clearly evaluated the norm’s justification, as one of the steps of the reasonableness scrutiny.  
Consistently, while as far as concerns the principle of reasonableness in the Italian judicial tradition 
the Italian case law addressed does provide useful insights to understand the content of this principle, 
the Spanish cases do not contribute in any way to frame the hermeneutic criterion – allegedly – applied 
in the Spanish system. 
Interestingly, the criterion of “essential content” is partially used by the Spanish Court, even though 
not with the intent to frame the core meaning of the fundamental labour rights concerned, but rather to 
establish the limits of this essential nucleus. However, where it is used, the concept of essential content 
of fundamental labour rights is understood as the sole boundary that the legislator cannot exceed, not as 
the latest one. Indeed, the Court does not seem to agree upon the existence of a peripheral zone of 
fundamental rights, which goes beyond the essential content. 
The Spanish Court has mostly applied the essential content by adopting (maybe unconsciously?) the 
following understanding of this criterion: “‘essential’ in the sense that it concerns the elements which 
are paramount to legally recognize the right at issue, both in its meaning and in its justiciability”545. 
                                                            
544 See, González Beilfuss 2015. 
545 Parejo Alfonso 1981. 
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However, given the uncontroversial  indeterminacy of the concept of essential content, in any case the 
Court should also properly design the legal reasoning, with strong and logical connections, whether via 
proportionality test or not, in the sense that (as already emphasised in Chapter 2) “the more a right is 
scarified, and therefore the more we get close to touch the essential content of it, the more justified the 
restricting provision must be”546. 
Beyond any doubt, a scheme for the legal reasoning, explicitly described by the Court, helps the 
reader (legislator, scholars or civil society) to understand the judgment, to what extent the various 
elements have been considered by the Court and, hence, to increase its persuasiveness, as well as – if 
necessary – to accept an inevitable limitation of fundamental labour rights. Among the judgments 
addressed in this thesis, some of the Italian cases have tried to provide such a systematization, while, 
however, never applying the proportionality test. On the other hand, the Spanish case law, where one 
would have expected such clarity to stem directly from the application of the proportionality principle, 
does not help in this sense, because the Court has not applied the test at all. As a consequence, this 
concluding reflections have to dispense with a “best practice”. 
Therefore, the question whether a Constitutional Court can conduct a proper suitability and necessity 
test without going beyond its competences remains unanswered, as well as the doubt whether a faithful 
application of the proportionality test would be too invasive of the legislative prerogatives. However, 
the Italian case provides some cause for reflection also as far as concerns the proportionality test 
feasibility, especially with regard to the evaluation of both suitability and necessity of the norm. 
Particularly, where the Court, first, demands for technical documents from the legislator (Judgment 
70/2015) and, second, acknowledges the existence of such documents in relation to following reforms 
(Judgment 250/2017). Indeed, the Court just states that these documents were provided and that they 
contained relevant data, but it does not go that far to assess them and discuss their internal consistency 
and reliability, which may be due to two reasons. First, the Court does not want to enter the legislative 
merit, which may concern choices of economic policy and/or interests to be enforced in a priority way. 
Second, the Court does not have enough technical means to conduct such an evaluation. In this second 
                                                            
546 Prieto Sanchis 2000. 
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case, it is questionable whether it would be appropriate to advocate for providing the Court with the 
technical expertise to carry out a strictly economic assessment. Indeed, the main problem would remain 
anyway: whatever technical document inevitably draws on political choices, which are not absolute and 
objective. This is especially true when we are dealing with issues of economic policy.  
The identification of the elements subject to the balancing exercise has been useful to understand 
what role is recognised to the economic crisis argument and to constitutional interests and principles of 
an economic nature, by the Constitutional Judges. In this respect, two main profiles have emerged. First, 
the opportunity of accepting a balancing between fundamental rights and interests or principles of an 
economic nature. Second, to what extent the arguments that have justified a limitation to the fundamental 
labour rights concerned are linked to the economic crisis and to what extent, instead, the economic crisis 
has just a marginal role, in a way that the Court’s argument may be – potentially – applicable also in 
positive economic phases.  
The Italian cases differ from the Spanish ones, among others, because of the terms that are balanced 
against the fundamental labour rights concerned. This is due to the fact that, while the Italian norms are 
mostly intended to contain public spending, the Spanish ones are adopted on the wave of the policy of 
flexibilisation of the labour market. Anyway, in both cases, the constraints imposed upon the 
fundamental labour rights at issue (which occur in most of the judgments) are justified on the grounds 
of constitutional norms that express public interests of an economic nature, and not proper fundamental 
rights. Before reviewing whether, overall, the Courts have truly admitted a balancing between these 
items, let us recollect the key relevant theoretical elements that have emerged in this thesis. 
As elaborated in Chapter 2, balancing can be conducted (and has to be conducted) only between 
principles which cannot be hierarchically ordered in absolute terms. These fundamental principles 
(expressed also as fundamental rights) cannot be hierarchically ordered in absolute terms because they 
express funding values of the legal system. Since no value can be considered completely overriding, in 
order to decide a case of conflict between principles that express values, those principles have to be 
discussed from a balancing perspective. In short, the theories reviewed lead to argue that only principles 
that express values have to be confronted on equal terms. Therefore, “constitutional balancing” is needed 
only if we recognise that fundamental rights and principles are expression of founding values, which 
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begs the question: does the principle of balanced budget (enshrined in Art. 81 Constitution), for the only 
facts of being called “principle” and being enshrined in a Constitutional Article, belong to this dynamic? 
And, therefore, can it really be balanced against rights and principles which are the normative expression 
of values?   
The problem raised by Luciani (balancing is possible only among equals)547, and contested by other 
authoritative scholars548, is solved precisely by referring to the main theoretical justification that 
underlies the balancing method and by looking at the very substance of constitutional rights and 
principles, that is if they are expression of founding values. Therefore, the “equal balancing” suggested 
by Luciani, should not be understood in absolute terms, which in fact would empty its meaning, but it 
should be understood from a value perspective: the terms are equal, and therefore can be balanced, if 
they are both expression of values (independently from whether they are named rights or principles). 
This approach, in the opinion of whom is writing, excludes the possibility to balance fundamental labour 
rights with the principle of balanced budget (as widely discussed in relation to the Italian case law), 
inasmuch as the latest is not the expression of a founding value, but rather it crystalizes a precise – and 
questionable – choice of political economy. In other words, if we accept that constitutional rights and 
principles are balanced against, we also have to accept the assumption behind such balancing: that rights 
and principles belong to this dynamic – only – as long as they are the normative expression of values. 
In this respect, it is remarkable the reflection provided in Judgment 124/2017, which is indirectly 
applicable also to Art. 81 Constitution. Here the Italian Court assesses the applicability of Art. 97 
Constitution, whose first paragraph has been amended in 2012 and now provides for the duty of the 
public administrations to ensure balanced budget and sustainability of the public debt. However, the 
Court does not consider at all such paragraph in its legal reasoning, rather it refers to the general principle 
of buon andamento (smooth running) of the public administration (in Art. 97 Constitution, since 1948), 
which is considered expression of a constitutional value. This passage is particularly interesting as it 
puts the use of the public budget argument, by the Constitutional Court, into perspective. Indeed, even 
before the forced constitutionalization of the principle of balanced budget, as understood by the EU legal 
                                                            
547 Luciani 1995. 
548 Most recently, Bin 2018. 
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system, the Court used to consider the public finance equilibrium (as generally expressed in the previous 
Art. 81 and Art. 97 Constitution), as it has always represented a guideline for the Court549, even without 
belonging to the balancing-game. In light of Judgment 124/2017, it is legitimate to argue that this 
function has not changed.  
Overall, the Court has been very cautious in the way in which it has included Art. 81 Italian 
Constitution in the legal reasoning550, for instance, in Judgment 124/2017 the Court never refers to Art. 
81 Italian Constitution, but it only mentions the need to consider the “resources concretely available”. 
Judgment 178/2015 seems one of the most delicate rulings as far as concerns the use of Art. 81 Italian 
Constitution. However, also in this case the Court is careful not to elevate the principle of balanced 
budget to a proper value. In the concluding phase of the Judgment, the Court states that a "coherent 
financial plan" expresses the "necessity to rationalise the allocation of resources and control of public 
expenditure (Art. 81.1 Italian Constitution)", thus clearly refusing to link Art. 81 to a constitutional 
value, while, in the same paragraph, it states that trade union freedom (Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution) is 
"inextricably connected to other constitutional values".  
Judgment 178/2015 deserves further attention since, in this case, the problem of the terms to be 
balanced strongly interlinks with the role of the Court. In fact, in order to take into serious account the 
public budget the Court opts for a type of ruling that has been highly criticised: the supervening 
unconstitutionality. However, apparently this is considered legitimate for the Court, as in 1993, Silvestri 
was already arguing that there is a duty of the Court to limit the retroactivity of the ruling’s effect in 
order to prevent a dysfunctional effect over the public budget, which stems from the “active” – not 
“political” – role of the Constitutional Court551. 
The Spanish case law assessed does not raise the same issues. Indeed, Law 3/2012 does not concern 
in any way the implementation of the principle of balanced budget (recently constitutionalised also in 
the Spanish legal system). As far as concerns the one year probationary period, the right to work is 
balanced against the freedom to conduct a business, which is beyond any doubt expression of a 
                                                            
549 Romboli 1993. 
550 As criticised by Anzon Demming 2015, in particular with regard to Judgment 70/2015, and, instead, praised 
by Cinelli 2015b. 
551 Silvestri 1993, 81. 
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constitutional value in the Spanish legal system (as in many other modern democracies) and the public 
administration’s duty to pursue a policy of full employment (Art. 40.1 Spanish Constitution). 
Nevertheless, the Court recognises a major weight to the letter term of the balancing. Indeed, in nearly 
all of the Spanish rulings addressed, Art. 40.1 Spanish Constitution has a key role in legitimizing the 
legislator’s choices, as fundamental labour rights have been balanced mostly against the general interest 
of full employment and the legislator’s duty to pursue it. To the point that in case of conflict between 
the public bodies’ duty and the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution), the right 
to work (Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution) is used to strengthen Art. 40.1 Constitution at the detriment of 
Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution552. With the effect that, not only the general interest to full employment 
is placed in a higher position compared to the right to collective bargaining, but the same hierarchical 
relationship is established between the right to work and the right to collective bargaining. With the 
effect that the individual dimension of labour is not recognised as inextricably linked to its collective 
dimension and collective bargaining is not recognised as a necessary complement of the right to work, 
i.e. as a way to guarantee the right to a decent work. 
While the “equal” value of the right to work and the right to collective bargaining, in constitutional 
terms, cannot be questioned (even though the fact that they are understood as conflicting elements is 
anything but uncontroversial), the public bodies’ duty to pursue a policy aimed at full employment raises 
a major issue mainly as to the way in which a Constitutional Court can approach an aim as such in its 
scrutiny. 
Indeed, the Court often stresses on the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the legislator with Law 
3/2012, which includes, inter alia, the intent to provide a remedy to the serious unemployment situation. 
However, even leaving aside the core misunderstanding, that is that labour law does not serve the 
purpose to create employment553, we should ask whether the Court, in assessing the legitimacy of the 
norm in light of its aim, should demand for a demonstration of the causal link between, for instance, the 
one year long probationary period and the improvement in the employment levels. It would be legitimate 
for the Court to question such a nexus, as it is challenged worldwide at various levels. One for all, the 
                                                            
552 The use of Art. 40.1 Spanish Constitution is a novelty for this Court, see Suarez Corujo 2015. 
553 In line with, inter alia, Diaz Aznarte 2015. 
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ILO Committee, reporting precisely on the probationary period introduced by the CAE, has reminded 
that “no direct link between the facilitation of dismissals and job creation has been demonstrated”554. 
This would mean assessing the suitability of the norm to achieve the aim pursued, which does not seem 
to be in the Spanish Court’s intentions and, on the other hand, if the Court would openly question such 
a causal link, as done by the ILO Committee, it would plainly enter the merit of political choices. 
Nonetheless, the aim perpetrated by the challenged provisions, as implementation of Art. 40.1 Spanish 
Constitution is widely emphasised by the Court and seems to constitute the key argument upholding the 
legitimacy of most of the norms. In order to escape such a superficial, but decisive, use of the aim of the 
norm, we should wonder, once again, whether the Constitutional Court should simply focus on the 
effective infringement of the fundamental labour rights at issue. Otherwise, as for the Spanish case, a 
legal reasoning mostly based upon the aim of the norm may raise serious doubts over a strategic use of 
the judicial reasoning555. 
The use of the economic crisis argument by both Courts has also attracted the scholars’ attention556. 
The study conducted in this thesis has revealed that, in both the Italian and Spanish case law, the 
economic crisis argument is widely present and extensively referred to by the Courts, mostly inasmuch 
as it is expressly mentioned in the legislative texts, which often provide justifications linked to the 
economic crisis, in various shades. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that none of the Courts has openly admitted a balancing between 
the fundamental labour rights concerned and the economic crisis. A remarkable aspect, that can be 
observed in some Italian and Spanish rulings, is the relevance of the temporal scope in relation to the 
economic crisis argument. The transitory and exceptional character of the challenged measure is crucial 
in the Court’s argumentation557, but only if, among the reasons that justify the contested measure, the 
economic crisis retains an important role (one for all, Judgment 178/2015 and Judgment 119/2014 and 
                                                            
554 Report of the Director-General, Fourth supplementary report: Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Spain of the Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 
158), submitted under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ 
Committees (CC.OO.) and the General Union of Workers (UGT). ILO Governing Body, 321st Session, Geneva, 
13 June 2014). 
555 On this line also Wilfredo Sanguineti 2015, which raises the misuse of the proportionality principle, albeit 
solely as far as concerns Judgment 8/2015. 
556 For all, Fontana 2015; Baylos Grau 2015. 
557 As noticed, among others, by Tega 2014b. 
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8/2015 as far as concerns Art. 4.3, Law 3/2012). In other words, if the norm is justified mainly on the 
grounds of the peculiar phase characterized by the economic crisis, its legitimacy is assessed in light of 
its temporal effects, which suggests that both Courts are inclined to admit a sacrifice of fundamental 
labour rights in exceptional economic phases. However, while in the Italian Judgment this criterion is 
self-standing, in the Spanish case, as far as concerns the probationary period, it is coupled with a 
quantitative data: the unemployment level. 
Even though, from a fundamental labour right perspective a reasoning as such may be considered 
very dangerous as, in fact, it admits a violation of the fundamental right at stake558, a comprehensive 
reading of the post-crisis cases selected for the purpose of this thesis suggests that, considering the 
extensive use of this argument made by the legislator ab origine, it may be desirable a proper 
consideration of this profile by the Court, in order to come to non-generalizable conclusions and develop 
a legal reasoning that cannot be easily reiterated as regards norms approved without the economic crisis-
justification.  
Far from arguing that Constitutional Judges have a duty not to consider the national economic 
context, whether it concerns public budget factors, an economic crisis or the employment rate559, this 
thesis has used certain judgments to reflect on the role of the Court as, primarily, warrantor of 
fundamental – labour – rights560. In order to exercise this role properly, the Court should give priority to 
the evaluation of the violation of fundamental rights and, on the other hand, be very cautious in entering 
the merit of the normative means chosen by the legislator. Moreover, where a limitation is found justified 
by a peculiar economic context, this aspect should be elaborated in depth as to circumscribe the violation 
tightly. In this regard, a consistent application and elaboration of the concept of the “essential content” 
and “peripheral content” of fundamental labour rights, howsoever called, could support the Court. 
Subsequently, following the Court’s indications, the legislator should be able to guarantee the 
enforcement of such rights, in light of the available public resources or the industrial national context, 
by designing normative tools that do not violate fundamental rights.    
                                                            
558 See, Loi 2016, on Judgment 178/2015. 
559 In line with D’Onghia 2013 and consistently with the Italian judicial tradition of the Constitutional Court, see 
Romboli 1993. 
560 The Constitutional Court role, according also to Wilfredo Sanguineti 2015. 
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The last profile addressed in the thesis is, precisely, the fundamental labour rights concerned by the 
selected Judgments. This step recapitulates on the status of the said rights at the latest interpretative 
(national) stage.  None of the Courts conduct what the literature has named a “definitional balancing”, 
however, the legal reasoning provide some indications that contribute to define the fundamental labour 
rights at issue. 
From a methodological point of view, we can observe that the Spanish Court has extensively focused 
on the definition of the rights at stake in the first part of its legal reasoning, apparently more with the 
aim to identify their boundaries, than to define their content. While, the Italian Court has concentrated 
more precisely on the single cases, thus strictly linking, in its argumentation, the considerations over the 
right at issue at the contested norm, hence, it has focused only on precise aspects of the said rights that 
may have direct connection with the challenged provisions. 
The fundamental labour rights addressed in the Italian post-crisis constitutional case law are: the 
right to a fair remuneration (Art. 36.1 Italian Constitution), as expressed also by the principle of 
independence of the judiciary (Art. 104 Italian Constitution); the right to an adequate pension (Art. 38.2 
Italian Constitution); the right to collective bargaining (Art. 39.1 Italian Constitution). Moreover, Art. 
3.2 Italian Constitution retains a peculiar position, it surely intersects the analysis of all of these rights, 
as it constitutes the legal basis for the reasonableness criterion, but, especially, it has a pivotal value as 
regards Art. 36.1 and Art. 38.2 Italian Constitution, given that these two rights are identified by the 
Court as the proper concretization of Art. 3.2 and the respective principle of substantial equality.  
In the Spanish case law, the fundamental labour rights concerned are the right to work (Art. 35.1 
Spanish Constitution) and the right to collective bargaining (Art. 37.1 Spanish Constitution). 
The assessment of the Italian case law allows to identify two characters that a fundamental labour 
right’s limitation must have in order to be legitimate: it must be temporary (also called exceptional or 
transitory) and it must be generalized, in the sense that it cannot concern a single category of workers 
and/or pensioners (e.g. Judgment 223/2012, Judgment 310/2013 and Judgment 175/2018).  
The Spanish Court rather focuses on the justification of the challenged norm. Indeed, it reiterates 
that, given that rights are not absolute, their limitation is accepted only if the provision at issue has a 
legitimate justification. To the contrary, it refers to the temporal element only as far as concerns the 
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scrutiny of the CAE’s probationary period, which is the only challenged norm with a transitory 
character. While as far as concerns the right to collective bargaining and, hence, the provisions that 
amend the collective bargaining system (in a permanent way), it does not consider the exceptional 
feature of the norm necessary to uphold a limitation of such right. 
From a joint perspective, the most significant fundamental labour right is certainly the right to 
collective bargaining. Both Courts provide insights on the status of the fundamental right to engage in 
and conduct collective bargaining procedures, in recent times. The Italian case is interesting especially 
as regards the content of the right to collective bargaining, in terms of effective exercise of the right to 
conduct collective barging procedures and legitimacy of limitations imposed by legislative acts. While, 
the Spanish judgments contribute to a reflection on the subjective scope, that is the bodies legitimated 
to conduct the negotiation and the respective bargaining levels, as well as the role of public authorities 
in interfering in the content of collective negotiations. 
As to the right to collective bargaining, the different application of supranational sources and the 
practical consequences on the definition of the right at stake are remarkable. On the one hand, the Italian 
Court, in Judgment 178/2015, has widely used the supranational sources to define the constitutional 
right to collective bargaining and strengthen its effectiveness in front of the economic arguments. On 
the other hand, the Spanish Court has made a fragmented and strategic use of some ILO tools only, in 
order not to elaborate on the fundamental labour right concerned, but rather to validate its limitations 
(the same misuse of international sources by the Spanish Court could be raised as regards the legal 
reasoning on Art. 4.1, Law 3/2012).  
Interestingly, both the Spanish Court and the Italian Court have applied the essential content 
criterion, which, in the first case, constitutes a hermeneutic criterion expressly recognised by the Spanish 
Constitution, while the Italian Court is slowly integrating this interpretative principle in the legal 
reasoning. The Spanish Court, as far as concerns the right to collective bargaining, seems to adopt the 
relative theory of the essential content, as it includes in this nucleus the freedom to conduct collective 
negotiations and the freedom to conclude a collective agreement, but it also points out that this freedom 
“is not absolute, but, for justified reasons, can be limited by the law” (Judgment 119/2914). On the other 
hand, while it states that the right to collective bargaining is part of the essential content of the trade 
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union freedom (Art. 28.1 Spanish Constitution, discussed only in relation to the overall assessment of 
the industrial relations system), it argues that trade unions do not retain an exclusivity in exercising this 
collective right. Moreover, and most surprisingly, the right to work includes the right to a stable 
employment, but the latter is not part of the essential content and therefore it is hierarchically sub-
ordered (Art. 35.1 Spanish Constitution)561. 
 It is worthwhile to emphasise that the Italian Judge defines the essential content of Art. 38.2 Italian 
Constitution, as read in conjunction with Art. 36.1 Italian Constitution, as, first, the conservation of the 
purchasing power of an acquired right (Judgment 70/2015) and, second, the minimum state benefit 
(Judgment 173/2016), but, at latest, it confirms that the essential content of the right to an adequate 
pension corresponds to the preservation of the purchasing power of retirement benefits (Judgment 
250/2017). Therefore, the Italian Court has defined the essential content of the right to an adequate 
pension in an extensive way, as it has put emphasis on the real value of retirement benefits, instead of 
on the nominal value.  
This latest example leads us to some final thoughts, as it demonstrates that, even when the legislator 
stresses on the economic crisis justification, the Constitutional Court may well grasp the opportunity to 
enforce fundamental labour rights and interpret their content expansively. 
Even though these findings cannot be generalized, given that they derive from a strongly 
circumscribed analysis, they provide food for thought on the general relationship between fundamental 
labour rights and Constitutional Courts. Indeed, these concluding reflections can be transposed beyond 
the judgments investigated in this thesis, as they raise a number of issues on the enforcement of 
fundamental labour rights by Constitutional Courts. Even though it is uncontroversial that the direct use 
of the economic crisis argument, albeit diversified, as well as its indirect use through Art. 81 Italian 
Constitution (for the Italian case), has legitimized a restriction of the scope of the fundamental labour 
rights concerned, the economic crisis context (and argument), that has characterized the challenged 
norms and the respective rulings, should not disorient the reader and suggest that these judgments are 
atypical as they belong to a peculiar economic phase, inasmuch as, in the current economic system, such 
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crises are cyclical (not to say permanent) and, on the other hand, the rhetoric which supports a causal 
link between the loosening of workers’ rights and the increase in employment levels is not intended to 
fade anytime soon. 
A remarkable aspect that has emerged from this work concerns the value of a Constitutional Court 
that acts as the warrantor of fundamental labour rights, in respect of legislative incursions. Some of the 
judgments assessed suggest that this function can be exercised by establishing a constructive relationship 
with the legislator, where the Court indicates the insurmountable limits of fundamental labour rights, 
but leaves the responsibility to decide how to allocate the available resources and design the legal 
framework to the legislator.  
In theory, whether the Court fulfils the role of warrantor and guidance with a proportionality test or 
other criteria is irrelevant. Indeed, it is not the principle per se, as a self-standing identity, but rather the 
use made of it by the Court that makes the difference and allows the legislator to understand the limits 
of its action and the civil society to comprehend the reasons that may justify a limitation of the scope of 
fundamental labour rights. However, in practice, in accurately assessing – especially – suitability and 
necessity of the norm, the Court risks not only to exceed the limits of its competence, but, also, to distract 
the attention from what should be its main focus: the protection of fundamental rights. This 
understanding reconciles a respectful attitude towards the legislator’s competences with an ample 
protection of fundamental rights. 
Presumably, a more punctual elaboration by the Constitutional Court(s) of the concept of essential 
content of fundamental labour rights, also in its relationship with the respective peripheral content, 
would substantially contribute to an effective enforcement of fundamental labour rights. An attentive 
use of this criterion may provide clear guidance to the legislator in the identification of the tolerance 
limit of each right, in order to, on the one hand, allocate the resources consistently with the constitutional 
provisions and, on the other hand, conduct, where necessary and appropriate, a correct balancing 
between fundamental rights and/or principles. 
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Annex 
About Judgment 194/2018 
During the concluding phase of this thesis, the Italian Constitutional Court has released an important 
Judgment concerning one of the crucial norms of the so-called Jobs Act: Judgment 194/2018. This 
Annex wants to introduce the recent Judgment and concisely highlight the most relevant profiles. 
In Judgment 194/2018, the Italian Court has declared the unconstitutionality of Art. 3.1 of D.Lgs. 
23/2015, for the part that establishes the method of calculation of the indemnity for unjustified dismissal. 
The provision at stake has been adopted at a late stage of the post-crisis phase, however it still 
implements the policies of flexibilisation of the labour market strongly supported by EU institutions, in 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis (as expressly emphasised also in the judicial phase). Moreover, even 
though the ruling is restricted to a precise norm, it may have a considerable impact on the overall D.Lgs. 
23/2015, as well as on reforms adopted at a later stage, which perpetrate the same illegitimacy. 
The contested norm has been declared unconstitutional on the grounds of Art. 3 Constitution (right to 
equal treatment), Art. 4.1 Constitution (right to work), Art. 35.1 Constitution (protection of work), as 
well as Art. 76 Constitution (on urgent legislative procedures) and Art. 117.1 Constitution (on the 
legislator’s duty to comply with European and international obligations) in relation to Art. 24 Revised 
European Social Charter (on the right to protection in cases of termination of employment). 
In particular, the mechanism of calculation set by Art. 3.1, D.Lgs. 23/2015, is found illegitimate, 
inasmuch as it gives rise to an indemnity, which results “rigid”, as it can be graded only in relation to 
the seniority criterion, and “uniform” for workers with the same length of service and it does not allow 
considerations over the illegitimacy of the dismissal. An indemnity as such becomes “a fixed and 
standardized legal liquidation” (para. 10). 
The Court, also in this case, reiterates the legislator’s discretionality as far as concerns the legal institute 
at issue: the remedies for unfair dismissal. Drawing on the constitutional case law, it emphasises that, 
even though the protection against unfair dismissal has to guarantee a certain restraint of the employer’s 
freedom to terminate the contract, “the Court has expressly denied that the balancing of the values 
expressed by Art. 4 and Art. 41 Constitution, ground on which the legislator has to exercise its 
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discretionality, imposes a precise protection regime” (para. 9.2). However, it further recalls the main 
aims of the legal institute at issue, that is the compensative function (in favour of the worker) and the 
dissuasive function (directed to employers). The legal reasoning is structured to supervise the balancing 
conducted by the legislator between the right to work and the freedom to conduct a business (Art. 41 
Constitution) and concludes that, with the measure at stake, it has failed “to realize a well-balanced 
compromise between the interests at stake” (para. 12.3).  
The principle of reasonableness is expressly used to measure the extent of sacrifice caused to the 
workers’ interest, by the contested norm. As far as concerns the alleged violation of Art. 3 Constitution 
(right to equal treatment), first, the Court underlines that the applicants have challenged the temporal 
scope of the norm, which starts from the date of recruitment of the worker and from the entry into force 
of the Legislative Decree. Second, it points out that the referring court has argued that the date of 
recruitment is an “incidental and extrinsic element”, which cannot justify a different treatment. 
Nevertheless, after having recalled that the “flow of the time” may constitute a valid ground of 
differentiation, the Court concludes that the reasonableness criterion, in light of the principle of equality, 
is not violated by the contested norm, because of its aim: “to strengthen the job opportunities for those 
who are seeking employment”. According to the Court, the different treatment, based on a temporal 
criterion and directed only to those employed after the entry into force of the contested Act is consistent 
with the aim of the norm, inasmuch as this measure may favour only those who are seeking employment. 
Interestingly, while the Court stresses on the non-unreasonableness of the temporal scope, it specifies 
that “it is not up to this Court to evaluate the results that the employment policy pursued by the legislator 
may have achieved”. In other words, it explicitly refuses to assess the suitability of the norm in relation 
to the aim pursued (para. 6). 
Nevertheless, eventually, the Court declares the infringement of the principle of equality, on different 
grounds. Indeed, it declares Art. 3 Constitution violated because of the homogeneous treatment to which 
workers with the same seniority are treated, independently from the qualitative aspects that have 
characterised the employment relationship. Indeed, it rejects that the contested norm only provides for 
a quantitative criterion (para. 11). 
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At a later stage, the Court newly applies the principle of reasonableness referring to Articles 4 and 35 
Constitution, but also to Art.1.1 Constitution, “in light of the particular value that the Constitution 
recognises to work” (para. 13). 
Articles 4.1 and 35.1 Constitution, which protect work in any form and constitute the basic guarantee 
for the enjoyment of any right at work, are deemed infringed upon by the contested provision, inasmuch 
as an economic protection that does not constitute neither an effective damage compensation, nor an 
appropriate dissuasive measure “cannot be considered respectful” of the constitutional norms that 
protect the same interest, as it fails the worker’s interest to employment stability (para 13). 
Last, it is remarkable that the Court has recognised a decisive role to the supranational parameter. 
Indeed, Art. 3.1, D.Lgs. 23/2015, is found in violation of Articles 76 and 107.1 Constitution because of 
Art. 24 European Social Charter, which provides for the member states’ duty to guarantee the right to 
an effective compensation in case of unfair dismissal (as interpreted by the Committee) and, says the 
Court, is inspired by ILO Convention No. 158 (Termination of Employment Convention) (para. 14). 
The latter could not be applied directly in the Italian legal system, inasmuch as it has not been signed by 
Italy. 
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